NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HECTOR ARMANDO ESCOTO-DERAS, No. 14-73872
Petitioner, Agency No. A078-968-977
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted September 08, 2020**
Before: SCHROEDER, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Hector Armando Escoto-Deras, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his
appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his applications for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Torture (“CAT”).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions
of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the
extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes
and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We also
review de novo whether a petitioner has been afforded due process. Ibarra-Flores
v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006). We review for substantial
evidence the agency’s factual findings. We deny the petition for review.
Even assuming the credibility of Escoto-Deras’s testimony, substantial
evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Escoto-Deras failed to establish he
was or would be persecuted on account of a protected ground. See Zetino v.
Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from
harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members
bears no nexus to a protected ground”); Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048,
1051-52 (9th Cir. 2001) (personal retribution is not persecution on account of a
protected ground). Accordingly, Escoto-Deras’ asylum and withholding of
removal claims fail.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection
because Escoto-Deras failed to show it is more likely than not he will be tortured
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by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Honduras.
See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009).
Escoto-Deras’ challenge to the IJ’s failure to administratively close his case
also fails. Even assuming that the standard in Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec.
688 (BIA 2012) applies,1 the record before the IJ did not support administrative
closure. See Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2018)
(assessing whether administrative closure is appropriate with reference to the non-
exhaustive list of six factors articulated in Avetisyan); Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. at
696 (cautioning that administrative closure is not appropriate “if the request is
based on a purely speculative event or action”).
Finally, we are not persuaded by Escoto-Deras’s contention that the agency
violated his due process rights. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir.
2000).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
1
In May 2018, the Attorney General issued an opinion overruling Avetisyan
and clarifying that “immigration judges and the Board may only administratively
close a case where a previous regulation or a previous judicially approved
settlement expressly authorizes such an action.” Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 271, 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
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