People v. Stellabotte

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA106

Court of Appeals No. 14CA1954
El Paso County District Court No. 12CR3669
Honorable Thomas L. Kennedy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

John Arthur Stellabotte,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, SENTENCES AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN
Freyre, J., concurs
Dailey, J., concurs in part and dissents in part

Announced July 14, 2016

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Patricia R. Van Horn, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, First Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Lynn C. Hartfield, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, John Arthur Stellabotte, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a jury verdict finding him guilty of one

count of aggravated motor vehicle theft, two counts of felony theft,

and one count of misdemeanor theft. He also appeals his sentence,

as enhanced by three habitual criminal counts. We affirm the

conviction, vacate the sentences for felony theft, affirm the other

sentences, and remand for resentencing on the felony theft

convictions.

I. Background

¶2 Stellabotte, owner of J&J Towing, was charged with six counts

of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, under section 18-4-

409(2) and (3)(a), C.R.S. 2015; four counts of theft, under section

18-4-401(1), C.R.S. 2015; and five habitual criminal counts

pursuant to section 18-1.3-801, C.R.S. 2015. The counts related to

J&J towing five vehicles. A jury convicted Stellabotte of one count

of aggravated motor vehicle theft, a class 4 felony; two counts of

theft, class 4 felonies; and one count of theft, a class 2

misdemeanor relating to two tows — the B.W. and P.H. tows.

1
 A. The B.W. Tow

¶3 In June 2012, B.W. parked her car at an apartment complex.

The following morning, her car was missing. A sign in the parking

lot stated that cars without parking permits would be towed by J&J

Towing. B.W., whose car did not have a parking permit sticker,

called J&J to recover her car, but the company stated that it did not

have it. B.W. reported her car stolen.

¶4 Five days later, J&J towed the car to a police station.

Stellabotte said that J&J had notified the police of the initial tow on

June 8, as required by state towing regulations. The officer,

however, could not find such a notification.

¶5 J&J initially requested that B.W. pay $215 to release her car

but eventually returned it to her without her making any payment.

However, several days later, Stellabotte told B.W. that he would put

a lien on her car and tow it again if she did not pay him the money.

The next day, he towed B.W.’s car, which was parked on a public

street across from her house. Stellabotte refused to release the car

to B.W. until she paid him $498.50, which she did. She noticed

damage to her car, and Stellabotte said if she did not sign a release

form he would charge her another $200, so she signed the form.

2
¶6 Teresa Hill, the apartment complex property manager, testified

that rules in place for the property required license plate stickers

indicating that any parked car belonged to a resident.1 As manager,

she entered into a contract with J&J, through an employee named

James Ward.2 The complex permitted J&J to tow cars without the

proper stickers without first contacting management at the

apartment complex.

¶7 B.W. reported J&J to the Colorado Public Utilities Commission

(PUC).

B. The P.H. Tow

¶8 In July 2012, K.S. parked a truck, registered to her father,

P.H., in the parking lot of a shopping mall, where she worked at a

yogurt shop. She arranged for P.H. to pick up the truck the

following day, but when he arrived to pick up the truck, it was

missing.

1 Visitors were required to park on the street.
2 Although he denied being a partner at J&J, Ward testified that
when he signed documents on behalf of J&J, he designated himself
as an owner. One of J&J’s drivers testified that Ward hired
employees, obtained the majority of the towing contracts, and was
in charge of day-to-day operations.

3
¶9 K.S.’s mother, R.H., and P.H. contacted Griffis-Blessing, the

company they believed to be the property manager for the mall.

Griffis-Blessing could not provide them with any information about

whether the truck had been towed, but the family later received an

unsigned letter from J&J, which advised them that J&J had towed

the truck. At the time the truck was towed, its registration had

expired. P.H. paid $583 to retrieve the truck.

¶ 10 R.H. requested a refund from J&J after Griffis-Blessing

advised her that it had not authorized the tow. However, Ward

advised her that she could only claim her refund if she signed a

letter of final settlement, stating that the refund settled all

outstanding amounts and that R.H. would “not slander or speak of

this matter to any partys [sic] outside of this matter,” including the

PUC. When she refused to sign the acknowledgment, Ward called

Stellabotte, who reiterated that if R.H. refused to sign the

agreement, he would not give her a refund.

¶ 11 Kelly Clay, a property manager who worked for Griffis-

Blessing, testified that she was unaware of any towing contract with

J&J for the portion of the shopping mall that she managed and that

she had not authorized the tow of P.H.’s truck. She stated that a

4
 different property management company managed the property

where the yogurt shop was located.3

C. PUC Investigation & Trial

¶ 12 Following B.W.’s complaint, Anthony Cummings, an

investigator with the PUC, spoke with Ward, who provided towing

invoices for both B.W. tows. Cummings determined that the

documents did not comply with PUC regulations. Specifically, the

invoices lacked authorizing signatures, a release date, and a

specific rate statement, and they contained an incorrect address for

the business. According to Cummings, these deficiencies rendered

the towing contracts invalid and meant that J&J was not

authorized to collect the $493 that B.W. had paid to have her car

released.

¶ 13 Cummings found similar PUC violations regarding P.H.’s tow.

Ward was unable to provide a written towing contract for the

shopping mall property. Ward claimed that “S.R.,” which stood for

Sean Reilly, had authorized the tow because his initials appeared

on the towing invoice. Reilly, the former leasing agent for the

3 At trial, no evidence indicated who managed the property where
the yogurt shop was located, but Stellabotte does not raise this as
an issue on appeal.

5
 shopping mall, testified that his responsibilities did not include

authorizing tows from the property. He denied authorizing the tow

of the truck.

¶ 14 On August 22, 2014, after a trial and jury verdict, the court

adjudicated Stellabotte a habitual criminal for convictions on three

counts ― a 2005 aggravated motor vehicle theft, a 2003 attempted

aggravated motor vehicle theft, and felony menacing in 1996.

¶ 15 In accordance with the habitual criminal statute, the court

quadrupled the maximum sentencing ranges of the felony

convictions, resulting in twenty-four-year sentences for each of the

three felony convictions. The court sentenced Stellabotte to one

year for the misdemeanor theft conviction. The sentences all ran

concurrently.

¶ 16 Stellabotte raises four contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court

erred in instructing the jury on aggravated motor vehicle theft; (2)

the court erred in providing the jury with a dictionary definition of

the term “authorization”; (3) the twenty-four-year sentences

imposed for Stellabotte’s two felony theft convictions should be

halved because of new legislation reducing the severity of those

offenses; and (4) the twenty-four-year sentences imposed for

6
 Stellabotte’s three habitual criminal counts are grossly

disproportionate to the nature and severity of the offenses. We

agree with Stellabotte’s third contention that he should benefit from

the General Assembly’s amendatory legislation to reduce the

severity of felony theft offenses. However, we disagree with his

other contentions.

II. Jury Instruction

¶ 17 Stellabotte contends that the trial court erred in instructing

the jury on aggravated motor vehicle theft, where, in contrast to the

theft instruction, the aggravated motor vehicle theft instruction did

not convey that he had to act knowingly without authorization. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 18 We apply a two-tier standard of review to jury instructions.

First, we review de novo the jury instructions as a whole to

determine whether the instructions accurately informed the jury of

the governing law. People v. Lucas, 232 P.3d 155, 162 (Colo. App.

2009). Second, if the trial court correctly informed the jury of the

governing law, we review the court’s formulation of the instructions

for an abuse of discretion. People v. Pahl, 169 P.3d 169, 183 (Colo.

7
 App. 2006). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, People v. Rath, 44

P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002), and when it misconstrues or

misapplies the law, People v. Henson, 2013 COA 36, ¶ 9, 307 P.3d

1135, 1136.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 19 Under section 18-4-409(2), a person commits first degree

aggravated motor vehicle theft “if he or she knowingly obtains or

exercises control over the motor vehicle of another without

authorization or by threat or deception.”

¶ 20 The culpable mental state, “knowingly,” applies not only to a

defendant’s exercise of control over the vehicle, but also to his or

her awareness of lack of authority. People v. Bornman, 953 P.2d

952, 954 (Colo. App. 1997). When a mental state is listed as a

stand-alone element, it applies to the succeeding elements. See

People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 62, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (“Knowingly”

is set out “as a standalone element, thereby indicating that it

applied to all of the subsequent elements of the offense.”); People v.

Stephens, 837 P.2d 231, 234 (Colo. App. 1992) (stating that

8
 “knowingly,” listed as separate element, applied to succeeding

elements, including the “without authorization” element).

C. Analysis

¶ 21 The court instructed the jury that the elements of first degree

aggravated motor vehicle theft were that Stellabotte:

1. In the State of Colorado, at or about the
date and place charged,

2. knowingly,

3. obtained and exercised control over the
motor vehicle,

4. belonging to another person,

5. without authorization, and

6. the value of the motor vehicle involved is
twenty thousand dollars or less, and

7. the defendant,

8. had possession and control over the motor
vehicle for more than twenty-four (24) hours.

¶ 22 The court listed “knowingly” as the second element and listed

“without authorization” as the fifth element. We conclude that the

trial court did not err in instructing the jury on aggravated motor

vehicle theft because the court listed the culpable mental state,

“knowingly,” as a separate element. Therefore, “knowingly” applied

9
 to the succeeding elements, including “without authorization,” and

thus the instruction indicated that Stellabotte had to have known

that possession of the automobile was without authorization.

¶ 23 Stellabotte next argues that when the jury read the theft and

aggravated motor vehicle theft instructions together, it reasonably

would have believed that the two offenses had different standards of

proof because the theft instruction explicitly tied the “without

authorization” element to the “knowingly” element, but the

aggravated motor vehicle theft instruction did not. The court

instructed the jury that the elements of theft were:

1. That the defendant,

2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the
date and place charged,

3. knowingly

a. obtained or exercised control over

b. anything of value

c. which was the property of another person,

d. without authorization . . . .

¶ 24 We conclude that the court properly instructed the jury as to

the elements of theft. In the theft instruction, the court listed

“without authorization” as a lettered subpart of the numbered

10
 “knowingly” element. Albeit in a different manner, this instruction

also conveyed that Stellabotte had to have known that he obtained

or exercised control of the automobile without authorization.

¶ 25 While we agree with Stellabotte that “it is error for a court to

instruct the jury in a manner that invites confusion,” Steward

Software Co. v. Kopcho, 275 P.3d 702, 711 (Colo. App. 2010), rev’d

on other grounds, 266 P.3d 1085 (Colo. 2011), we disagree that the

two instructions, when read together, created confusion. In both

instructions, the court set off the “knowingly” element. Although

the court set off “knowingly” in different ways — in the aggravated

motor vehicle theft instruction, as a separate numbered element,

and in the theft instruction, as a heading for several elements,

including “without authorization” — we nevertheless conclude that

because both instructions were correct, the court did not err, even

when we consider the two instructions together.

¶ 26 Stellabotte relies on Bornman to argue that the instructions

created confusion. In Bornman, 953 P.2d at 954, the instruction for

theft did not properly advise the jury that the defendant had to be

aware that his possession of a vehicle was unauthorized. The

instruction read:

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 1. That the defendant

2. In the state of Colorado at or about the date
and place charged,

3. knowingly

a. obtained or exercised control over

b. anything of value,

c. which was the property of another
person,

4. without authorization . . . .

Id. at 953. Bornman is distinguishable. There, the trial court erred

because the instruction did not explicitly require a finding that the

defendant knew that his possession or control of the item was

without authorization of the owner. The Bornman court added

subparts to the third element and did not include “without

authorization” as a subpart, but rather listed it as a separate

element. Here, as discussed above, in the aggravated motor vehicle

theft instruction, the court listed “knowingly” as a separate element,

with no subparts, so “knowingly” applied to all succeeding

elements, including “without authorization.” In contrast, in the

theft instruction, the court listed “without authorization” as a

subpart of the “knowingly” element, so “knowingly” applied to the

12
 “without authorization” element. Therefore, we conclude that the

trial court did not err in accurately informing the jury of the

governing law, and it did not abuse its discretion in formulating the

jury instructions.

III. Definition of Authorization

¶ 27 During deliberation, the jury asked for a definition of the term

“authorization,” and the court used a “standard dictionary

definition” to instruct the jury that the term “authorization” meant

“to provide someone with legal authority to perform an act.”

¶ 28 Stellabotte contends that the court abused its discretion when

it provided this definition because the definition differed from that

in relevant case law. While we agree that the court provided a

definition that differed from that found in case law, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 29 We apply the same standard of review as in Part II.A.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 30 Absent evidence to the contrary, a jury is presumed to

understand and follow the trial court’s instructions. Leonardo v.

People, 728 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Colo. 1986). This presumption may

13
 be overcome “when the jury indicates to the judge that it does not

understand an element of the offense charged or some other matter

of law central to the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Id. at 1256.

On receipt of a jury’s question regarding a point of law, a court

should give further instructions to the jury unless the question can

be answered by the instructions already given, the question is not

relevant to the law at issue, or the question asks the court to decide

issues of fact. Chase, ¶ 38, ___ P.3d at ___.

¶ 31 “When a term, word, or phrase in a jury instruction is one

with which reasonable persons of common intelligence would be

familiar, and its meaning is not so technical or mysterious as to

create confusion in jurors’ minds as to its meaning, an instruction

defining it is not required.” People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 45 P.3d 737,

745 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d, 70 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2003). However,

Colorado’s appellate courts have consistently upheld courts giving

the jury supplemental instructions, even when unnecessary, if the

instructions properly state the law. People v. Holwuttle, 155 P.3d

447, 449-50 (Colo. App. 2006).

14
 C. Analysis

¶ 32 There is no statutory definition of the term “without

authorization” or “authorization.” Thus, the court did not abuse its

discretion in supplementing the jury instructions because

“authorization” was related to a legal issue, the court’s response

was simple and direct, and the jury expressed confusion over the

term’s meaning. See People v. Cruz, 923 P.2d 311, 313 (Colo. App.

1996) (holding that court did not err in giving the jury a dictionary

definition of an undefined element of a crime); see also People v.

Martin, 851 P.2d 186, 189 (Colo. App. 1992).

¶ 33 Divisions of our court have defined “without authorization” in

the context of theft statutes to mean “that the owner of the

property, or a person in possession of the property with the owner’s

consent, has not given the actor permission to exercise control over

the property.” People v. McCormick, 784 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. App.

1989) (quoting People v. Edmonds, 195 Colo. 358, 362, 578 P.2d

655, 659 (1978)); see People v. Stell, 2013 COA 149, ¶ 14, 320 P.3d

382, 385 (“A person acts ‘without authorization’ when the owner of

the property has not given him or her permission to obtain or

exercise control over the property.”).

15
¶ 34 Generally, the use of an excerpt from an opinion in a jury

instruction is an unwise practice because opinions and instructions

have different purposes. Pahl, 169 P.3d at 183-84. Thus, the court

was not required to use the definition of “authorization” or “without

authorization” from our published decisions.

¶ 35 Further, we conclude that the court acted within its discretion

when it tailored the wording of its response to the jury’s question

because the court’s definition of “authorization” was a proper

definition that fit the facts of the case and related to the issues the

jury needed to resolve. Therefore, trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it supplied the jury with its definition of

authorization.

¶ 36 Stellabotte argues that by defining the term “authorization” to

require “legal authority,” the court injected a requirement that the

authority to act derive from a law. We disagree. “[T]erms frequently

have more than one ordinary meaning, or at least more than one

shading or nuance of meaning . . . .” Marquez v. People, 2013 CO

58, ¶ 8, 311 P.3d 265, 268. We conclude that the court did not

inject a new requirement that lowered the prosecution’s burden of

proof. Rather, the court chose a definition different from that in our

16
 published decisions that was appropriate in the circumstances of

this case.

¶ 37 Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its

discretion when it provided the jury with the dictionary definition of

“authorization.”

IV. Effect of Amendatory Legislation

¶ 38 On June 5, 2013, the General Assembly lowered the

classification of thefts of items valued between $5000 and $20,000

from class 4 to class 5 felonies. See Ch. 373, sec. 1, § 18-4-401,

2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 2196. The General Assembly did not include

a specific effective date of the amendment.

¶ 39 Stellabotte committed his offenses in June and July 2012.

The jury entered its verdict in May 2014, and the court sentenced

Stellabotte in August 2014. Consequently, by the time the court

sentenced Stellabotte, his offenses were considered class 5 felonies.

However, the court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced

him under the prior laws as class 4 felonies.

¶ 40 Stellabotte contends that the reclassification should reduce

the maximum of his sentencing range for his theft convictions from

six years to three years, which in turn should reduce his sentence

17
 for those offenses, as enhanced by the habitual criminal statute,

from twenty-four years to twelve years. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 41 We review de novo the legality of a sentence. People v. Hard,

2014 COA 132, ¶ 46, 342 P.3d 572, 581.

¶ 42 Because Stellabotte did not raise this argument before the trial

court, the People contend that we must review any error for plain

error. See Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶¶ 18-19, 288 P.3d 116,

120-21. However, we need not review for plain error because a

defendant may raise a claim at any time that his or her sentence

was not authorized by law. People v. Fransua, 2016 COA 79, ¶ 17,

___ P.3d ___, ___.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 43 In determining whether to apply amendments to legislation,

we first look to the plain language of the statute. People v.

Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 253-54 (Colo. 2009). Statutes that

explicitly state that they are to apply only to offenses committed

after the effective date are to be applied accordingly. See People v.

McCoy, 764 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Colo. 1988).

18
¶ 44 “A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation.” § 2-

4-202, C.R.S. 2015. However, where the legislative intent is silent,

a defendant may seek retroactive application of a statute if he or

she benefits from a significant change in the law. § 18-1-410(1)(f)(I),

C.R.S. 2015. The supreme court extended this rule to defendants

seeking relief on direct appeal. People v. Thornton, 187 Colo. 202,

203, 529 P.2d 628, 628 (1974); see also People v. Russell, 2014

COA 21M, ¶ 12, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (cert. granted Feb. 23, 2015).

Whenever constitutionally possible, a defendant should be granted

the benefits of amendatory legislation that mitigates the penalty for

a crime. People v. Bloom, 195 Colo. 246, 251, 577 P.2d 288, 292

(1978).

C. Analysis

¶ 45 The theft amendment is silent as to whether it applies

retroactively or prospectively, and the legislative history provides no

guidance as to its application. However, several divisions of our

court have considered whether amendments that are silent as to

their effective dates apply retroactively. See People v. Boyd, 2015

COA 109, ¶ 14, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (concluding that although

Amendment 64 does not indicate a clear intent for retroactive

19
 application, it applied retroactively to the defendant’s conviction for

possession of marijuana) (cert. granted Mar. 21, 2016); Russell,

¶ 13, ___ P.3d at ___ (same); People v. Palmer, 42 Colo. App. 460,

461-63, 595 P.2d 1060, 1062-63 (1979); People v. Jenkins, 40 Colo.

App. 140, 143, 575 P.3d 13, 15-16 (1977); see also Bloom, 195

Colo. at 251-52, 577 P.2d at 292; Thornton, 187 Colo. at 203, 529

P.2d at 628-29; People v. Thomas, 185 Colo. 395, 397-98, 525 P.2d

1136, 1138 (1974). We follow the legal analysis presented in the

above-cited decisions and apply them to the theft statutory

amendment. We conclude that the theft amendment applies

retroactively to cases pending in the trial court when the

amendment was enacted.

¶ 46 In addition, both Boyd and Russell, although they dealt with

constitutional amendments, relied on section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I).

Section 18-1-410(1)(f)(I) expressly applies to statutory amendments.

Thus, we find the analysis in Boyd and Russell particularly

persuasive here where a statutory amendment is at issue.

¶ 47 The partial dissent relies on Riley v. People, 828 P.2d 254, 258

(Colo. 1992); McCoy, 764 P.2d at 1174; and People v. Macias, 631

P.2d 584, 587 (Colo. 1981), for the proposition that a defendant

20
should not receive the benefit of legislation that lessens the

penalties for crimes committed before the legislation was enacted

unless the General Assembly clearly intended the legislation to be

applied retroactively. These cases are distinguishable. In Riley,

McCoy, and Macias, the supreme court considered cases where the

General Assembly provided that the statutory amendments applied

to offenses committed on or after the effective date. See also People

v. Pineda-Eriza, 49 P.3d 329, 333 (Colo. App. 2001). Thus, the

statements on which the dissent relies are dicta. Boyd, ¶ 29, ___

P.3d at ___.4 Further, because the three cases dealt with

amendatory statutes that applied only to offenses committed on or

after the effective date, we do not view Riley, McCoy, and Macias as

inconsistent with Russell and Boyd. Rather, the former apply to

4 We recognize that apparent conflict between section 2-4-202,
C.R.S. 2015, and section 18-1-410, C.R.S. 2015. Applying rules of
statutory construction, the Boyd majority concluded that section
18-1-410 should prevail over section 2-4-202 because the
propositions in Riley v. People, 828 P.2d 254, 258 (Colo. 1992), and
People v. McCoy, 764 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Colo. 1988), on which the
dissent relied constituted dicta and section 18-1-410 is the more
specific statutory provision. People v. Boyd, 2015 COA 109, ¶¶ 28-
32, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (cert. granted Mar. 21, 2016). The Boyd
majority ultimately resolved the conflict between section 2-4-202
and section 18-1-410 by reading section 18-1-410 as an exception
to section 2-4-202. We agree with that analysis.

21
 legislative amendments with prospective effective dates, and the

latter apply to legislative amendments, as here, with an effective

date, but no indication whether they were to be applied

prospectively or retroactively.

¶ 48 Therefore, we vacate and remand to the trial court to correct

his sentence on the two felony theft convictions and corresponding

habitual criminal sentence enhancement to reflect a twelve-year

sentence for those offenses. We emphasize that our analysis only

applies to the felony theft convictions, and not the aggravated motor

vehicle theft and misdemeanor theft convictions.

V. Proportionality Review

¶ 49 Stellabotte contends that the twenty-four-year sentences that

the trial court imposed are disproportionate to the nature and

severity of his offenses in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 50 We review de novo whether a sentence is constitutionally

proportionate. People v. Hargrove, 2013 COA 165, ¶ 8, 338 P.3d

413, 416.

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 B. Applicable Law

¶ 51 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

prohibits the imposition of sentences that are disproportionate to

the crime committed. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).

Although reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the

legislature’s authority to set penalty schemes, “no penalty is per se

constitutional.” Id. at 290.

¶ 52 “In the absence of a need for a refined analysis inquiring into

the details of the specific offenses or a detailed comparison of

sentences imposed for other crimes in this or other jurisdictions, an

appellate court is as well positioned . . . to conduct a proportionality

review.” People v. Gaskins, 825 P.2d 30, 37-38 (Colo. 1992).

¶ 53 Upon request, a defendant is entitled to an abbreviated

proportionality review of his or her sentence. People v. Deroulet, 48

P.3d 520, 526 (Colo. 2002). An abbreviated proportionality review

consists of a comparison of the gravity of the offense and the

harshness of the penalty to discern whether it raises an inference of

gross disproportionality. Id. at 527.

¶ 54 For purposes of proportionality review, we consider each

sentence imposed separately. Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 539

23
 (Colo. 2002). We scrutinize all the offenses in question, both

triggering and predicate, to determine whether in combination they

are so lacking in gravity or seriousness as to suggest that a

sentence enhanced by the habitual criminal sentence is grossly

disproportionate. People v. Patnode, 126 P.3d 249, 260 (Colo. App.

2005). If an abbreviated review does not yield an inference of gross

disproportionality, no further review is required. People v. Reese,

155 P.3d 477, 479 (Colo. App. 2006). “[I]n almost every case, the

abbreviated proportionality review will result in a finding that the

sentence is constitutionally proportionate, thereby preserving the

primacy of the General Assembly in crafting sentencing schemes.”

Deroulet, 48 P.3d at 526.

¶ 55 When a court considers the gravity of the offense in an

abbreviated proportionality review, it must determine whether the

offense is grave and serious. People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148, 1158

(Colo. App. 2010). In making the determination, courts consider

the harm caused or threatened to the victim or to society and the

culpability of the offender. Gaskins, 825 P.2d at 36.

¶ 56 Certain felonies are per se grave and serious crimes for

purposes of proportionality review. Close, 48 P.3d at 538. If a

24
 reviewing court is unable to conclude that a certain felony is

categorically grave and serious on its face, the court may conduct a

more refined inquiry into the case-specific facts and circumstances

underlying the offense and determine if the offense is grave and

serious. People v. Mershon, 874 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Colo. 1994).

C. Analysis

¶ 57 Stellabotte contends all three of his twenty-four-year

sentences are disproportionate to the nature and severity of the

offenses. We disagree.

¶ 58 Stellabotte’s triggering offenses — two counts of felony theft

and one count of aggravated motor vehicle theft — either

individually or in combination, are grave and serious crimes for the

purposes of an abbreviated proportionality review. See People v.

Cooper, 205 P.3d 475, 481 (Colo. App. 2008) (even assuming that

triggering and predicate car theft offenses were not individually

grave and serious per se, in combination they were grave and

serious); People v. Merchant, 983 P.2d 108, 117 (Colo. App. 1999)

(felony theft is a serious offense); People v. Penrod, 892 P.2d 383,

387 (Colo. App. 1994) (aggravated motor vehicle theft “may not be

characterized as lacking in gravity”).

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¶ 59 Likewise, Stellabotte’s underlying offenses — attempted

aggravated motor vehicle theft, aggravated motor vehicle theft, and

felony menacing — are also grave and serious. People v. Cisneros,

855 P.2d 822, 830 (Colo. 1993) (felony menacing is a grave and

serious offense). These prior felonies triggered habitual criminal

sentencing, which quadrupled his sentence.

¶ 60 Accordingly, Stellabotte’s triggering offenses and the three

predicate offenses are sufficiently grave and serious to support a

conclusion that his twenty-four-year concurrent sentences are

constitutionally proportionate, particularly in light of the mandatory

habitual criminal sentence enhancement. Given our conclusion in

Part V, it follows that Stellabotte’s new theft sentences of twelve

years also are not grossly disproportionate.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 61 The judgment of conviction is affirmed, the felony theft

sentences are vacated, the other sentences are affirmed, and the

case is remanded for resentencing on the felony theft convictions.

JUDGE FREYRE concurs.

JUDGE DAILEY concurs in part and dissents in part.

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 JUDGE DAILEY, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

¶ 62 I agree with all but Part IV of the majority opinion. Contrary

to the majority, I would decline to follow People v. Russell, 2014

COA 21M (cert. granted Feb. 23, 2015), and People v. Boyd, 2015

COA 109 (cert. granted Mar. 21, 2016), and, thus, I would uphold

the class 4 felony classification of defendant’s convictions for theft.

¶ 63 Defendant’s convictions were based on acts committed in the

summer of 2012. As noted by the majority, the General Assembly

did not amend the law, lowering the classification of defendant’s

criminal acts, until June 2013.

¶ 64 The issue is whether the 2013 legislation applies retroactively

to lower the felony classification for acts committed nearly a year

earlier. Relying on Russell and Boyd, the majority holds that it

does. Both Russell and Boyd addressed the retroactivity of an

amendment to the state constitution which decriminalized certain

theretofore illegal offenses related to marijuana use. In Russell, the

division said:

In general, when construing a constitutional
amendment, unless its terms clearly show
intent that the amendment be retroactively
applied, “we presume the amendment has
prospective application only.”

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 . . . The general presumption of prospective
application, however, is subject to a doctrine
established by our General Assembly and
supreme court enabling a defendant to benefit
retroactively from a significant change in the
law.

Russell, ¶¶ 11-12 (citations omitted) (quoting Huber v. Colo. Mining

Ass’n, 264 P.3d 884, 889 (Colo. 2011)).

¶ 65 The “doctrine” the Russell division identified as the exception

to the general rule of prospective application originated in a line of

supreme court cases holding that a defendant whose conviction is

not yet final is entitled to the benefit of amendatory legislation

mitigating the penalties for crimes. See People v. Thomas, 185 Colo.

395, 397-98, 525 P.2d 1136, 1138 (1974); see also People v. Bloom,

195 Colo. 246, 251-52, 577 P.2d 288, 292 (1978); People v.

Thornton, 187 Colo. 202, 203, 529 P.2d 628, 628-29 (1974).

¶ 66 However, a subsequent, and inconsistent, line of supreme

court cases states that a defendant should not receive the benefit of

legislation that lessens the penalties for crimes committed before

the new legislation was enacted unless the legislation was clearly

intended to be applied retroactively. See Riley v. People, 828 P.2d

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 254, 258 (Colo. 1992); People v. McCoy, 764 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Colo.

1988); People v. Macias, 631 P.2d 584, 587 (Colo. 1981).

¶ 67 The majority finds this second line of authority inapposite

because, although there is no clear indication of an intent to apply

the new legislation retroactively, there is also no clear indication of

intent to apply it only prospectively to acts committed on or after a

certain date.

¶ 68 I do not believe that this second — and, in my view, controlling

— line of authority can be so easily dismissed. It is premised on the

rule of construction that presumes a statute is “prospective in its

operation.” § 2-4-202, C.R.S. 2015. “The General Assembly may

override this presumption by clearly expressing a contrary intent.”

People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 256 (Colo. 2009); see Riley, 828

P.2d at 257 (“Legislation is presumed to have prospective effect

unless a contrary intent is expressed by the General Assembly.”);

see also McCoy, 764 P.2d at 1174 (“Our cases also establish that a

defendant does not receive any ameliorative benefit when retroactive

application of the amendatory legislation is clearly not intended by

its own terms.”); People v. Pineda-Eriza, 49 P.3d 329, 333 (Colo.

App. 2001) (“A defendant is not entitled to the ameliorative effects of

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 amendatory legislation if the legislature has not indicated its intent

to require retroactive application thereof.”).

¶ 69 Contrary to the majority’s belief, the absence of an explicit

prospective application provision cannot undermine the

presumption of prospective application. That presumption “is only

strengthened by the insertion of an effective date clause that

explicitly mandates prospective application.” Summers, 208 P.3d at

257 (emphasis added). In the absence of such a clause, the

presumption would still exist, unless and until the General

Assembly expressed an intent to apply the enactment retroactively,

Riley, 828 P.2d at 257.

¶ 70 Because no intent to apply the 2013 legislation retroactively is

suggested from its language, the presumption of prospective

application applies. Thus, I would hold that the 2013 legislation

did not retroactively re-classify the felony level of defendant’s 2012

criminal conduct. See § 2-4-303, C.R.S. 2015 (“The repeal,

revision, amendment, or consolidation of any statute . . . or section

. . . shall not have the effect to release, extinguish, alter, modify, or

change in whole or in part any penalty . . . either civil or criminal

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. . . unless the repealing, revising, amending, or consolidating act so

expressly provides . . . .”) (emphasis added).

31