J-A19045-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN :
:
Appellant : No. 3021 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered October 21, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007870-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 8, 2020
Michael McLaughlin (Appellant) takes this counseled appeal from the
order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing
his first, timely petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act1
(PCRA). On appeal, Appellant argues direct appeal counsel rendered
ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the trial court’s admission of
photographs of the victim’s injuries. Because we conclude Appellant is no
longer serving a sentence, and therefore is not entitled to PCRA relief, we
affirm.2
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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
2 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i).
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The facts presented at trial were summarized by the PCRA court as
follows:
On July 3, 2015, Appellant . . . . had an argument with his
neighbor, John Wallace [(the victim)], in the communal kitchen of
their home. During this argument, Appellant threw the contents
of a cup at [the victim], at which point [the victim] grabbed
Appellant around the waist. Appellant then hit [the victim]
repeatedly with his cup, striking him in the head and causing
multiple lacerations to the victim’s face and head. . . . [The victim]
was taken to the hospital, where he received nine surgical staples
to his head. Police who interviewed Appellant noted that he had
no visible injuries. . . .
PCRA Ct. Op. 12/23/19, at 1.
On March 21, 2016, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial. The victim,
“though present at trial, did not testify.” Commonwealth v. McLaughlin,
3453 EDA 2016 (unpub. memo. at 2) (Pa. Super. Aug. 28, 2017). The victim
suffered from mental illness, a diminished mental capacity, and “a significant
speech impediment.” Id. Appellant raised self-defense and testified on his
own behalf.
Appellant was found guilty of possessing an instrument of crime (PIC)
and recklessly endangering another person (REAP).3 On that same date,
March 21, 2016, the trial court imposed two years of probation for REAP,
followed by a consecutive two years of probation for PIC. The aggregate
sentence was four years of probation.
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3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 907, 2705.
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Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on March 31, 2016. On October
25, 2016, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition seeking reinstatement of his
appellate rights. On that same day, however, Appellant’s post-sentence
motion was denied by operation of law. On October 29, 2016, Appellant filed
a timely notice of appeal. On December 22, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to
withdraw his PCRA petition because it was prematurely filed. On February 25,
2017, Appellant’s PCRA petition was dismissed. On August 28, 2017, the
Superior Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth
v. McLaughlin, 3453 EDA 2016 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Aug. 28, 2017).
Appellant filed a pro se timely PCRA petition on September 20, 2017,
and a supplemental petition one week later. PCRA Ct. Op. at 2. In the
supplemental petition, Appellant claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for
failure to call fact witnesses and failure to meet certain discovery obligations
prior to trial. Appellant’s Amendment to the Prior Petition, 9/27/17, at 4-9.
The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition
on May 18, 2018. In the amended petition, Appellant argued that trial counsel
was ineffective for “failing to call a fact witness, who would have attested to
the [victim/s] propensity of violence, in support of [Appellant’s] self-defense/
justification claim.” Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 5/18/18, at 3. On
August 5, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to Appellant’s
petition. On September 16, 2019, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent
to dismiss the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court formally denied Appellant’s petition on
October 21, 2019.
On October 23, 2019, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On
November 6, 2019, the PCRA court directed Appellant to file a concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant complied, and filed a concise statement on November 19, 2019.4
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Whether Appellant’s prior appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel, which prejudiced Appellant’s right to a fair
appeal and forfeited his right to a new trial, when he failed to raise
issues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to bar admission of photographs depicting alleged injuries of
Complainant, which were not provided to the Defense prior to trial
though such evidence constituted mandatory discovery which the
Commonwealth was required to disclose, and the evidence was
inflammatory without any probative value[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 5. Here, Appellant claims that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to allege that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted photographs of the complainant’s injuries. Id. Appellant argues that
because the trial court admitted these photos, his right to a fair trial was
prejudiced. Id. at 10. Appellant claims that the evidence should have been
excluded because the photographs “had no probative value, as Appellant did
not deny hitting [the victim] and was presenting a justification defense, which
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4 In its opinion, the PCRA court explained that although Appellant raised
several issues in his PCRA petition, his Rule 1925(b) statement only presented
one issue.
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did not hinge on the extent of the victim’s non-lethal injuries.” Id. at 12-13.
Appellant argues that his judgment of sentence should be vacated and he
should be granted a new trial. Id. at 13.
The statutory requirements for eligibility for post-conviction collateral
relief are set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543, which states, in relevant part:
(a) General rule. To be eligible for relief under this subchapter,
the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the
evidence all of the following:
(1) That the petitioner has been convicted of a crime under
the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is
granted:
(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment,
probation or parole for the crime[.]
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). Case law has strictly interpreted the requirement
that the petitioner be currently serving a sentence for the crime to be eligible
for relief.
Here, the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving
his sentence is required by the plain language of the statute. To
be eligible for relief a petitioner must be currently serving a
sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole. To grant relief at
a time when appellant is not currently serving such a sentence
would be to ignore the language of the statute.
Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997) (emphasis in
original).
In Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 151 A.3d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2016), the
defendant was serving his sentence when he filed a timely PCRA petition, and
when the PCRA court denied it based on lack of merit. Id. at 1112. However,
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by the time this Court reviewed his appeal, the defendant was no longer
serving the sentence. Id. at 1108, 1112. This Court held that in order to
seek relief, a PCRA petitioner must be currently serving a sentence. Id. at
1109-1110. This Court thus concluded the defendant lacked standing to seek,
and was not entitled to, PCRA relief. Id. at 1108-09.
Here, Appellant was sentenced on March 21, 2016, to an aggregate term
of four years of probation. That sentence expired on March 21, 2020, and as
of this writing, Appellant has served the entirety of his sentence. The PCRA
requires that a petitioner be serving their sentence at the time relief is
granted. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, we conclude Appellant
is no longer eligible for PCRA relief. See Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720; Plunkett,
151 A.3d at 1109-1110. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA
petition, albeit on different grounds.5
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/08/2020
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5 “We may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if it is supported by
the record.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super.
2010).
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