UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4055
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEVEN RUSSELL HELTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Beckley. Frank W. Volk, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00134-1)
Submitted: October 26, 2020 Decided: November 17, 2020
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard W. Weston, WESTON | ROBERTSON, Hurricane, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Michael B. Stuart, United States Attorney, Negar M. Kordestani, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Russell Helton appeals his 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of
his supervised release. On appeal, Helton argues that his revocation sentence is
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to address his nonfrivolous
argument for a sentence split between incarceration and substance abuse treatment and did
not adequately explain the sentence imposed. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). “Only if this modified reasonableness
analysis leads us to conclude that the sentence was unreasonable, do we ask whether it is
‘plainly’ so, relying on the definition of ‘plain’ used in our plain error analysis—that is,
clear or obvious.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007) (alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, “even if a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we will still affirm
it if we find that any errors are harmless.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207. An error is harmless
if the Government “demonstrates that the error did not have a substantial and injurious
effect or influence on the result and we can say with fair assurance that [correcting the
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errors] would not have affected the sentence imposed.” United States v. Boulware, 604
F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Slappy,
872 F.3d at 207; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (listing relevant factors). “A court need not be
as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing
a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, “where a court entirely fails to mention a party’s nonfrivolous arguments
in favor of a particular sentence, or where the court fails to provide at least some reason
why those arguments are unpersuasive, even the relaxed requirements for revocation
sentences are not satisfied.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 209. Although “[t]he context surrounding
a district court’s explanation may imbue it with enough content for us to evaluate both
whether the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and whether it did so properly,”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006), we “may not guess at
the district court’s rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or
defense counsel or for any other clues that might explain a sentence,” United States v. Ross,
912 F.3d 740, 745 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
206 (2019). Finally, “it is uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a
more significant justification than a minor one.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Helton first argues that the district court failed to respond to his nonfrivolous
arguments, in particular his argument for a sentence split between incarceration and
substance abuse treatment. We disagree. The district court explicitly noted that it had
considered Helton’s request for a split sentence. It then accounted for Helton’s addiction
issues by recommending Helton’s placement in the Residential Drug Abuse Program
during his term of incarceration and ordering that Helton participate in an alcohol abuse
program while on supervised release. To the extent Helton’s argument was intended to
mitigate his violations, the district court made clear that it disagreed by stating its concerns
with Helton’s alcohol abuse and admission to driving while intoxicated.
Next, relying on our decision in Slappy, Helton argues that the district court failed
to adequately explain why it sentenced Helton to the statutory maximum of 24 months’
imprisonment. Again, we disagree. Unlike in Slappy, the district court correctly calculated
Helton’s policy statement range and adequately responded to Helton’s nonfrivolous
arguments. See Slappy, 872 F.3d at 209 (stating that the district court’s failure to address
Slappy’s nonfrivolous arguments “was compounded by its failure to explain why it was
necessary to impose the statutory minimum sentence”). The district court considered some
of the § 3553(a) factors and discussed Helton’s alcohol abuse, his dishonesty with the
probation officer, and his admitted drunk driving. In light of the deference given to district
courts with respect to revocation sentences, the district court’s stated rationale was
sufficient to support the sentence imposed.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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