Hess v. Hobart

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 17, 2020

2020COA139

No. 19CA0661, Hess v. Hobart — Real Property — Mineral
Estates

A division of the court of appeals considers whether a

reservation of “a life estate in all mineral rights” in a deed and

purchase contract is ambiguous, and what rights are conferred by

the plain language.

The division concludes the phrase “a life estate in all mineral

rights” is unambiguous and confers on the life tenant all mineral

rights that may be associated with the minerals, including the

power to enter oil and gas leases without consent of the

remaindermen and to retain all income from those leases.

The division also concludes that the common law open mines

doctrine and the Uniform Principal and Income Act of 1955,

sections 15-1-451 to -467, C.R.S. 2019, do not apply in this case to
adjust the division of income payments that may be gained from the

minerals, such as income from an oil and gas lease, between the life

tenant and remaindermen.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA139

Court of Appeals No. 19CA0661
Weld County District Court No. 18CV30978
Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge

Troy Hess and Shana Hess,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Judith Ann Hobart,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Johnson and Vogt*, JJ., concur

Announced September 17, 2020

Chipman Glasser, LLC, Rin Karns, Denver, Colorado; McDonough Law, LLC,
Crystal McDonough, Loveland, Colorado; D. Scott Slawson, Timnath, Colorado,
for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Peters Schulte Odil & Wallshein, LLC, Jennifer L. Peters, Nathaniel Wallshein,
Greeley, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3) and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2019.
¶1 In this dispute concerning the reservation of a life estate in “all

mineral rights” in a deed and contract, plaintiffs, Troy and Shana

Hess (the Hesses), appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing

their complaint against defendant, Judith Ann Hobart.

¶2 Because we conclude that the purchase contract and the deed

unambiguously reserved a life estate in all mineral rights to Hobart,

including the power to enter into oil and gas leases without the

consent of the Hesses and to retain all the income from those

leases, we affirm the dismissal of the Hesses’ action.

I. Background

¶3 This dispute involves mineral interests in Weld County. On

February 17, 2005, the Hesses entered into a contract with Hobart

to buy and sell real estate, pursuant to which the Hesses purchased

160 acres of vacant land from Hobart. The contract contained a

provision that “[s]eller [Hobart] reserve[d] a life estate in all mineral

rights on the property including, but not limited to all oil, gas,

hydrocarbons, and any other minerals.” On February 25, 2005,

Hobart conveyed the land to the Hesses by warranty deed. The

deed contained a reservation clause, which stated, as relevant here,

“except grantor [Hobart] reserves a life estate in all mineral rights

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 on the property including but not limited to all oil, gas,

hydrocarbons and any other minerals.”

¶4 Following the sale, the Hesses alleged the following in their

amended complaint: (1) Hobart had entered into three oil and gas

leases and was negotiating a fourth; (2) in 2010, Hobart signed a

lease with Hoover & Stacy, Inc.1; (3) on September 20, 2010, the

Hesses signed a letter ratifying the Hoover & Stacy lease,2 having

been advised by Hoover & Stacy that the Hesses were not entitled to

any income from the lease; (4) in 2014, Hobart signed a lease with

Extraction Oil and Gas, LLC; (5) in 2018, Hobart signed a lease with

Bur Oak Oil and Gas, LLC; (6) the Hesses did not ratify the last two

leases, alleging they were unaware of the leases and did not

negotiate or agree to the leases’ terms; and (7) in 2018, the Hesses

became aware that Hobart was negotiating a fourth lease with Edge

Energy, LLC.

¶5 In May 2017, the Hesses had a “chance conversation with a

landman in the Weld County Clerk and Recorder’s Office,” where

1 Hoover & Stacy, Inc. is a land company that deals with oil and gas
leases.

2 The ratification letter is not in the record on appeal.

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 they learned they might possess rights to income and bonuses as

remaindermen of Hobart’s life estate in the minerals.

¶6 As a result, in October 2018, the Hesses brought multiple

claims against Hobart: (1) declaratory judgment to clarify their

property ownership rights; (2) declaratory judgment to clarify their

rights in the Bur Oak lease; (3) breach of fiduciary duty in violation

of the Uniform Principal and Income Act of 1955 (UPIA), sections

15-1-451 to -467, C.R.S. 2019; (4) conversion; (5) civil theft; (6)

fraud; (7) negligence; (8) breach of contract; (9) breach of fiduciary

duty (constructive trust); and (10) accounting.

¶7 The district court granted Hobart’s motion to dismiss the

Hesses’ amended complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). In a thorough,

well-reasoned opinion, the district court found the deed

unambiguously conveyed a life estate in the mineral interests to

Hobart:

Defendant [Hobart] reserved “all mineral
rights”. . . . This is expansive language that
conveys neither limitation nor surrender of
rights in the mineral interest.

....

[T]he provisions contain no ambiguity. Again,
[Hobart] reserved “all mineral rights,” which

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 includes the right to explore, drill, and enter
leases to develop the Property’s minerals.
There is no question of whether . . . oil and gas
are minerals, whether development is a
mineral right, or whether “all” means less than
all. Although the reservation’s brevity may
have come at the expense of some litigation, it
was clear, nonetheless.

The district court further held, based on the language of the deed,

that Hobart was not required to seek the Hesses’ consent prior to

entering into any oil and gas leases and could dispose of the

mineral interests as she saw fit.

II. Interpretation of the Phrase “All Mineral Rights”

¶8 On appeal, the Hesses contend the district court erred in

dismissing the complaint because it ignored their rights under

various principles of oil and gas law. They argue, for example, that

the UPIA and the open mines doctrine give them a cause of action

against Hobart for “wasting” the life estate’s corpus without

permission, absent an explicit agreement to the contrary.3

3“Waste is injury to the reversionary interest in land caused by the
wrongful act of one lawfully in possession.” In re Estate of Downing,
461 S.W.3d 231, 240 (Tex. App. 2015); see also Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Mars, 821 P.2d 826, 831 (Colo. App. 1991).

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¶9 Hobart responds that the phrase “a life estate in all mineral

rights” is unambiguous that the UPIA does not apply because it

addresses only situations arising in the trusts and estates context,

not the deed or contract between the parties here; and that the

open mines doctrine does not override the parties’ agreements in

the deed and the contract for purchase and sale.4

¶ 10 As explained below, we conclude that the phrase “a life estate

in all mineral rights” unambiguously conveys a life estate in exactly

that to Hobart, and that the broad language does not contemplate

any surrender of those rights to the Hesses, or any sharing of

income with the Hesses that Hobart receives from minerals during

her life.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5)

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Bewley v. Semler,

2018 CO 79, ¶ 14, 432 P.3d 582, 586. In doing so, we accept all

factual allegations in the complaint as true, viewing them in a light

4Because it was not raised by the parties, we need not address
whether the purchase contract terms merged into the warranty
deed. See Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407, 412 (Colo. App. 1992).

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 most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. Similarly, we accept as true

factual allegations set forth in documents attached to or referenced

by the complaint. Prospect Dev. Co., Inc. v. Holland & Knight, LLP,

2018 COA 107, ¶ 11, 433 P.3d 146, 149. To survive a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must state a claim for

relief that is plausible (not speculative) on its face. See, e.g., Gandy

v. Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 22, 461 P.3d 575, 582-83; see also

Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 24, 373 P.3d 588, 595.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 12 We review de novo the interpretation of both a deed, Owens v.

Tergeson, 2015 COA 164, ¶ 17, 363 P.3d 826, 830, and the

interpretation of a contract, Klun v. Klun, 2019 CO 46, ¶ 18, 442

P.3d 88, 92 (citing Ad Two, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver ex rel.

Manager of Aviation, 9 P.3d 373, 376 (Colo. 2000)).

¶ 13 There are several considerations when interpreting a contract:

(1) a court’s primary goal is to determine and give effect to the

parties’ intent; (2) if possible, that intent is to be determined from

the language of the contract itself; (3) if the language of the contract

is unambiguous, it will be deemed to express the intent of the

parties; and (4) the contract’s plain meaning will be enforced as

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 written. See Klun, ¶ 18, 442 P.3d at 92. Extrinsic evidence may be

used to review the surrounding circumstances and to determine

whether an ambiguity exists in a contract, just as with a deed. See

Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 381.

¶ 14 Like contracts, deeds are generally construed in accordance

with the general rules of construction of written instruments.

Owens, ¶ 15, 363 P.3d at 830. Thus, if a deed is unambiguous, its

terms must be enforced as written. Id.

¶ 15 In determining whether an ambiguity exists in the first

instance, we examine the instrument’s language, giving the words

employed their plain and generally accepted meanings. Meyerstein

v. City of Aspen, 282 P.3d 456, 468 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 16 A life estate can be created by valid deed, contract, or lease.

Moss v. Moss, 175 P.3d 971, 974 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007); see also

§ 38-30-101, C.R.S. 2019 (allowing any person entitled to hold real

estate to be authorized to convey it “by deed”); Kendall v. Wiles, 483

P.2d 388, 389 (Colo. App. 1971) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.

35(f)) (“A life estate may be created by a present conveyance to the

grantee, reserving to the grantor a life estate. The reservation

should appear in the deed as an exclusion . . . .”) (emphasis added).

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 No particular words are necessary to create a life estate because

courts look to the intentions of the parties to the deed. See 31

C.J.S. Estates § 38, Westlaw (database updated June 2020); see

also Keith v. Kinney, 140 P.3d 141, 146 (Colo. App. 2005) (“Our

paramount purpose in construing any deed is to ascertain the

parties’ intent.”).

¶ 17 In conveyances of real property, it is common for a property

owner to sever and separately convey the minerals from the surface,

creating separate and distinct estates. See Notch Mountain, 898

P.2d at 556. A life estate is an acceptable means to convey a

mineral interest. See Keller Cattle Co. v. Allison, 55 P.3d 257, 262

(Colo. App. 2002) (“The duration of a mineral interest is like that of

common law estates, namely, in fee simple, in fee simple

determinable, for life, or for a fixed term of years.”).

C. Analysis

¶ 18 We conclude that the plain language in the deed and contract

unambiguously reserved a life estate in “all mineral rights” to

Hobart, meaning that Hobart has the right to produce the minerals

without consent of the Hesses and to retain all income from them.

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¶ 19 The plain language of the deed and contract is unambiguous.

As noted by the district court, “there is no question” as to “whether

‘all’ means less than all.” “All” is an unambiguous term. See City of

Grand Junction v. Ute Water Conservancy Dist., 900 P.2d 81, 91

(Colo. 1995); see also Hudgeons v. Tenneco Oil Co., 796 P.2d 21, 23

(Colo. App. 1990) (“‘All’ is an unambiguous term and means the

whole of, the whole number or sum of, or every member or

individual component of, and is synonymous with ‘every’ and

‘each.’”). Therefore, whatever mineral rights pertained to Hobart’s

reservation of a life estate, all of them are available to Hobart.

¶ 20 Unfortunately for the Hesses, “all” rights include “the right to

enter the land to explore, drill, produce, and otherwise carry on

mining activities,” as stated in Keller Cattle Co., 55 P.3d at 262.

The Hesses argue that Hobart’s right to carry on mining activities is

modified by her reservation of a life estate. However, while a life

estate indeed limits her rights to her lifetime, during that lifetime

she possesses “all mineral rights.” See Moeller, ¶ 16, ___ P.3d at ___

(“A conveyance of real property, which is generally defined and

designated in the deed’s granting clause, passes all title to the land

and the underlying mineral deposits, except those interests explicitly

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 held back.” (citing O’Brien v. Vill. Land Co., 794 P.2d 246, 249-51

(Colo. 1990))) (emphasis added).

¶ 21 In light of our conclusion that the language here is

unambiguous, we need not engage in further examination of the

surrounding circumstances. See Lazy Dog, 965 P.2d at 1236.

¶ 22 The Hesses contend that, notwithstanding the unambiguous

language in the deed and contract, because an explicit agreement

as to division of income from the produced minerals was never

made, the open mines doctrine and Colorado’s UPIA “fill in” the

gaps in the deed. However, based on our holding that the plain

language is unambiguous, we necessarily reject the Hesses’

arguments concerning the open mines doctrine, the UPIA, the

general practice of dividing rights between a life tenant and

remaindermen, and that an agreement was never made. We

disagree with the Hesses for four reasons.

¶ 23 First, the common law open mines doctrine dictates that

“when a [mineral] lease is in existence at the time the life estate is

created, the life tenant and the remainderman take the property in

the condition that existed at the time of the creation of the estate”

(i.e., “[t]he life tenant is entitled to the royalties from the lands

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 during his or her life time”). Angela L. Franklin & David B. Hatch,

Dotting Your I’s and Crossing Your T’s: Ensuring Proper Payment and

Execution, 3 Rocky Mountain Min. L. Inst. 3, 3-22 (2018); see also

Welborn v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 217 F.2d 509, 511-12

(10th Cir. 1954); Reese v. Reese-Young, 938 N.W.2d 405, 411-12

(N.D. 2020) (adopting the open mines doctrine by statute and

discussing its existence in other jurisdictions). The Hesses

maintain that the converse of the open mines doctrine applies here

— that because no leases existed when Hobart reserved her life

estate, she was not entitled to any income from mineral leases

entered after the life estate was created.

¶ 24 However, the open mines doctrine applies only when a lease is

created before the creation of the life estate, a factual situation that

indisputably does not exist here.

¶ 25 Second, the Hesses argue that the UPIA applies because the

UPIA contemplates divisions of income payments between life

tenants and remaindermen regarding mineral production. We

disagree. Rather, we agree with the district court that the UPIA

applies only in the context of wills, trusts, and estates. We note in

this regard that the UPIA is in title 15, which deals with those

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 subjects, not in title 38, which addresses principles of real property

law. Significantly, the Hesses have not cited any authority to the

contrary.

¶ 26 Third, we are not persuaded by the Hesses’ contention that the

general rule of dividing rights and income between a life tenant and

remaindermen applies here.

¶ 27 While contracting parties commonly divide rights between the

life tenant and the remaindermen, that was not done here. As one

commentator has noted, “[b]y far the simplest solution to this

problem is to obtain a stipulation from the holders of the present

and future estates setting forth with clarity the manner in which

these payments are to be divided.” 1B Stephen A. Hess, Colorado

Practice Series: Methods of Practice § 11:2, Westlaw (7th ed.

database updated June 2020); see also Hobson v. Cimarex Energy

Co., 453 P.3d 482, 485 (Okla. 2019) (Kauger, J., specially

concurring) (acknowledging “that grantors can avoid this problem

by ensuring the document creating the life estate restricts the part

of the remainderman. . . . The person conveying the life estate has

great discretion in any conditions [he or she] wish[es] to

attach . . .”). Because the parties here did not agree to a division of

12
 mineral rights, the general practice is irrelevant. Instead, we

enforce the contract according to its plain language.

¶ 28 Finally, the Hesses contend that each oil and gas lease made

subsequent to the deed, except for the one they ratified, was made

without their permission, and because there was no agreement to

that effect, the Hesses are entitled to obtain damages for waste.

Again, we disagree.

¶ 29 When a life estate is created, it is incumbent upon the life

tenant to avoid wasting the estate’s corpus to the detriment of the

remaindermen. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mars, 821 P.2d

826, 831 (Colo. App. 1991). Waste originally “referred to any

unauthorized destruction or severance of improvements, trees,

minerals, or other corporeal hereditaments on or from the land.” Id.

The concept has evolved into a legal means by which any

concurrent nonpossessory holder of an interest in land may prevent

or restrain harm to land by the party in possession, such as in a life

tenant and remainderman relationship, as here. See id.

¶ 30 Thus, as a rule, the life tenant must not waste the mineral

interests to prevent the remaindermen from also enjoying the

13
 mineral interests when they come into possession. Id.; see also In

re Estate of Downing, 461 S.W.3d 231, 240 (Tex. App. 2015).

¶ 31 However, especially in the oil and gas context, life tenants and

remaindermen often agree to alter the rule. For example, “[a] life

tenant and the remainderman may lease the land by a joint lease[,]

and they may agree as to the division of the rents and royalties.”

Welborn, 217 F.2d at 510 (footnote omitted). “In the absence of

such an agreement, the life tenant is not entitled to any part of the

royalties, but is entitled only to the income from such royalties.” Id.

Here, however, there was no agreement that “all mineral rights”

would mean something less than all.

III. C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) Motion

¶ 32 All ten causes of actions brought by the Hesses rest entirely on

their contention that no explicit agreement was made as to division

of income from the mineral production reserved in Hobart’s life

estate. However, as we have concluded, the deed and contract

unambiguously give Hobart unfettered rights concerning the

minerals during her life tenancy. Therefore, the district court

properly dismissed the Hesses’ claims.

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¶ 33 For the Hesses’ first and second claims of declaratory

judgment regarding their ownership in the mineral interests, they

do not have any rights that may be exercised until the life estate

ends and they come into possession, because “all mineral rights”

belong to Hobart for the duration of her life.5

¶ 34 Next, Hobart cannot be acting illegally if she has full rights to

produce the minerals during her lifetime. Therefore, she could not

be in breach of any fiduciary duty under the UPIA (even if it

applied); and she cannot be liable for conversion, theft, fraud,

negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty requiring a

constructive trust, or an accounting.

¶ 35 As a matter of law, there are no plausible claims here, and the

district court therefore did not err by dismissing the Hesses’ claims

under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).

5 Other courts in Colorado have held that when the court rules
against the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action, the court
should enter a declaratory judgment rather than sustain a motion
to dismiss. See, e.g., Karsh v. City & Cty. of Denver, 176 Colo. 406,
409-10, 490 P.2d 936, 938 (1971); Martinez v. Colo. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 97 P.3d 152, 156 (Colo. App. 2003). However, we need not
decide whether the district court should have done so here, as the
result of entering a declaratory judgment would have been the same
as dismissal of the Hobarts’ claim.

15
 IV. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 36 As a final matter, Hobart requests appellate attorney fees,

primarily because the contract signed by the parties contains a

provision awarding costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party.

Section 18(c) of the contract states, “[i]n the event of any arbitration

or litigation relating to the contract, the arbitrator or court shall

award to the prevailing party all reasonable costs and expenses,

including attorney fees.” The Hesses do not dispute the contract’s

provision, stating only that the applicability of this provision

depends on the outcome of this appeal.

¶ 37 Hobart further urges us to grant an award of attorney fees and

costs under section 13-17-201, C.R.S. 2019, for a successful

defense against a tort action, and under section 13-17-102, C.R.S.

2019, for the Hesses’ claim having lacked substantial justification.

¶ 38 We need not determine whether Hobart is entitled to attorney

fees and costs under either statute because Hobart is entitled to

reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs by virtue of the parties’

contract.

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 V. Conclusion

¶ 39 The district court’s judgment of dismissal under C.R.C.P.

12(b)(5) is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the district court

to determine the amount of Hobart’s reasonable appellate attorney

fees on appeal.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE VOGT concur.

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