Peo v. Gregory

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
November 12, 2020

2020COA162

No. 20CA0856, Peo v Gregory — Criminal Law — Sentencing —
Amendatory Statutes — Retroactive Application; Crimes —
Unauthorized Absence

A division of the court of appeals considers for the first time

whether a provision of the 2020 Prison Population Reduction and

Management Act — the language of the Act creating the crime of

“unauthorized absence” — applies retroactively. The division

concludes that the unauthorized absence provision applies

retroactively, following the supreme court’s reasoning in People v.

Stellabotte, 2018 CO 66, 421 P.3d 174.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA162

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0856
Mesa County District Court No. 19CR2080
Honorable Richard T. Gurley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Jesse Gregory,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Navarro and Tow, JJ., concur

Announced November 12, 2020

Daniel P. Rubenstein, District Attorney, Kraig R. Hamit, Deputy District
Attorney, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jeffrey A. Wermer, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 On March 6, 2020, Governor Jared Polis signed into law a bill

that, among other provisions, substantially reduced the penalty for

a person’s unauthorized removal of an electronic monitoring device

while on parole in an intensive supervision program (ISP parole).

Under House Bill 20-1019, the Prison Population Reduction and

Management Act (the Prison Reduction Act), the unauthorized

removal of an electronic monitoring device while on ISP parole no

longer constitutes felony escape, with a sentencing range of four to

twelve years in prison. Rather, the Prison Reduction Act provides

that a person on ISP parole who removes an electronic monitoring

device “without permission and with the intent to avoid arrest,

prosecution, monitoring or other legal process” commits the new

crime of “unauthorized absence.” Ch. 9, sec. 10, § 18-8-208.2(1)(b),

2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 27-28.

¶2 Unauthorized absence is a class 3 misdemeanor with a

maximum sentence of six months in county jail, unless the person

is serving a sentence for certain offenses, which the parties

stipulated do not apply here. Id. § 18-8-208.2(2)(b), 2020 Colo.

Sess. Laws at 27-28. (A person convicted of unauthorized absence

while serving a sentence for one of those listed offenses commits a

1
 class 6 felony. Id. § 18-8-208.2(1)(a), 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws at 27-

28.)

¶3 Defendant, Jesse Gregory, allegedly removed his electronic

monitoring device without authorization while on ISP parole.

Gregory faced prosecution for felony escape on the date the

governor signed the Prison Reduction Act into law.

¶4 It makes a significant difference whether a defendant is

charged with felony escape or the new crime of unauthorized

absence — even more so in this case, because, together with the

escape count, the prosecution charged Gregory with habitual

criminal sentencing enhancers and sought a forty-eight-year

sentence. Thus, for Gregory, retroactive application of the

unauthorized absence provision of the Prison Reduction Act means

the difference between a prison sentence of forty-eight years and a

maximum jail sentence of six months.

¶5 The district court agreed with Gregory that the new crime of

unauthorized absence applied to him and dismissed the felony

escape and habitual criminal charges. The court remanded the

case to county court for further proceedings as a misdemeanor

unauthorized absence case. The prosecution appealed.

2
¶6 We agree with the district court that the unauthorized absence

provision applies retroactively to cases being prosecuted as of the

effective date of the new statute, and thus applies to Gregory.

I. Background

A. The Prison Reduction Act

¶7 The Prison Reduction Act amended, among other statutes,

section 18-8-208(11), C.R.S. 2019, to state that, “[i]f a person . . . is

participating in a[n] . . . intensive supervision program . . . then the

person is not in custody or confinement” for purposes of the escape

statute. Ch. 9, sec. 8, § 18-8-208(11), 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 26-

27. Before the enactment of the Prison Reduction Act, a person on

ISP parole was deemed to be “in custody or confinement” for

purposes of the escape statute. See § 17-27.5-104(1), C.R.S. 2019

(“If an offender . . . knowingly removes or tampers with an electronic

monitoring device that he or she is required to wear as a condition

of parole, he or she shall be deemed to have escaped from custody

and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as provided in

section 18-8-208, C.R.S.”); § 18-8-208(2) (“A person commits a class

3 felony if, while being in custody or confinement following

3
 conviction of a felony other than a class 1 or class 2 felony, he

knowingly escapes from said custody or confinement.”).

¶8 The Prison Reduction Act defines the crime of authorized

absence as “knowingly . . . [r]emov[ing] or tamper[ing] with an

electronic monitoring device required by the supervising agency to

be worn by the person in order to monitor his or her location,

without permission and with the intent to avoid arrest, prosecution,

monitoring or other legal process.” Ch. 9, sec. 9, § 18-8-208.2(1)(b),

2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 27-28. (We note that the Prison Reduction

Act did not amend section 17-27.5-104(1), which arguably still

defines Gregory’s conduct as felony escape. However, because

neither party asked us to consider the apparent inconsistency

between amended sections 18-8-208(11) and 18-8-208.2(1)(b) and

section 17-27.5-104(1), that issue is not properly before us and we

do not consider it.)

¶9 Because, under the amended version of section 18-8-208(11),

a person on ISP parole is not considered to be “in custody or

confinement,” such a person who removes an electronic monitoring

device without permission to avoid monitoring commits the crime of

unauthorized absence, and not felony escape. Id.

4
 B. The Charges Filed Against Gregory

¶ 10 The prosecution alleges that, while Gregory was on ISP parole,

he removed his electronic monitoring device and left his residence of

record without permission. According to the prosecution, law

enforcement authorities could not find Gregory for fifteen months.

Once the authorities located Gregory, he was arrested and charged

with felony escape and habitual criminal sentencing enhancers.

¶ 11 Governor Polis signed the Prison Reduction Act into law after

Gregory allegedly removed his electronic monitoring device and

while Gregory’s felony escape charge was pending.

¶ 12 Gregory moved to dismiss the felony escape charge and to

remand the case to county court for further proceedings on a

misdemeanor unauthorized absence charge. He argued that the

General Assembly’s reclassification of his alleged conduct applies

retroactively.

¶ 13 The prosecution opposed the motion, asserting that, although

Gregory’s conduct, “if committed after [the enactment of the Prison

Reduction Act], [would] constitute the crime of ‘unauthorized

absence,’” the unauthorized absence provision does not apply

retroactively because the General Assembly created a new criminal

5
 offense instead of reducing the penalties associated with an existing

offense. The prosecution argued that People v. Stellabotte, 2018 CO

66, ¶ 3, 421 P.3d 174, 175, which addressed the retroactivity of

“ameliorative, amendatory legislation,” applies only when the

General Assembly reduces the sentencing range of or reclassifies an

existing offense and not when the General Assembly creates a new

offense.

¶ 14 The district court disagreed with the prosecution’s narrow

reading of Stellabotte and found that the unauthorized absence

provision applies retroactively to Gregory. The court remanded

Gregory’s case to county court for further proceedings as a

misdemeanor unauthorized absence charge. Further, “because

[Gregory could] no longer be charged with a felony,” the court

dismissed the habitual criminal counts. The prosecution filed this

interlocutory appeal.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

¶ 15 We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a defense

motion to dismiss criminal charges, which presents a question of

law. People v. Alameno, 193 P.3d 830, 834 (Colo. 2008); People v.

6
 Collins, 32 P.3d 636, 638 (Colo. App. 2001). This case also

“involves questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de

novo.” Stellabotte, ¶ 10, 421 P.3d at 176.

B. The Law Governing the Retroactive Application of
Criminal Statutes

¶ 16 Sections 2-4-202 and 2-4-303, C.R.S. 2020, create a general

presumption that statutes apply prospectively. Section

18-1-410(1)(f)(I), C.R.S. 2020, a section of the Criminal Code,

however, provides that a defendant may be entitled to relief if “there

has been significant change in the law, applied to the applicant’s

conviction or sentence, allowing in the interests of justice

retroactive application of the changed legal standard.” Under

section 18-1-410(1)(f)(II), an applicant may obtain relief on these

grounds unless the applicant “has not sought appeal of a conviction

within the time prescribed therefor or if a judgment of conviction

has been affirmed upon appeal.”

¶ 17 Relying on the identically worded predecessor of section

18-1-410(1)(f), our supreme court held in People v. Thomas that the

defendant was entitled to retroactive application of amendatory

legislation that lowered the degree of, and thus the maximum

7
 penalty for, the charged offense. 185 Colo. 395, 397-98, 525 P.2d

1136, 1137-38 (1974). The defendant in Thomas was charged with

attempted burglary. After the defendant’s arrest, but before his

case went to trial, the General Assembly lowered the degree of, and

thus the maximum penalty for, attempted second degree burglary.

Id. at 396-97, 525 P.2d at 1137; see Ch. 121, sec. 1, §§ 40-2–

101(5), 40-4-203, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 414-15, 427. In addition,

following the defendant’s conviction, and while his case was on

appeal, the General Assembly amended the savings clause of the

criminal code to allow for retroactive application of criminal

statutes. See Ch. 152, sec. 2, § 40-1-510(1)(f), 1973 Colo. Sess.

Laws 533.

¶ 18 The Thomas court explained that retroactive application of a

criminal statute “is especially appropriate where [the] change in the

law reducing the sentence intervenes before conviction is had and

sentence is imposed . . . .” Thomas, 185 Colo. at 397-98, 525 P.2d

at 1138. Further, the Thomas court noted that “[t]he view that

amendatory legislation mitigating the penalties for crimes should be

applied to any case which has not received final judgment finds

substantial support in the common law.” Id. at 398, 525 P.2d at

8
 1138. Thus, Thomas teaches that application of section

18-1-410(1)(f)(I) is not limited to cases in which the defendant has

been convicted and sentenced.

¶ 19 Two years ago, the supreme court reaffirmed the holding of

Thomas in a case involving facts similar to those presented here.

See Stellabotte, ¶¶ 5-6, 421 P.3d at 176. The defendant in

Stellabotte was charged with felony theft of items valued between

$5,000 to $20,000. Between the date of the alleged theft and

Stellabotte’s trial, the General Assembly lowered the classification of

theft for items valued between $5,000 to $20,000. Id.

¶ 20 Although the General Assembly amended the theft statute

before Stellabotte’s trial, neither the prosecution nor Stellabotte

brought the amendment to the trial court’s attention before the

trial. Id. at ¶ 7, 421 P.3d at 176. Because the trial court was

unaware of the amendment, following Stellabotte’s conviction, the

trial court sentenced him under the earlier version of the theft

statute. Id.

¶ 21 The supreme court applied section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I) in

determining that the amendment to the theft statute applied

retroactively to Stellabotte. Stellabotte, ¶ 38, 421 P.3d at 181-82.

9
 The Stellabotte court reaffirmed the rule announced in Thomas that

“amendatory legislation mitigating the penalties for crimes should

be applied to any case which has not yet received final judgment.”

Id. at ¶ 16, 421 P.3d at 177 (quoting Thomas, 185 Colo. at 398, 525

P.2d at 1138).

¶ 22 The Stellabotte court further clarified that the Thomas

retroactivity rule applies “unless the amendment contains language

indicating it applies only prospectively.” Id. at ¶ 3, 421 P.3d at 175.

In so ruling, the court expressly disavowed as dicta its statements

in People v. Macias, 631 P.2d 584 (Colo. 1981); People v. McCoy,

764 P.2d 1171 (Colo. 1988); and Riley v. People, 828 P.2d 254 (Colo.

1992), suggesting that courts may give retroactive effect only to

those criminal statutes that expressly apply retroactively.

Stellabotte, ¶¶ 28-29, 38, 421 P.3d at 179-80, 182.

¶ 23 The court explained that, because the statutes at issue in

Macias, McCoy, and Riley expressly provided for prospective

application only, the court’s “statements in those cases about the

legislature’s need to clearly indicate its intent for retroactive

application were ‘not necessary to the decisions in those cases’” and

were therefore dicta. Id. at ¶ 28, 421 P.3d at 179-80 (quoting Town

10
 of Eagle v. Scheibe, 10 P.3d 648, 652 (Colo. 2000)). For this reason,

the court concluded, the statements in Macias, McCoy, and Riley do

not control in cases involving statutes that do not expressly provide

for prospective application, such as the amendment to the theft

statute at issue in Stellabotte. Id.

¶ 24 The court noted that the amendment to the theft statute was

silent on whether it applied prospectively only or retroactively. Id.

at ¶ 11, 421 P.3d at 177. While acknowledging the general

presumption of prospective application found in sections 2-4-202

and 2-4-303, the court held that “well-established principles of

statutory interpretation” require the adoption of “a construction

that avoids or resolves potential conflicts, giving effect to all

legislative acts,” such as section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I). Id. at ¶ 32, 421

P.3d at 180 (quoting Huber v. Colo. Mining Ass’n, 264 P.3d 884, 892

(Colo. 2011)).

¶ 25 If conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, “a specific

statutory provision ‘acts as an exception to [a] general provision,

carving out a special niche from the general rules to accommodate a

specific circumstance.’” Id. (quoting Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846,

851 (Colo. 2001)). Because section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I) “is a more

11
 specific provision than the broad presumptions of prospective

application” of sections 2-4-202 and 2-4-303, the Stellabotte court

concluded that section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I) prevailed as an exception to

the general rule of prospectivity. Id. at ¶ 33, 421 P.3d at 181.

¶ 26 The Stellabotte court stressed the limited time period in a

criminal case in which section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I) relief is available.

Section 18-1-410(1)(f)(II) limits retroactive application of

ameliorative, amendatory criminal statutes to the time “before the

conviction is final.” Id. at ¶ 33, 421 P.3d at 181.

¶ 27 Under the broad language of Thomas and Stellabotte,

amendatory legislation applies both before and after the defendant’s

conviction and sentencing, so long as the defendant’s conviction

has not become final. The supreme court’s language can be read

only one way: the trial court should have applied the amendatory

legislation during Stellabotte’s trial and sentencing. Thus, the

Stellabotte analysis applies to cases where, as here, the General

Assembly enacted amendatory legislation between the date of the

alleged offense and the defendant’s trial.

¶ 28 Moreover, there is no logical reason why amendatory

legislation should apply only after a conviction, but not to a pending

12
 prosecution that has not yet gone to trial. A rule limiting Stellabotte

to cases where the defendant has already been convicted not only

cannot be squared with Stellabotte’s broad holding but makes no

sense in practice. Following the enactment of amendatory

legislation, a trial court should not be required to apply the old

version of the statute at trial, knowing full well that, immediately

following the trial, the trial court will need to set aside the

conviction and sentence and order a new trial or sentencing

proceeding.

¶ 29 Having determined that Thomas and Stellabotte apply even to

pending charges where the General Assembly enacted amendatory

legislation between the date of the defendant’s alleged criminal

conduct and the trial, we turn to whether the three requirements of

Stellabotte require retroactive application of the Prison Reduction

Act to Gregory’s case: (1) the amendment must be ameliorative; (2)

the amendment must not state that it only applies prospectively;

and (3) the defendant’s conviction must not yet be final. Id. at ¶ 38,

421 P.3d at 182.

13
 C. Application

1. The District Court Did Not Err by Finding that the
Unauthorized Absence Provision Satisfies the First Prong of
the Stellabotte Test

¶ 30 In determining whether the unauthorized absence provision

satisfies the first prong of Stellabotte, we consider two questions:

first, whether the unauthorized absence provision is “ameliorative”

and, second, whether the Stellabotte analysis applies to legislation

that creates a new offense. We answer both questions in the

affirmative.

a. The Unauthorized Absence Provision Is the Type of Legislation
that Thomas and Stellabotte Characterized as Ameliorative

¶ 31 The district court reasoned that, because “the newly created

offense of unauthorized absence exposes [Gregory] to a much lower

sentence range than he would otherwise face if charged under the

escape statute,” the unauthorized absence provision fits “squarely

within the type of ameliorative amendments that apply retroactively

under Thomas and Stellabotte.”

¶ 32 But what does “ameliorative” mean for purposes of the Thomas

and Stellabotte analysis?

14
¶ 33 The Thomas court neither used nor defined “ameliorative.”

185 Colo. at 398, 525 P.2d at 1138. Stellabotte also did not define

“ameliorative,” although the Stellabotte court provided an example

of “ameliorative” legislation — an amendment that “mitigates

penalties for crimes.” Stellabotte, ¶ 17, 421 P.3d at 178 (quoting

People v. Thornton, 187 Colo. 202, 203, 529 P.2d 628, 628 (1974)).

¶ 34 People v. Bloom, 195 Colo. 246, 577 P.2d 288

(1978), superseded by statute as stated in People v. Lucero, 2016

COA 105, 381 P.3d 436, provides another example of ameliorative

legislation, although it, too, does not define “ameliorative.” The

Bloom court held the defendant was entitled to the “ameliorative

benefits” of amendments to the state’s drug laws that reduced the

sentencing range for possession of cannabis. See Bloom, 195 Colo.

at 251-52, 577 P.2d at 292.

¶ 35 In addition, People v. Godinez, 2018 COA 170M, 457 P.3d 77,

provided examples of ameliorative amendments and explained when

an amendment is not ameliorative. In that case, a division of this

court noted that Stellabotte applies to statutes that “either

decrease[] the severity of a previously defined crime or reduce[] the

15
 maximum sentence that could be imposed for the commission of

that crime.” Id. at ¶ 29, 457 P.3d at 85.

¶ 36 Godinez concerned amendments to a jurisdictional statute

that the division concluded did not apply retroactively. The

amendments did not “reduce the severity or sentences for any of the

crimes of which Godinez was convicted.” Id. at ¶ 30, 457 P.3d at

85. Rather, the amendment concerned “the procedure by which

jurisdiction is apportioned between the district courts and the

juvenile courts . . . [an issue] fundamentally of a different nature”

than those addressed in Stellabotte and its antecedents. Id. at ¶ 29,

457 P.3d at 85.

¶ 37 Following the examples of ameliorative and nonameliorative

statutes in these cases, the unauthorized absence provision is

ameliorative because it mitigates the penalty for Gregory’s alleged

conduct. Recall that, before the enactment of the Prison Reduction

Act, Gregory’s alleged conduct was classified as felony escape

presumptively punishable by a four- to twelve-year prison sentence.

§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1), C.R.S. 2019. The Prison Reform Act

reclassified the identical conduct as a misdemeanor punishable by

a maximum sentence of six months in jail (unless the person is

16
 serving a sentence for certain offenses, which, as noted above, the

parties stipulated do not apply here). § 18-1.3-501(1)(a), C.R.S.

2020; Ch. 9, sec. 10, § 18-8-208.2(1)(b), 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 27-

28.

¶ 38 Thus, the unauthorized absence provision mitigates the

penalty for unauthorized removal of an electronic monitoring device

while on ISP parole — it reduces Gregory’s possible punishment.

For these reasons, it constitutes the type of ameliorative,

amendatory legislation that, according to Stellabotte, applies

retroactively under section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I), so long as the second

and third prongs of Stellabotte are also satisfied.

¶ 39 But our analysis of the first prong of Stellabotte does not stop

here. We must also address the prosecution’s argument that the

unauthorized absence provision does not apply retroactively, even if

it is ameliorative under Stellabotte, because it created a new

offense.

b. Stellabotte Applies to Ameliorative Amendments that Create a
New Offense

¶ 40 The prosecution contends that the unauthorized absence

provision “is not the type of ameliorative legislation that was applied

17
 in Stellabotte because it does not merely reduce the sentencing

range for escape, but instead creates an entirely new offense with

different elements.” Under the prosecution’s reasoning, Thomas,

Stellabotte, and section 18-1-410(1)(f) apply only to statutes that

reduce the sentencing range for an offense; they do not apply when

the General Assembly creates a new offense.

¶ 41 Like the district court, we reject the prosecution’s narrow

reading of Thomas, Stellabotte, and section 18-1-410(1)(f). By its

terms, section 18-1-410(1)(f) applies to any “significant change in

the law” that “applied to the applicant’s conviction or sentence,

allowing in the interests of justice retroactive application of the

changed legal standard.” The statute is not limited to “significant

change[s] in the law” that take the form of reducing the sentencing

range for an offense. See § 18-1-410(1)(f). In applying section 18-1-

410(1)(f), Thomas and Stellabotte did not create such a distinction.

Thus, regardless of whether the General Assembly reduces a

penalty by creating a new offense or by modifying an existing

offense, such an amendment applies retroactively for the benefit of

a defendant whose case has not yet resulted in a final conviction, so

18
 long as the legislation by its terms does not apply prospectively

only.

¶ 42 We agree with Gregory that Bloom and Glazier v. People, 193

Colo. 268, 565 P.2d 935 (1977), provide further support for

retroactive application of the unauthorized absence provision. In

Bloom, the division explained how the General Assembly had

mitigated the penalties for possession of cannabis by creating a new

offense. Ch. 115, sec. 6, § 12-22-404(1), 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws

435; see Bloom, 195 Colo. at 251-52, 577 P.3d at 292. Through the

1975 cannabis legislation, the General Assembly reclassified the

possession of cannabis from a felony to a misdemeanor and lowered

the applicable sentencing range. Bloom, 195 Colo. at 251, 577 P.3d

at 292. Based on the reasoning of Thomas, the Bloom court held

that the amendment to the cannabis statute applied retroactively

because it was “amendatory legislation which mitigates the penalty

for a crime.” Id.

¶ 43 Similarly, based on Thomas, the supreme court held in Glazier

that a defendant who was convicted of possessing more than

one-half ounce of cannabis was also entitled to be sentenced under

19
 the 1975 amendment, as it reduced the penalty for the defendant’s

conduct. See Glazier, 193 Colo. at 268, 565 P.2d at 935.

¶ 44 Like the unauthorized absence provision, the legislation at

issue in Bloom and Glazier created a new offense — which did not

exist at the time of the defendants’ arrest — but which covered

conduct that had previously fallen under a different criminal offense

with a more severe sanction. Both Bloom and Glazier held that this

type of legislation applies retroactively. Bloom, 195 Colo. at 251-52,

577 P.2d at 292; Glazier, 193 Colo. at 269, 565 P.2d at 936.

¶ 45 Also like the unauthorized absence provision, the legislation at

issue in Bloom and Glazier lowered the severity of, and reduced the

sentencing range for, the offense with which the defendant was

charged. See Bloom, 195 Colo. at 251-252, 577 P.2d at 292;

Glazier, 193 Colo. at 269, 565 P.2d 936. Moreover, the means by

which the General Assembly ameliorated the punishment for

possession of cannabis in Bloom and Glazier — creation of a new

offense — is the same means by which, through the Prison

Reduction Act, the General Assembly ameliorated the punishment

for unauthorized removal of an electronic monitoring device while

20
 on ISP parole. See Bloom, 195 Colo. at 251-252, 577 P.2d at 292;

Glazier, 193 Colo. at 269, 565 P.2d 936.

¶ 46 Thus, the prosecution’s contention that “ameliorative

legislation” refers exclusively to amendments that reduce the

sentence for an existing offense, and not to amendments that create

a new offense, draws a distinction that lacks support in section

18-1-410(1)(f), Thomas, or Stellabotte.

¶ 47 For this reason, we hold that, under the first prong of

Stellabotte, the unauthorized absence provision applies to Gregory,

even though the General Assembly accomplished its goal by

creating a new offense.

2. Because the Prison Reduction Act Does Not State that It
Only Applies Prospectively, the Unauthorized Absence
Provision Satisfies the Second Prong of Stellabotte

¶ 48 As explained above in Part II.B., the Stellabotte court held that

an ameliorative statutory amendment applies retroactively “unless

the amendment contains language indicating it applies only

prospectively.” Stellabotte, ¶ 3, 421 P.3d at 175. Thus, the second

prong of the Stellabotte test focuses on whether the amendment

expressly applies prospectively only.

21
¶ 49 As the district court explained, the Prison Reduction Act is

silent on whether “the [unauthorized absence provision] may only

be applied prospectively.” See People v. Hamm, 2019 COA 90, ¶ 35,

461 P.3d 559, 565 (holding that a statute that expressly applies “on

or after” a specified date has prospective effect only). The absence

of prospective application language from the Prison Reduction Act is

significant. See Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 41 Colo. App. 364, 365, 585

P.2d 599, 600 (1978).

¶ 50 Because the Prison Reduction Act does not specify that the

unauthorized absence provision only applies prospectively, the

provision satisfies the second prong of Stellabotte.

3. Because No Final Judgment of Conviction Has Entered
Against Gregory, the Third Prong of Stellabotte Is Satisfied

¶ 51 As explained above, retroactivity under Thomas, Stellabotte,

and section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I) is only available to applicants who do

not have a final conviction. § 18-1-410(1)(f)(II); Stellabotte, ¶ 3, 421

P.3d at 175; Thomas, 185 Colo. at 397, 525 P.3d at 1137. No

conviction, whether final or not, has entered in Gregory’s case. For

this reason, the third prong of Stellabotte is satisfied.

22
¶ 52 Because the application of the unauthorized absence provision

in this case meets all three of the Stellabotte requirements for

retroactivity, we must apply it retroactively to Gregory.

D. The Prosecution’s Remaining Contentions Are Not Convincing

¶ 53 The prosecution presents three additional arguments that we

conclude are not convincing.

¶ 54 First, the prosecution contends that retroactive application of

the unauthorized absence provision would create “some

constitutional peculiarities.” But the prosecution does not explain

the nature of these “peculiarities.” The prosecution concedes that

retroactive application of the unauthorized absence provision

“would not likely constitute an unconstitutional ex post facto law

because it decreases rather than increases punishment.”

¶ 55 The prosecution’s “peculiarities” argument is at best

underdeveloped and, for that reason, we do not address it on the

merits. See Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 2017 COA 71,

¶ 41, 411 P.3d 245, 255.

¶ 56 Second, the prosecution contends that this court should

decline to apply the unauthorized absence provision to Gregory

because the supreme court is currently considering whether a

23
 defendant “who is entitled to the ameliorative benefit of . . .

amendments to the theft statute” is also entitled to “entry of a

conviction for the degree of theft supported by the jury’s verdict, or

whether he should be subjected to a new theft trial.” Lawrence v.

People, No. 19SC556, 2020 WL 291171, at *1 (Colo. Jan. 21, 2020)

(unpublished order).

¶ 57 But the pendency of an issue in the supreme court does not

preclude us from addressing it or a similar issue. See People v.

Viburg, 2020 COA 8M, ¶ 1 n.1, ___ P.3d ___, ___ n.1.

¶ 58 Third, citing People v. Boyd, 2017 CO 2, 387 P.3d 755, the

prosecution asserts that, because the General Assembly did not

decriminalize interference with ISP parole monitoring, retroactive

application of the unauthorized absence provision would “deprive

the People of the power to prosecute escapes.”

¶ 59 But Boyd is inapposite. In that case, the supreme court did

not address retroactivity under section 18-1-410(1)(f). See id. at

¶¶ 5-10, 387 P.3d at 757-58. Rather, the Boyd court addressed

whether a constitutional amendment legalizing the possession of

less than one ounce of marijuana deprived the state of the power to

continue to prosecute appeals involving possession of such quantity

24
 of marijuana. See id. at ¶ 8, 387 P.3d at 757. The court concluded

that the amendment barred the state from continuing to prosecute

such appeals in those cases where the defendant had a pending

right to appeal at the time the amendment became effective. Id. at

¶ 10, 387 P.3d at 757.

¶ 60 The amendment at issue in Boyd did not merely reduce the

penalty for possessing small quantities of marijuana; it legalized

that conduct. In contrast, the Prison Reduction Act did not legalize

the removal of an electronic monitoring device without

authorization with the intent to avoid monitoring. Such conduct

remains a crime. It is simply a different crime, with a lesser

penalty, from the crime applicable before enactment of the Prison

Reduction Act. As explained above, under Stellabotte, ameliorative,

amendatory legislation that reduces the penalty for criminal

conduct applies during the pendency of a criminal case.

¶ 61 For this reason, in creating the new offense of unauthorized

absence, the General Assembly did not preclude the prosecution

from holding Gregory accountable. He still faces a possible jail

sentence for allegedly removing his electronic monitoring device

without authorization, even though he can no longer be prosecuted

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 for felony escape. The prosecution can prosecute Gregory for the

misdemeanor offense of unauthorized absence.

¶ 62 Lastly, we note that the unauthorized absence provision does

not constitute unconstitutional retrospective legislation.

“Retrospective” legislation violates the constitution because it “takes

away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or

creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new

disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.”

Abromelt v. Denver Career Serv. Bd., 140 P.3d 44, 51 (Colo. App.

2005). See also Colo. Const. art. 2, § 11 (barring legislation that is

“retrospective in its operation”). “Because some retroactively

applied legislation is constitutional while some is not, Colorado

courts use the term ‘retrospective’ to describe a statute

whose retroactive application is unconstitutional.” Whiting Oil &

Gas Corp. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 321 P.3d 500, 507 (Colo. App.

2010), aff’d on other grounds, 2014 CO 16, 320 P.3d 1179.

“[R]etroactive application of a statute . . . is not necessarily

unconstitutional.” Mesa Cnty. Land Conservancy, Inc. v. Allen,

2012 COA 95, ¶ 7, 318 P.3d 46, 50. Because the unauthorized

absence provision applies to conduct that was already illegal at the

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 time Gregory engaged in it, the unauthorized absence provision is

not unconstitutional retrospective legislation.

III. Conclusion

¶ 63 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE TOW concur.

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