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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-12595
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:17-cv-60746-WPD
HENRY WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(August 31, 2020)
Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Henry Williams (“Williams”), a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s
order sua sponte dismissing his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas
corpus as untimely and, in the alternative, denying his petition on the merits. We
granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on whether the district court erred in:
1) sua sponte dismissing Williams’s petition as time-barred and unexcused by
equitable tolling by taking judicial notice of electronic copies of certain state court
records rather than reviewing the official state court record; and 2) alternatively, sua
sponte denying Williams’s claims on the merits by taking judicial notice of
electronic copies of additional state court records rather than reviewing the official
state court record. After the parties’ briefing was completed, we stayed the appellate
proceedings in this case pending our decision in Paez v. Secretary, Florida
Department of Corrections, 947 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. petition filed, No.
19-8674 (May 13, 2020). Now, with the benefit of that decision and after careful
consideration, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 2017, Williams filed a pro se § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus
(the “petition”) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. On
May 19, 2017, the magistrate judge, without requiring a response to the petition,
issued a Report of Magistrate Judge (the “Report and Recommendation”)
recommending that Williams’s petition be dismissed as time barred. In considering
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Williams’s petition, the magistrate judge took judicial notice, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 201, of online dockets and electronically filed papers from
Williams’s underlying state court criminal proceedings. By separate order, the
magistrate judge made those state court records part of the district court record.
Williams filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. Williams
challenged the magistrate judge’s analysis but did not dispute the accuracy of the
judicially noticed state court records or ask to be heard on the taking of judicial
notice. Rather, his sole objection was that his § 2254 petition was timely because,
under the mailbox rule, it should have been deemed filed as of April 13, 2017.
On May 19, 2017, over Williams’s objections, the district court adopted in
part the Report and Recommendation. In doing so, he credited Williams’s claim that
his petition had been filed on April 13, 2017. Relying on the state court records
judicially noticed by the magistrate judge, the district court concluded that
Williams’s petition was time barred, although based on different reasoning than
recommended by the magistrate judge, and dismissed the petition. In particular, the
district judge determined that Williams’s conviction became final on May 8, 2013,
when he failed to file an appeal from his no-contest plea 1 and sentence on his original
1
Originally, the district court referred to the plea as a guilty plea, but Williams objected in
his Motion for Rehearing before the district court, noting that it was a no-contest plea. In a
subsequent order, the district court corrected its ruling to reflect that Williams entered a no-contest
plea.
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judgment imposed on April 8, 2013. The district court reasoned that Williams
challenged only his original conviction (listing as grounds for his petition claims
such as ineffective assistance of counsel in advising him to plead guilty and in failing
to file a suppression motion) and raised no claims against his probation revocation,
which occurred after his original conviction became final. Therefore, the statute of
limitations expired on April 8, 2014, since Williams did not appeal the original
conviction. And as a result, the district court explained, even under the mailbox rule,
Williams’s April 13, 2017, filing could not be timely. Alternatively, the district
court denied Williams’s petition on the merits. In reaching its alternative ruling, the
district court took judicial notice of additional electronically-filed papers and
transcripts from Williams’s underlying state court criminal proceedings, which the
district court made part of the record.
After filing a notice of appeal in this Court, Williams filed a motion for
rehearing in the district court. Notably, Williams’s motion did not dispute the
accuracy of the judicially-noticed state court records relied upon in determining that
his petition was untimely, nor did Williams ask to be heard on the issue of taking
judicial notice. Additionally, Williams’s motion did not dispute the district court’s
conclusion that his petition was time barred or, indeed, make any argument regarding
the timeliness of his petition. The district court denied the motion for rehearing and
specifically noted that that the records it had relied upon had been sent to Williams.
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A judge of this Court subsequently granted Williams a COA, and this appeal
ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion a “district court’s decision to take judicial
notice of a fact.” Paez, 947 F.3d at 651. We also review for abuse of discretion “a
district court’s decision to sua sponte raise the statute of limitations.” Id.; accord
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Williams argues that the district court erred in sua sponte
dismissing his petition as untimely by taking judicial notice of online state court
records and without ordering a response from the respondent, the Department of
Corrections (the “Department”). We find Williams’s argument foreclosed by Paez.
Regarding the issue of judicial notice, Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits
a court to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it
. . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). “State court records of an
inmate’s postconviction proceedings generally satisfy this standard.” Paez, 947 F.3d
at 651.
In Paez, the magistrate judge took judicial notice of dates contained in online
state court dockets for Paez’s state criminal cases in making a sua sponte
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recommendation that Paez’s § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed
as untimely, and the district court adopted that recommendation. Id. On appeal, this
Court determined that dates in the state-court online dockets were facts properly
subject to judicial notice. Id. at 651–52. Although we cautioned that taking judicial
notice is a “highly limited process” because it “bypasses the safeguards which are
involved with the usual process of proving facts by competent evidence in district
court,” we concluded that proper safeguards were met in Paez because the judicially
noticed documents were made part of the court record, Paez had the opportunity to
object to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, Paez did not ask to be
heard on the issue of judicial notice, and Paez did not dispute the accuracy of the
docket entries at issue or give any indication that he lacked the ability to dispute the
docket sheets due to lack of access. Id. at 652–53. Thus, the district court in Paez
did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of dates in the state court dockets.
Id. at 653.
Regarding the issue of dismissing the petition without ordering a response,
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings “requires district courts to
dismiss § 2254 petitions without ordering the State to respond ‘[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief.’”2 Id. (quoting Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, R. 4). In Paez, this Court held
2
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides, in relevant part:
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that Rule 4 authorizes sua sponte dismissal for untimeliness as long as the petitioner
has “notice and opportunity to explain why his petition was timely.” Id. at 655. We
found that Paez was provided “ample notice and opportunity to explain why his
petition was timely in his form petition and again when he was given the opportunity
to respond to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation that his petition
be summarily dismissed as untimely.” Id. We also noted that the state was “notified
of the court’s action and had an opportunity to respond,” but remained silent and did
not indicate a desire to waive the timeliness defense. Id. We therefore concluded
that the district court did not abuse it discretion in sua sponte dismissing the petition
for untimeliness without ordering a response. Id.
Here, as in Paez, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sua sponte
dismissing Williams’s petition as untimely after taking judicial notice of online state
court dockets and filings and without requiring a response from the Department.
First, the dates contained in the online docket entries and filings from Williams’s
state court proceedings constitute judicially noticeable facts, see id. at 651–62, and
the district court followed proper safeguards in taking judicial notice of them. The
If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner
is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and
direct the clerk to notify the petitioner. If the petition is not dismissed, the judge
must order the respondent to file an answer, motion, or other response within a
fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order. In every case, the clerk
must serve a copy of the petition and any order on the respondent and on the
attorney general or other appropriate officer of the state involved.
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state court records were made part of the district court record. Williams had two
opportunities to object to and ask to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial
notice of these records—first, when he filed his objections to the magistrate judge’s
Report and Recommendation and, again, when he filed his motion for rehearing on
the district court’s order—and in neither instance did Williams dispute the accuracy
of the records or otherwise ask to be heard on the issue of taking judicial notice. We
therefore find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial
notice of the state court records.
Second, Williams was provided notice and an opportunity to explain why his
petition was timely, not only when he filed the petition itself but also when he filed
his objections to the Report and Recommendation and his motion for rehearing on
the district court’s order. Similarly, the record shows that the Department was
notified of the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation but remained silent,
thus not indicating an intent to waive the timeliness defense. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing
the petition as untimely.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Williams’s petition as
time barred and need not address the district court’s denial of the petition on the
merits in the alternative.
AFFIRMED.
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