J-S41008-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INT. OF: A.E.L.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 436 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 24, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-0125a.
IN THE INT. OF: T.M.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 437 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 24, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2019-0193a.
IN THE INT. OF: A.E.L.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 438 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 24, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2019-0194a.
J-S41008-20
IN THE INT. OF: A.E.L.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 439 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Decree Entered February 24, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2019-0195a.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2020
In these consolidated matters, T.L. (Mother) appeals from the decrees
involuntarily terminating her rights to four children – 11-year-old A.L. (born
2008); 10-year-old A.L. (born 2010); 6-year-old A.L. (born 2013); and 5-
year-old T.L. (born 2014) – pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).1 After review, we affirm.
The relevant history is as follows:
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The orphans’ court also terminated the rights of T.L. (Father), who is the
parent of A.L. (born 2010), A.L. (born 2013), and T.L. (born 2014). His
consolidated appeal is separately listed before this panel. See 545, 546, and
547 MDA 2020. The orphans’ court also terminated the rights of R.V., the
biological father of A.L. (born 2008); he did not appeal. Also separately listed
before this panel is Mother’s appeal of a prior permanency review order. See
1954, 1953, and 1955 MDA 2019. Given the subsequent terminations of
Mother’s rights, which are at issue in this memorandum, we dismissed that
appeal as moot.
-2-
J-S41008-20
The family came to the attention of the York County Office of Children
Youth and Families (Agency) in June 2017 following allegations that Mother
physically abused A.L. (2008) in a parking lot, and that Mother was abusing
drugs. The court consequently removed A.L. (2008) from Mother’s care and
adjudicated the child dependent. The three younger children remained with
Mother.
In December 2017, the family again came to the Agency’s attention,
following allegations Father abused T.L. (2014) by rubbing the boy’s face in a
mess he made, hitting him, and throwing him into a bathtub. The child
sustained injuries, and the court eventually found T.L. was a victim of abuse
under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303.2 There was also domestic violence between
Mother and Father. In January 2018, the Agency filed an application for
emergency protective custody, and the court removed the children from
Mother’s care. The court adjudicated the children dependent.
The Agency developed a family service plan to aid in the reunification
of the family. Although Mother generally cooperated with the Agency, the
dependency case lingered in large part due to Mother’s inability to deal with
the children’s advanced behavioral issues. All of the children were diagnosed
with disorganized attachment disorder due to their developmental trauma and
____________________________________________
2 It was also alleged Father sexually abused A.L. (2013) and A.L. (2010), but
evidently the court was satisfied that there was no reason to pursue these
allegations. We only mention them insofar as they were the impetus for the
children’s removal.
-3-
J-S41008-20
neglect. By December 2019, the children had been placed outside of Mother’s
care for approximately two years, and the Agency petitioned for termination.
The court held termination hearings over the course of three dates,
February 19-21, 2020. Following the hearing, the orphans’ court issued
findings from the bench and terminated Mother’s rights. See Trial Court
Opinion (T.C.O. 1), 2/21/20 at 1-17. The orphans’ court issued decrees on
February 24, 2020. Mother timely-filed this appeal, and the court issued a
second opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). See Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.
2), dated 3/30/20, at 1-9.
On appeal, Mother presents a considerably broad question:
Did the lower court abuse its discretion and err as a matter
of law as the Agency failed to meet its burden to terminate
Mother’s parental rights?
Mother’s Brief at 5.
Notwithstanding Mother’s vague question presented, her Brief largely
corresponds with the specific points she raised in her Rule 1925(b) concise
statement of errors such that we may discern her arguments on appeal. In
essence, Mother appeals the sufficiency of evidence for each subsection upon
which the court terminated Mother’s rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8) and (b).
We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard or review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
-4-
J-S41008-20
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court’s
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotations marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
the child under the standard of best interests of the child.
One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to the
effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
We have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so
“clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to
a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
-5-
J-S41008-20
issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 3 We need only agree with the
court as to any one subsection of 2511(a), as well as Section (b), in order to
affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We
begin with the first prong of the termination analysis under Section 2511(a).
Specifically, we analyze the court’s decision under Section 2511(a)(2).
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
[…]
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
Regarding Section 2511(a)(2), we have explained:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must
be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
____________________________________________
3 We note that neither the petitions for termination, nor the resulting decrees
identified the specific, enumerated sections under Section 2511(a) upon which
termination was granted. Instead, the Agency listed the text of the
subsections that correspond with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8).
Likewise, the resulting decrees simply granted the petitions.
-6-
J-S41008-20
refusal has caused the child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative
misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations,
internal quotation marks, and indentation omitted).
Regarding Section 2511(a)(2), Mother limits her argument to the third
element; whether Mother can remedy her inability to parent. See Mother’s
Brief at 37-40. For support, Mother contends that she accomplished every
family service goal asked of her during the dependency case.
The orphans’ court acknowledged Mother’s general compliance, but it
opined that focusing on her compliance alone misses the broader point. The
court determined Mother had not remedied her inability to parent the four
children, who have experienced trauma and have resulting behavioral issues:
[T]he [c]ourt does not feel that Mother at any time has not
been cooperative, but we have to label cooperation
differently from progress. Mother has come a long way, but
she had a long way to come. She has not come far enough
that she can parent a child [referring to A.L. [2008)] whose
memory of being in her home was of being hit and taking
care of her siblings, nor can she address the trauma faced
by the other children.
See T.C.O. 1, at 7.
The court also opined:
-7-
J-S41008-20
This [c]ourt disagrees that the initial reasons for placement
have been remedied as there are still significant concerns
for the [c]ourt. Specifically, the [c]ourt has concerns
regarding the emotional and physical safety of the children
stemming from the abuse and the neglect that resulted in
the children being placed. Mother’s main problem is that,
after 24 months in placement and significant services,
Mother’s visits were still supervised. For the past 12
months, Mother’s able counsel has argued that she is always
on the cusp of accomplishing her goals, yet she has always
failed to actually have a present ability to assume custody.
Despite extensions of time and substantial services, Mother
has been unable to implement and demonstrate the parental
capacity and [judgment] necessary to ensure the children’s
physical and emotional safety even for brief periods of visits.
Overall, Mother would have the [c]ourt look at her individual
accomplishments in certain areas without a view towards
the bigger picture whether she can parent now.
T.C.O. 2 at 3-4.
With minimal citations to either the record or legal authority, none
particularly relevant to the question of whether Mother can remedy her
inability to parent, Mother essentially argues that the service providers’
testimony lacked credibility and thus should have been given limited weight.
See generally Mother’s Brief at 37-39. To that end, we observe that
appellate courts “are not in a position to make close calls based on fact-specific
determinations,” particularly in termination cases where the lower court
judge, who presides over multiple hearings with the same parties, possesses
“a longitudinal understanding of the case.” See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). And as we stressed above, we do not second-guess the
court’s credibility determinations so long as they are supported by the record.
See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
-8-
J-S41008-20
In our review, we conclude that these findings were supported by the
record. Regarding the children’s significant needs, the court heard expert
testimony from Ellie Williams, the executive director and mental health
therapist at EquiTeam, a service provider. Ms. Williams testified that the
children were diagnosed with disorganized attachment disorder.
“[Disorganized attachment disorder] doesn’t meet the qualifications for full
blown reactive attachment disorder [RAD], that is a very severe diagnosis,
and I hesitate to give that. Disorganized attachment is just they haven’t
reached the level of RAD. There hasn’t been sort of killing animals or severe
instances like that, but they are unable or have challenges attaching to
caregivers and parental figures.” See N.T. at 171.
The reason for this diagnosis is that all of the children have experienced
significant “developmental trauma.” Ms. Williams explained the basis of the
trauma as follows: “[W]hen there hasn’t been the nurturing and the love and
the care in an early childhood infancy, toddler, they believe, they start to
believe when there has been neglect, ‘I’m the bad person.’ They have so
much shame. […] Their acting out to an extreme level, the shame, this is who
we are, we are this bad and this is why we do this.” Id. at 167. Consequently,
the children displayed extreme behaviors, acted out, and refused to listen to
directions. Id. at 157.
In order to address this misbehavior, Ms. Williams testified that she
employed “didactic developmental psychotherapy techniques.” Id. at 161.
For instance, when the children are engaging in an activity in a dangerous
-9-
J-S41008-20
manner, Ms. Williams will offer to teach the children to do the activity safely.
If she told them “don’t do that,” Ms. Williams explained that the children will
be triggered and act out. By teaching them, the children lose interest in the
“fun” of being dangerous. See id. at 159-162.
Repairing the relationship between the parents and the children
necessarily means addressing the trauma. Ms. Williams testified that this
would take “years and years and years.” See N.T. at 183. Importantly, Mother
would have to be “healthy and regulated” before she could even begin that
work. Id.
Susan Scott, another expert therapist with EquiTeam testified that the
children experienced trauma as a result of Mother placing the older two
siblings in the caregiver role to the two youngest siblings, while Mother’s
substance abuse and domestic violence permeated the home. See id. at 212.
While the children have done well with therapy, aided by the support of their
respective foster parents, the children’s progress will not continue unless they
achieve security and stability through permanency. See id. at 212.
While Ms. Scott and Ms. Williams focused primarily on the children’s
therapy, Ms. Suzanne Kearse – a family therapist with Catholic Charities –
worked with Mother to address her therapeutic goals. See id. 368.
Specifically, Ms. Kearse sought to help Mother’s “self-esteem with relation to
goal setting and planning for a sober life, identifying healthy relationships that
support her sobriety, and confronting and working through strong or difficult
emotions so that she can develop healthy coping skills for those emotions.”
- 10 -
J-S41008-20
Id. at 369. From September 2018 through July 2019, Mother was not
consistent with her therapy. At the time of the termination hearing in
February 2020, Ms. Kearse described Mother’s progress as “moderate,” but
noted it fluctuated from “minimal” to “significant” over the course of the
dependency case. Id. at 371.
Of concern for Ms. Kearse, was Mother’s inability to separate herself
from Father T.L., whose influence on Mother would cause her to exercise poor
judgment and regress. See id. at 371-372. Ms. Kearse opined further that
Mother needed to learn how to process her own trauma in order to meet the
children’s parenting needs. See id. at 405; 408-409. By way of example, a
few weeks prior to the termination hearing, Mother had a visit with T.L.
(2014). The child evidently had a panic attack. He told the supervising
therapist that he couldn’t breathe because he couldn’t control his emotions
and anxiety. Id. at 425. In addition to difficulty breathing, T.L. (2014) likely
broke out in hives. Id. Mother could not de-escalate the situation to address
T.L.’s needs.
These facts support the orphans’ court determination. The larger
concern for the court – indeed, the larger focus of Section 2511(a)(2) – was
that Mother did not possess the ability to parent these children, who all have
significant behavioral issues. Although Mother was inclined to learn parenting
skills, she never implemented them or displayed that she understood them.
Importantly, Mother was never able to progress to the point of having
unsupervised visits with the children. Although Mother made some progress,
- 11 -
J-S41008-20
the court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the progress was
not enough to overcome her inability to parent.
Having concluded the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion
regarding the first prong of the termination analysis under Section 2511(a)(2),
we turn to the second prong of the analysis under Section 2511(b). This
section addresses the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
the best interests of the child. See In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Specifically, Section 2511(b) provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b).
Under this prong of the termination analysis, the orphans’ court
determined that the children’s needs and welfare would be best served by
terminating Mother’s rights. The court summarized those findings as follows:
As it relates to [A.L. (born 2008)], all of the professionals
involved with her indicate that at this point she needs
permanency. Notably at every hearing Mother has been
supposedly on the cusp of being ready. We’ve passed the
point where she can be on the cusp of ready. She isn’t ready
and [A.L. (born 2008)] can’t wait anymore. She is in a
- 12 -
J-S41008-20
stable foster home where she is doing well. She is in a
school where she is doing well. She has progressed in her
counseling, and she needs to know that her situation is
permanent. Therefore, it is clearly in her best interests at
this time to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
Turning next to [A.L. (born 2010)], she while not having
been in this home long, has been there long enough that
she feels safe, secure, bonded with her sister and ready to
move forward in her current setting. She also has
progressed in counseling. Notably while Mother and Father
have had an opportunity to participate in counseling, that
has not allowed them any meaningful way to help [A.L.
(2010)] address the trauma in any way that would allow her
to feel safe and move forward in the care of either parent.
As it relates to [A.L. (born 2013)], the only person currently
capable of addressing her current behaviors appears to be
the foster parents. The [c]ourt has some concerns and
would certainly like to support the foster parents with
additional evaluations, which are underway. It is clear,
however, that neither parent can handle those behaviors.
Therefore, it is in her best interests to terminate parental
rights.
As it relates to [T.L. (born 2014)], his strongest bond at this
point is most likely with his siblings. He also needs
permanency. He has been in a stable foster home and
needs to know that he will be able to stay there. Therefore,
it is in the best interests of each of the children for Mother’s
parental rights to be terminated.
T.C.O. 1, at 10-11.
Immediately we note that none of Mother’s arguments adequately
address the court’s determinations under this second prong of the termination
analysis. In her Brief, Mother starts by reiterating that she has been
cooperative with the family service plans. See generally Mother’s Brief at 45-
49. However, the focus under Section 2511(b) is not on a parent’s actions,
- 13 -
J-S41008-20
but on the needs and welfare of the children. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d at
511.
Next, Mother’s contends the court erred by relying upon the expert
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Gransee, who prepared various parenting
assessments. See Mother’s Brief at 49-54; see also Agency’s Exhibits 11-14.
Specifically, Mother attacks the reliability of Dr. Gransee’s testimony and
reports, arguing that Dr. Gransee based his opinions on collateral information
he received from the Agency, and that he was not prepared during the
termination hearing. See Mother’s Brief at 49-50. For support, Mother cites
the court’s “preemptive comment” to the parties that they treat Dr. Gransee
with professional courtesy, because York County has had difficulty obtaining
professionals to conduct evaluations due to “some attorneys [being] overly
aggressive.” See Mother’s Brief at 50; see also N.T. at 274.4 Mother
concludes that Dr. Gransee was “not an expert witness giving an unbiased
assessment.” See Mother’s Brief at 51.
We do not find Mother’s argument persuasive or relevant. Indeed, we
are inclined to find waiver. Mother stipulated Dr. Gransee’s four parenting
assessments would be admitted in lieu of specific testimony, and she also
stipulated to his qualifications as an expert. See N.T. at 270. Although Mother
____________________________________________
4The orphans’ court clarified to Mother’s counsel: “This has not been an issue
with you…but I just want to make the comment generally since we don’t have
a lot of people who are currently willing to perform capacity evaluations for
us.” Id.
- 14 -
J-S41008-20
questioned Dr. Gransee about the underlying information used in his reports,
not once did she object during Dr. Gransee’s abbreviated testimony.
Moreover, Dr. Gransee’s testimony and reports are not particularly
relevant to the analysis under Section 2511(b). They largely concern Mother’s
parenting ability, as opposed to the best interests of the children. For
instance, Dr. Gransee conceded that he did not observe Mother with any of
the children, but he testified that “wasn’t the point of the evaluation.” N.T. at
286. Dr. Gransee explained that his reports concerned parenting capacity;
they were not assessments of parental bonding. Id. at 286; 288. Indeed, the
orphans’ court did not appear to rely upon this testimony or evidence when
concluding that the Agency met its burden under Section 2511(b).
Therefore, we need not find waiver outright, because Mother’s
arguments under Section 2511(b) are irrelevant to our analysis of this prong.
Notably, Mother presents no argument concerning the court’s bonding
determinations. Although the bond analysis is “a major aspect of the Section
2511(b) best interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to
be considered by the [orphans’] court when determining what is in the best
interest of the child.” In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted). The question is not whether a bond exists, but whether termination
would destroy a necessary and beneficial bond. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). Still, “in cases where there is no evidence of
any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 243 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
- 15 -
J-S41008-20
Even if a bond between Mother and the children existed, it is clear any
detriment in severing that bond will be outweighed by the benefit of achieving
stability for the children. Ms. Williams opined that termination would be in the
children’s best interests because “[t]he extent of their trauma [is] so severe
and there needs to be stability for the children to be able to work through
that.” See N.T. at 170.
In sum, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it found
termination best served the children’s needs and welfare.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/19/2020
- 16 -