IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0800
Filed August 5, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF H.K.,
Minor Child,
E.H., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Adam D.
Sauer, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Danielle M. Ellingson of Eggert, Erb, & Ellingson, P.L.C., Charles City, for
appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Jane M. Wright, Forest City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Gamble, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2020).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, H.K.
She challenges the statutory grounds authorizing termination and claims the State
failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. We affirm.
I. Scope and Standard of Review
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40
(Iowa 2010). We generally use a three-step process to review the termination of
a parent’s rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). That process
includes determining: (1) whether the State established statutory grounds
authorizing termination, (2) if termination is in the child’s best interest, and (3)
whether to apply a permissive exception to preclude termination. See id. at 472–
73. “However, if a parent does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not
address it.” In re J.P., No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2020).
II. Discussion
The juvenile court found grounds for termination under Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2020). The mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding
under paragraph (h) but makes no challenge to paragraph (e). Because the
mother does not challenge the statutory grounds under paragraph (e), we find the
statutory grounds authorizing termination satisfied under section 232.116(1)(e).
See J.P., 2020 WL 110425, at *1; In re N.S., No. 14-1375, 2014 WL 5253291, at
*3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014). Further, with respect to the statutory ground the
mother did challenge, it is clear the child cannot be returned to the custody of the
mother under section 232.102 at the present time as required under section
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232.116(1)(h)(4) due to the mother’s chronic and unremitting methamphetamine
addiction.
However, the mother claims the Iowa Department of Human Services
(DHS) failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. “[T]he reasonable
efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive requirement of
termination.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “Instead, the scope of
the efforts by the DHS to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the burden
of proving those elements of termination which require reunification efforts.” Id.
“The State must show reasonable efforts as part of its ultimate proof the child
cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” Id.; accord Iowa Code
§ 232.102(7).
A parent must alert the court of the alleged deficiencies prior to the
termination hearing. See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002) (“If,
however, a parent is not satisfied with DHS’[s] response to a request for other
services, the parent must come to the court and present this challenge.”); In re
O.T., No. 18-0837, 2018 WL 3302167, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 5, 2018) (“The
failure to request different or additional . . . services in the juvenile court precludes
[the parent’s] challenge to the services on appeal.”); In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85,
91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (stating the parent has an obligation to demand other,
different, or additional services prior to the termination hearing or the issue is
considered waived for appeal). The mother claims DHS (1) did not stay in close
enough contact with her to monitor her progress, (2) failed to provide the call-in
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number for drug testing,1 and (3) provided inconsistent support because multiple
social workers were assigned to the family over the life of the case. Yet, our review
of the record reveals no motion from the mother requesting additional or different
services prior to the termination hearing.2 Therefore, we find the mother waived
any challenge to reasonable efforts.
Because the mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s best-interest
determination or request we apply a section 232.116(3) permissive factor to
preclude termination, we do not address the remaining two steps in our process
and end our analysis here.
III. Conclusion
We find the juvenile court correctly terminated the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
1 A DHS worker testified she provided the mother with the call-in number for drug
testing.
2 We note early in this case the State filed a motion for additional services to
change the family safety, risk, and permanency worker assigned to the case.