UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4203
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RUSSELL LASHON WORRELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
R. Bryan Harwell, Chief District Judge. (4:19-cr-00714-RBH-1)
Submitted: September 18, 2020 Decided: September 30, 2020
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Justin William Holloway,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Russell Lashon Worrell pled guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court
calculated Worrell’s sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(2018) at 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Worrell to 57 months’
imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal, but raising as issues for review whether the district court plainly erred
in accepting Worrell’s guilty plea and abused its discretion in imposing the 57-month
prison term. Worrell was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he
has not done so. The Government elected not to file a brief. We affirm.
In federal cases, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “governs the
duty of the trial judge before accepting a guilty plea.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
243 n.5 (1969). The Rule “sets out the information a court is to convey to ensure that a
defendant who pleads guilty understands the consequences of the plea.” United States v.
Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 381 (4th Cir. 2012). “The court also must determine that the plea
is voluntary and that there is a factual basis for the plea.” United States v. Williams,
811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). Because Worrell did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, the acceptance of his guilty plea is reviewed for plain error only.
United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). “To succeed under
plain error review, a defendant must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was
plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” Id. In the guilty plea context, a
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defendant meets his burden to establish that a plain error affected his substantial rights by
showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but for the district
court’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 omissions. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815-16
(4th Cir. 2014).
Our review of the Anders brief and the transcript of the guilty plea hearing leads us
to conclude that the district court’s omissions under Rule 11 did not affect Worrell’s
substantial rights. The transcript of the guilty plea hearing also reveals that the district
court ensured that the plea was supported by an independent basis in fact and that Worrell
entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily and with an understanding of the consequences.
Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the district court’s acceptance of Worrell’s guilty
plea. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
Next, we review a criminal sentence for reasonableness under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007).
In conducting this review, we first ensure that the district court did not commit any
“significant procedural error,” such as “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111-12
(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51); see United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d
213, 217-19 (4th Cir. 2019).
If the sentence is procedurally sound, we then review the substantive reasonableness
of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at
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51. Any sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
substantively reasonable, and that presumption may only be rebutted by a showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not commit
any procedural error in sentencing Worrell, and he fails to rebut the presumption that the
57-month prison term is substantively reasonable. The court properly calculated the
Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence,
heard Worrell’s allocution, considered the Guidelines as advisory, considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and Worrell’s arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence, and
adequately explained its chosen sentence. The court explained that a 57-month prison term
was warranted in light of the nature and circumstances of Worrell’s offense conduct, his
history and characteristics, and the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to provide just punishment, and to afford adequate deterrence, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B). On appeal, Worrell points to nothing suggesting this sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.
Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the remainder of the record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the criminal
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Worrell, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Worrell requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
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may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Worrell.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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