IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of:
No. 80296-8-I
MAHALINGAM LAKSHMANAN,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
and UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SEETHALAKSHMI MAHALINGAM,
Respondent.
MANN, C.J. — Mahalingam Lakshmanan appeals the trial court’s entry of a
parenting plan. He argues that the trial court erred by (1) limiting his residential time, (2)
considering the recommendations of a court-appointed social worker, (3) granting sole
educational decision-making authority to the mother, and (4) ordering him to complete a
domestic violence class for dads. We affirm.
I.
Mahalingam 1 and Seethalakshmi Mahalingam entered into an arranged marriage
in India in July 2012 and had one child in April 2013. 2
1 We use the parties’ first names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.
2 The pertinent facts are set forth in the trial court’s uncontested findings of fact. Unchallenged
findings are verities on appeal. In re Marriage of Rounds, 4 Wn. App. 2d 801, 804, 423 P.3d 895 (2018).
We recite only those facts necessary to address the issues raised on appeal.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 80296-8-I/2
Soon after their wedding, Mahalingam began to criticize Seethalakshmi’s manner
of speech and dress as not being up to his family’s standards and his family insulted her
for not knowing how to cook. Mahalingam yelled at Seethalakshmi and struck her
during the pregnancy. He also took Seethalakshmi’s mobile phone away and restricted
her ability to call friends. The couple moved to Washington in May 2013.
Once in Washington, Mahalingam withheld the immigration paperwork that
Seethalakshmi needed to work in the United States and did not give her access to the
family’s bank accounts. He devoted a great deal of attention to controlling everything in
their family. According to Seethalakshmi, the physical abuse she had experienced
infrequently in India now occurred about once a week, which included Mahalingam
pushing her and twisting her hands.
In 2014, as their child’s one-year birthday approached, Seethalakshmi told her
parents that she could not take it anymore, so her father bought tickets for her and the
child to return to India after the birthday party. After the child’s party, a big fight ensued.
Mahalingam believed that Seethalakshmi’s desire to return to India with the child meant
the marriage was irretrievably broken, slapped her on the face, and refused to produce
the child’s passport. Mahalingam turned over the passport after Seethalakshmi’s father
threatened to call the police. Seethalakshmi and the child departed to India in May
2014.
Seethalakshmi and Mahalingam Facetimed each other when she was back in
India, but Mahalingam never asked to Facetime with the child and indicated that he
wanted her to “change.” Meanwhile, Mahalingam’s parents and family in India were
denigrating Seethalakshmi’s reputation by telling people she came to India without
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Mahalingam’s permission. In order repair the marriage and return to Washington,
Seethalakshmi and her parents had to apologize to the business community, apologize
to Mahalingam’s family and pay them $3,000, and pay for the return tickets to Seattle.
In August 2015, after 15 months in India, Seethalakshmi and the child returned to
Washington. The marriage continued to deteriorate. Mahalingam complained to others
that Seethalakshmi was not working, but he would not provide her the immigration
papers she needed to get a work permit, and he sometimes took her laptop, keys, and
locked her inside or outside of the house for hours.
In December 2016, the couple had a two-day “mediation” that also involved a
neighbor and several of Mahalingam’s relatives and none of Seethalakshmi’s.
Mahalingam berated Seethalakshmi, yelled at her, and used abusive language. The
neighbor described Mahalingam as “about to explode.” Their child was present during
this mediation.
In 2017, the physical and emotional abuse worsened. Seethalakshmi called the
police several times. Mahalingam’s verbal abuse of Seethalakshmi, including degrading
her, always took place in front of their child. According to Seethalakshmi, she sent
photographs of her injuries to her uncle in Texas and to her parents. 3 Seethalakshmi
went to visit her uncle in Texas for a couple of weeks, she said, to escape
Mahalingam’s physical abuse. Upon her return to Washington, Seethalakshmi learned
that Mahalingam had gotten rid of her car, placed her clothes in the garbage, and
instructed her to sleep on the couch, on the floor, and in the garage. Meanwhile,
3 None of these photographs were produced at trial or made a part of the record on appeal.
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Mahalingam had taken over parenting the child and placed the child in extended day
care.
On September 15, 2017, Mahalingam and Seethalakshmi fought over the use of
a rice cooker. According to Seethalakshmi, Mahalingam hit her in the back and twisted
her hands behind her back. Seethalakshmi began to record the encounter on her
mobile phone. The video captured Mahalingam pushing Seethalakshmi three times,
almost causing her to fall. Law enforcement officers responded to the scene and
observed red marks and later bruises that were consistent with Seethalakshmi’s version
of the event.
Mahalingam was arrested and charged with assault in the fourth degree,
domestic violence. He accepted a Stipulated Order of Continuance that required him to
participate in domestic violence treatment, which he later completed. However,
Mahalingam demonstrated very little insight into his own behaviors and continued to
assert that his actions were all defensive.
On November 15, 2017, Mahalingam petitioned the King County Superior Court
for legal separation, which was eventually converted into a dissolution proceeding.
Days later, Seethalakshmi obtained a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) for
herself and the child. Mahalingam then stopped paying the rent, the utilities, and the
fee for the child to attend pre-kindergarten. He did not make any payments toward
supporting the child until the trial court required him to do so in a temporary order.
Seethalakshmi relied on friends to pay utility bills and to help her rent a studio
apartment. The trial court ordered Mahalingam to pay Seethalakshmi maintenance
based on his ability to pay and her need.
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No. 80296-8-I/5
During the four-day bench trial in April 2019, the trial court heard the testimony of
the parties, as well as 14 other family members, friends, and professionals. Sarah
Zubair, a Family Court Services social worker, who conducted a parenting evaluation
testified about her recommendations for a parenting plan. Zubair testified that
Mahalingam’s approach to parenting is “parent-centered.” Mahalingam was determined
to have the child placed in a “gifted academic program,” and yet the child’s teachers
said the child was below grade level. Zubair also testified that Mahalingam had signed
the child up for Kumon (beginning at age three), Indian dance and singing, piano,
gymnastics, and other activities.
Among other things, Zubair recommended that there be a restriction on
Mahalingam’s residential time based on a history of acts of domestic violence and that
the child continue to reside primarily with Seethalakshmi.
The trial court entered a permanent parenting plan, along with contemporaneous
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, providing for the child to live primarily
with Seethalakshmi. The court limited Mahalingam’s residential time based upon a
finding that he had “a history of domestic violence.” The parenting plan allowed for the
child to reside with Mahalingam overnight on weekends, every other week, from Friday
afternoon to Monday morning. The plan also required Mahalingam to successfully
complete the “DV Dads program” and follow all treatment recommendations, and
allocated major decision-making authority to Seethalakshmi. Mahalingam moved for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied.
Mahalingam appeals.
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II.
We review a trial court’s parenting plan for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs
when a decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or
untenable reasons.” In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012)
(citing In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)). The
appellant bears the “‘heavy burden of showing a manifest abuse of discretion.’” In re
Marriage of Kim, 179 Wn. App. 232, 240, 317 P.3d 555 (2014) (quoting In re Marriage
of Landry, 103 Wn.2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 (1985)).
On review, we will uphold a trial court’s findings of fact if substantial evidence
supports them. In re Marriage of Bernard, 165 Wn.2d 895, 903, 204 P.3d 907 (2009).
Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of
the declared premise. Bernard, 165 Wn.2d at 903. We accept unchallenged findings of
fact as verities on appeal. Rounds, 4 Wn. App. 2d at 804.
III.
A.
Mahalingam claims that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his
residential time with the child under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a) without first weighing the best
interests of the child factors in RCW 26.09.187(3). We disagree.
RCW 26.09.187(3) states that a “child’s residential schedule shall be consistent
with RCW 26.09.191” and that the seven factors listed in RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(i)-(vii)
must be considered only if “the limitations of RCW 26.09.191 are not dispositive of the
residential schedule.” RCW 26.09.191 lists several circumstances under which the trial
court must impose mandatory parenting plan restrictions. RCW 26.09.191(2)(a)(iii)
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requires a trial court to limit a parent’s residential time if it finds that the parent has “a
history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010(3).” RCW
26.50.010(3)(b) defines “domestic violence” as the following conduct committed against
a family or household member: “physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of
fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, sexual assault, or stalking as
defined in RCW 9A.46.110.”
Here, the trial court’s finding that Mahalingam had a history of domestic violence
is well supported by the record. Mahalingam hit, struck, slapped, and physically
assaulted Seethalakshmi throughout their marriage. Because the trial court’s
restrictions imposed under RCW 26.09.191 were required, and dispositive of the
residential schedule, the court was not required to consider the factors set forth in RCW
26.09.187(3)(a). 4
B.
Next, Mahalingam argues that the residential restrictions imposed under RCW
26.09.191(2) were not reasonably calculated under the circumstances.
Any limitations imposed by the trial court pursuant to RCW 26.09.191(2) “shall be
reasonably calculated to protect the child from the physical, sexual, or emotional abuse
or harm that could result if the child has contact with the parent requesting residential
time.” RCW 26.09.191(2)(m)(i).
Here, the trial court expressly found that (1) the couple’s child was present during
a two-day “mediation” in which Mahalingam berated Seethalakshmi and was verbally
aggressive, yelling, and about to explode, and (2) Mahalingam’s “[v]erbal abuse,
4Because the unpublished opinion that Mahalingam cites on this issue is not necessary for a
reasoned decision, we neither cite nor discuss it. See GR 14.1(c).
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including degrading her, always took place in front of their child.” A child’s “direct and
indirect exposure to domestic violence is harmful.” Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d
586, 598-99, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017) (“[E]xposure to domestic violence . . . qualifies as
domestic violence under chapter 26.50 RCW.”).
In view of the domestic violence to which their child was exposed, the trial court
properly exercised its discretion to impose reasonably calculated restrictions on
Mahalingam’s residential time in an effort to protect the child from further harm.
IV.
Mahalingam contends that the trial court erred by considering and accepting
Zubair’s “biased” residential schedule recommendations.
We defer to the trial court on witness credibility and the persuasiveness of the
evidence. In re Marriage of Akon, 160 Wn. App. 48, 57, 248 P.3d 94 (2011). After
hearing all of the testimony and considering the evidence, the trial court was free to
accept, reject, or modify the recommendations in Zubair’s written report. Although
Mahalingam argues that Zubair failed to “investigate and balance” the RCW 26.09.187
and .191 factors “on the record,”5 this argument is misplaced because we do not review
whether substantial evidence supports a social worker’s recommendation. Instead, our
review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and
whether those findings support its conclusions. And, as we have already determined
that the trial court’s imposition of restrictions under RCW 26.09.191(2)(a) was proper,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by substantially agreeing with Zubair that
Mahalingam’s residential time should be limited.
5 Mahalingam cites to another unpublished opinion on this so-called requirement but discussion
of that opinion is not needed for us to address this argument.
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V.
Mahalingam argues that the trial court abused its discretion by “automatically
awarding” Seethalakshmi sole decision-making authority for their child’s education.
RCW 26.09.191(1) provides:
The permanent parenting plan shall not require mutual decision-
making or designation of a dispute resolution process other than court
action if it is found that a parent has engaged in any of the following
conduct: . . .(c) a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW
26.50.010(3) or an assault or sexual assault that causes grievous bodily
harm or the fear of such harm or that results in a pregnancy.
“RCW 26.09.191 is unequivocal.” Mansour v. Mansour, 126 Wn. App. 1, 10, 106
P.3d 768 (2004). Thus, once the trial court finds that a parent has a history of acts of
domestic violence, such as Mahalingam in this case, the court “must not require mutual
decision-making.” Mansour, 126 Wn. App. at 10. Under RCW 26.09.187(2)(b), “[t]he
court shall order sole decision-making to one parent when it finds that: (i) [a] limitation
on the other parent’s decision-making authority is mandated by RCW 26.09.191.” “The
Legislature designed a system whereby sole decision-making is granted to the parent
that has not committed physical abuse.” Mansour, 126 Wn. App. at 11 (emphasis
added).
The record is replete with instances of Mahalingam physically abusing
Seethalakshmi and engaging in acts of domestic violence. So, applying RCW
26.09.191(1) and .187(2)(b), the trial court properly awarded sole educational decision-
making to Seethalakshmi. This was not an abuse of discretion.
VI.
Finally, Mahalingam argues that the trial court erred by requiring him to attend a
domestic violence program for dads. He claims that this requirement was “based on the
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premise that the child was present during the history of alleged acts of domestic
violence.” Contrary to Mahalingam’s contentions, the trial court ordered Mahalingam to
complete another domestic violence awareness program because it deemed the
additional training necessary. The trial court heard testimony that Mahalingam needed
“further treatment for the history of domestic violence” and entered findings that
Mahalingam demonstrated “very little insight into his own behaviors, continuing to assert
that his actions were all defensive.” The trial court did not err by requiring completion of
the DV Dads program.
VII.
Seethalakshmi requests an award of attorney fees on appeal. Under RAP 18.1,
we may award attorney fees on appeal if applicable law provides for an award of fees.
RCW 26.09.140 allows us to order a party to pay the other party for maintaining the
appeal and the attorney fees in addition to statutory costs. Because Seethalakshmi
demonstrates financial need, we grant her request subject to compliance with RAP
18.1(d).
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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