NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LEROY COLLINS, No. 19-15272
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01696-JCM-
CWH
v.
DWIGHT NEVEN, Warden; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 14, 2020**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Leroy Collins appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
470 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Collins’s
excessive force claim because Collins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether Hendricks violated his Eighth Amendment rights when
Hendricks was driving a maintenance cart that hit Collins. See Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (the “core judicial inquiry” in resolving an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is “whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Collins’s medical
deliberate indifference claim because Collins failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendants Cox, Aranas, and Neven violated his Eighth
Amendment rights when they were not personally involved in Collins’s medical
care. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable
under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation omitted));
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official is
deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to inmate health); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The inquiry
2 19-15272
into causation [under § 1983] must be individualized and focus on the duties and
responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to
have caused a constitutional deprivation.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Collins’s motion
for reconsideration because Collins presented no basis for reconsideration. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th
Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and bases for reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Collins’s motion
for default judgment against defendant Hendricks where Hendricks had already
answered the complaint. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.
1986) (setting forth standard of review and factors for determining whether to enter
default judgment).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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