NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 27 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HONGXIA GUO, No. 17-72299
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-773-489
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 21, 2020**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: WALLACE, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Hongxia Guo, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that dismissed
her appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum.
Here, Guo’s claim is based on the allegation that she was forced to undergo an
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
abortion in 2012 because Chinese government authorities determined she had
violated family planning policy when she became pregnant with her second child
while unmarried. The IJ denied this claim due to an adverse credibility
determination, which the BIA adopted. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §
1252 and deny the petition.
In making an adverse credibility determination, an IJ must consider “the
totality of the circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The BIA reviews
that determination under the clearly erroneous standard. 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
We review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence, and findings “are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). In this case, the BIA explained its reasoning
with “sufficient particularity and clarity,” while also relying on the IJ’s opinion “as
a statement of reasons.” Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted). We therefore review “the reasons explicitly identified by the
BIA, and then examine the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s oral decision in support
of those reasons.” Id. In other words, “we do not review those parts of the IJ’s
adverse credibility finding that the BIA did not identify as ‘most significant’ and
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did not otherwise mention.”1 Id.
Here, the BIA focused on five of the IJ’s adverse credibility findings in
affirming the adverse credibility determination. First, regarding Guo’s marriage:
In her asylum application, Guo reported that she got married in 1991 and was later
widowed. However, in a supplemental statement filed two years later, she
admitted that she and her late husband had never legally married because she had
been too young. Her testimony was also inconsistent as to whether her parents had
attended the wedding banquet.
Second, regarding Guo’s household registration certificate: Guo claims to be
a widow, but the certificate states that she is divorced. Guo explained that her
father had bribed an official to change her household registration status so that her
son, born of her informal marriage, would not suffer the stigma of illegitimacy.
Neither the IJ nor the BIA was persuaded by this testimony, especially without a
rational explanation as to why Guo could not have changed the certificate to reflect
her status as “widowed,” as claimed, rather than “divorced.” Third, a letter written
by Guo’s father undermined the credibility of Guo’s testimony, due to the letter’s
failure to make any mention of the forced abortion and Guo’s failure to
persuasively justify the omission.
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For example, the BIA dismissed certain of the IJ’s findings as “speculative, such
as those concerning why the respondent did not move when her adolescent son was
being taunted by his peers.”
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Fourth, the IJ and the BIA were both unconvinced by Guo’s testimony that
she could not obtain a death certificate for her husband because she had not been
legally married to him. Her son qualified as her husband’s immediate relative and
could have obtained the death certificate for her. Fifth, Guo’s testimony that she
had visited a doctor for mental health issues only once was contradicted by the
documentary evidence.
The BIA concluded that the IJ “properly” gave “limited weight” to Guo’s
additional documentary evidence from the Chinese government. See Yali Wang,
861 F.3d at 1007–08 (“[T]he IJ has no obligation to determine whether the
documents submitted by petitioner are forgeries; rather, the petitioner has the
burden to satisfy the trier of fact by offering credible and persuasive evidence.”).
Both the State Department’s country conditions report and Guo indicated the
prevalence of fraud and corruption in the issuance of such documents in China.
Indeed, Guo admitted to having bribed a government official to obtain a false
document before.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s dismissal of Guo’s appeal from the
IJ’s adverse credibility determination, because—at a minimum—we are not
“compelled” by the evidence “to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Guo is correct that an IJ may not base her adverse credibility
determination on an “utterly trivial inconsistency,” see Shrestha v. Holder, 590
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F.3d 1034, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010), or on mere speculation, see Chawla v. Holder,
599 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, however, the inconsistencies were not
trivial, like a typographical error, see Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1043, but were
numerous and substantive, see id. at 1044 (“Mindful of the legitimate impact that
even minor inconsistencies may have on credibility, we conclude only that trivial
inconsistencies that under the totality of the circumstances have no bearing on a
petitioner’s veracity should not form the basis of an adverse credibility
determination.” (emphases added)). And the REAL ID Act gives IJs explicit
permission to consider “all relevant factors . . . without regard to whether an
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). As for Guo’s argument that the IJ’s findings were
impermissibly speculative, we have held that an adverse credibility determination
is not based on “complete speculation and conjecture” where, as here, “the IJ and
BIA supported the determination with specific citations to record evidence.” Singh
v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2015). For these reasons, we are not
compelled to reverse the BIA’s decision to affirm the IJ’s denial of Guo’s
application for asylum.
Petition DENIED.
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