IMO: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of D.C. and A.C(Minor Children)and De.C.(Father)and T.F., Jr.(Minor Child)and T.F., Sr.(Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem.dec)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 05 2020, 8:26 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT FATHER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
DE.C. Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deidre L. Monroe Attorney General of Indiana
Public Defender’s Office
Crown Point, Indiana Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT FATHER Indianapolis, Indiana
T.F., SR.
Karyn Price
Lake County Juvenile Public Defender
Crown Point, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination November 5, 2020
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of D.C. and A.C., Minor 20A-JT-1059
Children and De.C., Father; and Appeal from the Lake Superior
T.F., Jr., Minor Child, and T.F., Court
Sr., Father The Honorable Thomas P.
De.C., Stefaniak, Jr., Judge

Appellant-Respondent, Trial Court Cause No.
45D06-1904-JT-121,
v. 45D06-1904-JT-122,
45D06-1904-JT-124

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 1 of 21
 The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

and

T.F., Sr.,
Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

May, Judge.

[1] De.C. (“Father C.”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his

children D.C. and A.C. T.F. Sr. (“Father F.”) appeals the termination of his

parental rights to his child, T.F. Jr. (“Jr.”) (together with D.C. and A.C.,

collectively, “Children”). Father C. and Father F. both argue the trial court’s

findings do not support its conclusions that (1) the conditions that resulted in

the removal of Children would not be remedied; (2) the continuation of the

parent-child relationships posed a threat to the well-being of Children; and (3)

termination was in the best interests of Children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 2 of 21
[2] L.S. (“Mother”) 1 gave birth to D.C. on August 21, 2014, and A.C. on

December 27, 2015. Father C. is father of D.C. and A.C. On October 2, 2016,

the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother was

attempting to leave a hospital with D.C. and A.C., 2 but did not have

transportation or car seats. DCS representatives investigated and found

Mother, D.C., and A.C., to be dirty and to have an unpleasant odor. Mother

subsequently admitted she and the children were homeless.

[3] DCS contacted Father C. from the hospital. Father C. was living in Iowa and

was “unable or unwilling” to take custody of D.C. and A.C. (Ex. Vol. I at 13.)

Based on Mother’s homelessness and Father C.’s inability to care for D.C. and

A.C., DCS placed D.C. and A.C. in foster care. On October 4, 2016, DCS filed

petitions alleging D.C. and A.C. were Children in Need of Services

(“CHINS”). The trial court held an initial hearing on the CHINS petitions on

November 9, 2016, and Mother and Father C. admitted D.C. and A.C. were

CHINS.

[4] On the same day, the trial court held a dispositional hearing and issued its

dispositional order, which required Mother and Father C. to complete a

parenting assessment and any recommended treatment and to participate in

1
The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children, but she does not participate in this
appeal.
2
The record indicates Mother had a third child, J.C., with her at the time, but that child is not a subject of
these proceedings.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 3 of 21
 supervised visitation with D.C. and A.C. Additionally, the trial court ordered

Mother to work with a home-based caseworker to secure housing and ordered

Father C. to establish paternity of D.C. and A.C.

[5] In a May 2017 progress report, DCS indicated Father C. had not engaged in

visitation, had not established paternity, and had not completed the ordered

parenting assessment. On June 23, 2017, Mother gave birth to Jr., whose father

is Father F. Jr. remained in Mother’s custody following his birth. Father F.

was incarcerated at the time of Jr.’s birth and has remained incarcerated in

Illinois during the entirety of these proceedings. In January 2018, DCS moved

to transition D.C. and A.C. back to Mother’s care. On March 2, 2018, the trial

court placed D.C. and A.C. with Mother for a trial home visit.

[6] On May 7, 2018, Mother obtained a protective order against Father C. based on

allegations of domestic and family violence. At a review hearing on the same

day, DCS reported Father C. had begun participating in supervised visits with

D.C. and A.C. On July 15, 2018, DCS removed Children from Mother’s care

after A.C. “suffered severe scald bur[n]s to her feet” for which Mother did not

seek immediate treatment. (Ex. Vol. I at 72.) Mother reported A.C. “was

burned in the bath by [D.C.].” (Id.) A.C.’s burns required emergency surgery

and skin grafting. Father C. visited A.C. during her hospital stay.

[7] On July 19, 2018, DCS filed a petition alleging Jr. was a CHINS. The trial

court held an initial and fact-finding hearing on October 15, 2018. Father F.

did not attend due to his incarceration. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown.

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 Based thereon, the trial court adjudicated Jr. as a CHINS. The trial court held

a dispositional hearing and issued its dispositional order the same day, which

required Father F. “to complete a parenting assessment, initial clinical

assessment and once released from jail participate in supervised visitations with

[Jr.].” (Father F.’s App. Vol. II at 33.) The last time Mother saw Children or

had contact with DCS was December 2018.

[8] On April 8, 2019, the trial court entered an order on its case review and

permanency plan hearing. The trial court changed the permanency plan for

Children from reunification to termination of parental rights. The DCS

progress report noted Father C. had visited with D.C. and A.C. only three times

in 2019, was noncompliant with services, and did not have stable housing. The

report also noted that Father F. remained incarcerated with a “potential parole

date of 3/21/2022 and a projected release date of 3/21/2025,” (Ex. Vol. II at

21), had not established paternity of Jr., had not visited with Jr., and had not

engaged in services.

[9] On April 25, 2019, DCS filed petitions to terminate Father C.’s parental rights

to D.C. and A.C. and a petition to terminate Father F.’s parental rights to Jr.

The cases were consolidated and, on June 4, 2019, the trial court held an initial

hearing on the termination petitions. In February 2020, Father F. took a DNA

test that identified him as the biological father of Jr. 3 On March 11, 2020, the

3
The termination order indicates Father C. also established paternity of D.C. and A.C. at some point during
the proceedings, but it does not indicate when that occurred.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 5 of 21
 trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the termination petitions. Father C.

appeared at the fact-finding hearing and Father F. appeared by counsel only

because he was incarcerated at the time of the hearing. On May 5, 2020, the

trial court entered its order terminating the parental rights of Mother, Father C.,

and Father F. to their respective children.

Discussion and Decision
[10] We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., 750

N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh evidence or judge

the credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App.

2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable

inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment

terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S.,

717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied 534 U.S.

1161 (2002).

[11] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In

re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A juvenile court

must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child, however,

when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750

N.E.2d at 837. The right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated

solely because there is a better home available for the child, id., but parental

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 6 of 21
 rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or

her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[12] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and

prove:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at
least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a
description of the court’s finding, the date of the
finding, and the manner in which the finding was
made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and
has been under the supervision of a county office of
family and children or probation department for at
least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-
two (22) months, beginning with the date the child
is removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons
for placement outside the home of the parents will
not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment
of the child.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 7 of 21
 Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of

these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied.

“[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not

entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” Id. at 1261. Because

parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise

their children, the State “must strictly comply with the statute terminating

parental rights.” Platz v. Elkhart Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18

(Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

[13] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether the

evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment.

Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to

support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98,

102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the juvenile court’s

decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208. Father C. and Father

F. do not challenge any of the trial court’s findings and thus they stand proven.

See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (“Because Madlem does

not challenge the findings of the trial court, they must be accepted as correct.”).

A. Reasonable Probability Conditions Not Remedied
[14] The juvenile court must judge parents’ fitness to care for their children at the

time of the termination hearing. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 8 of 21
 2010). Evidence of a parent’s pattern of unwillingness or lack of commitment

to address parenting issues and to cooperate with services “demonstrates the

requisite reasonable probability” that the conditions will not change. Lang v.

Starke Cty. OFC, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

1. In re Father C.

[15] Father C. argues the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the

conditions that resulted in removal of D.C. and A.C. would not be remedied

because “there was never an effort by DCS to reunite [D.C. and A.C.] with

[Father C.]” and “the [trial court] did not give any credit to [Father C.] for his

significant accomplishments.” (Br. of Appellant Father C. at 13.) The trial

court entered the following findings in support of its conclusion that the

conditions would not be remedied:

The Department of Child Services received a report alleging
neglect. . . . [D.C. and A.C.] were removed from [Mother’s] care.
[Father C.] was in the State of Iowa and was unable to take
custody of [D.C. and A.C.].

*****

[Father C.] appeared at the fact finding hearing and was
represented by counsel for the proceedings. [Father C.] is
sporadic with the visitations with [D.C. and A.C.]. [Father C.]
was to visit twice weekly with [D.C. and A.C.]. [Father C.] has
only attended approximately 50% of the scheduled visits. [Father
C.] has only been attending the visit [sic] approximately once a
month. [Father C.] has a pattern of visiting with [D.C. and A.C.]
right before a court hearing and then visits would become
sporadic. [Father C.] continuously cancels or no-shows for his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 9 of 21
 visitations with [D.C. and A.C.]. [Father C.] does not have any
real engagement with [D.C. and A.C.]. [Father C.] does not
come prepared for the visits. [Father C.] resides in Chicago and
transportation was offered for visits. Often times, [D.C. and
A.C.] would be transported and [Father C.] would not make
himself available.

[Father C.] did establish paternity for [D.C. and A.C.]. The
Department of Child Services has been unable to verify [Father
C.’s] housing. Service providers were changed on a number of
occasions to accommodate [Father C.’s] schedule. [Father C.]
would remain sporadic with his compliance with the case plan.
[Father C.] has not progressed in the case plan toward
reunification.

[Father C.] has a criminal history including incarcerations and
work release. Mother currently has an active protective order
against [Father C.].

[Father C.] would not allow the case manager to view his home
in an attempt for the visitations to progress. [Father C.] would
not allow the service providers into his home. [Father C.] has
moved at least three times since the CHINS case began. [Father
C.] testified he is looking to move again. [Father C.]
continuously refused to allow the case manager to view the
home. [Father C.] did not ever become vested [sic] in the
services offered through the Department of Child Services.
Although [Father C.] sporadically visits with [D.C. and A.C.],
[Father C.] is in no position to independently parent [D.C. and
A.C.] on a daily basis. [Father C.] is not able to care for [D.C.
and A.C.’s] basic needs. All efforts to engage [Father C.] in the
reunification process have failed.

(Father C.’s App. Vol. II at 3-4) (internal citations omitted).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 10 of 21
[16] Father C. contends he is “in total compliance with his case plan.” (Br. of

Appellant Father C. at 13.) The trial court’s findings indicate otherwise, and

Father C. has not advanced an argument that any of those findings are not

supported by evidence. Father C.’s argument is an invitation for us to reweigh

the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In

re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge

the credibility of witnesses). We therefore conclude that the trial court’s

findings supported its conclusion that the conditions that resulted in removal of

D.C. and A.C. would not be remedied. See In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 908 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2017) (affirming the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions under

which child was removed from mother’s care would not be remedied based on

mother’s pattern of behavior and noncompliance with services).

2. In re Father F.

[17] Father F. argues the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the

conditions that resulted in Jr.’s removal would not be remedied. In support of

its conclusion that the conditions that resulted in Jr.’s removal would not be

remedied, the trial court found as follows:

[Children] were placed on a trial home visit with [Mother] in
March 2018, but had to be removed again when [A.C.] was
hospitalized in July 2018 with severe burns on her feet. Mother
did not seek medical attention in a timely manner. . . . [Jr.] was
then also made ward of the Department of Child Services.
[Father F.] was incarcerated at this time.

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 [Father F.] remains incarcerated. [Father F.] was represented by
counsel for the termination proceedings and had the opportunity
to testify. [Father F.] will remain incarcerated until 2022 and
does not have an adequate plan for care or treatment of [Jr.].
[Father F.] was given DNA testing for [Jr.]. [Father F.] is the
biological father of [Jr.], but has not established paternity.

[Father F.] has not participated in any services. [Father F.] has
no significant bond with [Jr.]. [Father F.] has not ever met [Jr.].
The Department of Child Services is required to provide
reasonable efforts to the parties for reunification services.
Services were referred to providers, but due to [Father F.’s] high
security issues, providers were not allowed. Once [Father F.]
was moved to Moline, Illinois, Fatherhood Initiative [S]ervices
were offered to [Father F.]. Although, DCS was unable to
physically provide the other services, [Father F.’s] place of
incarceration usually offers numerous services and programs
through their institution. [Father F.] did not voluntarily
participate in or provide any proof of any participation in these
services. [Father F.] was aware of the CHINS proceedings for
[Jr.], and [Father F.] did not contact the Department of Child
Services, not until the petition to terminate his parental rights
was filed, after [Jr.] was in foster care for over a year. [Father F.]
has shown no interest in parenting [Jr.].

Psychological data indicates that crucial socialization for human
beings occurs between birth and five years of age. While
incarceration hampers a parents [sic] ability to do services, the
fact remains that but for [Father F.] committing, and being
convicted of Armed Habitual Criminal [sic] and becoming
incarcerated on February 15, 2017 while [Jr.] was in utero[,]
[Father F.] could have been involved in [Jr.’s] life. [Father F.’s]
actions have caused him to never meet his child. [Father F.’s]
actions have lead [sic] to his incarceration until at least March
21, 2022. By [Father F.’s] release date [Jr.] will be nearly five

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 years old. [Father F.’s] past pattern of conduct cannot be
ignored.

(Father C.’s App. Vol. II at 3-4) (internal citations omitted).

[18] Father F. contends he “has participated in all the programs that were available

to him while he has been incarcerated” and “he can live with his father or

mother upon his release and . . . can return to his previous employer that has a

program for convicted felons.” (Br. of Appellant Father F. at 17.) Father F.

maintains that his “release date [from incarceration] is the sole factor that [DCS

is using in] recommending termination of parental rights.” (Id. at 12.) Father

F. likens the facts here to those in K.E. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d

641 (Ind. 2015).

[19] In K.E., like here, the father had been incarcerated since K.E.’s birth, as he and

the mother were arrested and convicted on drug-related charges when mother

was pregnant with K.E. The father was serving a ten-year prison sentence. Id.

at 644. While incarcerated, the father “completed over twelve programs . . .

that relate to self-improvement, parenting, and drug and alcohol abuse.” Id.

Additionally, child’s placement, his paternal aunt, took child to visit with his

father “for two to three hours at a time” and the father “ma[de] nightly phone

calls . . . in order to talk” to his child. Id.

[20] During the trial court’s termination fact-finding hearing, the Court-Appointed

Special Advocate (“CASA”)

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 was willing to recommend that termination of Father’s parental
rights be delayed until it was determined whether Father’s
sentence would be modified. The CASA considered the efforts
Father had made to complete multiple programs, the bond he
had developed with K.E., the fact that Father had not been given
the same amount of time and services that DCS made available
to Mother, and that a delay would not harm K.E. The CASA
felt that a temporary delay in termination of Father’s parental
rights was merited. Yet, this recommendation was conditioned
upon Father being approved for a sentence modification, and the
CASA recommended termination if Father would not be released
until September of 2016.

Id. at 644-5. The trial court terminated father’s parental rights to K.E., and

father appealed. Our Indiana Supreme Court held:

[Father’s] potential release date is only one consideration of
many that may be relevant in a given case. We do not seek to
establish a higher burden upon incarcerated parents based upon
their possible release dates nor do we believe the burden of proof
should be reduced merely because a parent is incarcerated.
Because the release date alone is not determinative, we consider
whether other evidence, coupled with this consideration,
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable
probability that Father would be unable to remedy the conditions
for removal.

*****

Despite Father’s criminal and substance abuse history, his recent
improvements at the time of the termination hearing were not
balanced against his habitual patterns of conduct. Given the
substantial efforts that Father is making to improve his life by
learning to become a better parent, establishing a relationship
with K.E. . . . and attending substance abuse classes, it was not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 14 of 21
 proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father could not
remedy the conditions for K.E.’s removal. . . . [T]here is
seemingly nothing else that Father could have been doing to
demonstrate his dedication to obtaining reunification. Because
there was insufficient evidence to establish this factor for
termination, the findings cannot support the conclusion reached
by the trial court, making the conclusion clearly erroneous.

Id. at 648-9.

[21] The facts before us are not similar at all. While Father F. signed service copies

of the CHINS petition and related notices, he did not show an interest in

preserving any relationship with Jr. until DCS filed a petition to terminate

Father F.’s parental rights. Father F. contends he completed parenting classes

while incarcerated, however, he did not provide any documentation to support

his testimony regarding the completion of those classes. 4 Finally, Father F. has

never met Jr. and, if Father F. is released from incarceration at the earliest

possible date, Jr. will be five years old by the time of Father F.’s release in 2022.

Based thereon, we conclude the trial court’s findings supported its conclusion

that the conditions that resulted in Jr.’s removal would not be remedied. See In

re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013) (trial court’s findings supported its

4
Father F. also argues DCS violated his due process rights by failing to provide him reunification services
and visitation. However, Father F. did not raise this issue before the trial court, and thus it is waived. See In
re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a
claimed violation of due process rights by raising it for the first time on appeal”). Waiver notwithstanding, it
is well-settled that “failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a
termination order as contrary to law,” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), and a failure
to offer services due to incarceration does not “constitute a deprivation of due process rights.” Castro v. State
Ofc. of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Father F.’s due process
argument fails.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 15 of 21
 conclusion that the conditions under which child was removed from mother’s

care would not be remedied because mother did not consistently participate in

services and engaged in criminal behavior). 5

B. Best Interests of Children
[22] In determining what is in Children’s best interests, a trial court is required to

look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the

evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed.

A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with the

parent’s current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental

rights is in the best interests of the child. In re A.L.H., 774 N.E.2d 896, 900

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The recommendations of a DCS case manager and court-

appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in Children’s best interests. In

re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

5
Father C. and Father F. also argue the trial court’s findings do not support its conclusion that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of their respective children.
However, as the trial court’s findings supported its conclusions that the conditions under which their
respective children were removed would not be remedied, we need not address that argument. See In re L.S.,
717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (because statute written in disjunctive, court needs to find only one
requirement to terminate parental rights), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1161 (2002).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 16 of 21
 1. In re Father C.

[23] Father C. contends the best interests of D.C. and A.C. were “most definitely

not served by this ruling[,]” the trial court’s order did not take into account that

D.C. and A.C. love Father C., and the trial court did not consider the “pain and

suffering” it was causing D.C. and A.C. (Br. of Appellant Father C. at 15.)

Regarding D.C. and A.C.’s best interests, the trial court found:

[D.C. and A.C.] are thriving in their current placements. [D.C.
and A.C.] are bonded in the placements and all their needs are
being met and addressed in their placements. . . . [D.C. and
A.C.] are extremely bonded in their home and it would be
detrimental for the girls to be removed from that placement.

(Father C.’s App. Vol. II at 4.) During the fact-finding hearing, the Family

Case Manager testified:

At this time it’s in the best interest of [D.C. and A.C.] for the
termination of parental rights. Although they have a bond with
[Father C.] and they love [Father C.], they don’t engage with
[Father C.]. . . . [D.C. and A.C.] are doing really well in their
foster homes. They’re thriving. They’re meeting their
milestones. They’re able – they have stability, they have
schedules. Moving forward, they have a permanency plan that is
in place and effective for them and is doing well with them in
their behaviors and schooling.

*****

[D.C. and A.C.] do have a very good, strong bond with [Foster
Mom]. They call [Foster Mom] mom. They tell her that they

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 love her. They look forward to coming home from school and
being with her. She treats them very well in her home.

(Tr. Vol. II at 67.) Therefore, based on the Family Case Manager’s testimony

as well as the trial court’s findings that the conditions that resulted in the

removal of D.C. and A.C. would not be remedied, we conclude the trial court’s

findings supported its conclusion that termination of Father C.’s parental rights

was in the best interests of D.C. and A.C. See A.D.S. v. Indiana Dept. of Child

Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (recommendation by

family case manager and guardian ad litem, along with the trial court’s findings

that the conditions under which children were removed from mother’s care

would not be remedied, supported trial court’s conclusion that termination of

mother’s parental rights was in children’s best interests), trans. denied.

2. In re Father F.

[24] Father F. argues the termination of Father F.’s parental rights is not in Jr.’s best

interests. He likens the facts here to those in In re G.Y., wherein mother was

G.Y.’s sole caretaker for first twenty months of G.Y.’s life until mother was

arrested for Class B felony dealing in cocaine. 904 N.E.2d at 1259. Prior to

pleading guilty and facing incarceration, mother unsuccessfully attempted to

find a suitable relative with whom G.Y. could stay during mother’s

incarceration. Mother pled guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced her

to twelve years with four years suspended. DCS removed G.Y. and placed him

in foster care; he was subsequently adjudicated a CHINS. Id.

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[25] Eventually, DCS filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to G.Y.

because, in part, mother was unavailable to parent G.Y. due to mother’s

incarceration. During the fact-finding hearing, mother testified that she visited

with G.Y. once a month for one to two hours, completed a parenting class, and

completed an “inmate to work” program while incarcerated. Id. at 1262. She

received reductions in her sentence for classes she took while incarcerated.

However, the Guardian ad Litem recommended termination of mother’s

parental rights to G.Y. because G.Y. needed stability and mother’s earliest

possible release date was approximately two years away. The trial court

terminated mother’s parental rights to G.Y. Id. at 1262.

[26] Mother appealed, arguing termination of her parental rights was not in G.Y.’s

best interests. Our Indiana Supreme Court agreed, holding that prior to the

CHINS adjudication, “the record gives no indication that Mother was anything

but a fit parent[,]” id.; that mother’s additional education classes had shortened

her sentence, that DCS had not demonstrated mother was likely to reoffend,

and that mother “maintained a consistent, positive relationship with G.Y.” Id.

at 1264. The Court further noted that while “[p]ermanency is a central

consideration in determining the best interests of a child[,]” id. at 1265,

mother’s continued commitment to reunification with G.Y. and her willingness

to continue services following her release outweighed the need for immediate

permanency through adoption for G.Y. Id.

[27] The same is not true here. Father F. has never met Jr. and was incarcerated

prior to Jr.’s birth for possession of a handgun with a prior felony. Father F.

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 has not visited with Jr., could not provide documentation of any parenting

classes he attended, and had not received a reduction in his sentence due to

availing himself to educational opportunities while incarcerated. The family

case manager testified that

[Jr.] has not known anybody since – as family related, since he
was a year old. He has almost been in this home for a whole
year. He’s doing extremely well. He’s come a long way with
meeting his milestones in his speech and his physical abilities.
So, he has some permanency and some stability in his life at this
time.

(Tr. Vol. II at 38.) Based on the family case manager’s recommendation and

the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions that resulted in Jr.’s removal

would not be remedied, we conclude the trial court’s findings support its

conclusion that termination of Father F.’s parental rights to Jr. is in Jr.’s best

interests. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1159 (recommendation by family case

manager and guardian ad litem, along with the trial court’s findings that the

conditions under children were removed from mother’s care would not be

remedied, supported trial court’s conclusion that termination of mother’s

parental rights was in children’s best interests).

Conclusion
[28] Regarding all Children, the trial court’s findings support its conclusions that the

conditions under which Children were removed would not be remedied and

that termination of the fathers’ parental rights was in Children’s best interests.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-1059 | November 5, 2020 Page 20 of 21
 Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Father C.’s parental rights to D.C.

and A.C. and the termination of Father F.’s parental rights to Jr.

[29] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.

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