FILED
Nov 17 2020, 8:51 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Thomas Lowe Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lowe Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
New Albany, Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyler Wayne Harris, November 17, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-732
v. Appeal from the Orange Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven L. Owen,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
59C01-1901-F1-48
Bradford, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CR-732 | November 17, 2020 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Tyler Harris was charged with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in
death. At a pretrial hearing, Harris and the State entered into a plea agreement,
under the terms of which Harris would plead guilty to Level 3 felony neglect of
a dependent. The trial court accepted Harris’s guilty plea, then indicated that it
would wait for a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) to be prepared before
accepting the plea agreement and sentencing Harris. After reviewing the PSI,
the trial court rejected Harris’s plea agreement. Harris’s case went to trial, he
was convicted, and he was sentenced to thirty years of incarceration. Harris
contends that the trial court abused its discretion and was required to enforce
the plea agreement after accepting his plea of guilty. Because we disagree, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On December 3, 2018, Harris, Harris’s wife, and two of their children visited
the home of Preston Judd. During the visit, Harris smoked marijuana and used
methamphetamine with Judd while the Judd and Harris children played in
Judd’s children’s bedroom. Judd possessed liquid methadone, which he kept in
a baby bottle stored in his bedroom closet. Harris was aware that methadone
was in the home before the visit because he had discussed it with Judd
previously. Sometime before the visit concluded, Judd retrieved the baby bottle
containing methadone and brought it into the kitchen, placing it on a shelf.
Shortly after the Harris family left Judd’s home, C.H. fell asleep. When the
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Harris family arrived home at 2:45 p.m., Harris’s wife put C.H. in bed to sleep.
Sometime after 5:00 p.m., after beginning to prepare dinner, Harris’s wife went
to retrieve C.H. for supper and started screaming when she found him
unresponsive. Harris’s wife called her stepfather, who lived nearby. When
Harris’s in-laws arrived, his father-in-law called 911. C.H. was taken to the
hospital but passed away. Forensic examination revealed that C.H. had died
from methadone toxicity. At trial, a forensic pathologist testified that a fatal
dose of methadone for a child C.H.’s size would be approximately ten
milligrams, or about one teaspoon of liquid methadone.
[3] On January 1, 2019, the State charged Harris with neglect of a dependent
resulting in death, a Level 1 felony. On September 23, 2019, Harris agreed to
plead guilty to Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent causing serious bodily
injury. Pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, Harris and the state agreed
that he would receive a sentence of nine years, with eight years suspended.
Also on September 23, 2019, the trial court advised Harris of his rights, found a
factual basis existed for the plea, permitted Harris to withdraw his plea of not
guilty, accepted his plea of guilty, and found him guilty of Level 3 felony
neglect of a dependent causing serious bodily injury. When accepting the plea,
the trial court stated, “the Court will accept your plea of guilty to neglect of a
dependent causing serious bodily injury as a level three felony. However, I am
going to withhold the sentence because it is a level three, and the nature of the
case, until a pre-sentence investigation is done.” App. Vol. II, 46. After
reviewing the PSI, the trial court rejected the plea agreement on November 21,
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2019, and set the case for trial. Following a jury trial, Harris was found guilty
of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death and sentenced to
thirty years of incarceration, all executed.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Harris contends that, because the court accepted his guilty plea on September
23, 2019, the court abused its discretion when it rejected his plea agreement on
October 19, 2019, violating Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2. We disagree.
[5] A plea agreement is “a contract, ‘an explicit agreement between the State and
defendant,’ which, if accepted by the trial court, is binding upon all parties.”
Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Griffin v. State, 756
N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. Ct. App 2001)). However, “the defendant’s acceptance
of a proposed plea bargain does not create a constitutional right to have the plea
bargain specifically enforced.” Coker v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1135, 1138 (Ind.
1986). After all, trial courts may exercise their discretion to accept or reject plea
agreements. Reffett v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Ind. 1991) (citing Phillips v.
State, 441 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. 1982)). Once a court accepts a plea agreement, that
court is “bound by all terms in the plea agreement which are within its legal
power to control.” Id. at 1230 (citing Griffin v. State, 461 N.E.2d 1123 (Ind.
1984)).
[6] Harris contends that the law binds a trial court to accept a bargained for plea
agreement if the court accepts a plea of guilty, arguing that to do otherwise
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would deprive the defendant of the benefit of their bargain. Ind. Code § 35-35-
1-2 states:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first
determining that the defendant: has been informed that if: (A)
there is a plea agreement . . . and the (B) the court accepts the plea;
the court is bound by the terms of the plea agreement at the time
of sentencing[.]
We do not interpret this statute to mean that once a court accepts a guilty plea
that it automatically accepts the plea agreement. Rather we read it to say that,
before a court may accept a plea of guilty it must inform a defendant that, if it
accepts a plea agreement, it will be bound by its terms. Here, we have no such
acceptance, so the trial court is not bound by the plea agreement which it
intended to review on a later date.
[7] The leading case on these issues is Reffett, in which the trial court’s rescission
of its initial acceptance of a plea agreement was overturned. Reffett, 571
N.E.2d at 1230. The Reffett trial court explicitly accepted both the guilty plea
and the plea agreement, then found the defendant guilty. Reffett, 571 N.E.2d
at 1229. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court rescinded its acceptance of
the plea agreement in light of the PSI, which showed Reffett’s lengthy criminal
history. Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1228. This case, however, is distinguishable
from Reffett because, in accepting Harris’s plea of guilty, the trial court
specifically noted that it would not be accepting the entire plea agreement until
after a review of the PSI.
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[8] The trial court was acting with its discretion when it accepted Harris’s guilty
plea but explained that it would not be accepting the plea agreement until it
reviewed the PSI. Under that plea agreement, which called for nine years of
incarceration, with eight years suspended. If this plea agreement had been
explicitly accepted when the guilty plea was given, the trial court would have
had no discretion at sentencing. It is clear, however, that the trial court’s
motive was to review the PSI, and only then determine whether the sentence
provided for in the plea agreement was acceptable. When the trial court did
review the PSI, it determined that the plea agreement was unacceptable and
allowed Harris to revoke his guilty plea before the court set a trial date. Harris
failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea
agreement.
[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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