MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 25 2020, 9:03 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Frederick A. Young Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Natalie F. Weiss
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Frederick A. Young, August 25, 2020
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-MI-239
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
Mark Sevier, Indiana Parole The Honorable Kit C. Crane,
Board, Judge
Appellees-Respondents. Trial Court Cause No.
33C02-1911-MI-197
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 1 of 12
[1] Frederick A. Young appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct
error following the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On November 19, 2004, Young was sentenced to thirty-five years for child
molesting as a class A felony1 under cause number 84D03-0410-FA-2757. On
February 26, 2017, Young was released on parole. Young signed State Form
23, a conditional parole release agreement, which listed parole regulations and
stated in part: “I do hereby agree to abide by the following terms and conditions
of parole as established by the Department of Correction and promulgated by
the Indiana Parole Board pursuant to IC 11-9-1-2; IC 11-13-3-4; IC 35-50-6-1.”
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 46. The agreement also stated: “I
understand that any acts of omissions in violation of the terms and conditions
of my parole will subject me to being taken into immediate custody by the
Indiana Parole Board and initiation of proceedings for revocation of my
parole.” Id. Form 23 listed the date of maximum expiration of sentence as
August 27, 2038. Young also signed State Form 49108, which was titled Parole
Stipulations for Sex Offenders and listed certain stipulations.
[3] On May 3, 2017, a Warrant for Retaking Offender was issued alleging Young
violated certain conditions of his release. On May 5, 2017, Young waived his
1
The abstract of judgment cited Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1), which at that time provided: “(a) A person who,
with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
conduct commits child molesting, a Class B felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony if: (1) it is
committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age . . . .”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 2 of 12
right to a preliminary hearing and admitted that he violated his parole by
having contact with minors, possessing personal contact materials, using a
computer or electronic device, possessing or using alcohol or an illegal
substance, and having an unapproved relationship. The Parole Board found
Young guilty of violating his parole and ordered that he be assessed the balance
of his sentence.
[4] On November 4, 2019, Young filed a Class Action Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus against Mark Sevier, the warden of New Castle Corrections, and the
Indiana Parole Board (the “Defendants”) in the Henry Circuit Court under
cause number 33C02-1911-MI-197 (“Cause No. 197”) asserting that State
Forms 23 and 49108 were unconstitutionally vague and he and others were not
provided notice they would lose all or part of their previously earned good time
credits for violating any condition of their parole. On November 13, 2019,
Young filed an Addendum to A Class Action Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. On November 21, 2019, he filed a Motion to Add to Class Action
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On November 25, 2019, Michael Boggs
filed a Motion to Add to Class Action Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under Cause No. 197.
[5] On November 27, 2019, Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to
Petitioners’ Class Action Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. That same day,
the court denied Young’s petition. Specifically, the court’s order states:
The Court, having reviewed Young’s petition, Defendants’
Response, and supporting evidence, and being duly advised in
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 3 of 12
the premises, now DENIES Young’s Petition for the following
reasons:
1. Young’s parole was revoked because he violated parole and
since he plead guilty to a violation of his parole agreement. By
pleading guilty, Young has given up the right to challenge the
revocation of his parole.
2. Young claims that the State Form 23 – Parole Release
Agreement and State Form 49108 – Parole Stipulations for Sex
Offenders are unconstitutionally vague as he was not given
notice that he would lose all or part of his previously earned good
time credits for violating any condition of his parole. (Pet. Pp. 2-
3.) This claim stems from a misunderstanding of credit time. It
is well-established that credit time only determines when a
prisoner is eligible for parole.
3. Thus, Petitioner’s claim that he lost all or part of his credit
time when he violated his parole is incorrect. (Pet. P. 3.) When
a prisoner is released to parole, the prisoner is not deprived of his
earned credit time. Boyd v. Broglin, 519 N.E.2d 541, 543 (Ind.
1988)[, reh’g denied]. Instead, when a prisoner is released to
parole, the prisoner has “received the benefit of his earned credit
time when he was released to parole.” Id. So, State Form 23 –
Parole Release Agreement and State Form 49108 – Parole
Stipulations for Sex Offenders were not unconstitutionally vague.
The forms were not required to explain to Young that he would
lose his credit time because he would not lose his credit time.
4. Lastly, Young tries to bring this Petition as a class action.
The Petition fails for two reasons: first, the Petition is being
denied on substantive grounds, as explained above. Second,
Young would not have met the necessary requirements of
certifying a class, and the burden is on him to prove. McCart v.
Chief Executive Officer in Charge, Independent Federal Credit Union,
652 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)[, reh’g denied, trans.
denied].
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 4 of 12
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by
the court that Young’s petition for writ of habeas corpus relief is
DENIED.
Id. at 58-59.
[6] On December 18, 2019, Young filed a Motion for the Correction of Errors. On
January 3, 2020, Young filed a motion titled: “Seek Leave To Amend Class
Action Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Id. at 77. On January 12, 2020, the court
entered an order denying Young’s motion to correct errors. The order states:
This matter was originally before the court on a petition for writ
of habeas corpus relief filed by petitioner Frederick Young, which
the Court denied. Plaintiff Young then filed a Motion to Correct
Error. Additionally, Plaintiffs William Jackson, Shawn Willett,
and Donald Frye submitted their own motions.[ 2] Defendants,
Mark Sevier and the Indiana Parole Board, by counsel, submitted
their Response in Opposition.
The Court, having reviewed these motions and Defendants’
Response, and being duly advised in the premises, now DENIES
Young’s Petition for the following reasons:
Jackson, Willet, and Frye’s Motions to Add
1. Plaintiffs William Jackson, Shawn Willett, and Donald Frye
have filed a “Motion to Add to Class Action Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.” However, this Court denied Young’s Petition
and never certified a class action lawsuit. Thus, these “Motions”
2
The record does not appear to contain motions filed by Jackson, Willett, or Frye. The trial court spells
Willett as Willet in some places in its order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 5 of 12
are procedurally improper because this cause number belongs to
Plaintiff Frederick Young.
2. Regardless, even if the Court considered these Motions to
Add, they are denied on the substance of the Motion. Jackson,
Willet, and Frye’s claim that the State Form 23 – Parole Release
Agreement and State Form 49108 – Parole Stipulations for Sex
Offenders are unconstitutionally vague as he was not given
notice that he would lose all or part of his previously earned good
time credits for violating any condition of his parole. This claim
stems from a misunderstanding of credit time. It is well-
established that credit time only determines when a prisoner is
eligible for parole.
3. Indiana courts have uniformly interpreted the statutory
scheme to provide that credit time determines a prisoner’s
eligibility for parole and does not shorten or diminish the total
sentence. A prisoner is discharged only when the parole board
orders discharge as required by Indiana Code section 35-50-6-
1(b). Majors v. Broglin, 531 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind. 1988); Boyd v.
Broglin, 519 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. 1988)[, reh’g denied]; State v. Mullins,
647 N.E.2d 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). “The credit time statute is
only applied to determine when felons are eligible for parole.”
Page v. State, 517 N.E.2d 427, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)[, trans.
denied]. The same issue was addressed in Randolph v. Buss, 956
N.E.2d [38] (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, in the context of
credit time allowed under Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3 for
completing educational programs. The Court of Appeals
recently reiterated that credit time is applied to determine when
to release to parole or probation and that the sentence is not
hereby completed. Hart v. State, 889 N.E.2d 1266, 1272 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008). The Northern District of Indiana, in another
context, has noted that the statute permits release of a paroled
prisoner “prior to the expiration of his fixed term of
imprisonment,” Greer v. Duckworth, 555 F. Supp. 725, 729 (N.D.
Ind. 1983), thus acknowledging that credit time does not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 6 of 12
diminish the fixed term and parole does not equate with
expiration of a sentence.
4. Thus, the Petitioners’ claim that they lost all or part of [their]
credit time when they violated their parole is incorrect. (Pet. p.
3.) When a prisoner is released to parole, the prisoner is not
deprived of his earned credit time. Boyd v. Broglin, 519 N.E.2d
541, 543 (Ind. 1988)[, reh’g denied]. Instead, when a prisoner is
released to parole, the prisoner has “received the benefit of his
earned credit time when he was released to parole.” Id. So, State
Form 23 – Parole Release Agreement and State Form 49108 –
Parole Stipulations for Sex Offenders are not unconstitutionally
vague. The forms were not required to explain to Jackson,
Willet, and Frye that they would lose their credit time because
[they] would not lose [their] credit time.
5. For these reasons, William Jackson, Shawn Willett, and
Donald Frye’s “Motion to Add to Class Action Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus” [is] DENIED.
Young’s Motion to Correct Error
6. Young also filed a Motion to Correct Error. The Court will
address each of Young’s arguments individually.
7. First, in Young’s “Statement of the Issues I” and “Good Time
Credits II”, Young reiterates his misunderstanding of credit time,
arguing that credit time entitles prisoners to an early release. But
courts have clearly ruled against Young’s interpretation, as stated
above. “The credit time statute is only applied to determine
when felons are eligible for parole.” Page, 517 N.E.2d at 430.
See also Randolph, 956 N.E.2d at [38], trans. denied; Hart, 889
N.E.2d at 1272. The case law could not be any clearer, and
Young’s interpretation is simply incorrect.
8. Next, in Young’s “Void for Vagueness III” section, Young
argues that the parole release documents must notify of what
conduct would deprive parolees of their earned credit time. But
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 7 of 12
they do not lose credit time. Credit time determines when the
prisoner is released on parole. Once on parole, the offender has
gained the benefit of [his] credit time, not lost it. Young
additionally adds the argument that Indiana Code § 35-50-6-1(d)
[are] unconstitutionally vague. (Motion for Corrections of Error
¶ 13.) But a party may not raise an issue for the first time in a
motion to correct error. Yater v. Hancock County Bd. of Health, 677
N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)[, reh’g denied.]
9. Young then claims that Defendants’ counsel violated 210 IAC
1-6-2 and Indiana Code § 5-14-3-4 by serving Young’s abstract of
judgment to the other named inmates. But Young was the one
that put this into play. Young attempted to name all these other
offenders as Plaintiffs. Thus, under Indiana Rule of Trial
Procedure 5, the Defendants must serve each party with every
motion and brief submitted to the Court. Thus, it was Young’s
action of naming them as parties that required Defendants to
serve this information upon them. Further, an Abstract of
Judgment is a public court record and not confidential.
10. Lastly, Young argues that the Court should have certified the
class action. But Young adds no new argument. And the Court
noted when it denied Young’s Petition, certifying the class would
be futile: all claims are based on a misunderstanding of credit
time.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUGED and DECREED by the
Court that William Jackson, Shawn Willett, and Donald Frye’s
“Motion to Add to Class Action Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus” are DENIED, and that Frederick Young’s Motion to
Correct Errors is DENIED, as is his January 3, [2]020 pleading
entitled Seek Leave to Amend Class Action Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Id. at 79-82.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 8 of 12
Discussion
[7] Before addressing Young’s argument, we observe that although he is
proceeding pro se, such litigants are held to the same standards as trained
attorneys and are afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-
represented. See Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Young
argues “State form 23 nor State form 49108, gives parolees clarity of how much
previously earned credit time they would loss [sic] if they violated any
conditions of their parole,” and “[t]he forms are a standard boiler plate for
every release prisoner to sign and do[] not clearly explain any forfeiture of any
earned credit time.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. He asserts that “the violation of a
parole condition cannot be used as grounds to deprive a parolee of previously
earned credit time, nor may it be the basis for reassignment to a new credit
class.” Id. at 11 (citing Ind. Code §§ 35-50-6-4, -5(a)). He contends that “State
form (23) and State form (49108), deprive[] a[] parolee all of [his] previously
earned good time credits for any technical violation without any such
‘Notice.’” 3 Id. at 12.
[8] Ind. Code § 34-25.5-1-1 provides that “[e]very person whose liberty is
restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus
to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered from the
3
Young includes a footnote which states: “Parole Conditions are not categorized as major or minor
offenses.” Appellant’s Brief at 12 n.2. He asserts that he is not challenging any aspect of parole violation or
revocation of parole. He also does not challenge the trial court’s order that he had not met the necessary
requirements of certifying the petition as a class action.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 9 of 12
restraint if the restraint is illegal.” “The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is
to bring the person in custody before the court for inquiry into the cause of
restraint.” Partlow v. Superintendent, Miami Corr. Facility, 756 N.E.2d 978, 980
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), superseded by statute on other grounds. “One is entitled to
habeas corpus only if he is entitled to his immediate release from unlawful
custody.” Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 139, 374 N.E.2d 496,
498 (1978)). We review the trial court’s habeas decision for an abuse of
discretion. Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Without
reweighing the evidence, this Court considers only that evidence most favorable
to the judgment and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id.
[9] Once incarcerated, “prisoners begin accumulating additional credits which
shorten the length of time they will be kept behind bars.” Miller v. Walker, 655
N.E.2d 47, 48 (Ind. 1995); see also Ind. Code §§ 35-50-6-3 (credit time classes for
a person convicted before July 1, 2014) and -4 (credit time assignments).
“Credit time is a statutory reward for a lack of conduct that is in violation of
institutional rules.” Boyd v. Broglin, 519 N.E.2d 541, 542 (Ind. 1988), reh’g
denied. “It is earned toward release on parole for felons, and does not diminish
the fixed term or affect the date on which a felony offender will be discharged.
Further, release on parole is distinguished from discharge.” Id. (emphasis
added). Credit time is applied to determine a defendant’s release date from
prison but does not reduce the sentence itself. Miller, 655 N.E.2d at 48 n.3.
[10] “When a sex offender (as defined in IC 11-8-8-4.5) completes the sex offender’s
fixed term of imprisonment, less credit time earned with respect to that term,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 10 of 12
the sex offender shall be placed on parole for not more than ten (10) years.” 4
When a person who is a sexually violent predator under IC 35-38-1-7.5
“completes the person’s fixed term of imprisonment, less credit time earned
with respect to that term, the person shall be placed on parole for the remainder
of the person’s life.” 5 Ind. Code § 35-50-6-1(e). “A person whose parole is
revoked shall be imprisoned for all or part of the remainder of the person’s fixed
term. However, the person shall again be released on parole when the person
completes that remainder, less the credit time the person has earned since the
revocation.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-1(c).
[11] We note that Young does not develop an argument or cite to the record to
indicate what credit time he has earned. Further, the record reveals that Young
was sentenced on November 19, 2004, to thirty-five years for child molesting as
a class A felony with 448 days of jail time credit. Thus, Young effectively
began his sentence on approximately August 29, 2003. Thirty-five years from
that date is approximately August 29, 2038. As noted, credit time simply
shortens a fixed executed sentence for release to parole, it does not reduce
Young’s thirty-five year sentence itself, which does not end until 2038.
Accordingly, Young was not entitled to immediate release because his sentence
4
Ind. Code § 11-8-8-4.5 defines a “sex offender” as “a person convicted of . . . [c]hild molesting (IC 35-42-4-
3).”
5
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.5 provides: “A person who: (1) being at least eighteen (18) years of age, commits an
offense described in . . . IC 35-42-4-3 as a Class A or Class B felony (for a crime committed before July 1,
2014) . . . is a sexually violent predator.” Young does not specifically assert whether he is a sex offender or a
sexually violent predator.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 11 of 12
has not expired. See Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(rejecting petitioner’s argument that the parole revocation improperly deprived
him of his earned credit time and holding that “his early release does not mean
that [he] had completed his sentence and was entitled to discharge” and that
“[r]ather, the credit time statutes are only applied to determine when felons are
eligible for parole”), trans. denied; see also Boyd, 519 N.E.2d at 543 (noting that
the defendant received the benefit of earned credit time when he was released to
parole and he was not, therefore, deprived of his earned credit time).
[12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
[13] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-MI-239 | August 25, 2020 Page 12 of 12