Brown v. Berryhill

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SHAUNA BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 18-1294-RCL ANDREW M. SAUL,' Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Shauna Brown brings this action challenging a Social Security Administration determination that she is ineligible for disability insurance benefits .or supplemental security income because she is not disabled under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seg. Before the Court are plaintiff's Motion for Judgment of Reversal, ECF No. 12, and defendant Andrew M. Saul’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance, ECF No. 13. After considering the motions and the entire record, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion and grant defendant’s motion for the reasons below. I, BACKGROUND Through an adjudicatory process, the Social Security Administration provides benefits to individuals who cannot work because of a physical or mental disability. On May 3, 2016, plaintiff protectively filed an application with the Social Security Administration for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income for an alleged disability that began on November 1, 2015. Soc. Sec. Admin. Op. 1, ECF No. 8-2. These claims were initially denied on October 13, 2016, and upon reconsideration on March 22, 2017. /d. Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for a ' Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Nancy A. Berryhill, his predecessor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). hearing, which was held on January 8, 2018, in front of the Honorable Susan Maley, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Jd. At the hearing plaintiff appeared and testified in person. Jd. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was thirty-two years old and had a high school education. Tr. 4, ECF No. 8-2. She had not worked for two or three years, and last worked at a clothing store and as a dietary aide at a nursing home. Tr. 5. While plaintiff had spent almost two years living in homeless shelters, in 2017 she moved into her own home with her nine-year-old daughter and four-year-old son. Tr. 6. Plaintiff testified that she cooks for her children, but that they often miss or are late to school because she frequently lacks the energy to get out of bed; plaintiff also stated that her depression and anxiety got worse after her son was born in 2013. Tr. 6, 8. When she does take her children to school, and picks them up, plaintiff takes two buses. Tr. 7, 12. She reported that she suffers from anxiety “[a]lmost every day” and also gets panic attacks “every other day.” Tr. 11, 13. Plaintiff also described herself as antisocial, and sometimes heard voices calling her name until she started taking medication. Tr. 13, 14. When asked why she is unable to work, plaintiff pointed to her anxiety, inability to concentrate, and pain from her diabetes. Tr. 15-18. Ms. Theresa M. Kopitzke, an impartial vocational expert, also testified by telephone. Tr. 25. The ALJ gave Ms. Kopitzke two hypothetical individuals and asked her whether there would be any jobs either individual could perform in the national economy. /d. The first was an individual with a medium exertional capacity that could carry out simple tasks in two-hour increments with fifteen-minute breaks in between, have occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors but no direct interaction with the general public, and be able to adapt to simple changes in a routine work setting. Jd. Assuming the individual would be able to stay on task ninety percent of the time, Ms. Kopitzke testified that the individual could work in the national economy as an industrial cleaner, kitchen helper, hospital cleaner, or in similar jobs. Tr. 28, 29. The second individual would be able to remain on task only eighty percent of the time, and here Ms. Kopitzke stated that there would be no jobs that the individual could perform given that off-task behavior. Tr. 28. On January 31, 2018, the ALJ issued her decision denying plaintiff's disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income claims. Op. 1. The ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2015, that she had the severe impairments of diabetes, obesity, affective disorder, and anxiety disorder, and that those severe impairments did not equal or exceed the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1. Op. 3. The ALJ then considered plaintiffs residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and found that plaintiff was not disabled because she could perform medium work, subject to the limitations of the first hypothetical individual discussed at the hearing. Op. 7. After unsuccessfully seeking review by the agency’s Appeals Council, plaintiff timely filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). II. LEGAL STANDARD Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to deciding whether the ALJ correctly applied the relevant légal standards and whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The substantial evidence standard “requires more than a scintilla, but .. . less than a preponderance of the evidence,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and can be satisfied by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). To qualify for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act, plaintiff must establish that she is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1). The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for assessing whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The first three steps involve, respectively, the ALJ considering whether the individual is currently doing “substantial gainful activity,” whether the medical impairment is “severe,” and whether the severe medical impairment meets one of the “listings” in the relevant subpart appendix. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(ili), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(iii). If the severe medical impairment is not a listed impairment under the third step, the ALJ then assesses the individual’s RFC before moving on to the fourth step. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (e), 416.920(a)(4), (e). An individual’s RFC is the most she can still do despite her limitations and is assessed based on all the relevant evidence in the record. § 416.945(a)(1). If the ALJ finds that the individual can adjust to other work based on her age, education, and the RFC assessmerit, she is not disabled under the Social Security Act. §§ 404.1520(h), 416.920(h). Il. DISCUSSION At issue is the ALJ’s finding regarding plaintiff's RFC. Specifically, plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not provide an adequate explanation to support her RFC findings regarding plaintiff's mental limitations and that the ALJ failed to include any limitation on concentration, task persistence, or pace in plaintiff’s RFC. P1.’s Mot. J. Reversal 5—6, 9, ECF No. 12. The Court finds plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive and affirms. A. The ALJ Adequately Supported Her Findings Regarding Plaintiff's Mental Limitations Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide the required “narrative discussion” when she found that plaintiff was capable of carrying out simple tasks in two-hour increments with fifteen- minute breaks in between, having occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors but no direct interaction with the general public, and being able to adapt to simple changes in a routine work setting. Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal 6. An ALJ’s conclusions in the RFC assessment “must contain a ‘narrative discussion’ identifying the evidence that supports each conclusion.” Butler, 353 F.3d at 1000. A narrative discussion should contain “specific medical facts . . . and nonmedical evidence.” Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court holds that the ALJ included sufficient information to satisfy the narrative discussion requirement of the RFC assessment. In her opinion the ALJ states that, in making her RFC findings, she “considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence,” Op. 7, before spending approximately five pages detailing her findings on plaintiffs impairments.” Half of the ALJ’s analysis is dedicated to plaintiff's mental impairments, which is what her RFC limitations for plaintiff are based on. For example, the ALJ found that plaintiff could do simple tasks in two-hour increments with fifteen-minute breaks in between. The ALJ supported this limitation when she cited to doctors describing plaintiffs mental impairments, on the one hand, as “affect[ing] her memory and ability to complete tasks, understand and follow instructions,” and that her concentration was “