IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-19-00411-CV
No. 10-19-00412-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.D., JR., A CHILD
From the 278th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 18-28,739
&
IN THE INTEREST OF B.S. AND J.M., CHILDREN
From the 278th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 18-28,745
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In eight issues in appellate cause numbers 10-19-00411-CV and 10-19-00412-CV,
appellant, Darkevia Jones, challenges the trial court’s orders terminating her parental
rights to her children, A.D., B.S., and J.M. Because we overrule all of appellant’s issues
in both appellate cause numbers, we affirm.
I. THE APPELLATE RECORD
In her first issue in both appellate cause numbers, appellant asserts that she was
denied her rights of due process and due course of law because the trial court denied her
a record of all relevant hearings. More specifically, appellant contends that the missing
record demonstrates that the Department sought termination, not merely on the facts of
the case, but on the recommendation of the trial court judge, which resulted in her being
denied a fair trial before a neutral and detached judge.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.4 provides that a court of appeals must not
affirm a judgment if an erroneous action of the trial court prevents the proper
presentation of a case to the court of appeals and the trial court can correct that action.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.4(a). In this issue, appellant relies exclusively on the testimony of
Christina Vaughn, a caseworker for the Department of Family and Protective Services, as
evidence that a hearing was held in April or May 2019, and as a result of comments made
by the trial judge in that hearing, the Department changed its objective from reuniting
appellant and her children to terminating appellant’s parental rights. No Reporter’s
Record of this April or May 2019 hearing was included in the record for us to review.
Appellant alleges it was during this hearing that the Department changed its objective
from reunification of the children with appellant to terminating appellant’s parental
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rights. Appellant emphasizes the following exchange between defense counsel and the
Vaughn, during trial, to show that, as a result, she was denied a fair trial before a fair and
detached judge:
Q [Defense counsel]: When was the goal changed to termination as to
Ms. Jones?
A [Vaughn]: I can’t recall the specific date. But it was at one
of our court hearings.
Q: Do—what was the basis for that change in goal?
A: The Judge’s recommendations.
See Markowitz v. Markowitz, 118 S.W.3d 82, 86-87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (“Parties have a right to a fair and impartial hearing. One of
the fundamental components of a fair trial is a neutral and detached judge. A judge
should not act as an advocate nor an adversary for any party. To reverse a judgment on
the ground of improper conduct or comments of the judge, we must find (1) that judicial
impropriety was in fact committed and (2) probable prejudice to the complaining party.”
(internal citations & quotations omitted)).
However, later in her testimony, Vaughn clarified that the basis for changing the
goal from reunification to actual termination of appellant’s parental rights was a letter
that appellant sent to one of the caregivers of appellant’s children. This letter, which was
made a part of the record, included several threats of physical violence made by appellant
to the caregiver. Because appellant’s complaint regarding the record is entirely based on
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Vaughn’s earlier testimony to support a contention that the trial judge was not fair or
detached, Vaughn’s subsequent testimony undermines the entire basis for appellant’s
complaint in this issue. See id. at 86-87.
Furthermore, accepting for argument’s sake that the judge did make the reported,
complained-of comments, appellant admits in her brief that said judge was not the same
judge who conducted the trial of this matter. Thus, the accusation of bias had no bearing
on the final order in this case.
Accordingly, we cannot say that appellant has demonstrated that the purported
error regarding the record, if any, prevented her from properly presenting her case to this
Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.4(a). We therefore overrule appellant’s first issue.
II. THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
In her second issue in both appellate cause numbers, appellant complains that the
trial court erred by failing to appoint her counsel for five months after the Department
filed petitions seeking termination. Appellant argues that this amounts to a failure to
timely advise her of her right to counsel and, thus, constitutes reversible error.
Regarding A.D., in appellate cause number 10-19-00411-CV, the Department filed
its original petition on May 1, 2018. Regarding B.S. and J.M., in appellate cause number
10-19-00412-CV, the Department filed its original petition on May 7, 2018. The record
reflects that the trial court appointed appellant counsel in both cases on October 16,
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2018—a year before the trial in this matter commenced. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
107.013(d) (West 2019).
We recognize that Texas courts have routinely held that the appointment of
counsel for an indigent parent more than five months into the case does not violate the
parent’s due-process rights. See In re M.J.M.L., 31 S.W.3d 347, 353-54 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (concluding that the appointment of counsel six months after
the Department filed its termination petition did not violate section 107.013 of the Family
Code, especially considering counsel was appointed over a year before the trial date); see
also In re M.M., No. 05-18-00901-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 368, at **4-5 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Jan. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by appointing an indigent parent counsel six months into the case, after the
removal hearing and a subsequent status hearing); In re B.K., No. 10-12-00311-CV, 2012
Tex. App. LEXIS 10730, at **5-6 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 27, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(holding that the appointment of counsel fifteen months after the child’s removal and
slightly less than five months before trial did not violate the parent’s due-process rights);
In re C.R., No. 09-11-00619-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 4303, at **9-11 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by appointing counsel for a parent three months prior to trial); In re C.Y.S., No.
04-11-00308-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9355, at **9-15 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 30,
2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
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appointing counsel ten months after the termination petition was filed and four months
before trial).
However, in In the Interest of S.R., this Court held that the failure to appoint counsel
for one-third of the time the case was pending constituted harmful error that “probably
caused the rendition of an improper judgment.” 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 11277, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Waco Dec. 31, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); In re
B.C., 592 S.W.3d 133, 137-38 (Tex. 2019)). During this time, appellants “were deprived of
the appointment of counsel prior to the adversary hearing, and were subsequently
without counsel at the status hearing, the dismissal hearing, and the first permanency
hearing conducted by the trial court.” Id. Moreover, without the benefit of the advice of
counsel, appellants testified at the hearings, and the testimony given while unrepresented
was used at trial to determine whether or not appellants had completed their service
plans and whether termination was in the best interest of the child. Id. at *6.
Unlike In the Interest of S.R., where appellants testified at proceedings without the
benefit of the advice of counsel and that evidence was used at trial to demonstrate that
appellants had failed to complete their service plans and to support a best-interest
finding, the evidence is sufficient to support termination of appellant’s rights under
section 161.001(b)(1)(E) without any reference to statements or evidence from those
hearings conducted prior to the appointment of counsel. Therefore, we cannot conclude
that appellant was harmed by the trial court’s failure to appoint counsel until five months
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into the case and a year before trial such that the purported error “probably caused the
rendition of an improper judgment.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); In re B.C., 592 S.W.3d
at 137-38; see also In re S.R., 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 11277, at **5-6. Accordingly, we
overrule appellant’s second issue.
III. THE PREDICATE GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF APPELLANT’S PARENTAL
RIGHTS
In her third, fourth, and fifth issues in both appellate cause numbers, appellant
contends that the evidence supporting the predicate grounds for termination—sections
161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(N), and (b)(1)(O) of the Family Code—is legally and
factually insufficient as to A.D., B.S., and J.M. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In an involuntary termination proceeding brought under section 161.001 of the
family code, the Department must establish: (1) at least one ground under subsection (1)
of section 161.001; and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2019); In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Both
elements must be established; termination may not be based solely on the best interest of
the child as determined by the trier of fact. See Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727
S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).
Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a) (West Supp. 2019). Evidence is clear and
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convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019). Due
process demands this heightened standard because termination results in permanent,
irrevocable changes for the parent and child. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002);
see In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007) (contrasting the standards for termination
and modification).
In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental-termination cases, we
determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm
belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d
570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding
and judgment. Id. We resolve any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable
factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all contrary evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could have disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is
contrary to the finding. Id. In other words, we consider evidence favorable to termination
if a reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable
factfinder could not. Id. We cannot weigh witness-credibility issues that depend on the
appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is within the province of the
factfinder. Id. at 573-74. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record,
we defer to the factfinder's determinations if they are reasonable. Id. at 573.
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In reviewing for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to the factfinder's
findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105,
108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the parent committed the predicate
ground alleged and that the termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the
best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1); see In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder
could not reasonably have formed a firm belief in the truth of its finding, then the
evidence is factually insufficient. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
B. Discussion
Termination under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E) requires clear and convincing
evidence that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with
persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being
of the child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
To endanger means to expose to loss or injury, to jeopardize. Tex. Dep’t of Human
Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987); see also In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.
1996). The specific danger to a child’s physical or emotional well-being need not be
established as an independent proposition, but it may be inferred from parental
misconduct. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533.
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Under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists
that the endangerment of the child’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s
conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 83-84 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).
Additionally, termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than
a single act or omission; the statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and
conscious course of conduct by the parents. [In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117,
125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)]; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
161.001([(b)](1)(E). It is not necessary, however, that the parent’s conduct
be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury. Boyd, 727
S.W.2d at 533; J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. The specific danger to the child’s
well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone. Boyd,
727 S.W.2d at 533; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, pet. denied).
In re T.T.F., 331 S.W.3d 461, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).
Regarding subsections 161.001(b)(1)(E), appellant contends that the Department
failed to present clear and convincing evidence of endangerment. Rather, appellant
complains that her parental rights were terminated merely because of her incarceration.
To further emphasize her point, appellant directs us to the trial court’s decision regarding
the fathers of the children—many of whom had criminal histories yet did not have their
parental rights terminated. See C.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 408 S.W.3d
495, 505-06 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (rejecting an argument that because one
parent’s rights were not terminated, neither parent’s rights should be terminated); see also
In re K.R.M., No. 07-13-00429-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 2979, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
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Mar. 17, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“That one parent may have been afforded another
chance to be a parent does not mean both must. . . . [The parent’s] own conduct and
circumstances are determinative.”).
At trial, the Department presented evidence of appellant’s extensive criminal
history. Appellant admitted that she is currently incarcerated. Her current incarceration
stems from a conviction for possessing a prohibited item in a correctional facility that
resulted in her being placed on community supervision for six years. However,
appellant’s community supervision was revoked, and she received a five-year prison
sentence. Appellant claimed that she would be released in March 2020. This date,
however, was only her hearing date before the parole board. Appellant’s request for
parole had previously been denied in November 2018, and her maximum sentence date
is December 26, 2022.
Additionally, appellant further admitted to numerous other arrests, charges, and
convictions, including the following: (1) an arrest in April 2016 for aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon; (2) eighteen days’ incarceration in 2012 for criminal mischief; (3)
a guilty plea in 2013 for assault causing bodily injury; (4) charges in July 2013 for burglary
of a habitation with intent to commit another felony and criminal trespass that resulted
in an eighteen-day sentence corresponding with the criminal-trespass charge; (5) an
arrest and fifteen-day stay in jail for criminal mischief; and (6) a sentence of two years’
community supervision for abandoning and endangering a child by criminal negligence
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that resulted from the child suffering a head injury and a burned foot. Moreover,
appellant acknowledged that she has a current charge pending for second-degree sexual
assault of a child apparently relating to her relationship with the father of A.D.1
A parent’s engaging in criminal conduct endangers the emotional well-being of a
child because of the parent’s resulting incarceration. See In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739
(“[C]onduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the
physical and emotional well-being of a child.”); see also Karl v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
Regulatory Servs., No. 03-03-00655-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6288, at **3-4 (Tex. App.—
Austin July 15, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.). While imprisonment alone is not a basis to
terminate a parent’s rights, it is an appropriate factor to consider because when a parent
is incarcerated, he or she is absent from the child’s daily life and unable to provide
support to the child, negatively impacting the child’s living environment and emotional
well-being. In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (op.
on reh’g).
And finally, Vaughn recounted that there were allegations of domestic violence
between appellant and A.D.’s father. Furthermore, appellant testified that A.D.’s father
was “very aggressive,” which supports an inference of domestic violence. Yet,
considering the purported physical aggressiveness of J.D.’s father, appellant did not keep
1The evidence adduced at trial suggested that A.D.’s father was fifteen or sixteen years old and
that appellant was twenty-five years old when A.D. was born.
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the children away from J.D.’s father. Moreover, the Department used the letter appellant
wrote to the caregiver detailing various threats of physical violence to support an
inference that appellant lacked self-control and was prone to violent behaviors. In further
support of this inference is appellant’s criminal history, which, as shown above, includes
several convictions for assaultive offenses.
Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence may be
considered as evidence of endangerment. See In re B.J.B., 546 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Sylvia M. v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 771
S.W.2d 198, 201-04 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ) (considering “volatile and chaotic”
marriage, altercation during pregnancy, and mother’s repeated reconciliation with
abusive spouse). Abusive or violent conduct by a parent or other resident of a child’s
home may produce an environment that endangers the physical or emotional well-being
of a child. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d at 222; see Ziegler v. Tarrant County Child Welfare Unit,
680 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that violent or
abusive conduct by someone within the household is an environment that endangers
children).
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the factfinder’s findings
and considering the evidence as a whole, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could
have formed a firm belief or conviction that appellant engaged in conduct or knowingly
placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical
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or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); see also In re J.P.B.,
180 S.W.3d at 573; In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108. This is not the case that appellant’s
parental rights were terminated solely because of her current incarceration. Accordingly,
we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusions that appellant’s parental rights to A.D., B.S., and J.M. should be terminated
under subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); see also In
re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
Because we have found that the evidence was legally- and factually-sufficient as
to at least one predicate act, we do not address appellant’s complaints regarding
subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(N), or (b)(1)(O). See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.; In re A.V.,
113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (“Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1)
is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interest.”). We overrule appellant’s third, fourth, and
fifth issues.
IV. BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN
In her sixth, seventh, and eighth issues in both appellate cause numbers, appellant
argues that the evidence supporting the trial court’s best-interest finding as to A.D., B.S.,
and J.M. is not supported by legally- and factually-sufficient evidence. Once again, we
disagree.
A. Applicable Law
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In a parental-rights-termination case, the best interest of the child is assessed using
a non-exhaustive list of factors. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
These factors are: (1) the child's wishes; (2) the child’s emotional or physical needs now
and in the future; (3) emotional or physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4)
the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody; (5) programs available to help those
parties; (6) plans for the child by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that indicate that the existing
parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuses for the acts or omissions of
the parent. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). The Department need
not prove all nine Holley factors as a “condition precedent” to termination; the absence of
some factors does not bar the factfinder from finding that termination is in the child's best
interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. And while no one factor is controlling, the analysis
of a single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that
termination is in the child's best interest. In re J.O.C., 47 S.W.3d 108, 115 (Tex. App.—
Waco 2001, no pet).
B. Discussion
The record reflects that, at the time of trial, A.D., B.S., and J.M. were two years old,
seven years old, and five years old, respectively. An alternative response investigation
supervisor for the Department, testified that, prior to removal, appellant had left the
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children with a seventeen-year-old cousin of A.D.’s father. Later, when the seventeen-
year-old cousin was unable to care for the children, all the children except for A.D. were
placed with the caregiver. At the time of removal, all the children except for A.D. were
with caregiver. The seventeen-year-old cousin was also unable to care for A.D. and left
him at the police station when he was just seven months old.
According to the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”), A.D. is currently
placed with his paternal great aunt with whom he has a strong bond. The CASA also
testified that A.D. is very well cared for in his current placement and is thriving.
B.S. and J.M. are currently placed with the caregiver and are also doing well. After
receiving ADHD medication, B.S. acts like a “little adult.” The CASA noted that B.S. is
concerned about appellant coming back into the picture. In fact, Vaughn testified that
the children expressed that they do not want to be with appellant. B.S.’s anxiety about
possibly leaving the caregiver’s home has manifested itself in the form of extensive bed
wetting. The CASA recalled that B.S. told her that she wants Hamilton to adopt her.
J.M. has trouble communicating orally and needs speech and occupational therapy
twice a week for an hour. The caregiver has taken J.M. to his therapy appointments, and
as a result of the therapy, the CASA has seen substantial improvements in J.M., though
he has some scholastic troubles that warrant further monitoring.
The CASA further testified that appellant did not take care of medical and dental
issues for the children. At the time of removal, J.M. was behind on his shots and needed
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dental work due to neglect. Additionally, the CASA was concerned about appellant’s
habit of leaving the children with others. The children never knew if appellant was
coming back to them. The CASA opined that this is psychologically harmful to the
children. Additionally, the children told the CASA that appellant “was abusive as far as
physically hitting them and yelling at them.”
Vaughn emphasized that appellant’s parental rights to the children should be
terminated and that the current placements for the children are in their best interest. The
CASA agreed that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest of
the children so that they could achieve some stability in their lives.
Despite appellant’s testimony to the contrary, Vaughn testified that appellant has
not tried to contact the children while in jail, nor has she provided the children any
support, financial or otherwise. In fact, appellant has had no contact with B.S. or J.M. in
a year and a half. And because of her incarceration throughout most of this case,
appellant has had one supervised visitation with A.D., which resulted in A.D. crying the
entire time. The CASA characterized the encounter as a “very disruptive visit.”
Regarding this visit, the CASA also noted that appellant was told to visit alone. However,
appellant disregarded this instruction and brought another young person who tried to
participate in the visit as well.
In her testimony, appellant acknowledged that, at the time of removal, she and the
children were living in an apartment with others. This apartment was described as dirty
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and not having the utilities connected. Indeed, the alternative response investigation
supervisor for the Department stated that the allegations at the time of removal were as
such:
At that time, there was allegations of neglectful supervision and sexual
abuse allegations, neglectful supervision for the children, for all five
children with concerns of no running water and no electricity in the home
is what the allegation stated on the report, and that there was concerns of
that there was a sexual relationship between Ms. Jones and a 16 year old
child, [A.D.’s father].
Appellant also admitted that she has been homeless at various periods of time. In all,
appellant has seven children, though only three are the subject of this appeal.
Furthermore, appellant does not know where any of the children are. However, she
claims to know who is taking care of them.
When asked about her future plans to care for the children, appellant provided no
response. Regarding her living situation, appellant stated: “Of course. I have that all
together. But far as job wise, I want to do a few things. . . . But far as job wise, I’m working
on that now.” On cross-examination, appellant stated that she plans to live with her aunt,
Beverly Glaze, whenever she is released from jail.
Finally, as stated above, appellant is currently incarcerated with a maximum
sentence set to expire on December 26, 2022. Appellant hopes to be released on parole in
March 2020, though she has been denied parole previously in November 2018. Moreover,
appellant also has a pending sexual-assault-of-a-child charge that is a second-degree
felony with a sentencing range of two to twenty years in prison. Additionally, there was
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testimony that appellant allowed one of her other children to suffer a head injury and a
burned foot due to her criminal negligence and that appellant engaged in violent
behaviors and made threats of violence, as well as allowed the children to be around
J.M.’s father, whom appellant described a “very aggressive.”
Based on our review of the record, we find that the above-mentioned evidence
supports numerous Holley factors. See 544 S.W.2d at 371-72. We therefore conclude that
the evidence presented was legally and factually sufficient for a factfinder to reasonably
form a firm belief or conviction that termination of appellant’s parental rights was in the
best interest of A.D., B.S., and J.M. See In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; see also In re H.R.M.,
209 S.W.3d at 108; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sixth,
seventh, and eighth issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating appellant’s
parental rights to A.D., B.S., and J.M. in appellate cause numbers 10-19-00411-CV and 10-
19-00412-CV.
JOHN E. NEILL
Justice
In the Interest of A.D., Jr., a child & In the Interest of B.S. & J.M., children Page 19
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
(Chief Justice Gray concurring)
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed August 10, 2020
[CV06]
In the Interest of A.D., Jr., a child & In the Interest of B.S. & J.M., children Page 20