UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4534
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROGER PLUMLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00224-2)
Submitted: January 26, 2017 Decided: March 1, 2017
Before NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Research & Writing Specialist, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Carol A. Casto, United States Attorney, Miller Bushong,
Assistant United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
The district court revoked Roger Plumley’s supervised
release and sentenced him to 8 months’ imprisonment and 50
months’ supervised release. Plumley appeals. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the
statutory maximum and not plainly unreasonable. United States
v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 494 (2015). Under this standard, we first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).
In making this inquiry, “we strike a more deferential appellate
posture than we do when reviewing original sentences.” Padgett,
788 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court considered the policy statements in Chapter Seven
of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the policy statement range,
and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors identified in 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). Id. Chapter Seven directs district
courts to “sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust,
while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness
of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the
violator.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch.7, pt. A(3)(b)
(2016).
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Section 3583(e) identifies several § 3553(a) factors to be
considered by the sentencing court, including the nature and
seriousness of the offense, the defendant’s history and
characteristics, the need for deterrence or correctional
treatment, and the sentencing range. The section does not cite
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), which refers to “the need for the sentence
imposed to . . . reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
A sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court adequately identified a proper basis for it. Crudup, 461
F.3d at 438. We presume reasonable a sentence within the policy
statement range. Id.
“Only if we find the sentence unreasonable must we decide
whether it is plainly so.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638,
640 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
plainly unreasonable sentence refers to a sentence with clear or
obvious error. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
We reject Plumley’s claim that the district court imposed a
procedurally unreasonable sentence when it considered as a
sentencing factor Plumley’s repeated violations of the
conditions of his supervised release. According to Plumley,
when the court considered that factor, it disregarded Chapter
Seven and impermissibly relied on the need for punishment under
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§ 3553(a)(2)(A), which contains sentencing factors not
identified in § 3583(e).
The law and record do not support Plumley’s argument.
Chapter Seven does not bar the district court from considering
the seriousness of the offense; it merely limits the importance
of that factor in comparison with a defendant’s breach of trust.
See USSG ch.7, pt. A(3)(b). We have held that “although a
district court may not impose a revocation sentence based
predominately on . . . the need for the sentence to promote
respect for the law and provide just punishment, . . . mere
reference to such considerations does not render a revocation
sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are
relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated
§ 3553(a) factors.” Webb, 738 F.3d at 642.
Here, the record shows that the district court did not
impose its revocation sentence primarily to punish Plumley. The
court considered several factors identified in § 3583(e).
We also conclude that the district court imposed a
substantively reasonable sentence. Plumley has failed to
overcome the presumption of reasonableness afforded his
sentence, which falls within the policy statement range. See
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438.
Because the district court did not impose an unreasonable
sentence, we affirm its judgment. We dispense with oral
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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the material before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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