J-S28013-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: S.R.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.A.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 333 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 21, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 31-44-2018,
CP-31-DP-0000046-2017, CP-31-DP-0000050-2015
IN RE: A.L.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.A.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 334 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 21, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 31-45-2018,
CP-31-DP-0000046-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2020
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M.A.H. (“Mother”) appeals separate January 21, 2020 decrees that
involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her minor daughter, S.R.H.,
and son, A.L.H., respectively.1 We affirm.2
S.R.H. was born in September 2011. Huntingdon County Children and
Youth Services (“CYS”) initially became involved with Mother and S.R.H. in
August 2015 due to lack of supervision, hygiene, and home conditions. N.T.,
6/24/19, at 24; N.T., 4/3/19, at 2-3, 10. It was reported that then-four-year-
old S.R.H. was wandering the neighborhood unsupervised and climbing on the
roof of the residence. In addition, there was a drug overdose in the home.
N.T., 4/3/19, at 2-3. As described during the termination proceeding, “We
had Agency reports of [S.R.H.] found on the roof of the home . . . , running
through the [development] with no supervision, and also there was [sic]
concerns of a friend who overdosed in the home of [Mother] during that time.”
Id. S.R.H. was adjudicated dependent on September 17, 2015. N.T., 4/3/19,
at 36. While the court did not remove S.R.H. from Mother, the court ordered
Mother to not be alone with S.R.H., and to have another party present. Id.
____________________________________________
1 This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte.
2 By separate decrees entered October 4, 2019, the orphans’ court terminated
the parental rights of both S.R.H.’s father, M.D., and A.L.H.’s father, K.K.
Neither father appealed the decrees or participated in the instant appeal.
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at 3. S.R.H. was then placed on September 9, 2016,3 and, since placement,
has remained in the same foster home. N.T., 6/24/19, at 6, 19, 24.
A.L.H., born in September 2017, was placed in CYS custody from the
hospital shortly after his birth. N.T., 6/24/19, at 6, 70-71. The agency
determined that Mother was “unable to ‘meet [his] basic needs[.]’” Exhibit 2
(Dr. O’Hara’s, 11/21/17 report), 6/24/19, at 2, 11. A.L.H. was adjudicated
dependent on October 4, 2017, and since placement, he has remained in the
same foster home, except for a brief respite placement in another home
between July 21, 2018 and November 4, 2018, due to a procedural hitch.4
N.T., 6/24/19, at 7; Exhibit 2, 6/24/19, at 2.
On December 19, 2018, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights to both children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court held hearings on April 3, 2019, and
June 24, 2019. Mother was present and represented by counsel. S.R.H. and
A.L.H. were represented by both a guardian ad litem and counsel.5 At the
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3 S.R.H. was placed temporarily between July 8, and July 12, 2016 due to
issues surrounding Mother and her paramour making a sex video. S.R.H. was
returned to the home until placed again on September 9, 2016. N.T., 6/24/19
at 24.
4 A.L.H.’s foster parent had to obtain a waiver due to the number of children
in the home. N.T., 6/24/19, at 7, 10, 25.
5 Both the guardian ad litem and legal counsel filed briefs in this Court that
supported the termination of Mother’s parental rights as promoting the
children’s best interests and legal interests, respectively. See In re Adoption
of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 175, 180 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (stating that,
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hearing, the orphans court incorporated the dependency records of both
children. N.T., 4/3/19, at 1. In addition to several CYS case workers and
third-party service providers, CYS presented Terry O’Hara, Ph.D., the licensed
psychologist who performed several individual and interactional evaluations of
Mother and the children. Mother, who did not testify on her own behalf,
presented the testimony of her cousin, A.M.
On January 21, 2020, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of Mother pursuant to. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).
Mother filed timely separate notices of appeal, along with concise statements
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
The orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 17, 2020.
Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion
or error of law when it concluded that [CYS] established grounds
for termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), and/or (8)?
2. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion
or error of law in concluding the termination of the bond between
[S.R.H. and A.L.H.] and [M]other could be severed where the
testimony of the [CYS] expert was that termination would be
detrimental?
3. Whether the orphans’ court mischaracterized the testimony of
Dr. O’Hara such that its reliance on his testimony led to an
erroneous conclusion and termination?
____________________________________________
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested
involuntary termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel who
discerns and advocates for the child’s legal interests, defined as a child’s
preferred outcome).
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4. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion
or error of law when it concluded that [CYS] had met the
requirements for Family Finding where a maternal [cousin] was
not investigated until the petition for involuntary termination was
filed, and was then not seriously considered as a kinship
placement option?
Mother’s brief at 5-6 (suggested answers omitted).6
Our standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The
trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.
& J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
____________________________________________
6 We note with disapproval the lack of development, precision, and clarity in
Mother’s argument as to her first three issues and the lack of organization and
delineation as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Nevertheless, since the defects
in Mother’s brief do not preclude our review, we address the merits of the
arguments raised therein.
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the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B.,
835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of the
grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must
engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to
affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court
as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). See In re
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B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Instantly, the
certified record sustains the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any
of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2),
we have indicated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
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causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a
long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re
A.L.D., supra at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
As to termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2),
the orphans’ court reasoned:
The factual basis for the conclusion that the parental
rights of [Mother] should be terminated with respect to each of
her two (2) children is the reality that [M]other is not intellectually
capable of safely caring for her children. Despite the best efforts
of multiple therapists, [Mother] has made no progress toward
resolving the issues that led to the finding of dependency in 2015.
She is the same today as she was then and is therefore simply not
able to parent these children without help. Testimony from a
clinical psychologist indicated [Mother] is intellectually limited.
Also, we heard that historically she has had two (2) psychiatric
hospitalizations. Nonetheless, the clinician reported that she had
a reluctance to pursue mental health treatment. He also testified
that he saw [Mother] three (3) times over a period of seventeen
(17) months and saw no progress in her ability to parent. He
opined that [S.R.H. and A.L.H.] would be potentially at risk of
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abuse if they were unsupervised in the custody of their mother.
[M]other did not testify at hearing.
On these facts the [c]ourt found that [CYS] had
established by clear, convincing and undisputed evidence conduct
by [Mother] that satisfied the statutory grounds for termination
set forth in [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)].
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/20, at 2-3.
The following review of the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s
finding that CYS established the grounds for terminating Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2). Significantly, the record reveals that Mother
failed to make progress with the services provided and to remedy the
conditions surrounding the removal of S.R.H. and A.L.H.
CYS caseworker, Lisa Starr, testified that her concerns as to Mother
continued over the approximate three years S.R.H. had been in placement.
N.T., 6/24/19, at 29. Ms. Starr indicated that, during this time, Mother had
not maintained stable housing, residing in nine different residences. Id. at
31. While Mother obtained employment, Ms. Starr confirmed that Mother had
three different jobs representing a relatively short period of the length of the
case. Id. at 20. At the time of the June 2019 hearing, Mother had been
working at McDonald’s since the beginning of the year. She had previously
worked at Unimart for about three months and at different employer for a
week or two. Id. at 9, 20. Further, although Mother had been consistent with
mental health treatment and medication management since she enrolled at
Enlightened in November 2018, she was previously inconsistent with similar
treatment at Universal Community Behavioral Health (“UCBH”) and that
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treatment was terminated for lack of attendance.7 Id. at 30, 52. As to
parenting services, Ms. Starr acknowledged that Mother completed such
services; however, Mother had to redo and/or review lessons. Id. at 29-30.
Additionally, upon completion of services, Mother’s home conditions remained
an issue. Id.
Caseworkers with Raystown Developmental Services (“RDS”), with
whom CYS contracted to provide additional services, confirmed that Mother’s
parenting and housekeeping issues persisted, including living in squalor, feces
on the toilet seat, cockroaches, and unsecured prescription bottles. N.T.,
6/24/19, at 29; N.T., 4/3/19, at 11-12, 14-44. Piper Tanner, RDS family
service manager, noted that Mother requires assistance to be able to care for
S.R.H. and A.L.H. N.T., 4/3/19, at 9. Similarly, Tammy Lucas, a parent
educator in the RDS “Proud to be a Parent” program, testified that, upon
completion of the program, Mother had not made sufficient progress and that
she recommended that Mother “acquire another parenting program to
continue to broaden her knowledge in child development.” Id. at 21-23. She
opined that Mother would not be able to care for her children without “constant
modeling and direction.” Id. at 25. In this vein, A.M., the children’s maternal
cousin, described Mother as “someone who needs the support.” N.T.,
6/24/19, at 66.
____________________________________________
7As reported by Dr. O’Hara, Mother had a history of depression, anxiety, and
self-injury, as well as two psychiatric hospitalizations. N.T., 6/24/19, at 36-
37, 48-49.
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Likewise, Ms. Tanner indicated that Mother’s ability to provide
supervision and interact with S.R.H. and A.L.H. has decreased and that Mother
becomes “tired and overwhelmed.” Id. at 60. When asked to comment on
Mother’s progress, Ms. Tanner stated:
I would say we have seen progress[,] but then we have also
seen great remission in her as well. We have seen that [Mother]
struggles to do things independently. She does need supports[,]
but she does become angry and frustrated with supports as well
at times and wants to be independent and do things on her own.
We’ve seen a decline in her ability at times to meet [S.R.H.’s and
A.L.H.]’s needs[,] knowing safety, knowing what it best practice
for them. Over the course of four years[,] I can be confident
in saying we are not comfortable at this point in time with
those children being returned to the home.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added). As such, she testified that S.R.H. and A.L.H. are
not safe if left with Mother unsupervised. Id. at 68.
Moreover, Dr. O’Hara, who conducted the individual and interactional
evaluations with respect to Mother, first revealed that Mother exhibited
intellectual deficits. N.T., 6/24/19, at 36-37. He explained that this condition
“influenced her to be potentially taken advantage of by others and for her to
remain in relationships which are not stable and that could be potentially
abusive to her and her children.” Id. at 51. While observing positive
interactions between Mother and S.R.H. and A.L.H., Dr. O’Hara further found
a lack of protective capacity on the part of Mother. Id. at 37-38, 47. He
opined that Mother was unable to appropriately provide for her children’s
needs and welfare, and that there was no evidence that she would be able to
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make the necessary progress in a reasonable amount of time. Id. at 38-39,
47-48; Exhibit 3 (Dr. O’Hara’s 8/21/18 report), 6/24/19, at 13. He testified:
. . . I eventually did not [believe] that Mother was in a
position to appropriately care for a child’s needs and
welfare. She has not made progress over the history of the
case with regard to services.[8] I didn’t have any evidence
that she’d increased her history of low protective capacity.
I didn’t have evidence she was able to make much progress
when she was in a [sic] more independent from the
historical support of her sister and her mother.
It was problematic from my perspective[,] given that
[S.R.H. and A.L.H.] had been out of their mother’s care. . .
. So[,] even though [S.R.H. and A.L.H.] had been out of
their mother’s care for a significant amount of time, I still
didn’t have evidence that she had made the gains necessary
to appropriately care for her children’s needs and welfare.
Id. at 38-39. Dr. O’Hara further stated that S.R.H. and A.L.H. “would be at
risk of abuse if they were unsupervised with their mother and they would be
at further risk for housing [in]stability as well.” Id. at 49. Dr. O’Hara
therefore advised that permanency for S.R.H. and A.L.H. was of “urgent
importance.” Id. at 39-40. While acknowledging that S.R.H. and A.L.H. would
experience an emotional detriment as a result of termination, he concluded,
“So I think the relationship [Mother] has with [S.R.H. and A.L.H.] is
____________________________________________
8 Dr. O’Hara observed that Mother “had not been able to demonstrate a
commitment to treatment, housing has been unstable, lack of income, [and]
lack of progress with services.” N.T., 6/24/19, at 42. Along with Mother’s
inconsistency with mental health treatment, Dr. O’Hara highlighted Mother’s
failure to complete non-offenders treatment, which he recommended due to
her relationships with men who had histories of inappropriateness with
children. Id. at 37-38, 44, 48-49.
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important[,] but I don’t think it’s sufficient in the overall equation of what’s in
the best interests of [S.R.H. and A.L.H.].” Id. at 42.
As the certified record substantiates the orphans’ court’s conclusion that
Mother’s continued incapacity, a condition that she cannot remedy, has caused
the children to be without essential parental control or subsistence necessary
for their physical and mental well-being, we do not disturb it. See In re
Adoption of M.E.P., supra at 1272.
With regard to § 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between
the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to
discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as
discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
In re T.S.M., supra at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond
between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
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well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent
will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition. See In re:
T.S.M., supra at 267 (“Even the most abused of children will often harbor
some positive emotion towards the abusive parent.” Our High Court reasoned,
“[t]he continued attachment to the natural parents, despite serious parental
rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure to correct parenting and
behavior disorders which are harming the children cannot be misconstrued as
bonding.” Id.
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
The gravamen of Mother’s argument on appeal is that the orphans’ court
ignored the portions of Dr. O’Hara’s testimony that indicated that terminating
her parental rights would be detrimental to S.R.H. and A.L.H. Mother’s brief
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at 14-15. She asserts that the court instead had a narrow view of its options.
Id. at 15-16. Mother states:
Despite all of this expert testimony, some on direct and some on
cross-examination, the trial court dismissed the option of denying
the petition to terminate parental rights, which would have
prompted the Agency to pursue some sort of guardianship.
Instead[,] the court erroneously concluded that this was not an
option. While the court is correct that it was “obliged to render a
decision on the merits of the petitions” and that “the Act does not
confer on judges the ability to mandate agreements,” the
dichotomy identified by the court in setting up this dilemma does
not exist: were [M]other’s parental rights not terminated [S.R.H.
and A.L.H.] would not return to her care; they would remain in
foster placement, pending a more appropriate outcome than
termination of parental rights. In short, the court’s vision of what
its options were was entirely too narrow.
Id. (citations to record omitted).
In finding that the needs and welfare of S.R.H. and A.L.H. favor
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b), the orphans’ court
reasoned as follows:
In this case, [Dr. O’Hara] testified that [Mother] consistently
did well during the interactional phase of his three (3) evaluations.
Thus, he perceived a bond and related that [S.R.H. and A.L.H.]
have a positive relationship with their mother, who, he said, cares
very much for her children. He opined therefore that therefore
[sic] there would be some psychological detriment for [S.R.H. and
A.L.H.] if [Mother]’s parental rights were terminated.
Nonetheless[,] he expressed concern about unsupervised contact
between [Mother] and her children.
Our conclusion was that the potential risk to [S.R.H. and
A.L.H.] outweighed the harm to [S.R.H. and A.L.H.] of severing
the bond. Accordingly, we granted the petitions.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/20, at 4-5.
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Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. The record
supports the orphans’ court’s finding that S.R.H.’s and A.L.H.’s developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Mother’s
parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b). See T.S.M., supra at 267.
The record confirms that S.R.H. and A.L.H. have a bond with Mother.
N.T., 6/24/19, at 41, 74; N.T., 4/3/19, at 8-9. Dr. O’Hara observed a positive
relationship between S.R.H. and A.L.H. and Mother. He stated, “I would
definitely say that [S.R.H. and A.L.H.] have a positive relationship with their
mother and Mother without question very much cares for her children.” N.T.,
6/24/19, at 41. Similarly, Ms. Tanner noted that S.R.H. and A.L.H. show
Mother affection, recognize her, and call her mom and/or mother. N.T.,
4/3/19, at 8-9.
However, as indicated infra, although Dr. O’Hara noted that S.R.H. and
A.L.H. would experience an emotional setback as a result of the termination
of Mother’s parental rights, he highlighted Mother’s lack of progress and the
lack of evidence that Mother would make and maintain the necessary gains to
appropriately care for S.R.H.’s and A.L.H.’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare. As such, he determined that preserving the
relationship between Mother and her children does not outweigh the best
interests of the children. Id. at 42. Again, he stated, “So I think the
relationship [Mother] has with [S.R.H. and A.L.H.] is important[,] but I don’t
think it’s sufficient in the overall equation of what’s in the best interests of
[S.R.H. and A.L.H.].” Id. Given Mother’s lack of progress, Dr. O’Hara
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recommended that “permanency was of urgent importance for [S.R.H. and
A.L.H.]. Id. at 39-40.
Further, Mother’s visitation had reverted to supervised visitation two
hours per week at the RDS facility “due to [Mother] promising [S.R.H. and
A.L.H.] things and not following through with.” N.T., 6/24/19, at 8. Likewise,
Ms. Tanner noted concerns with respect to Mother’s visitation. While
acknowledging that Mother displays affection, as indicated infra, Ms. Tanner
testified that Mother’s ability to provide supervision and interact with S.R.H.
and A.L.H. has decreased and that Mother becomes “tired and overwhelmed.”
N.T., 4/3/19, at 60.
Moreover, S.R.H. has been placed in the same foster home since
September 2016. N.T., 6/24/19, at 6, 19, 24. A.L.H. never resided with
Mother and has been placed in the same foster home since September 2017,
shortly after birth, less a brief three-month respite placement. Id. at 6-7, 32-
33. The evidence establishes that both children are bonded with their foster
parents. CYS caseworker Lisa Starr testified about her observations of the
positive interactions between S.R.H. and A.L.H. and their respective foster
parents and families. Id. at 25-26. Specifically, as to S.R.H., Ms. Starr
described, “Whenever I’ve gone there right after school S.R.H. runs to the
door, yells mom, look what I did today. She shows her paperwork. She gives
her hugs, kisses, love you. They ask how your day was. S.R.H. will sit and
tell her how her day was. They’ve read books together.” Id.
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The guardian ad litem for S.R.H. and A.L.H. confirmed a positive
relationship between S.R.H. and her foster parents. Id. at 73-74. The
guardian ad litem noted that S.R.H. calls her foster parents mom and dad.
Id. at 74-75. Further, the guardian ad litem spoke with A.L.H., and, while
indicating that he was too young to express an opinion, noted a positive
relationship with his foster family. Id. at 75.9
While Mother may profess to love S.R.H. and A.L.H., a parent’s own
feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination
of parental rights. In re Z.P., supra at 1121. At the time of the June 2019
hearing, S.R.H. had been in placement for approximately two years and nine
months and A.L.H. one year and nine months, his entire life, and they are
entitled to permanency and stability. As we stated, a child’s life “simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to
handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125.
To the extent that Mother argues that the orphans’ court
mischaracterized Dr. O’Hara’s testimony, this claim is without merit. As we
explained at length, supra, Dr. O’Hara testified that the emotional detriment
____________________________________________
9 We note that, as part of legal counsel’s representation, counsel advised the
court of S.R.H.’s preference to stay with the foster family. Counsel observed,
in part, “. . .[S]he really seemed to be very well adjusted, very pleasant and
indicated a very strong desire to stay in the resource parents’ home.” N.T.,
6/24/19, at 73-74. Counsel continued, “We talked about the other foster
children in the home. You know, she was telling me funny stories about things
they would do and, you know, of course, there’s even little petty fighting, that
kind of thing, but she indicated that they all get along and she considered it
to be her family and felt very comfortable there.” Id. at 74
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to the children as a result of terminating Mother’s parental rights is
outweighed by Mother’s inability to provide the most basic parental functions.
N.T., 6/24/19, at 42. Critically, while Dr. O’Hara acknowledged the benefit of
ongoing contact and the idea that permanency can be achieved through
placement with a family member or guardian, as opposed to adoption, he
emphasized the importance of the stability of the parent. Id. at 42-44. Dr.
O’Hara stated, in part, “There’s many cases unfortunately where parents are
not able to remain in a stable position and I think ongoing contact can be very
detrimental to children.” Id. at 43. Noting his concerns with Mother and her
lack of progress, he made it clear that he did not find that Mother was stable.
Id. at 42-44. Thus, he reasoned, terminating Mother’s parental rights best
served the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of S.R.H.
and A.L.H.
Finally, we examine Mother’s claim as to family finding. Mother argues
that the orphans’ court abused its discretion when it concluded that CYS had
met the requirements for family finding where a maternal cousin was neither
investigated nor considered as a kinship placement option. Mother’s brief at
16-20. She asserts that the cousin, who independently obtained approval as
a foster parent, came forward in December 2018, but CYS did not evaluate
that potential resource or permit her to contact the children because it already
had determined that reunification was not possible. Id. at 17-19.
In rejecting Mother’s claim, the orphans’ court noted that it did not make
a conclusion as to family finding. The court further reasoned that 23 Pa.C.S.
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§ 2511 (a) and (b) do not require compliance with 67 Pa.C.S. § 3103 prior to
termination of parental rights, and that 67 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a)(3) allows for
discontinuance of family finding when adoption proceedings are commenced
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101, et seq. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/17/20, at
10. With this, we agree.
Mother’s arguments relates to CYS’s actions during the dependency
proceedings, which are not before us in the instant appeal. Moreover, to the
extent that the issue of family finding is justiciable in this appeal, no relief is
due.
Pursuant to 67 P.S. § 3103, “Family finding shall be conducted for a
child when the child is accepted for services and at least annually thereafter,
until the child’s involvement with the county agency is terminated or the family
finding is discontinued in accordance with section 3104 (relating to
discontinuance of family finding).” Instantly, CYS was in compliance with the
family finding requirement and attempted to pursue those family and friends
offered by the parents as potential placements for S.R.H. and A.L.H. N.T.,
6/24/19, at 26-29. Critically, the maternal cousin, A.M., did not provide her
name to CYS as a potential resource until approximately December 8, 2018,
eleven days before the agency filed its formal petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights. Id. at 14-15, 22, 24-25, 60-61, 71-72. As such, although
CYS subsequently sent a referral to A.M., who has not contacted S.R.H. since
July 2015, and has never met A.L.H., that effort was not required because the
termination petition had been filed. See 67 P.S. § 3104(a)(3) (agency may
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discontinue family finding if child is in pre-adoptive placement, and court
proceedings to adopt the child have been commenced. Mother’s claim fails.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the orphans’ court’s did not err
or abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights to S.R.H. and
A.L.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/11/2020
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