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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.Q.L., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER : No. 3238 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree, September 14, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000533-2016,
CP-51-DP-0000744-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.L., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.L., MOTHER : No. 3240 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree, September 14, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000532-2016,
CP-51-DP-0000746-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017
M.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered September 14,
2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, granting the
petition of the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her minor, dependent
children, S.Q.L., a male born in August of 2009, and A.L., a female born in
October of 2007 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act,
J. S25032/17
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1 2
Mother further appeals
the orders entered September 14, 2016, changing the Children’s
permanency goal to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6351. After review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history
as follows:
The family in this case has been known to DHS since
2010.[3] Between 2010 and 2014, DHS received
four General Protective Services (“GPS”) reports
alleging problems in the home.[4] All four reports
were substantiated, and DHS offered services. On
February 6, 2014, DHS received another GPS report
that the utilities in Mother’s home were turned off.
DHS visited the home and found it was filled with
trash, smelled of marijuana and had no heat.[5] The
Children were truant. By family arrangement, DHS
implemented a Safety Plan and the Children moved
into the home of their maternal cousin. On
March 25, 2014, Mother met with DHS and the
1
By separate decrees entered June 27, 2016, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of the Children’s fathers and/or putative
fathers, also pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Neither
of the Children’s fathers and/or putative fathers has appealed, nor are they
parties to this appeal.
2
Mother’s three older children, who are not the subject of this matter, were
also adjudicated dependent and remained committed and in placement.
3
Upon review of the certified record, DHS’s involvement goes back even
further, to May of 2008. (See DHS Exhibit 1.)
4
DHS received reports on September 7, 2010, May 28, 2011, February 6,
2014, and February 9, 2014, with respect to conditions of the home and
neglect of the Children. (See DHS Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5.)
5
DHS received a similar report as to the conditions of the home, among
other things, on February 9, 2014. (See DHS Exhibit 5.)
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Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) and stated she
intended to take the Children back into her care.
DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody
(“OPC”) and formally placed the Children with the
cousin. The following day the cousin stated she
could not care for the Children, so DHS placed them
in other foster homes. Following an adjudicatory
hearing on April 9, 2014, the court adjudicated the
Children dependent and fully committed them to
DHS custody. CUA then developed a Single Case
Plan (“SCP”) with objectives for Mother. Between
2014 and 2016, Mother failed to complete her
objectives. . . .
Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 1-2 (citations to record omitted).
The trial court held regular permanency review hearings in this matter.
Throughout these reviews, the trial court maintained the Children’s
commitment and placement and permanency goal.
On June 10, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate
parental rights and for a goal change. Thereafter, the trial court conducted
combined termination and goal change hearings on June 27, 2016 and
September 14, 2016.6 In support of its petitions, DHS presented the
testimony of CUA caseworker, Lloyd Guyton. Further, DHS offered DHS
Exhibits 1 through 17, which were admitted into evidence on June 27, 2016.
(Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 86.) Counsel stipulated to their content,
6
Mother agreed to sign voluntary relinquishments of her parental rights to
the Children at the June 27 hearing. Mother signed the necessary
paperwork subsequent to the submission of evidence and testimony being
taken on the termination/goal change petitions. The matter was, however,
listed for September 14, 2016, for the court to issue its decision on the
termination/goal change petitions should Mother revoke the voluntary
relinquishments, which she in fact did, in the requisite 30 days.
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but not their veracity. (Id. at 20-21, 37.) Mother additionally testified on
her own behalf. Children’s fathers were not present. However, putative
father for both Children, S.P.B., Jr., a/k/a S.B., a/k/a S.B., who is
incarcerated and was represented by counsel, was contacted via telephone
and chose not to participate.7
By decree entered September 14, 2016, the trial court involuntarily
terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children.8 On October 10, 2016,
Mother, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal, along
with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
granting [DHS]’s Petition to Change the Goal
to Adoption?
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
finding that DHS proved by clear and
convincing evidence that [M]other failed to
rehabilitate herself pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
Section 2511[(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)]?
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
finding that DHS proved by clear and
convincing evidence that it would not harm
A.L. and/or S.Q.L. to be severed from their
mother and that it was in the best interests of
7
A.L.’s father, D.F., was represented by counsel. S.Q.L.’s father, A.P., was
not represented by counsel as an address was never obtained. (Notes of
testimony, 6/27/16 at 19-20.)
8
The trial court announced its decision, memorialized by subsequent
decrees and orders, on the record on September 14, 2016.
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the children to be adopted pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(b)?
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to consider that [M]other completed all
her family service plan goals in 2015, and that
after the additional goal of “mental health” was
added in 2015, [M]other had made substantial
progress with this goal despite the fact that
DHS made no referral and provided no
assistance to her.
Mother’s brief at 4.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.”
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.
“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however,
should not be reversed merely because the record
would support a different result. Id. at 827. We
have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the
parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re
R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
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competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of
the child.
Our case law has made clear that under
Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
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With regard to Mother’s second, third, and fourth issues, which we
address first, Mother essentially challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in
terminating her parental rights. (Mother’s brief at 13-18.) In this case, the
trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We have long held that, in
order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the
trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under
Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after a
petition filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused
the child to be without essential
parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of
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the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control
of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
the court shall not consider any efforts by the
parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three
elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216
(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super.
2002).
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Instantly, in finding sufficient evidence supporting termination of
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the court stated as
follows:
The Children have been in care since April 9, 2014.
Mother’s original objectives were to visit the
Children, obtain housing and a job, complete
parenting classes and a PCE [(“parenting capacity
evaluation”)]. Mother obtained appropriate housing.
Mother has never provided documentation of her
income. While Mother completed parenting classes,
she was completely unable to demonstrate that she
learned anything from them. Even after the classes,
she did not have the capacity to provide the Children
with a safe and permanent home. During the PCE,
Mother minimized and denied the issues that brought
the Children into care. The PCE recommended
Mother engage in therapy, and this became an
objective in her SCP and in court orders. CUA
referred Mother for mental health therapy in October
2015. Mother has never attended therapy. Mother
testified that therapy was never one of her
objectives, though it had been discussed at SCP
meetings and court hearings where Mother was
present. Mother testified that she attended family
therapy with the Children, but was actually referring
to another child who is not the subject of this case.
At the beginning of the case, Mother consistently
attended visits, and was given unsupervised visits.
She began coaching the Children to withhold
information from the foster parents, and her visits
were changed to supervised. The Children had
originally been placed with relatives, but had been
removed and placed with unrelated foster parents at
Mother’s request. Mother testified falsely about her
request, originally testifying that the relatives had
failed FBI clearances. When asked about this
contradictory testimony, Mother admitted that her
original testimony had been untrue. The Children
need permanency, which Mother cannot provide.
Mother has demonstrated that she is unwilling to
remedy the causes of her incapacity to parent in
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order to provide the Children with essential parental
care, control, or subsistence necessary for their
physical and mental well-being. Termination under
this section was also proper.
Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 6-7.
Mother, however, argues that the record “does not support the finding
that she failed to take affirmative action to rectify the circumstances that led
to the removal of the children.” (Mother’s brief at 16.) Mother argues the
evidence was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard. (Id. at
16-17.) Specifically, she indicates the only evidence offered was the
testimony of the caseworker as to a lack of documentation regarding
individual therapy, income or results of a medication evaluation. (Id. at
16.) Mother further challenges the court’s evidentiary rulings during her
cross-examination of the caseworker, which she contends prevented her
“from eliciting any further information that the witness should have gleaned
from his review of the case documents. (Id. at 17.) We disagree.
A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). CUA caseworker Lloyd Guyton
testified that Mother’s objectives were “to sustain housing, to maintain a
source of income, to attend therapy and to attend parenting classes.”
(Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 43.) Mr. Guyton also verified a parenting
capacity evaluation. (Id. at 43.) Critically, he indicated that Mother failed
to provide documentation as to mental health treatment, although
acknowledging that she stated she had completed therapy, or a psychiatric
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evaluation, as recommended by the parenting capacity evaluation, 9 as well
as to income. (Id. at 43-44.) Further, as confirmed by Mr. Guyton, a
parenting capacity evaluation conducted by William Russell, Ph.D., and
Sheetal A. Duggal, Psy.D., dated December 2, 2014, opined that Mother
lacked the “capacity to provide safety and permanency” for the Children.
(Id. at 49. See also DHS Exhibit 14 at 10.) Notably, the evaluators
highlighted Mother’s potential inability to provide for the Children financially,
noting, “[Mother] presented no secure plan of how she intends to financially
support her children with a limited income.” (DHS Exhibit 14 at 9.) In
addition, the evaluators recognized Mother’s lack of insight as to issues for
which the Children were brought into care and her inability to accept
responsibility.
Additional barriers include [Mother’s] continued
denial and minimization of events that led to her
children’s removal (including keeping them in unsafe
housing, failure to meet their medical and dental
needs, and concerns regarding substance use) and
she continues to project blame and responsibility
onto others for DHS involvement. [Mother] was
unable to make any connection between her
behavior and parenting and the fact that all of the
children have emotional/behavioral problems.
9
Mr. Guyton testified that Mother was referred for therapy in October of
2015. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 50.) Mother denied the inclusion of
any additional objectives and disputed any meetings as to her objectives
following completion of the parenting capacity evaluation. (Id. at 76, 82.)
However, Mother testified to her presence in court on numerous occasions
since that time where there was testimony presented regarding her
objectives. (Id. at 84.)
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Id. See also notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 49. The evaluators also
recognized concerns as to the Children’s putative father, who is a registered
sex offender, which Mother minimized. (Id. at 5, 7, 9.) Similarly, the
evaluators further observed that, despite completion of parenting classes,
Mother, who admitted to the prior use of corporal punishment, “was unable
to identify methods of appropriate discipline.” (Id. at 9. See also notes of
testimony, 6/27/16 at 49.) Therefore, as suggested above, among other
things, the evaluators recommended Mother participate in individual therapy
“with the focus to include identifying the role she played in her children’s
removal and for DHS’s ongoing involvement with her family, [sic] monitoring
possible substance use.” (Id. at 10.)
Further, we note, the decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Buchhalter v.
Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
See also Schuenemann v. Dreemz, LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 100-101 (Pa.Super.
2011); Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922 A.2d 950 (Pa.Super. 2007). This court
may only reverse upon a finding of a clear abuse of discretion. Id. After
review of the record, we do not discern any abuse of discretion with respect
to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Hence, the record substantiates the
conclusion that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect,
or refusal has caused the Children to be without essential parental control or
subsistence necessary for their physical and mental well-being. See In re
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Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not
remedy this situation. See id. As the trial court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result
of an error of law or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s
decrees with regard to Section 2511(a)(2). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267
(Pa. 2013).
We next determine whether termination was proper under
Section 2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), we have stated as
follows:
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b)
does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the
term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case
law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional
bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to
be considered as part of our analysis. While a
parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a
major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest
analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors
to be considered by the court when determining
what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the foster parent.
Additionally, this Court stated that the
trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships
and whether any existing parent-child
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bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights favored
Children’s needs and welfare, the court concluded:
Mother has consistently visited with the Children
over the life of this case, but has not maintained a
bond with them. She does not have a healthy
maternal relationship with [A.L.] Mother has
coached the Children improperly, whereby visits
were changed to supervised. Mother appeared to
confuse these Children with her other Children.
Mother planned to have the Children adopted by a
sex offender who is currently in prison. Mother
interfered with the Children’s placement and
permanency to prevent them from being placed with
relatives, in contravention of the purpose of the
Juvenile Act. It is in the Children’s best interest to
terminate Mother’s rights, as they will not suffer
irreparable harm. Mother does not have a healthy
parental relationship with [A.L.] [S.Q.L.] is
hospitalized at the time of trial. CUA is exploring
potential family resources. Although Mother visits
with [S.Q.L.], the trial court did not hear any
evidence of a bond between Mother and [S.Q.L.]
Consequently, the trial court properly inferred that
no parental bond exists with Mother. The court did
not abuse its discretion when it found that it was
clearly and convincingly established that there was
no parental bond, and that termination of Mother’s
parental rights would not destroy an existing
beneficial relationship.
Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 10-11 (citations to record omitted).
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Despite acknowledging Section 2511(b) in her brief, Mother fails to
offer any discussion and/or analysis as to this subsection. Mother, therefore,
waived any claim relating to Section 2511(b). See In re W.H., 25 A.3d
330, 339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 24 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2011),
quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[W]here an
appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”). See also In re
Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 679 n.4 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 76 A.3d 540 (Pa. 2013) (declining to address Section 2511(b)
where not challenged on appeal).
Nevertheless, in light of the requisite bifurcated analysis, we observe
that, had Mother preserved this issue, we would have found it lacked merit.
There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to make a
determination of the Children’s needs and welfare, and as to the existence of
a bond between Mother and Children that, if severed, would not have a
detrimental impact on them. Mother’s visitation with the Children, while
unsupervised for a time, was modified to supervised.10 (Notes of testimony,
6/27/16 at 73-75.) Further, Mr. Guyton testified as to the unhealthy
relationship between Mother and A.L. and no irreparable harm to either child
10
Although disputing the truth, Mother acknowledged being advised that the
change in visitation was due to coaching the Children not to disclose certain
information to their foster parents. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 82-83.)
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if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. (Id. at 44.) Of significance, we
also again recognize the parenting capacity evaluation, which concluded
Mother’s inability to provide safety and permanency for the Children, noting
her lack of insight and acceptance of responsibility as to issues for which the
Children were brought into care. (Id. at 49; DHS Exhibit 14 at 10.) As this
court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent
attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a
child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
and hope for the future.” R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513.
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights
under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Lastly, we turn to Mother’s first issue, the question of whether the trial
court appropriately changed the permanency goal to adoption. In so doing,
our standard of review is the same abuse of discretion standard as noted
above. See In the Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015),
citing In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010), for the proposition that
the abuse of discretion standard applies in a dependency matter. Further,
following an examination and findings of factors provided in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6351(f) and (f.1), regarding matters to be determined at the permanency
hearing, the trial court must also find that a goal change is in Children’s best
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interests. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g); In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa.
2010).
The primary purpose of the disposition of a dependent child is to
examine what is in the best interest of the child. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(a);
In the Interest of Z.W., et al., 710 A.2d 1176, 1178 (Pa.Super. 1998).
See also In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 1990) (stating, “In
ordering a disposition under Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, the court acts
not in the role of adjudicator reviewing the action of an administrative
agency, . . . rather the court acts pursuant to a separate discretionary role
with the purpose of meeting the child’s best interests.”), quoting In re
Lowry, 484 A.2d 383, 386 (Pa. 1984).
In the case at bar, Mother posits that the trial court should not have
changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption, as the court failed to
consider the “totality of the circumstances” pursuant to Section 6351(f).
(Mother’s brief at 9-10.) Again, Mother challenges the court’s evidentiary
rulings as to the testimony of the caseworker. (Id. at 10-12.) Mother
argues, “It is this pattern of biased [sic] against Mother that accentuates the
[c]ourt’s unwillingness to comply with the ‘totality of the circumstances’
outlined in 6351(f) and which is proof that the court abused its discretion in
terminating [M]other[’s] parental rights.” (Id. at 12.) Mother further
asserts that she accomplished all goals for which she received referrals in
2015, and the remaining obstacle of therapy “was in progress and could
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have rectified Mother’s parenting deficits within a reasonable time.” (Id. at
12-13.)
However, supporting the goal change to adoption, the court reasoned:
Mother expressed an interest in signing voluntary
relinquishments of her parental rights to the
Children, but only if her conditions for placement
were met. Mother has interfered with the
permanency of the Children before, asking that they
be removed from relatives and have less contact
with family. This conduct was clearly against the
purposes of the Juvenile Act. Mother then lied in
court, testifying that she had never asked for the
Children to be removed. Mother intended to have
the Children adopted by a sex offender. Mother
improperly coached the Children and her visits had
to be changed to supervised. Mother has not
provided proof of her employment or income.
Mother has not engaged in mental health treatment,
despite it being an objective routinely discussed at
SCP meetings and court hearings. Mother completed
parenting classes but did not learn anything at all.
Mother denied that there had ever been any issues in
her house, and that her Children’s teeth had rotted
because they ate too much candy. Mother did not
present the capacity to provide the Children with a
safe and permanent home. Mother confused these
Children with another one of her children. Mother
does not have a healthy parental relationship with
the Children. Adoption is in the best interest of the
Children. Because of these facts, and the stipulated
facts in the termination petition, it was clearly and
convincingly established by credible testimony of
DHS’s witness that the court’s change of permanency
goal from reunification to adoption was proper.
Trial court opinion, 12/1/16 at 11-12 (citations to record omitted). With
this, we agree.
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J. S25032/17
Upon review of the record, Mother’s claim lacks merit. The record
reveals that a change of the permanency goal to adoption was in Children’s
best interests. Again, Mother failed to provide CUA with documentation as
to completion with respect to all of her objectives, notably therapy and
income. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 43-44.) Moreover, and more
importantly, a parenting capacity evaluation revealed Mother’s inability to
provide for the Children’s safety and permanency, noting her denial and
minimization of issues related to the Children’s placement in care, as well as
her financial instability and inability to name appropriate forms of discipline.
(DHS Exhibit 14 at 9-10.) In addition, Mother’s visitation with the Children
was changed to and remained supervised, and the caseworker testified as to
no irreparable harm to either child if Mother’s parental rights were
terminated. (Notes of testimony, 6/27/16 at 44, 73-75.) Further, as we
find no abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s evidentiary determinations,
we do not disturb them. Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263
(Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted). See also Schuenemann v. Dreemz,
LLC, 34 A.3d 94, 100-101 (Pa.Super. 2011); Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922
A.2d 950 (Pa.Super. 2007). Therefore, the record supports that a goal
change was in the best interests of Children. Accordingly, after review of
the record, we again discern no abuse of discretion, and conclude that the
trial court properly changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption.
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J. S25032/17
Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s termination of
Mother’s parental rights and change of the Children’s permanency goal, we
affirm the decrees and orders of the trial court.
Decrees and orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2017
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