Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
September 22, 2020
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 53531-9-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CALVIN NORMAN ROUSE, JR.,
Appellant.
MAXA, J. – Calvin Rouse appeals a superior court order denying his petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel the superior court clerk to correct the judgment and sentence in this case to
reflect his true legal name or to schedule a hearing on his motion to correct his name on the
judgment and sentence. Rouse filed the petition after (1) the superior court transferred Rouse’s
motion to correct the judgment and sentence to this court under CrR 7.8, (2) this court rejected
the transfer and returned the motion to superior court, and (3) the superior court took no further
action on the motion after the transfer was rejected.
We hold that the superior court properly denied the petition for a writ of mandamus
because the superior court clerk had no legal duty to correct a judgment and sentence or on its
own initiative to schedule a hearing after this court rejected a transfer under CrR 7.8. Therefore,
we affirm the superior court’s order.
No. 53531-9-II
FACTS
In 2003, Rouse pleaded guilty in Pierce County Superior Court to the charge of second
degree murder with a deadly weapon enhancement. The case was captioned as “State vs. Calvin
Norman Rouse.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 5. Throughout the proceedings, Rouse repeatedly
confirmed that his true name was Calvin Rouse. He signed the judgment and sentence with the
name Calvin Rouse.
In September 2018, Rouse filed a motion asking the superior court to correct his 2003
judgment and sentence to reflect his legal name, Abdur Rashid Khalif. He attached a 1997 order
from a New Jersey court changing his legal name from Calvin Rouse to Abdur Rashid Khalif.
The superior court entered an order transferring Rouse’s motion to this court for consideration as
an untimely personal restraint petition under CrR 7.8(c)(2).
This court rejected the transfer, ruling: “The transferred motion seeks to amend the case
caption in his judgment and sentence to Abdur Rashid Khalif. Because this motion is not a CrR
7.8 motion, the transfer is improper.” CP at 25. The court returned the matter to the superior
court “for further action.” CP at 25.
The superior court took no further action. Four months later, Rouse filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus. The petition requested that the superior court issue a writ of mandamus to the
superior court clerk to require compliance with this court’s order by either correcting the caption
on his judgment and sentence to reflect his legal name or setting his motion on the court calendar
for a factual hearing. Rouse requested that the petition be considered without oral argument.
The State filed a response opposing the relief requested. The superior court entered an order
denying the petition on the pleadings. Rouse appeals the superior court’s order.
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No. 53531-9-II
ANALYSIS
Initially, Rouse’s assignments of error claim that the superior court erred by failing to
hold a hearing or to take further action on his motion to correct his name on the judgment and
sentence following this court’s rejection of the transfer. But his notice of appeal is from the
order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. We generally review only “the decision or
parts of the decision designated in the notice of appeal.” RAP 2.4(a). Therefore, the only issue
before us is whether the superior court erred in denying Rouse’s writ of mandamus petition. We
hold that the superior court did not err in denying the petition.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
There are three essential elements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus: “(1) the party
subject to the writ has a clear duty to act, (2) the applicant has no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy at law, and (3) the applicant is beneficially interested.” Zapotocky v. Dalton, 166 Wn.
App. 697, 702, 271 P.3d 326 (2012). The applicant has the burden of proving all three elements.
Id.
The superior court may issue a writ of mandamus “to compel the performance of an act
which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office.” RCW 7.16.160.
A writ of mandamus can only command what the law itself commands. If the law
does not require a government official to take a specific action, neither can a writ
of mandamus. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Lawler, 2 Wn.2d 488, 490, 98 P.2d 658
(1940) (“The jurisdiction given to this court by the state constitution in Art. IV, §
4, to issue writs of mandamus to state officers, does not authorize [us] to assume
general control or direction of official acts.”).
Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 893, 467 P.3d 953 (2020). Mandamus is proper only when the
law imposes a duty with such certainty that the official has no discretion or judgment in the
performance of the duty. Id.
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No. 53531-9-II
Mandamus, therefore, is an appropriate remedy only “‘[w]here the law prescribes
and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave
nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.’ ” Id. (emphasis omitted)
(quoting State ex rel. Clark v. City of Seattle, 137 Wash. 455, 461, 242 P. 966
(1926)).
Id. (quoting SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Gregoire, 168 Wn.2d 593, 599, 229 P.3d 774 (2010)).
B. AVAILABILITY OF WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Rouse argued in his petition for a writ of mandamus that RCW 2.32.050 placed a
ministerial duty on the superior court clerk to correct his judgment and sentence. RCW 2.32.050
provides a long list of the powers and duties of superior court clerks. Absent from this list is a
duty to correct alleged errors in a judgment and sentence. And Rouse provides no other
authority for the proposition that a superior court clerk has a duty to correct an alleged error in a
judgment and sentence. Therefore, we conclude that a writ of mandamus was not available to
compel the superior court clerk to correct Rouse’s name on the judgment and sentence.
Rouse also argues that the superior court clerk had a duty to schedule a hearing on his
motion to correct his name on the judgment and sentence following this court’s rejection of the
CrR 7.8 transfer. However, Rouse provides no authority for the proposition that a superior court
clerk has a duty on his or her own initiative to schedule a hearing when this court rejects a
transfer under CrR 7.8 and directs the superior court to take action on the matter. This court did
not expressly direct the superior court to schedule a hearing.
Pierce County Local Rule 7(a)(3) states that motions are scheduled for a hearing when
the moving party files a Note for Motion Docket with the clerk. But the record does not reflect
that Rouse filed a Note for Motion Docket on his motion to correct the judgment and sentence to
reflect his legal name after this court rejected the CrR 7.8 transfer. Therefore, we conclude that a
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No. 53531-9-II
writ of mandamus was not available to compel the superior court clerk to schedule a hearing on
Rouse’s motion to correct the judgment and sentence.
In addition, Rouse continues to have an adequate remedy. He can obtain a hearing on his
motion to correct the judgment and sentence to reflect his legal name by refiling his motion
along with a Note for Motion Docket.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the superior court’s denial of Rouse’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, J.
We concur:
SUTTON, A.C.J.
GLASGOW, J.
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