NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 23 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TODD WILLS, No. 19-16053
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02994-DLR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2020**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: TALLMAN, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Todd Wills appeals the district court’s order affirming the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) decision denying Wills’ application for disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of
Social Security benefits, and we must independently determine whether the ALJ’s
decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence. Brewes v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012). “If the
evidence can support either affirming or reversing the ALJ’s conclusion, we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466
F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
First, Wills contends the ALJ erred by failing to identify his mental
impairments as “severe impairments” at step two of the sequential evaluation
analysis. The ALJ reasonably concluded that the minimal evidence of mental
health treatment in the record and largely unremarkable mental status examination
results indicated that Wills’ mental impairments did not cause more than minimal
limitations in Wills’ ability to work. This finding is supported by substantial
evidence. Moreover, even if the ALJ did err here, such error would be harmless
because step two was resolved in Wills’ favor. Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040,
1049 (9th Cir. 2017).
Second, Wills contends the ALJ improperly discredited his symptom
testimony. The ALJ reasonably relied on the evidence of Wills’ improvement
when compliant with treatment, Wills’ daily activities, which were inconsistent
2
with the specific limitations he alleged, Wills’ failure to follow treatment
recommendations, and the lack of supporting medical evidence to find Wills’
symptom allegations were not entirely credible. These are clear and convincing
reasons to discount his testimony. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039–40
(9th Cir. 2008) (permitting the ALJ to discredit symptom testimony for failure to
follow prescribed course of treatment and for conflict with evidence of
improvement with treatment); Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007)
(permitting the ALJ to discredit symptom testimony that is contradicted by a
claimant’s activities); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007)
(permitting the ALJ to discredit symptom testimony that is inconsistent with the
medical evidence). Wills argues for a different interpretation of the evidence, but
the ALJ’s interpretation is supported by substantial evidence. See Orn, 495 F.3d at
630.
Third, Wills contends the ALJ erred in giving too little weight to the
opinions of his treating physicians Drs. Smith and Winscott. An ALJ may reject a
treating doctor’s contradicted opinion “by providing specific and legitimate
reasons that are supported by substantial evidence,” which can be done by “setting
out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,
stating [the ALJ’s] interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Revels v.
Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Here, the ALJ
3
found the opinions of Drs. Smith and Winscott were inconsistent with the evidence
of relatively stable symptoms and clinical findings in the record, Wills’ own
presentation and symptom reports to his providers, including reports of
improvement, and Wills’ daily activities. These are specific and legitimate reasons
to discount a treating physician’s opinion. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154–55
(9th Cir. 2020) (approving rejection of treating physician’s opinion as inconsistent
with the medical evidence and the claimant’s activities). Wills urges the Court to
adopt a different interpretation of the evidence, but the ALJ’s finding is supported
by substantial evidence. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630.
Because Wills fails to identify harmful error in the ALJ’s formulation of his
residual functional capacity or the ALJ’s subsequent conclusion that Wills was
capable of performing past relevant work as it is generally performed, we need not
address Wills’ remaining argument that the ALJ should have applied
Medical-Vocational Guidelines “grid rules” at step five of the sequential
evaluation analysis. See Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (9th
Cir. 2006) (explaining grid rules).
AFFIRMED.
4