In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.B. (Minor Child) and C.L. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 18 2020, 9:01 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Stone IV Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary September 18, 2020
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of A.B. (Minor 20A-JT-401
Child) Appeal from the Madison Circuit
and Court
The Honorable G. George Pancol,
C.L. (Mother), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, Trial Court Cause No.
48C02-1904-JT-189
v.

Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

Crone, Judge.

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 Case Summary
[1] C.L. (Mother) appeals an order involuntarily terminating her parent-child

relationship with A.B. (Child). She claims that several of the trial court’s

findings are not proper findings. She also asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting her drug screen results and challenges the sufficiency of

the evidence to support the termination order. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born in April 2013 and is the son of Mother and M.B. (Father). 1 At

birth, Child had drugs in his system and had to remain hospitalized for about a

month. Upon Child’s discharge, the Indiana Department of Child Services

(DCS) removed him from Mother and placed him with Father in the paternal

grandmother’s home. DCS filed a petition to have Child adjudicated a child in

need of services (CHINS). Mother was incarcerated at the time. Child was

adjudicated a CHINS in May 2013. Father was arrested and incarcerated, and

Child remained with his grandmother. After Mother’s release from

incarceration, DCS released Child to her and dismissed the case.

[3] In August 2016, DCS received a report of Mother’s substance abuse issues and

domestic violence in the home, removed Child from her care, and filed a

CHINS petition. The trial court found Child to be a CHINS and ordered

1
Father is not participating in this appeal.

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 Mother to undergo a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations;

participate in visitation with Child; formulate and implement a child protection

plan; participate in home-based counseling; complete a substance abuse

assessment and follow all recommendations; attend AA/NA regularly, provide

written verification of her attendance, and secure a sponsor for it; refrain from

alcohol consumption and from the consumption, manufacture, trade, sale, or

possession of illegal substances; submit to random drug screens; obey the law;

abide by travel restrictions for Child; secure and maintain stable and safe

housing; and secure and maintain a stable and legal income.

[4] In 2018, DCS changed the permanency plan to include a concurrent plan of

adoption by Child’s paternal grandmother, citing Mother’s noncompliance with

services, failure to enhance parenting skills, and failure to consistently visit

Child, as well as Mother’s positive drug screens and arrests. In April 2019,

DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights, citing Mother’s

continued noncompliance with services, failure to remain in contact with DCS,

continued drug use, noncooperation with drug screens or in-home visits, failure

to maintain safe and suitable housing, failure to complete the parenting

assessment or parenting classes, failure to provide documentation concerning

any participation in AA/NA, and failure to follow the recommendations from

the substance abuse assessment.

[5] The trial court conducted factfinding hearings in autumn 2019. Mother testified

that she was bipolar type two with rapid cycling, that her “psych meds”

included lithium, Prozac, and Xanax, and that she had become addicted to pain

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 medicine. Tr. Vol. 2 at 64, 69. Between 2015 and the 2019 factfinding

hearings, Mother was arrested six times in Madison County. Meanwhile, Child

had spent thirty-seven months outside Mother’s care, had not had a visit with

her in two years, and had been living with his paternal grandmother, who

expressed her absolute willingness and ability to adopt Child.

[6] In February 2020, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother’s and

Father’s parental relationships with Child. Mother now appeals. Additional

facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision
[7] Mother contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental

relationship with Child. When reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact and

conclusions thereon in a case involving the termination of parental rights, we

first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the

findings support the judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We

will set aside the trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Bester v.

Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). “A

judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s

conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” In re A.G., 45

N.E.3d 471, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (2016). Unchallenged

findings stand as proven. T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. In conducting our review, we neither

reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Rather,

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 we consider only the evidence and inferences most favorable to the judgment.

Id. “[I]t is not enough that the evidence might support some other conclusion,

but it must positively require the conclusion contended for by the appellant

before there is a basis for reversal.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2011)

(citations omitted).

Section 1 – The trial court’s findings are not improper.
[8] Mother asserts that several of the trial court’s findings are mere recitations of

witness testimony. The mere recitation of testimony does not amount to a

proper finding of fact; rather, the trial court must adopt the testimony of the

witness. S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1121-22 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2013). Here, however, when the court referenced the testimony of a given

service provider, it specified, “The Court makes the following findings and

reasonable inferences from this testimony.” See, e.g., Appealed Order at 7

(finding 19 concerning family case manager’s testimony). The court adequately

adopted the testimony and did not simply recite it.

[9] Mother also criticizes the trial court’s findings, claiming that the court simply

adopted DCS’s proposed findings verbatim. We were unable to find a copy of

the parties’ proposed findings in the record before us, so we have no way of

even making such a comparison. That said, we note that a trial court’s

verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed findings is not prohibited. Country

Contractors, Inc. v. A Westside Storage of Indianapolis, Inc., 4 N.E.3d 677, 694 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2014). “Although we by no means encourage the wholesale adoption

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 of a party’s proposed findings and conclusions, the critical inquiry is whether

such findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous.” Id. Mother’s

arguments concerning the impropriety of the findings lack merit.

Section 2 – Mother failed to preserve her argument concerning
the admissibility of her drug screen results.
[10] Mother challenges the admission of her drug screen results, which are detailed

in finding 22(v). That finding comprises a list of ten drug screen results during

the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, with each entry including the result

(nine positive and one negative), the type of drug(s) for which Mother tested

positive, and the concentration of the drug(s) found in her system. Appealed

Order at 10.

[11] Mother asserts that the drug screen results were inadmissible hearsay. We

review the trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, which

occurs only when the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the

facts and circumstances before the court. Matter of A.F., 69 N.E.3d 932, 942

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “Errors in admission of evidence are to be

disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a

party.” Id. (citation omitted). “Admission of hearsay evidence is not grounds

for reversal where it is merely cumulative of other evidence admitted.” Id.

(citation omitted).

[12] DCS claims that Mother did not object on hearsay grounds below and therefore

waived this argument for review. A party who objects on one basis below and a

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 different basis on appeal waives the argument for appellate review. In re

Paternity of K.H., 116 N.E.3d 504, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied (2019).

Likewise, a mere general objection is ineffective to preserve an issue for review.

Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ind. 2008). An objection must be

contemporaneous and sufficiently specific to alert the trial court as to its

grounds and thus fully apprise the court of the legal issue. Id.

[13] At the factfinding, DCS introduced the certified CHINS record, which included

the information to which Mother now objects. Mother herself responded, not

in the form of an objection but by interrupting her counsel with an exclamation

that was partially inaudible, largely incoherent, and did not address hearsay.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. Moments later, when DCS again sought to introduce the

CHINS record, Mother’s counsel indicated that Mother had no objection. Id.

at 29. The closest Mother ever came to raising a hearsay objection occurred

when DCS sought to introduce the laboratory results as a separate exhibit, and

Mother’s counsel indicated a concern over authenticity and how the tests were

conducted. Id. at 31. This simply does not amount to a clear and

contemporaneous hearsay objection. As such, Mother has failed to preserve

this allegation of error for review. Waiver notwithstanding, the record is replete

with unchallenged testimony about Mother’s drug use. Therefore, the

challenged evidence is cumulative, and Mother’s substantial rights were not

prejudiced by the admission of the drug screen information that served as the

basis for finding 22(v).

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 Section 3 – Mother has failed to establish that the trial court
clearly erred in terminating her parental relationship with
Child.
[14] Mother asserts that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental

rights. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children – but this right

is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental

responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Matter of Ma.H., 134

N.E.3d 41, 45-46 (Ind. 2019) (citation omitted), cert. denied (2020). To obtain a

termination of a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to establish in

pertinent part:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.

….

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

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 (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).

[15] In recognition of the seriousness with which we address parental termination

cases, Indiana has adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard. Ind.

Code § 31-37-14-2; Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367,

377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Clear and convincing evidence need

not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the

child’s survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing

evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by

the respondent parent’s custody.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind.

2013) (citation omitted). “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a

[termination] petition … are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child

relationship.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

[16] Mother focuses her argument solely on the trial court’s conclusion that a

reasonable probability exists that the conditions that led to Child’s removal and

continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.2 When assessing

2
Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires proof of only one of the three circumstances listed. The
record shows that Child has twice been adjudicated a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(iii). Here,
however, Child’s two CHINS adjudications were neither alleged by DCS nor found by the trial court to be a
basis for termination. As such, we analyze the merits of Mother’s argument concerning the reasonable
probability of unremedied conditions.

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 whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions that led to a child’s

removal will not be remedied, we must consider not only the initial basis for the

child’s removal but also the bases for continued placement outside the home.

In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Moreover,

“the trial court should judge a parent’s fitness to care for his children at the time

of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed

conditions.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

“Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not

preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of

their future behavior.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. “Due to the permanent effect of

termination, the trial court also must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of

conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the

child.” J.T., 742 N.E.2d at 512. In making its case, “DCS need not rule out all

possibilities of change; rather, [it] need establish only that there is a reasonable

probability that the parent’s behavior will not change.” In re Kay.L., 867

N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The court may properly consider

evidence of a parent’s substance abuse, criminal history, lack of employment or

adequate housing, history of neglect, and failure to provide support. McBride v.

Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App.

2003).

[17] Mother claims that the record is not entirely clear as to the conditions that led

to Child’s initial removal. She characterizes as clearly erroneous findings 19(d)

and 22(d), both of which reiterate DCS’s reasons for initial removal: drug use

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 and domestic violence. She is correct that there is no evidence of domestic

violence in the record. Nevertheless, it is understood that DCS makes its initial

determinations based on reports received, that CHINS petitions include

allegations based on those preliminary reports, and that DCS conducts follow-up

investigations and presents those to the trial court. There may be a dearth of

evidence of domestic violence, but there is overwhelming evidence to

substantiate the allegation of Mother’s drug abuse, which has been pervasive

and protracted. Mother admits that she became addicted to her pain

medications and that she took various “psych meds,” such as lithium, Prozac,

and Xanax to combat her post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar type two

rapid cycling disorder. Tr. Vol. 2 at 64, 69. The DCS family case manager

testified that there was a period of two years during which Mother failed to

submit to any of her required drug screens and her whereabouts were unknown.

Id. at 33, 37. Despite this gap, Mother had a pattern of testing positive when

she was screened.

[18] Finally, Mother asserts that DCS established no nexus between her drug use

and her neglect of Child. We could not disagree more. The disturbing nexus

predates the current CHINS proceedings and extends back to Mother’s

pregnancy with Child, during which she tested positive for drugs three times.

As a result, Child was born drug-addicted and had to remain hospitalized for

his first month of life while withdrawing from those drugs. After his discharge,

Child was removed from Mother and eventually adjudicated a CHINS.

Meanwhile, Mother was in and out of jail and continued to use drugs. She was

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 afforded a second chance to parent Child, but even then, she could not refrain

from drug use or maintain a safe and suitable environment for him, so most

often she left him with his paternal grandparents. This precipitated his removal

and his second CHINS adjudication by age three. Again, Mother failed to

comply with services, continued to test positive for drugs, and simply did not

avail herself of the opportunity to show that she was earnest about getting clean

and becoming a better mother. She was arrested six times in Madison County

between 2015 and 2019, and her pattern of being in and out of jail is not

conducive to providing a stable home for Child. The current proceedings have

lasted more than three years, and, as of the time of the factfinding hearings,

Mother had not visited Child in two years. This failure demonstrates her lack

of commitment to complete the steps necessary to preserve her parental rights.

See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372 (failure to exercise right to visit one’s children

demonstrates lack of commitment to complete actions necessary to preserve

parent-child relationship).

[19] Mother’s drug use has essentially defined Child’s life. Her failure to improve

after the dismissal of the first CHINS case portends a similar outcome now.

Her behavior during the factfinding hearings reflects an attitude of deflection

and a stubborn refusal to take responsibility for her problems and get herself

clean. In short, Child has endured more than six years of instability and

uncertainty, and there is a reasonable probability that the drug use that led to

his removal from and continued placement outside of Mother’s home will not

be remedied. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Mother has failed to

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 establish clear error in the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental

relationship with Child. Accordingly, we affirm.

[20] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.

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