IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
ROBERT BORDY, 1 §
§ No. 499, 2019
Petitioner Below, §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below–Family Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
RAEGAN RADIA, § File No. CK15-02343
§ Pet. Nos. 18-30076
Respondent Below, § 18-34451
Appellee. §
Submitted: May 22, 2020
Decided: July 29, 2020
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
Upon careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, it
appears to the Court that:
(1) Robert Bordy (“the Father”) appeals the Family Court’s October 31,
2019 order awarding primary placement of the parties’ two minor children to their
mother, Raegan Radia (“the Mother”).2 We find no merit to the appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the Family Court’s judgment.
(2) The parties, who never married, share legal custody of their two
daughters, born in 2014 and 2016, respectively (“the Children”). Under a December
1
The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2
The Family Court’s order also dismissed the Mother’s petition for rule to show cause. That
decision is not at issue in this appeal.
2017 custody order, placement of the Children alternated between the Father, who
lives in New York, and the Mother, who lives in Delaware, on a week-to-week basis.
In October 2018, the Father filed a petition to modify the custody order, seeking
final decision-making authority and primary placement of the Children. The Father
alleged that continuing enforcement of the 2017 custody order would endanger the
children’s physical health and impair their emotional development because the
Mother was unable to care adequately for the children and failed to attend to their
medical needs. The Mother filed a counterclaim seeking primary placement of the
children.
(3) The Family Court held a hearing over the course of four days on June
7, 2019, July 9, 2019, July 11, 2019, and July 12, 2019. The Family Court heard
testimony from three mental health professionals, the Children’s caregivers, the
Mother’s five older children, as well as the Mother and the Father. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Family Court issued an eighty-seven-page written order, awarding
primary placement of the Children to the Mother. Although the Family Court
explicitly rejected the grounds for modification alleged by the Father, it nevertheless
concluded that modification of the 2017 custody order was warranted because (i) the
parties agreed that—because their Children were no longer toddlers and their older
daughter would soon enter kindergarten—continued enforcement of the shared
placement provision of the custody order was no longer desirable and (ii) all three
2
mental health professionals who testified agreed that continuing with the shared
placement arrangement would be disruptive to the Children’s mental well-being
going forward.3 This appeal followed.
(4) On appeal, the Father argues: (i) the Family Court failed to consider the
Mother’s ex-husband’s domestic violence history and the Father’s mental health
expert’s “uncontroverted” testimony that the Mother is emotionally detached from
her children when it balanced the best-interests factors under 13 Del. C. § 722; (ii)
the Family Court’s factual findings are not supported by the record; and (iii) the
Family Court’s decision was not the product of an orderly and logical deductive
process and, in fact, constituted discrimination against the Father—a single parent—
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
(5) Our review of an appeal from a custody decision extends to both the
facts and the law, as well as to the inferences and deductions made by the Family
Court after considering the weight and credibility of the testimony. 4 To the extent
that the Family Court’s decision implicates rulings of law, our review is de novo.5
Findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are found to be clearly erroneous
3
Because the petition to modify was filed within two years of the court’s last custody order, the
Family Court could not modify its prior order unless it found that continuing enforcement of the
prior order may endanger the Children’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional
development. 13 Del. C. § 729(c)(1).
4
Devon v. Mundy, 906 A.2d 750, 752 (Del. 2006).
5
Id.
3
and justice requires that they be overturned.6 The judgment below will be affirmed
“when the inferences and deductions upon which [the decision] is based are
supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive
process.”7
(6) After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on
appeal, we find it evident that the judgment of the Family Court should be affirmed
on the basis of and for the reasons assigned in the Family Court’s thoughtful and
well-reasoned October 31, 2019 order. After determining that modification of the
custody order was warranted under 13 Del. C. § 729(c)(1), the Family Court weighed
all of the relevant evidence bearing on the best-interests factors under 13 Del. C. §
722, as it was required to do. Contrary to the Father’s contentions, a thorough review
of the record and a fair reading of the Family Court’s opinion shows that the Family
Court considered all of the relevant evidence in this case, including the testimony of
the Father’s psychological expert regarding the Mother’s ability to care for the
Children and the evidence of the protection from abuse consent order entered against
the Mother’s ex-husband in 2012.8 Finding that all but one of the factors was neutral
and that the remaining factor—the parties’ past and present compliance with their
parental rights and responsibilities—weighed against both parties due to their
6
Id.
7
Id. at 752-53.
8
The Family Court ordered that the Children have no unsupervised contact with the Mother’s ex-
husband, with whom the Mother co-parents four of her older children.
4
inability to communicate, the Family Court properly considered other relevant
evidence,9 including the Mother’s successful history of co-parenting her other five
children, the Children’s bond with their half-siblings, and the parties’ respective
ability or willingness to relocate to be near the Children. The Family Court’s
conclusion was the product of a logical deductive process and did infringe upon the
Father’s constitutional rights. It is clear that the trial judge considered all of the
evidence under the appropriate legal standards and that its findings of fact are
supported by the record. The Family Court did not err or abuse its discretion in
determining that joint legal custody, with the Mother having primary placement of
the Children, was in the Children’s best interest. We recognize that these facts
required that the Family Court make a tough call because it was not presented with
an easy or obviously correct outcome. Our duty on appeal is to defer to a difficult
decision made by the trial court when it is supported by the record and the law, as it
is here.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ James T. Vaughn, Jr.
Justice
9
13 Del. C. § 722 (“The [Family] Court shall determine the legal custody and residential
arrangements for a child in accordance with the best interests of the child. In determining the best
interests of the child, the Court shall consider all relevant factors including [those enumerated
herein.]” (emphasis added)).
5