J-A16034-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JENNIFER BITZER, IN HER OWN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
RIGHT, AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE : PENNSYLVANIA
ESTATE OF LYNNE E. BITZER, AND :
KAREN BITZER :
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
BRENNTAG NORTHEAST, INC., :
Armstrong WORLD INDUSTRIES, :
INC., BARLEY SNYDER, LLP AND :
ALAN J. HAY, M.D. : No. 111 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No(s): 18-05895
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2020
Jennifer Bitzer (“Bitzer”), in her own right, and as Executrix of the Estate
of Lynne E. Bitzer (“Decedent”), and Karen Bitzer (“Karen”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), appeal from the Order sustaining Preliminary Objections as to
Bitzer’s Complaint, filed on behalf of Brenntag Northeast, Inc. (“Brenntag”),
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (“Armstrong”), Barley Snyder, LLP (“Barley
Snyder”), and Alan J. Hay, M.D. (“Dr. Hay”) (collectively, “Defendants”). We
affirm.
As the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaints based upon the
Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants, we must accept as true all well-
pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the Complaint, and every
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inference that is fairly deducible from those facts. See Commonwealth by
Shapiro v. UPMC, 208 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2019) (setting forth the scope and
standard of review of an order sustaining preliminary objections due to legal
insufficiency).
As alleged in the Complaint, between 1965 and November 2003,
Decedent was employed by Armstrong, in the Inspection Department of its
Lancaster flooring plant. See Complaint, 7/24/18, at ¶¶ 11-12. During that
time, Decedent was exposed to trichloroethylene, methylene chloride and
methyl ethyl ketone (“the toxic chemicals”). Id. at ¶ 13. The toxic chemicals
were used by Armstrong in a “Safety Solvent” manufactured by Brenntag. Id.
As a result of his exposure to the toxic chemicals, Decedent developed multiple
myeloma, which in turn caused his death on June 22, 2013. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15.
In 2016, by Writ of Summons, George Chada, Esquire (“Attorney
Chada”), initiated identical litigation on behalf of Plaintiffs, and over thirty
additional plaintiffs, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, at
docket number CI-03605 (“the 2016 case”). The procedural posture of the
2016 case is relevant to an understanding of the instant appeal. Thus, we set
forth the trial court’s summary of the history of the 2016 case as follows:
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case has a long and complex procedural history. …
Complicating matters is the company the case keeps. It is just
one of thirty cases currently on appeal involving numerous
[plaintiffs] brought primarily against defendants [Armstrong] and
[Brenntag,] but including various other defendants on occasion.
Although these cases are distinct, they do overlap significantly in
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regard to their facts and to the legal issues at play. Many times,
similar orders were entered across all [of] these cases, and the
procedural history will reflect that reality.
A. Pleadings History
On August 15, 2017, thirty-six similarly[-]situated cases were
assigned to the undersigned judge. Counsel met and agreed to
attempt to streamline the pleadings process by instituting a model
case structure in which the court would rule on preliminary
objections in four model cases[,] and the parties would use these
rulings to guide future pleadings. This case was not one of the
model cases.
This case began by [W]rit of [S]ummons on April 25, 2016,
naming as defendants [Armstrong], Barley Snyder[], Barnes &
Thornburg, LLP[,] and Morgan Lewis and Bockius, LLP. [The
plaintiffs] filed a [C]omplaint on October 10, 2017[,] naming
[Armstrong] and [Brenntag] as defendants, to which defendant
[Armstrong] filed [P]reliminary [O]bjections. Defendant
[Brenntag] filed a [M]otion for protective order on November 13,
2017, asserting it was being forced to relitigate identical claims
[the plaintiffs] filed in United Steel Workers of America Local
285, CI-15-08680, and [because] it was not named in the [W]rit
of [S]ummons. The [trial] court denied Brenntag’s [M]otion,
stating the issues raised were more appropriately addressed
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028. [Brenntag] then filed [P]reliminary
[O]bjections[,] and a [M]otion for sanctions against Attorney
Chada individually. The [P]reliminary [O]bjections were not
resolved prior to the case being dismissed for failure to prosecute.
B. Sanctions on Attorney Chada
[Brenntag] filed its [M]otion for sanctions on December 21,
2017….
C. Disqualification of Attorney Chada
On June 14, 2018, the [trial] court entered a [R]ule to [S]how
[C]ause upon Attorney Chada to show why he should not be
disqualified from the case due to his continuing and flagrant
disregard for the court’s [O]rders and the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure. The court also stayed the cases at this time. On
July 5, 2018, Attorney Chada filed a [M]otion requesting an
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extension of time to respond to the court’s [R]ule, which the court
granted by [O]rder dated July 6, 2018. On July 6, 2018, Attorney
Chada filed his [A]nswer and [a M]otion to recuse. [Attorney]
Chada then refiled this [M]otion on July 11, 2018. [Brenntag] filed
responses on July 13, 2018, and July 27, 2018. [Armstrong] filed
a response on July 27, 2018. After consideration of the [A]nswer
and responses, the court entered an [O]pinion and [O]rder on
September 4, 2018, disqualifying Attorney Chada as counsel of
record for the [p]laintiffs in the thirty-four open cases. [The
plaintiffs] did not seek reconsideration of this [O]rder or file an
appeal.
D. Closure of Case
In its [O]rder of September 4, 2018, disqualifying Attorney Chada,
the court extended the stay on the cases for an additional ninety
days to allow the [p]laintiffs time to obtain new counsel[,] and for
that counsel to enter his or her appearance. On December 19,
2018, one hundred six days after the court’s [O]rder, [Brenntag]
filed a [M]otion for entry of judgement non pros against the
[plaintiffs,] based on the failure of the [plaintiffs] to obtain new
counsel or enter a pro se appearance. On December 20, 2018,
the [trial] court entered an [O]rder scheduling a hearing[,] which
required the [plaintiffs] to appear and state the reason(s) the
[M]otion should not be granted. The [plaintiffs] failed to appear
for the January 10, 2019, hearing. On January 11, 2019, the court
entered an [O]rder directing the prothonotary to close the case
based on the [plaintiffs’] failure to prosecute.
[The plaintiffs, represented by new counsel,] filed an appeal on
February 11, 2019.[1]
USW Local 285 et al. v. Armstrong World Indus., No. CI-16-03605, 2019
Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 6531, at *4-7 (C.P. Apr. 29, 2019) (footnote and
emphasis added).
____________________________________________
1The appeal of the 2016 case was docketed in this Court at No. 264 MDA
2019.
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Thereafter, Armstrong and Brenntag filed an Application to dismiss the
appeal of the 2016 case, based upon the plaintiffs’ failure to file a [P]etition
to open the judgment of non pros. On July 7, 2019, this Court granted the
Motion to dismiss. USW Local 285 et al. v. Armstrong World Indus., No.
264 MDA 2019 (Order filed July 7, 2019). This Court denied reconsideration
of its Order on November 1, 2019. See id. (Order filed November 1, 2019).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. USW, Local
285 v. Armstrong World Indus., 231 A.3d 779 (Pa. 2020).
On July 24, 2018, during the first stay entered in the 2016 case,
Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a Complaint asserting wrongful death
and survival actions, as well as other tort claims. Relevant to this appeal, in
Count Three of the Complaint, Bitzer and Karen alleged a cause of action
against Armstrong for battery. Specifically, the Complaint averred that Bitzer
had suffered secondary exposure to the toxic chemicals. Complaint, 7/24/18,
at ¶¶ 48-50. The Complaint averred that the exposures constituted a battery
against Bitzer and her unborn child, Karen. Id. at ¶¶ 50, 52-53. Karen was
born on March 30, 1987. Id. at ¶ 55. According to the Complaint, “[a]s a
direct and proximate result of [] Bitzer’s battery by toxic and hazardous
substances in the Bitzer Home while pregnant with Karen [], [] Bitzer delivered
a child with [] reproductive and developmental injuries.” Id. at ¶ 54.
Count Six of the Complaint avers a similar battery claim against
Brenntag, as the manufacturer of the Safety Solvent. Id. at ¶¶ 78-90.
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In Count Nine, Plaintiffs alleged a cause of action for intentional
misrepresentation against Barley Snyder. According to the Complaint, Barley
Snyder “paid for and directed the disposal of Employee Exposure and Medical
Records … within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. 1910.1020.” Id. at ¶ 106.
Plaintiffs averred that when they requested Decedent’s medical records,
Barley Snyder “responded with intentional and knowingly false statements
about the existence” of Decedent’s records. Id. at ¶ 111. Plaintiffs asserted
that Barley Snyder’s statements were perpetrated to conceal the cause of
Decedent’s medical condition and death. Id. at ¶ 116.
In Count Ten of the Complaint, Plaintiffs averred a cause of action
against Dr. Hay for breach of medical records confidentiality. The Complaint
averred that Dr. Hay owed a duty pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1910.1020 to preserve
the confidentiality of Decedent’s medical records, and to produce those
records upon the proper request. Complaint, 7/24/19, at ¶¶ 123-126.
According to the Complaint, Dr. Hay gave custody and control of the records
to Barley Snyder, which then disposed of the records, thereby breaching the
duty of maintaining confidentiality over a patient’s medical records. Id. at ¶¶
127-133.
In the instant case, the trial court summarized the relevant procedural
history underlying the present appeal as follows:
On July 24, 2018, [during the first stay entered in the 2016
case,] [P]laintiffs commenced this action by filing a [C]omplaint,
including claims that are identical to those brought against the
same [D]efendants in thirty-five (35) other related cases. On
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August 29, 2018, the [trial] court issued an [O]rder staying this
case[,] and prohibiting Attorney [] Chada, who represents the
[P]laintiffs in this action, from filing any further actions against
these [D]efendants, or any further pleading in this case or the
related cases, without leave of court. On November 6, 2018,
following a status conference, the [trial] court lifted the stay[,]
partially[,] to allow Attorney Chada to file non-frivolous pleadings
in this case. This [O]rder also set deadlines to allow [D]efendants
until November 27, 2018, to file preliminary objections, and to
allow [P]laintiffs until December 17, 2018, to file responses to the
preliminary objections.
Defendants Brenntag …, [Armstrong], Barley Snyder, [] and
[Dr. Hay,] timely filed [P]reliminary [O]bjections to [P]laintiffs’
[C]omplaint. On December 17, 2018, Attorney Chada filed four
[M]otions for leave to file responses in opposition to the
[P]reliminary [O]bjections, which included [P]laintiffs’ responses
as attachments. The [trial] court sustained the [P]reliminary
[O]bjections and dismissed with prejudice all counts in [P]laintiffs’
[C]omplaint[,] by [O]rder issued December 20, 2018. Plaintiffs
filed a [N]otice of [A]ppeal from this [O]rder on January 14, 2019,
and a [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] [C]oncise [S]tatement of matters
complained of on appeal on February 21, 2019.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/19, at 1-2.
Before this Court, Defendants have filed Applications/Motions to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ appeal based upon waiver and Plaintiffs’ untimely filing of their
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appellate brief.2 Plaintiffs have filed responses to the Motions, and Defendants
have filed Replies thereto. These Applications/Motions have been deferred to
this panel for disposition.3
Plaintiffs present the following claims for our review:
1. Did the [trial court] err when it failed to rule upon or even
consider the causes of action asserted in the [C]omplaint by
[Bitzer] and Karen [] (Counts Three and Six) for the injuries they
sustained as a result of their exposure to the toxins in the Safety
Solvent manufactured by Brenntag?
2. When it granted the [P]reliminary [O]bjections to all counts,
did the [trial] court erroneously violate the rule that statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised in an
Answer and adjudicated after the presentation of a full record?
3. Did the [trial] court err when it dismissed Count Nine, which
sets forth a cause of action against Barley Snyder for Intentional
Misrepresentation?
4. Did the [trial] court err when it dismissed Count Ten, which
sets forth a cause of action against Dr. Hay for Breach of
Confidentiality?
____________________________________________
2 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2188 provides that, “[i]f an
appellant fails to file his … brief … within the time prescribed by these rules,
or within the time as extended, an appellee may move for dismissal of the
matter.” However, as Defendants suffered no prejudice resulting from the
delay, we decline to dismiss the appeal. See Warner v. Univ. of Pa. Health
Sys., 874 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating that “[a]ppellant’s filing
faults were minor and have not impacted on [a]ppellee’s ability to respond.
Therefore, we decline to dismiss the appeal.”).
3As discussed infra, we decline to dismiss the appeals based upon the waiver
argument set forth on Defendants’ respective Applications/Motions. Rather,
we prefer to address the issues as presented by Plaintiffs, and determine
whether the issue of waiver is relevant in that context. Consequently, we
deny Defendants’ Applications/Motions to dismiss the appeal based upon
waiver.
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Brief for Appellants at 6-7.
In their first claim, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by failing to
rule upon or consider Counts Three and Six “for the injuries they sustained as
a result of their exposure to the toxins in the Safety Solvent manufactured by
Brenntag.” Brief for Appellant at 18. Plaintiffs state that in Count Three, they
alleged battery against Armstrong, based upon their secondary exposure to
toxic and hazardous substances, pursuant to Field v. Phila. Elec. Co., 565
A.2d 1170, 1180 (Pa. Super. 1989).4 According to Plaintiffs, Brenntag
manufactured the Safety Solvent, which included chemicals that were
“teratogens.” Brief for Appellants at 19. Plaintiffs argued that the toxic
chemicals crossed the placenta, causing “reproductive and developmental
injuries in Karen[.]” Id. Plaintiffs further argue that, in Count Six of their
Complaint, they averred a similar cause of action for battery against Brenntag,
as the manufacturer of the chemicals. Id. at 20. Plaintiffs now argue that
the trial court erred in addressing only the wrongful death and survival actions,
and not addressing their separate causes of action. Id. at 20. Thus, Plaintiffs
claim, they were precluded from asserting the applicability of the discovery
rule to defeat Defendants’ assertion of a statute of limitations defense. Id. at
21-22.
____________________________________________
4 In Field, this Court concluded that the appellee electric company had
produced a “contact” with the appellant, such that the company could be held
liable for battery. Field, 565 A.2d at 1178.
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Brenntag counters that Plaintiffs’ challenge is waived, based upon their
failure to include this claim in their Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement.
Brief for Brenntag at 9. Brenntag argues that Plaintiffs failed to raise any error
regarding the trial court’s application of the statutes of limitations. Id. at 12.
According to Brenntag, Plaintiffs’ Concise Statement makes no mention of the
statute of limitations. Id. Brenntag asserts that the claims regarding the
statute of limitations are therefore waived as well. Id.
A party’s failure to include an issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement waives that issue on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Timely
filing of a response to a trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order is not enough to
preserve issues for appeal. Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210
(Pa. Super. 2008). Rule 1925 requires an appellant to “concisely identify each
error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the
issue to be raised for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “Issues … not
raised in accordance with the provisions of (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(vii). “[A c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the courts
to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no
[c]oncise [s]tatement at all.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683,
686-87 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Importantly, however, “[e]ach error identified in the [Rule 1925(b)
s]tatement will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue which was
raised in the trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v) (emphasis added). In
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accordance with the Official Note to Rule 1925, this Court has warned that
courts should guard “against being too quick to find waiver, claiming that Rule
1925(b) statements are either too vague or not specific enough.” Astorino
v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 912 A.2d 308, 309 (Pa. Super. 2006); see
also Pa.R.A.P. 1925, Official Note Subparagraph (b)(4).
With this in mind, we review the Concise Statement filed by Plaintiffs.
Instantly, Plaintiffs’ Rule 1925(b) statement preserved the following claims for
appeal:
a. [The trial court] erred as a matter of law and/or abused its
discretion by not considering Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File
a Response in Opposition in regard to any of the four
Defendants, thereby depriving the Plaintiffs of the opportunity
to respond to Defendants’ Preliminary Objections.
b. [The trial court] erred as a matter of law and/or abused its
discretion by sustaining the Preliminary Objections and
dismissing the Complaint when Plaintiffs had valid causes of
action.
c. [The trial court] erred as a matter of law and/or abused its
discretion by denying Plaintiffs their due process rights under
the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by making a judgment on the
pleadings, without considering all pleadings, and without
affording Plaintiffs notice and an opportunity to be heard.
d. [The trial court] erred as a matter of law and/or abused its
discretion by dismissing the Complaint with prejudice and
depriving Plaintiffs of the right to plead over in an [a]mended
[c]omplaint.
e. [The trial court] erred as a matter of law and/or abused its
discretion by issuing inconsistent rulings when it sustained the
Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Complaint in this
case, despite the fact that it overruled Preliminary Objections
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in thirty-five similar cases that involved the same claims and
the same Defendants.
Plaintiffs’ Concise Statement, 2/21/19, at 2-3.
None of the issues set forth above specifically challenge the trial court’s
dismissal of Counts Three and Six, as individual causes of action as to Bitzer
and Karen, and the applicability of the discovery rule. Nor are the issues
“subsidiary” to any of the vague issues raised in Plaintiffs’ Concise Statement.
Consequently, we conclude that Plaintiffs have waived their first claim. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(vii); Dowling, 778 A.2d at 686-87.
In their second claim, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly
sustained Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, because the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense, which must be raised in an answer. Brief
for Appellant at 27. Although Plaintiffs cite one case in support, they offer no
further argument. See id.
In their Concise Statement, Plaintiffs did not state this basis for relief.
Rather, Plaintiffs claimed a constitutional violation of their right to due
process, and a general claim that the trial court precluded them from filing a
response to the Preliminary Objections or an amended complaint. See
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Concise Statement, ¶¶ a, c, d. Consequently, this claim is also waived.5 See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(vii); Dowling, 778 A.2d at 686-87.
In their third claim, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly
dismissed Count Nine of their Complaint, which sets forth a cause of action
against Barley Snyder for fraudulent misrepresentation. Brief for Appellants
at 28. Plaintiffs set forth the elements of a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation, and the paragraphs of the Complaint purportedly
establishing those elements. Id. at 28-30. In particular, Plaintiffs take issue
with the trial court’s determination that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a
past or present misrepresentation. Id. at 31. According to Plaintiffs, the
Complaint alleges that after Barley Snyder destroyed documents, “it then lied
to Plaintiffs about their availability, with the intent to delay and prevent
Plaintiffs’ quest for truth.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly
focused upon the Plaintiffs’ reference to Armstrong’s “intent to produce”
documents, while ignoring the averment that Barley Snyder had “destroyed
documents and then lied about their existence and accessibility.” Id. at 31.
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5 Even if Plaintiffs had preserved this claim, we would conclude that Plaintiffs
waived their claim by not preliminarily objecting to the preliminary objections.
“Where a party erroneously asserts substantive defenses in preliminary
objections[,] rather than to raise these defenses by answer or in new matter,
the failure of the opposing party to file preliminary objections to the defective
preliminary objections, raising the erroneous defenses, waives the procedural
defect and allows the trial court to rule on the preliminary
objections.” Richmond v. McHale, 35 A.3d 779, 782 (Pa. Super. 2012).
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On this basis, Plaintiffs assert, this Court should overturn the Preliminary
Objection as to Count Nine. Id. at 32.
Once again, our review discloses that that the issues raised in Plaintiffs’
Concise Statement do not include or suggest the issue raised in Plaintiffs third
claim. Plaintiffs’ general Concise Statement raises no specific claim as to
Count Nine, or the sufficiency of its pleading of a cause of action for fraudulent
misrepresentation. As such, this claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(vii);
Dowling, 778 A.2d at 686-87.
In their fourth claim, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it
dismissed Count Ten of their Complaint, which sets forth a cause of action
against Dr. Hay for breach of physician-patient confidentiality. Brief for
Appellants at 33. In support, Plaintiffs state that Dr. Hay was employed by
Armstrong as the physician at Armstrong’s Floor Plant. Id. Plaintiffs contend
that Decedent “was entitled to the regulatory protections provided by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Access to Employee
Exposure and Medical Records. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020.” Brief for Appellants
at 33. Plaintiffs state that under section 1910.1020(a), “[t]he purpose of this
section is to provide employees and their designated representatives a right
of access to relevant exposure and medical records;” and that the activities
involved in complying with that section may be carried out, on behalf of the
employer, by the physician or other health care personnel in charge of
employee medical records. Id. Plaintiffs argue that “[t]here is no provision
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in section .1020(a) that required [Dr.] Hay to treat [Decedent].” Id. Further,
Plaintiffs assert that the section does not require a physician-patient
relationship. Id. at 34. At no time did they provide authorization for Barley
Snyder to obtain decedent’s Employee Exposure and Medical Records. Id.
According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Hay concealed Decedent’s medical records and
regulatory medical surveillance, and this caused Decedent to develop multiple
myeloma and allowed it to progress to Decedent’s death. Id. at 36.
Plaintiffs dispute the trial court’s determination that OSHA does not
create a private cause of action against an employer for a violation. Id. at
37. Plaintiffs additionally dispute the trial court’s conclusion that a physician-
patient relationship is essential for a cause of action for breach of
confidentiality. Id. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in
sustaining a Preliminary Objection as to Count Ten of the Complaint. Id. at
39.
Once again, our review of the Concise Statement filed by Plaintiffs
discloses no issue based upon the trial court sustaining the Preliminary
Objection as to Count Ten, or an issue implicating the arguments set forth
above. Nor is Plaintiffs’ claim subsidiary to any claim raised in the Preliminary
Objections. Accordingly, we must deem this issue waived. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(vii); Dowling, 778 A.2d at 686-87.
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Defendants’ Applications/Motions to dismiss this appeal based upon
waiver and Applications and Motions to dismiss this appeal based upon
Plaintiffs’ late filings are hereby denied. Order sustaining the Preliminary
Objections affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/15/2020
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