West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. TRRS Corp.

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Appellate Court Date: 2020.10.16
13:07:17 -05'00'

West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. TRRS Corp., 2019 IL App (2d) 180934

Appellate Court WEST BEND MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-
Caption Appellee, v. TRRS CORPORATION, COMMERCIAL TIRE
SERVICES, INC., and GARY BERNARDINO, Defendants (Gary
Bernardino, Defendant-Appellant).

District & No. Second District
Nos. 2-18-0934, 2-18-1009 cons.

Filed March 1, 2019

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County, No. 18-MR-798;
Review the Hon. Thomas A. Meyer, Judge, presiding.

Judgment No. 2-18-0934, Reversed and remanded.
No. 2-18-1009, Appeal dismissed.

Counsel on Robert T. Edens, of Robert T. Edens, P.C., of Antioch, for appellant.
Appeal
Thomas F. Lucas and Kristin D. Tauras, of McKenna Storer, of
Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Schostok and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.
 OPINION

¶1 This consolidated interlocutory appeal concerns the propriety of a circuit court’s order
staying the proceedings on a claim filed before the Illinois Workers’ Compensation
Commission (IWCC). Plaintiff, West Bend Mutual Insurance Company (West Bend), filed a
declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of McHenry County, seeking a ruling that it
had no duty to defend or indemnify defendants TRRS Corporation (TRRS) and Commercial
Tire Services, Inc. (Commercial Tire), against an IWCC claim filed by defendant Gary
Bernardino. Shortly thereafter, West Bend filed an emergency motion in the circuit court,
requesting a stay of the IWCC proceedings pending the resolution of the declaratory
judgment action. Relying on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and over Bernardino’s
objection, the circuit court granted West Bend’s motion and entered an order staying the
IWCC proceedings. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017),
Bernardino filed an interlocutory appeal in case No. 2-18-0934. Bernardino subsequently
filed a motion to vacate the circuit court’s stay order. When the circuit court continued the
hearing on the motion, Bernardino filed another Rule 307(a)(1) interlocutory appeal in case
No. 2-18-1009. We granted Bernardino’s motion to consolidate the two appeals. We now
reverse the circuit court’s stay order in appeal No. 2-18-0934, and we dismiss appeal No.
2-18-1009 for lack of jurisdiction. 1

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The record reflects that Bernardino sustained an injury from a forklift accident in April
2017, during the course of his employment with TRRS and Commercial Tire (collectively the
employers), which required him to undergo rotator cuff surgery. The accident occurred at the
employers’ facility located in Lake in the Hills, one of several such facilities that the
employers operated throughout the state. According to West Bend, the employers chose to
cover Bernardino’s lost wages and medical expenses relating to his surgery without ever
reporting the injury to West Bend. However, Bernardino later learned that he needed a
follow-up surgery, prompting him to file an “Application for Adjustment of Claim” in the
IWCC on March 29, 2018. More than five months later, on September 12, 2018, Bernardino
filed a petition before the IWCC for an immediate hearing under section 19(b) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2016)) and for penalties for
unreasonable and vexatious delay under sections 16 and 19(k) of the Act (id. §§ 16, 19(k)).
¶4 On October 2, 2018, West Bend filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit
court of McHenry County. The employers and Bernardino were each named as defendants.
West Bend alleged that it had written a workers’ compensation insurance policy for the
employers that would have covered Bernardino’s IWCC claim if the employers had not
violated the terms of the policy. West Bend alleged that, by failing to provide proper notice
of Bernardino’s injury and paying for the expenses related to the first surgery, the employers
voluntarily decided to forgo coverage. Accordingly, West Bend sought a declaration that it

1
We note that, although TRRS and Commercial Tire have both filed appearances in this
consolidated appeal, neither party has filed a brief.

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 had no duty to defend or indemnify the employers in connection with Bernardino’s IWCC
claim.
¶5 On October 5, 2018, the IWCC scheduled a hearing on Bernardino’s petition, to take
place on November 19, 2018. However, on October 9, 2018, West Bend filed an emergency
motion in the circuit court to stay the IWCC proceedings until the declaratory judgment
action was resolved. On October 12, 2018, before Bernardino filed a response and apparently
without Bernardino’s counsel present, the circuit court granted West Bend’s emergency
motion to stay the IWCC proceedings.
¶6 On October 25, 2018, Bernardino filed an emergency motion in the circuit court to vacate
the stay order, arguing that the IWCC was the proper venue for a ruling on the coverage issue
raised in West Bend’s declaratory judgment action. West Bend filed a response relying
largely on Employers Mutual Cos. v. Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d 284 (1994), and Hastings Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Ultimate Backyard, LLC, 2012 IL App (1st) 101751. West Bend argued
that, pursuant to Skilling, the circuit court had primary jurisdiction to rule on the legal issues
raised in the declaratory judgment action. Furthermore, West Bend argued, Ultimate
Backyard established that the circuit court should stay the IWCC proceedings until such a
ruling was entered. In his reply, Bernardino asserted for the first time that West Bend’s
declaratory judgment action might be rendered moot, as he had reason to believe that the
policy in question did not provide any coverage for the employers’ Lake in the Hills location.
¶7 On November 1, 2018, the circuit court conducted a hearing and explained at the outset
that it was vacating the stay order for the purpose of considering the arguments raised by
Bernardino and West Bend. The court rejected Bernardino’s argument that the IWCC was the
proper venue for West Bend’s insurance coverage dispute. Thus, the court ruled as follows:
“I’m vacating the original order staying so that we could proceed with this
hearing and I am—because I wanted to proceed on the merits. I thought procedurally
that was appropriate, and—but I am now reinstating the stay after hearing the
argument because I believe that this is ultimately a question of law and more
appropriately brought before the court than the workers’ compensation commission,
and that this court has primary jurisdiction over the issue regarding the coverage
following the clam of late notice.”
The court proceeded to enter an order granting West Bend’s emergency motion to stay the
IWCC proceedings and scheduling a hearing for January 7, 2019, for status on the
completion of written discovery.
¶8 On November 6, 2018, Bernardino filed a motion in the circuit court to vacate the stay
order dated November 1, 2018. Aside from arguing that the stay was altogether improper,
Bernardino stressed his theory that the late notice issue raised by West Bend was moot
because the disputed policy did not cover the employers’ Lake in the Hills location.
Bernardino observed that, although the policy covered the employers’ other Illinois locations,
it did not specifically list the Lake in the Hills location. Bernardino argued that, at the very
least, the stay should be “limited to the issue of determination of coverage based on notice,
specifically [authorizing] the IWCC to make threshold determinations regarding the
existence of coverage, but not to make findings of fact regarding notice being given to [West
Bend].”
¶9 On November 8, 2018, Bernardino filed his notice of a Rule 307(a)(1) interlocutory
appeal from the stay order dated November 1, 2018, in appellate case No. 2-18-0934.

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¶ 10 Also on November 8, 2018, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Bernardino’s motion
to vacate the stay order dated November 1, 2018. West Bend refuted Bernardino’s theory and
maintained that, but for the late notice, coverage would indeed apply based on the
“Locations” provision in the policy, which established that it applied to each of the
employers’ locations in Illinois. Undeterred, Bernardino asserted that he anticipated
obtaining a certificate from the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), stating
that its database contained no record of insurance being provided for the work site where he
was injured. Bernardino argued that this would violate certain technical requirements under
the Act for establishing the existence of insurance coverage and asserted that the issue should
be decided by the IWCC. The court noted the conundrum of West Bend contesting an
opponent’s argument that furthered West Bend’s own interests. The court indicated that, even
if Bernardino obtained the aforementioned certificate, greater weight would likely be given
to West Bend’s position; i.e., if West Bend did not prevail on its argument regarding the late
notice, then coverage would indeed apply. The court was also reluctant to limit the terms of
the stay, per Bernardino’s alternative request, reasoning that West Bend would be placed “in
limbo” if the IWCC proceedings continued before there was a ruling on the issue of
coverage. The court decided that it was appropriate to continue Bernardino’s motion to
vacate the stay order dated November 1, 2018, stating as follows:
“Where we’re at right now, I think we have too many variables for us to do
anything significant today other than to continue your motion to January 7th. We’ll
wait to see what reports you get, but I’ve told you the problems I have with relying on
them.”
¶ 11 On December 10, 2018, Bernardino filed his notice of a Rule 307(a)(1) interlocutory
appeal from the continuance order dated November 8, 2018, in appellate case No. 2-18-1009.
On December 12, 2018, Bernardino filed a motion to consolidate the two appeals, which we
granted.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 We begin with our independent duty to examine our own jurisdiction. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hayek, 349 Ill. App. 3d 890, 892 (2004). Rule 307(a)(1)
provides that an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order “granting, modifying,
refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1)
(eff. Nov. 1, 2017). Our supreme court has held that the issuance of a stay of an
administrative order pending judicial review constitutes an injunction for purposes of appeal
under Rule 307(a)(1). Marsh v. Illinois Racing Board, 179 Ill. 2d 488, 496-97 (1997); see
also Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 385 Ill. App. 3d 287, 288 (2008) (“A stay is considered
injunctive in nature, and thus an order granting or denying a stay fits squarely within Rule
307(a).”); Lundy v. Farmers Group, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 214, 216 (2001) (“Courts have
treated the denial of a motion to stay as a denial of a request for a preliminary injunction.”).
¶ 14 Here, the trial court’s stay order dated November 1, 2018, is reviewable under Rule
307(a)(1), and Bernardino perfected his appeal in case No. 2-18-0934 by filing a notice of an
interlocutory appeal within 30 days of the entry of the order. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 307 (eff. Nov.
1, 2017). We note that Bernardino’s notice of an interlocutory appeal in case No. 2-18-1009
would also have been timely, despite being filed 32 days after the continuance order dated
November 8, 2018, as the thirtieth day after the entry of the order fell on a Saturday. See

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 Shatku v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013 IL App (2d) 120412, ¶ 9. However, the continuance of
a hearing on a motion to vacate a stay is not equivalent to the denial of the motion. Oscar
George Electric Co. v. Metropolitan Fair & Exposition Authority, 104 Ill. App. 3d 957, 962
(1982). On November 8, 2018, the circuit court was clear that it was continuing, rather than
denying, Bernardino’s motion to vacate the stay order dated November 1, 2018, so that
Bernardino could gather the anticipated materials from the NCCI. Accordingly, the order
dated November 8, 2018, states only that Bernardino’s motion was “entered and continued to
January 7, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.” Because the order did not grant, modify, refuse, dissolve, or
refuse to dissolve or modify an injunction, it is not reviewable under Rule 307(a)(1). Case
No. 2-18-1009 is therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 15 We now turn to the stay order dated November 1, 2018, in case No. 2-18-0934. 2
Ordinarily a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to stay will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Sentry Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co., 2017
IL App (1st) 161785, ¶ 65; TIG Insurance Co. v. Canel, 389 Ill. App. 3d 366, 372 (2009).
Under this standard, we consider whether the circuit court acted “arbitrarily without the
employment of conscientious judgment or, in light of all the circumstances, exceeded the
bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice
resulted.” Allianz Insurance Co. v. Guidant Corp., 355 Ill. App. 3d 721, 730 (2005).
Bernardino notes, however, that the circuit court made no factual findings in this case and
instead determined that the stay was appropriate as a matter of law pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. He thus requests de novo review. See Continental Western Insurance
Co. v. Knox County EMS, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 143083, ¶ 15 (reviewing de novo the issue
of whether the circuit court properly applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction).
¶ 16 We agree with Bernardino that our standard of review is de novo. Our supreme court has
explained that the scope of review in an interlocutory appeal is normally limited to an
examination of whether there was an abuse of discretion in granting or refusing the requested
relief. In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996).
“However, where the question presented is one of law, a reviewing court determines
it independently of the trial court’s judgment. [Citation.] Moreover, to the extent
necessary, a reviewing court may consider substantive issues in order to determine
whether the trial court acted within its authority.” Id.
¶ 17 The circumstances contemplated by Lawrence M. are present here. As we will explain,
we agree with West Bend that, as a matter of law, the circuit court is the proper venue for its
declaratory judgment action. However, by staying the IWCC proceedings, the circuit court
erroneously applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In doing so, the circuit court did not
make any factual findings but, rather, followed the First District Appellate Court’s holding in
Ultimate Backyard, which we now decline to follow. Specifically, we disagree with the First
District’s holding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction authorizes a circuit court to stay
administrative proceedings. To the contrary, we interpret the doctrine to stand only for the
proposition that a circuit court may, in certain circumstances, stay its own judicial
proceedings pending the referral of a controversy to an administrative agency having

2
We note that we granted West Bend’s motion to strike certain portions of Bernardino’s reply brief
for raising new arguments in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(j) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

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 specialized expertise over the disputed subject matter. Accord Estate of Bass v. Katten, 375
Ill. App. 3d 62, 68 (2007) (noting that a circuit court has the inherent authority to stay its own
proceedings, based on factors such as the orderly administration of justice and judicial
economy).
¶ 18 In United States v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), the United States
Supreme Court provided a detailed explanation of the principles underlying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the rule requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies, is concerned with promoting proper relationships between
the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.
‘Exhaustion’ applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an
administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative
process has run its course. ‘Primary jurisdiction,’ on the other hand, applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body;
in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 63-64.
¶ 19 In keeping with these principles, our supreme court has consistently held that, “[u]nder
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when a court has jurisdiction over a matter, it should, on
some occasions, stay the judicial proceedings pending referral of the controversy, or a
portion of it, to an administrative agency having expertise in the area.” (Emphasis added.)
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611, ¶ 43; see also
Segers v. Industrial Comm’n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 427 (2000); People v. NL Industries, 152 Ill. 2d
82, 95 (1992); Board of Education of Warren Township High School District 121 v. Warren
Township High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504, 128 Ill. 2d 155, 162-63 (1989);
Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 112 Ill. 2d 428, 444 (1986) (each stating that
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows for a stay of judicial proceedings pending referral
of a controversy to an administrative agency). But here, the circuit court turned the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction on its head by staying administrative proceedings pending the
resolution of a legal issue in the circuit court. This inverse application might seem a logical
and practical extension of the doctrine, but it conflicts with the underlying principles
established in Western Pacific, as well as those that have since been articulated by Illinois
courts.
¶ 20 “The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine that is not technically
a question of jurisdiction, but a matter of self-restraint and relations between the courts and
administrative agencies.” Bradley v. City of Marion, 2015 IL App (5th) 140267, ¶ 35. “No
fixed formula exists for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; rather, in every case
the question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether
the purposes it serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.” Village of
Itasca v. Village of Lisle, 352 Ill. App. 3d 847, 853 (2004). In considering whether the
doctrine applies, courts must first determine whether the legislature has vested “exclusive
original jurisdiction” over the disputed subject matter in an administrative agency. Skilling,
163 Ill. 2d at 287. If it cannot be shown that the legislature intended to deprive the circuit
court of its jurisdiction over the disputed subject matter, then the circuit court shares

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 concurrent jurisdiction with the administrative agency. NL Industries, 152 Ill. 2d at 99. The
question then becomes whether the circuit court should “stay the judicial proceedings
pending referral of a controversy, or some portion of it, to an administrative agency having
expertise in the area.” Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d at 288. “Thus, under the doctrine a matter should
be referred to an administrative agency when it has a specialized or technical expertise that
would help resolve the controversy, or when there is a need for uniform administrative
standards.” Kellerman, 112 Ill. 2d at 445. “Conversely, when an agency’s technical expertise
is not likely to be helpful, or there is no need for uniform administrative standards, courts
should not relinquish their authority over a matter to the agency.” Id.
¶ 21 Here, the circuit court relied on Skilling in determining that it had primary jurisdiction
over West Bend’s declaratory judgment action. Although Skilling did not involve a request
for a stay, the facts were otherwise similar to this case. After the employee filed his workers’
compensation claims, the insurance provider filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit
court, asserting that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify the employer. The insurance
provider argued that the policy did not apply because it provided coverage for injuries
occurring only in Wisconsin and the employee’s injury had occurred in Illinois. The
employee moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, arguing that the circuit court
was not the proper venue to resolve the coverage dispute. The circuit court dismissed the
declaratory judgment action and the insurance provider appealed. Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d at
285-86.
¶ 22 Our supreme court in Skilling first considered whether jurisdiction was exclusive with the
administrative agency or whether it was concurrent with that of the circuit court. If there was
concurrent jurisdiction, then the issue became which forum’s jurisdiction was “paramount.”
Id. at 286. The court observed that section 18 of the Act states: “ ‘[a]ll questions arising
under this Act, if not settled by agreement of the parties interested therein, shall, except as
otherwise provided, be determined by the Commission.’ ” Id. (quoting 820 ILCS 305/18
(West 1992)); see also 820 ILCS 305/1(c) (West 2016) (“Commission” means the IWCC).
The court held that, because there was no language specifically divesting the circuit court of
its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the declaratory judgment action (the interpretation
of an insurance policy), the circuit court and the IWCC shared concurrent jurisdiction. The
question then became whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictated that the circuit
court, rather than the IWCC, was the proper venue for hearing the declaratory judgment
action. Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d at 287. After discussing the principles underlying the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, the court ruled that the circuit court had erred in dismissing the
declaratory judgment action, as the coverage dispute involved a question of law that was
precisely within the scope of the declaratory judgment statute (see 735 ILCS 5/2-701 (West
1992)). Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d at 289. Thus, although the IWCC had concurrent jurisdiction to
hear the dispute, “when the question of law was presented to the circuit court in the
declaratory judgment suit, the jurisdiction of the circuit court became paramount.” Id. at 290.
Notably, the Skilling court said nothing about staying the proceedings before the IWCC
pending the resolution of the declaratory judgment action in the circuit court.
¶ 23 In another case dealing with a similar issue, Knox County, after the employee’s guardian
filed a workers’ compensation claim in Illinois, the insurance provider filed a declaratory
judgment action in the circuit court, seeking a ruling that it had no duty to defend or
indemnify the employer for claims filed outside Indiana. Knox County, 2016 IL App (1st)

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 143083, ¶ 6. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance provider
and against the employer, determining that the policy did not comply with certain provisions
of the Act and, thus, did not provide coverage for Illinois claims. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. The employer
appealed, arguing that the circuit court’s ruling should be vacated because the disputed
provisions of the Act “should be originally interpreted by the [IWCC],” not by the circuit
court. Id. ¶ 13. The appellate court followed Skilling in affirming the circuit court’s ruling,
stating:
“As in Skilling, the declaratory judgment action at bar solely concerns the scope
of coverage afforded in a workers’ compensation insurance policy. The construction
of [the] insurance policy is not a determination of the factual issues related to a
determination of workers’ compensation benefits, such as the nature or extent of the
injury or the potential defenses to the workers’ compensation claim. If it was, the
circuit court would have no original jurisdiction in the case and the [IWCC] would
have exclusive jurisdiction as it would be in a better position to draw on its special
expertise to answer these questions.” Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 24 Here, Bernardino does not argue that the circuit court lacks primary jurisdiction over the
late notice issue raised by West Bend. He argues, however, that the issue he raised as to
whether the West Bend policy covered the employers’ Lake in the Hills location
distinguishes this case from Skilling and Knox County. Bernardino maintains that, absent a
certificate from the NCCI establishing the existence of coverage for the Lake in the Hills
location, the IWCC’s specialized expertise is needed to determine whether there were
violations of the technical requirements under the Act for establishing the existence of
coverage. We disagree. In the circuit court, West Bend acknowledged that there was no
certificate from the NCCI establishing the existence of coverage for the Lake in the Hills
location, but argued that this “inadvertent failure to report the location to [the] NCCI does not
negate the existence or the legal effect of the West Bend policy.” West Bend takes that same
position in this appeal, arguing that the Lake in the Hills location was (but for the late notice
issue) covered, based on the “Locations” provision in the policy, and that “[t]he fact that the
location is not shown in the NCCI database does not negate the coverage.” Thus, it is
apparent that there are no disputed questions of fact with respect to the issue raised by
Bernardino, but only a legal dispute as to whether a lack of compliance with the Act’s
technical requirements for certification with the NCCI serves to negate coverage that would
otherwise apply. Following Skilling and Knox County, we hold that the circuit court was
correct in determining that it had both concurrent and primary jurisdiction over the subject
matter of West Bend’s declaratory judgment action.
¶ 25 Having resolved that the circuit court shares concurrent jurisdiction with the IWCC, and
that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is “paramount” (see Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d at 290), the
issue now squarely before us is the propriety of the stay order dated November 1, 2018. As
discussed, the circuit court agreed with West Bend that it should stay the IWCC proceedings,
based on the First District’s holding in Ultimate Backyard. We cannot fault the circuit court
for following Ultimate Backyard, as it appears to be the only Illinois case that has considered
whether, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a circuit court may stay administrative
proceedings pending the resolution of a legal dispute in the circuit court. See State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 539 (1992) (“A decision of the appellate court,
though not binding on other appellate districts, is binding on the circuit courts throughout the

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 State.”). However, because we decline to follow Ultimate Backyard, we nonetheless hold that
the circuit court erred as a matter of law in staying the IWCC proceedings.
¶ 26 The reasoning in Ultimate Backyard was based largely on the holding in Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Kendall Enterprises, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 582 (1998). In Kendall, an
arbitrator from the IWCC issued a decision in favor of the employee after ruling that, because
the insurance provider did not properly cancel its workers’ compensation policy, it remained
liable for benefits to the employee. However, within the 30-day period for filing a petition for
review in the IWCC, the insurance provider filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit
court, claiming that it was not liable for any benefits to the employee because it had canceled
the policy. Id. at 583-84. The employee filed a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment
action, conceding that the circuit court had primary jurisdiction over the disputed legal
question but arguing that the doctrine should not be applied, because of the rulings that were
already made by the IWCC. The circuit court granted the employee’s motion to dismiss and
the insurance provider appealed. Id. at 585-86.
¶ 27 The Kendall court noted that, pursuant to Skilling, “[t]he circuit court and the [IWCC]
had concurrent jurisdiction over questions arising under the Act.” Id. at 586. Next, the court
rejected the insurance provider’s contention that its declaratory judgment action presented a
question of law and did not raise a question of fact, noting the insurance provider’s assertion
that it had canceled the employee’s policy by mailing notifications of the cancellation to the
employee, the employee’s insurance agent, and the NCCI. The court observed that this
disputed factual issue had already “been decided against [the insurance provider] by the
[IWCC’s] arbitrator following a hearing at which [the insurance provider] presented evidence
and attempted to defend its position.” Id. “In effect,” the court reasoned, the insurance
provider was “actually contesting the administrative findings of fact” that had already been
made by the IWCC. Id. The court concluded:
“This case is procedurally distinct from Skilling, where the [IWCC] had not made
factual findings regarding the issue and, unlike plaintiff in our case, the insurance
company contested the authority or jurisdiction of the [IWCC] to hear the case.
[Citation.] Here, plaintiff’s complaint contained assertions of fact regarding whether
it had effectively cancelled [the employer’s] insurance policy. The [IWCC] had held a
hearing over several days, heard evidence and issued findings of fact contrary to
plaintiff’s position. In addition, the cause was still pending on review before the
[IWCC] when plaintiff filed its complaint. Thus, we find no error in the court’s
dismissal of [the insurance provider’s] complaint for declaratory judgment.” Id. at
587.
¶ 28 In Ultimate Backyard, after the employees filed a claim with the IWCC, the insurance
provider filed (1) a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court, asserting that it had no
duty to defend or indemnify the employer in the IWCC proceedings, and (2) a motion in the
circuit court to stay the IWCC proceedings. In its declaratory judgment action, the insurance
provider argued that it had canceled the employer’s policy in compliance with the relevant
provisions of the Act. Ultimate Backyard, 2012 IL App (1st) 101751, ¶¶ 3-4. However, the
circuit court granted the employees’ motions to dismiss based on the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, concluding that certain factual questions would be more appropriately
determined before the IWCC. Id. ¶ 8. The appellate court reversed, finding the facts of
Skilling to be “most analogous” and noting that the circuit court was simply asked to interpret

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 the relevant sections of the Act in determining whether the insurance provider had canceled
the policy. Id. ¶ 32. The court noted that the interpretation of a statute “is a question of law,
which is best answered by the circuit court and one that does not require the specialized
expertise of the IWCC.” Id. The court concluded in pertinent part:
“Therefore, the IWCC does not have primary jurisdiction, and as stated in Kendall,
when there is a ruling on a question of law that could foreclose needless litigation, it
is best addressed by the circuit court. Kendall, 295 Ill[.] App. 3d at 586. We find that
this is the exact situation present before us.
For the above-mentioned reasons, we find that the lower court abused its
discretion in granting appellees’ motions to dismiss and denying [the insurance
provider’s] motion to stay. We, therefore, reverse and remand. We direct the lower
court to stay the proceedings before the IWCC on the underlying workers’
compensation claim until it determines if the notice of cancellation that [the insurance
provider] submitted to the NCCI met the statutory requirements of section 4(b) of [the
Act], relying on the undisputed fact that the NCCI logged and date stamped the notice
of cancellation prior to its rejection.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
¶ 29 Unlike the other cases discussed above, Ultimate Backyard is procedurally analogous to
this case in that the insurance provider sought to stay the IWCC proceedings pending the
resolution of a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court. However, to the extent that
Ultimate Backyard relied on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to stay the administrative
proceedings, the case stands out as an anomaly. As can be seen, the Ultimate Backyard court
directed the circuit court to enter the stay without recognizing that it was doing so based on
the inverse application of the doctrine. Furthermore, we disagree with the Ultimate Backyard
court that it was facing “the exact situation” that was faced by the Kendall court. See id. ¶ 32.
The Kendall court simply affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the insurance provider’s
declaratory judgment action. In distinguishing Skilling, the Kendall court noted that the
insurance provider was not challenging the IWCC’s jurisdiction to consider the disputed
factual question; rather, the insurance provider was seeking to relitigate the factual dispute
that the IWCC’s arbitrator had already ruled upon in finding that the insurance provider was
liable for benefits to the employee. The Kendall court further implied that, even if the
arbitrator had not already ruled on it, the disputed factual question would have warranted a
referral to the administrative agency. Kendall, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 586-87. Hence, by
affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment action, the Kendall court
effectively prohibited the insurance provider from using the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
as a mechanism for circumventing the administrative process. Certainly nothing in Kendall,
or in any other case that we know of, implies that the doctrine authorizes a circuit court to
stay the proceedings before an administrative body pending the resolution of a legal dispute
in the circuit court.
¶ 30 We acknowledge that Bernardino has not challenged Ultimate Backyard on the grounds
that we have identified as our basis for reversal. A reviewing court normally should not
search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse the circuit court’s judgment,
especially when it would have the effect of transforming its role from jurist to advocate.
Marconi v. City of Joliet, 2013 IL App (3d) 110865, ¶ 18. We have no such concerns here.
We did not search the record for a reason to reverse the circuit court. To the contrary, we
noticed an error on the face of the order dated November 1, 2018, in which the circuit court

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 stayed the IWCC proceedings based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. “ ‘[A] reviewing
court does not lack authority to address unbriefed issues and may do so *** when a clear and
obvious error exists in the trial court proceedings.’ ” Mid-Century Insurance Co. v. Founders
Insurance Co., 404 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966 (2010) (quoting People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311,
325 (2010)). Moreover, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), in
exercising its responsibility for a just result, a reviewing court may decide a case on grounds
not raised by the parties. Gay v. Frey, 388 Ill. App. 3d 827, 832 (2009).
¶ 31 We are not advocating for Bernardino in this case, but simply correcting a clear and
obvious error in the circuit court proceedings that would otherwise produce a result that is
contrary to well-established legal principles. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction establishes
that, in cases raising issues of fact that are within an agency’s expert and specialized
knowledge, the judiciary’s role is best exercised by deferring to the agency charged with
regulating the subject matter. Western Pacific, 352 U.S. at 64-65. Accordingly, when a court
has jurisdiction over a matter, there are instances where it should “stay the judicial
proceedings pending referral of the controversy, or a portion of it, to an administrative
agency having expertise in the area.” Crossroads, 2011 IL 111611, ¶ 43. There is no fixed
formula for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, as in every case “the question is
whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it
serves will be aided by its application in the particular litigation.” Village of Itasca, 352 Ill.
App. 3d at 853.
¶ 32 Here, the reasons for the existence of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not present,
because there is no need to refer any specialized controversy to the IWCC. Furthermore, the
purposes served by the doctrine will not be aided by its application in this case. The Ultimate
Backyard ruling paves the way for insurance providers to rely on the doctrine to create
procedural advantages for themselves. Here, West Bend has effectively relied upon Ultimate
Backyard to stay the IWCC proceedings while it awaits a ruling from the circuit court as to
whether it has an interest to defend before the IWCC. However, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction was not created for litigants to game the administrative system (see, e.g.,
Kendall, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 586-87); it was created to promote “self-restraint and relations
between the courts and administrative agencies” (Bradley, 2015 IL App (5th) 140267, ¶ 35).
The circuit court reasoned that West Bend would be placed “in limbo” if the IWCC
proceedings continued before there was a ruling on the issue of coverage. But if West Bend
finds itself in limbo, it is by West Bend’s own doing. Because the IWCC shares concurrent
jurisdiction with the circuit court (see supra ¶ 25), West Bend could have argued the late
notice issue before the IWCC and appealed to the circuit court upon the entry of an adverse
ruling. It chose instead to bring the issue straight to the circuit court. While the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction requires the circuit court to consider the issue, it does not provide that
the administrative proceedings should be stayed pending its resolution.
¶ 33 During oral argument, Bernardino suggested that West Bend must satisfy the ordinary
requirements for a preliminary injunction before the circuit court can stay the IWCC
proceedings. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must show (1) a clearly ascertained
right in need of protection, (2) an irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, (3) no
adequate remedy at law, and (4) a likelihood of success on the merits of the case. Clinton
Landfill, Inc. v. Mahomet Valley Water Authority, 406 Ill. App. 3d 374, 378 (2010). We
observe that similar requirements are included in section 3-111(a)(1) of the Administrative

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 Review Law (Law), which authorizes a circuit court, “upon notice to the agency and good
cause shown, to stay the decision of the administrative agency in whole or in part pending the
final disposition of the case.” 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1) (West 2016). For purposes of this
subsection, “good cause” requires a showing that (1) an immediate stay is required in order to
preserve the status quo without endangering the public, (2) it is not contrary to public policy,
and (3) there exists a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Id. It is worth noting,
however, that the Law applies to an administrative agency only “where the Act creating or
conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions” of the Law.
Id. § 3-102. Other courts have observed that the Act does not adopt the Law. Dobbs Tire &
Auto v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2018 IL App (5th) 160297WC, ¶ 17;
Farris v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2014 IL App (4th) 130767WC, ¶ 46;
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 324 Ill. App. 3d 961, 966 (2001).
¶ 34 Because these issues have not been fully briefed or argued by West Bend, we take no
position as to what procedures, if any, are available to West Bend if it seeks to renew its
motion in the circuit court to stay the IWCC proceedings. However, we agree with
Bernardino’s argument that the nature of his section 19(b) petition, which seeks to determine
only whether he is entitled to receive medical services, militates against staying the
proceedings in the IWCC. The primary purpose of the Act is to “provide prompt and
equitable compensation for employees who are injured while working, regardless of fault.”
In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 331 (2000). Relevant here,
“[w]hether the employee is working or not, if the employee is not receiving or has not
received medical, surgical, or hospital services or other services or compensation ***,
the employee may at any time petition for an expedited hearing by an Arbitrator on
the issue of whether or not he or she is entitled to receive payment of the services or
compensation.” 820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2016).
“Expedited hearings shall have priority over all other petitions and shall be heard by the
Arbitrator and Commission with all convenient speed.” Id. We agree with Bernardino that it
would contradict our legislature’s clear intent to provide an expedited process for employees
awaiting medical services if the process could be suspended while the employer and
insurance provider dispute the issue of coverage in the circuit court.

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The order of the circuit court of McHenry County staying the IWCC proceedings is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 37 No. 2-18-0934, Reversed and remanded.
¶ 38 No. 2-18-1009, Appeal dismissed.

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