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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-14885
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:04-cr-60079-JIC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AERRINGTON EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 4, 2020)
Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant Aerrington Edwards (“Edwards”) appeals his sentence of 36
months’ imprisonment, imposed by the district court after the revocation of his
supervised release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). On appeal, Edwards argues
that the district court imposed a procedurally and substantively unreasonable
sentence when it found that Edwards committed a Grade A supervised release
violation and sentenced him at the high end of the guideline range. After a review
of the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm Edwards’s sentence.
I.
We generally review a district court’s revocation of supervised release for an
abuse of discretion and the sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release
for reasonableness. United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir.
2014). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will affirm any sentence that
falls within the range of reasonable sentences, even if we would have decided that
a different sentence was more appropriate. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The party challenging the sentence bears the
burden to show that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.
2010).
A district court’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court
erred in calculating the guideline range. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933,
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936 (11th Cir. 2016). In calculating the guideline range for the imposition of a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release, the district court considers the
grade level classification of the revocation-provoking conduct, the defendant’s
criminal history at the time of the underlying offense, and the class of the
underlying offense. United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 1348–49 (11th Cir.
2007); U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4. A supervised release violation is a Grade A
violation if the conduct is, among other things, a state offense that is a crime of
violence. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1). “Where there is more than one violation of the
conditions of supervised release, . . . the grade of the violation is determined by the
violation having the most serious grade.” Id. § 7B1.1(b).
We have held that aggravated assault, in violation of Florida Statutes
§ 784.021, is categorically a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s
(“ACCA”) elements clause. Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI, 709 F.3d 1328, 1338
(11th Cir. 2013), abrogated in part on other grounds by Johnson v. United States,
576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). We
subsequently reaffirmed our holding in Turner, concluding that Florida aggravated
assault categorically constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1,
comment. (n.1), which incorporated the identical elements clause in § 4B1.2.
United States v. Golden, 854 F.3d 1256, 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that
“even if Turner is flawed, that does not give us, as a later panel, the authority to
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disregard it”); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Under the prior panel precedent rule, we
are bound by published decisions that have not been overruled by the Supreme
Court or this court en banc. United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236
(11th Cir. 2008).
Upon determining that a defendant violated a condition of supervised
release, the district court may revoke the term of supervision and impose a prison
term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). A district court must consider certain of the factors
outlined in § 3553(a) when imposing a sentence after revoking supervised release.
See id; Vandergrift, 754 F.3d at 1308. Specifically, the district court must consider
the nature and circumstances of the crime with the history and characteristics of the
defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence and
protect the public; and the applicable guideline range and any pertinent policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). We ordinarily
expect a sentence within the guideline range to be reasonable. United States v.
Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1309 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).
A court can abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable
sentence when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3)
commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably.
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Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Thus, a district court’s unjustified reliance on any one
§ 3553(a) factor may be indicative of an unreasonable sentence. United States v.
Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). However, the district court can give
great weight to one factor over others. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892
(11th Cir. 2014). The district court need not state on the record that it has
explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or discuss them all individually.
United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2007). It is enough that the
context and record indicated the reasoning behind the district court’s conclusion.
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007). We will
only remand for resentencing when we are left with “the definite and firm
conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191
(quotation marks omitted).
II.
In 2004, Edwards pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute more
than 50 grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).
The district court sentenced Edwards to 262 months’ imprisonment, followed by
five years of supervised release. After the First Step Act of 2018 made the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 retroactively applicable, the district court reduced
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Edwards’s term of imprisonment to 188 months, followed by four years of
supervised release. At the end of January 2019, Edwards began his term of
supervised release with specific conditions: that he not commit another federal,
state or local crime or unlawfully possess a firearm; that he permit his probation
officer to visit him at any time in his home or elsewhere; and that he truthfully
answer inquiries from his probation officer.
On October 1, 2019, the probation officer filed a petition for warrant for
Edwards because he had violated the mandatory conditions of his supervised
release. First, Edwards committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
without the intent to kill, in violation of Florida Statute 784.021(1)(a). Second,
Edwards failed to refrain from violation of the law by committing battery in
violation of Florida Statute 784.03. Third, Edwards failed to permit his probation
officer to visit him at any time, at home, or elsewhere. Edwards denied the
violations, and the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing. After hearing
testimony from the probation officer, the victim of the aggravated assault, the
victim of the battery, and Edwards, the district court found Edwards guilty of all
three charged violations, revoked his term of supervised release, and sentenced him
to 36 months’ imprisonment and no further supervision. Edwards appeals.
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III.
Edwards contends that the district court procedurally erred by finding that he
committed a Grade A violation of his supervised release because Edwards’s
commission of aggravated assault in violation of Florida law is a crime of violence.
For sentences imposed on revocation of supervised release, the range is based on
(1) the classification of the revocation-producing conduct into one of three grades,
(2) the criminal history category applicable at the time the defendant was originally
sentenced to the term of supervised release, and (3) the class of his original
offense. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1; § 7B1.4; Campbell, 473 F.3d at 1348–49. After that, a
district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and “impose a term of
imprisonment after considering various factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
Campbell, 473 F.3d at 1348.
Edwards challenges the district court’s determination that his Florida
aggravated assault charge is not a Grade A violation because it is not categorically
a crime of violence. However, Edwards concedes that binding precedent does not
support his assertion. See Turner, 709 F.3d at 1338; Golden, 854 F.3d at 1256–57.
Neither of these decisions has been overruled by the Supreme Court or by our
court en banc. Therefore, the district court properly determined that Edwards’s
Florida aggravated assault violation constituted a crime of a violence for purposes
of classifying his revocation offense as a Grade A and correctly calculated his
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guideline range based on that determination. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not commit procedural error in imposing a 36-month
imprisonment sentence.
IV.
Edwards also contends that the district court committed substantive error
because it sentenced him at the high end of the guidelines range and did not
consider any of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Based on our
review of the record, we find that Edwards cannot meet his burden to show that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378.
Revocation proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), which
provides that “a district court may, upon finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant has violated a condition of supervised release, revoke the
term of supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment” by considering
certain factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105,
1107 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). The district court did not refer
specifically to the § 3553(a) factors but it did reference Edwards’s multiple release
violations to support its sentencing determination. The district court also
considered the statements of all the parties at the revocation hearing and the
information in the violation report in its sentencing determination. The district
court found that Edwards, a felon on release, brandished a firearm to threaten an
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individual, and during the altercation, Edwards employed language identical to that
he used in a prior aggravated assault, and it found that within weeks, Edwards hit
another man hard enough to knock out two teeth. These findings implicate
Edwards’s history and characteristics and the need for deterrence, the seriousness
of the offense, and the need to protect the public. See generally § 3553(a)(1)-(2).
Although Edwards contends that the district court imposed a sentence at the
high end of the advisory guideline range (33-36 months) without explanation,
nothing in the law “requires the district court to state on the record that it has
explicitly considered each of § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the district court explained that the sentence
imposed was appropriate and was within the advisory guideline range, which is a
sentencing factor. See 18 U.S.C.§ 3553(a)(4). We ordinarily expect a sentence
within the guideline range to be reasonable. Foster, 878 F.3d at 1309.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Edwards has failed to
meet his burden to show that the district court imposed a procedurally or
substantively unreasonable sentence. Accordingly, based on the aforementioned
reasons, we affirm the district court’s imposition of a 36-month term of
imprisonment for Edwards’s violation of supervised release.
AFFIRMED.
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