UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4705
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRELL PLUMMER, a/k/a Rell,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00223-GLR-1)
Submitted: July 29, 2020 Decided: September 10, 2020
Before AGEE, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory W. Gardner, LAW OFFICE OF GREGORY W. GARDNER, LLC, Boulder,
Colorado; Kenneth E. McPherson, KENNETH E. MCPHERSON, CHTD., Fulton,
Maryland, for Appellant. Michael Clayton Hanlon, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrell Plummer appeals his conviction and 300-month sentence imposed following
his guilty plea, pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, to conspiracy to
participate in racketeering activity (RICO conspiracy), in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1962(d), 1963(a) (2018). On appeal, counsel for Plummer has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning the district court’s compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and the
reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Although notified of his right to do so, Plummer
has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Counsel first addresses whether the district court complied with Rule 11 in
accepting Plummer’s guilty plea. Because Plummer did not move to withdraw his guilty
plea, we review the adequacy of the Rule 11 proceeding for plain error. United States v.
Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). To prevail under this standard, Plummer “must
demonstrate not only that the district court plainly erred, but also that this error affected his
substantial rights.” Id. at 816. A defendant who pleads guilty establishes that an error
affected his substantial rights by demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not
have pled guilty but for the error. United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 608 (2013).
Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in
which it informs the defendant of, and determines he understands, the rights he is
relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the maximum
and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that the plea was
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voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea
agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).
We have reviewed the transcript of Plummer’s guilty plea hearing and conclude that
the district court fully complied with Rule 11. Moreover, the district court ensured that
Plummer entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that a factual basis supported the
plea. See DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116, 119-20 (explaining Rule 11 requirements).
We review Plummer’s sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bolton,
858 F.3d 905, 911 (4th Cir. 2017). First, we “ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as . . . improperly calculating[] the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2018)]
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If there is no
procedural error, we then must also consider the substantive reasonableness of Plummer’s
sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth
in § 3553(a).” United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,”
to accomplish the § 3553(a) sentencing goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “Any sentence that is
within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can
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only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Here, the court correctly calculated Plummer’s advisory Guidelines range, heard
argument from counsel, provided Plummer an opportunity to allocute, considered the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, and explained its reasons for imposing the sentence stipulated
in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement. Because Plummer has not demonstrated that his term
of imprisonment “is unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors,” he
has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded his below-Guidelines
sentence. Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306. We therefore conclude that Plummer’s sentence is
both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. In accordance with
Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Plummer, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Plummer requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Plummer. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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