In re Marriage of Burdess

2020 IL App (3d) 190342

Opinion filed July 8, 2020
____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020

In re MARRIAGE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
LAURA BURDESS, ) Peoria County, Illinois
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 3-19-0342
and ) Circuit No. 12-D-165
)
MARK BURDESS, ) Honorable
) Kim L. Kelley
Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding
____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The trial court granted respondent Mark Burdess a reduction in the amount of maintenance

he was obligated to pay petitioner Laura Burdess and denied Laura’s requests for an increase in

the monthly award based on the statutory maintenance guidelines and for a retroactive increase for

the time period the case was pending. We affirm.

¶2 FACTS

¶3 Petitioner Laura Burdess and respondent Mark Burdess were married in 1985, and three

children, now adults, were born during the marriage. Laura worked part time and seasonally at a
 nursery, enabling her to spend time with the children and tend to the household duties. She

purchased insurance for the family through her employer. Mark worked as a graphic designer at

his brother’s business and was the family’s primary financial support. The couple owned the

marital residence, which was their principal asset and subject to encumbrances.

¶4 In March 2012, Laura filed a petition for temporary relief, seeking maintenance, in part,

followed by a petition for dissolution of the marriage, which was filed in April 2012 and again

sought maintenance. Mark filed a counterpetition for dissolution, denying Laura needed

maintenance. Mark also sought sole possession of the marital residence. Following a series of

hearings on temporary relief, Mark was awarded sole temporary possession of the marital

residence and ordered to pay all the household bills and to contribute $500 toward Laura’s attorney

fees. In addition, the court ordered Mark to pay $750 per month in maintenance to Laura.

¶5 The parties submitted financial affidavits and updates to the affidavits. Per Mark’s affidavit

dated March 2013, he earned a gross monthly income of $6510, with a monthly net income of

$5061, and had monthly expenses of $6045. Laura’s affidavit from the same time period included

earned gross monthly income of $965, with a net monthly income of $251, plus $750 in

maintenance for a total monthly income of $1001. Her monthly expenses totaled $3640. In his

memorandum of law in preparation of trial, Mark argued that his career as a graphic designer was

uncertain, as business in the industry was declining. He further argued that Laura had sufficient

skills to support herself and that temporary maintenance would suffice, and he recommended an

award of $600 per month payable for five years. Mark wanted to purchase the marital residence,

which was appraised at $220,000 with $24,729 in equity.

¶6 The trial court entered a judgment of dissolution on September 18, 2013. The trial court

found the house to have a value of $223,000 subject to mortgages in the amount of $198,271. The

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 trial court awarded the house and all the equity to Mark. In exchange for her marital interest in the

home, the court awarded Laura a $9000 lump-sum maintenance payment and monthly

maintenance in the amount of $1000 per month, reviewable in 24 months. Mark was ordered to

pay $3500 in Laura’s attorney fees. Laura moved to reconsider, seeking monthly maintenance of

$2000. The trial court denied her motion.

¶7 In August 2015, Laura petitioned for a maintenance review. She submitted that she had

sustained a work injury, was unable to work, and required additional medical procedures and

surgeries in the future. She filed a workers’ compensation claim for her injury and anticipated

receiving a settlement. Currently, maintenance was her sole income, and she sought an increase in

the monthly amount and also payment of her attorney fees. On Laura’s motion, the court ordered

that Mark make two $1000 payments while Laura’s petition for review was pending. In October

2015 and January 2016, agreed orders were entered, continuing the $1000 maintenance payments

until the petition for review was determined.

¶8 In July 2018, prior to a hearing on Laura’s motion to review maintenance, Mark moved to

terminate maintenance. He argued that he was unable to pay it because his job profitability

continued to decline, he had health issues that were becoming severe, he was contemplating taking

early retirement in the next few years, and he was incurring debt and depleting his savings. He

further argued that Laura was capable of working. His financial affidavit dated September 2018

stated he had gross monthly earnings of $2170 with a net income of $170 after $2000 in deductions.

His monthly expenses amounted to $2104, leaving him a monthly shortfall of $1934. He had

approximately $1500 in his checking account and $27,252 in his savings account, which consisted

of the proceeds from his sale of the marital home. Laura filed a trial memorandum in which she

argued Mark’s potential retirement did not constitute grounds for terminating maintenance. She

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 sought an increase of maintenance to $1500 per month based on the amended statutory guidelines.

Her financial affidavit dated November 2018 indicated she was on medical leave from the nursery;

had net monthly income of $1350, consisting of Social Security disability payments and

maintenance; had monthly expenses of $1913; had a monthly shortfall of $563; had debts of

$62,735; and had a $50 balance in her bank account.

¶9 A hearing took place on Laura’s petition for maintenance review and Mark’s petition to

terminate maintenance. The court first found that the judgment of dissolution contemplated

reviewable maintenance, not rehabilitative, as evidenced by the long-term, 27-year marriage and

that Laura forwent her career opportunities to care for the home and children. Second, the court

found the amended guidelines did not apply per In re Marriage of Harms, 2018 IL App (5th)

160472. It determined that both Laura and Mark were credible witnesses. It considered that Mark’s

business experienced a downturn and estimated his gross yearly income to be $33,666, a deduction

of 50% from his previous earnings. The court further found that the decrease in Mark’s income

was “economically legitimate” and a “good faith reduction.” The court noted that Laura earned

$405 per month in Social Security disability insurance and spent $134 of that amount on health

insurance. It found that, although Laura had skills, she lacked job experience due to the fact she

did not work outside the home in a career capacity during the marriage. It also noted her workers’

compensation claim and anticipated settlement. The court found Mark demonstrated a substantial

change in circumstances that warranted modification of maintenance and reduced his monthly

payment to Laura to $675. The court made the award automatically reviewable when Mark turned

62, when Laura received her workers’ compensation award, or upon petition by the parties. It

denied Laura’s request to apply the statutory guidelines and increase the amount of maintenance.

The court also denied retroactive application of the modified maintenance amount to the period of

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 time that Laura’s petition was pending. The court denied her motion to reconsider, and she

appealed.

¶ 10 ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Laura raises two issues on appeal: whether the trial court erred in reducing her maintenance

and in failing to increase the maintenance amount due during the pendency of the proceedings.

Although Laura was the only party to submit a brief, the record is simple, and because the issues

may be decided without Mark’s brief, we will reach the merits of the appeal. First Capitol

Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

¶ 12 We begin with Laura’s claims regarding the trial court’s downward modification of her

maintenance award. She argues the statutory factors support an extension of maintenance, the

amended statutory guidelines formula applies, and guidelines dictate an increase in the amount of

Mark’s maintenance obligation. She also argues the court misconstrued the availability of the

proceeds Mark received from the sale of the marital house.

¶ 13 Section 510(a-5) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS

5/510(a-5) (West 2018)) concerns the modification, termination, or review of prior maintenance

awards. In determining a modification, termination, or review of maintenance, the trial court must

consider the factors from section 504(a) of the Act, as well as the factors in section 510(a-5) of the

Act. Id. §§ 504(a), 510(a-5). Maintenance may be modified or terminated only when a substantial

change in circumstances has been demonstrated. Id. § 510(a-5). A change of circumstances does

not need to be established when maintenance is before the court on review. Blum v. Koster, 235

Ill. 2d 21, 35-36 (2009).

¶ 14 Section 504(a) requires the court to apply the following factors to determine whether a

maintenance award is warranted:(1) each party’s income and property, including apportioned

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 marital property and nonmarital property assigned to the party who is requesting maintenance as

well as the financial obligations imposed on each party as a result of the dissolution of marriage;

(2) each party’s needs; (3) each party’s realistic present and future earning capacity; (4) any

impairment to the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance due to that

person devoting his or her time to domestic duties or having forgone or delayed his or her own

education, training, employment or career opportunities due to the marriage; (5) any impairment

of the present and future earning capacity of the party who is being asked to pay maintenance;

(6) the time needed by the party seeking maintenance to acquire appropriate training and

employment and whether appropriate employment will allow the party to support himself or

herself; (6.1) parental responsibility arrangements and any effects on a party’s ability to seek or

maintain employment; (7) the standard of living as established during the marriage; (8) the

marriage’s duration; (9) each party’s age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of

income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs; (10) the parties’ incomes,

including public, private, disability, and retirement income, without limitation; (11) the tax

consequences to each party; (12) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to

the other party’s education, training, career, or career potential or license; (13) any valid agreement

of the parties; and (14) any other factor the court finds to be just and equitable. 750 ILCS

5/504(a)(1)-(14) (West 2018).

¶ 15 The section 510(a-5) factors the court must also consider include

“(1) any change in the employment status of either party and whether the change

has been made in good faith;

(2) the efforts, if any, made by the party receiving maintenance to become self-

supporting, and the reasonableness of the efforts where they are appropriate;

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 (3) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of either party;

(4) the tax consequences of the maintenance payments upon the respective

economic circumstances of the parties;

(5) the duration of the maintenance payments previously paid (and remaining to

be paid) relative to the length of the marriage;

(6) the property, including retirement benefits, awarded to each party under the

judgment of dissolution of marriage *** and the present status of the property;

(7) the increase or decrease in each party’s income since the prior judgment or

order from which a review, modification, or termination is being sought;

(8) the property acquired and currently owned by each party after the entry of the

judgment of dissolution of marriage ***; and

(9) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” 750

ILCS 5/510(a-5)(1)-(9) (West 2018).

¶ 16 The maintenance provisions of the Act were amended in 2015. Prior to amendment, the

court used the statutory factors to determine whether to award maintenance and to decide the

amount and duration. In re Marriage of Johnson, 2016 IL App (5th) 140479, ¶ 94 (citing 750 ILCS

5/504(a) (West 2012)). Under the amended statute, the factors are used to determine whether

maintenance is appropriate, but the amount and duration of maintenance is calculated based on

guideline formulas set forth in the statute. In re Marriage of Cole, 2016 IL App (5th) 150224, ¶ 8.

The court may depart from the guidelines when appropriate. Id. We will not reverse a trial court’s

determination on review, modification, or termination of maintenance absent an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Kocher, 282 Ill. App. 3d 655, 660 (1996).

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¶ 17 We have previously considered whether the amended maintenance guidelines as to amount

and duration apply to review and modification of maintenance orders entered prior to the statutory

amendment adding the guidelines and concluded they do not. See In re Marriage of Kuper, 2019

IL App (3d) 180094, ¶ 28. In reaching our disposition in Kuper, we relied on Harms, where the

court reasoned that the amended guidelines did not apply because section 504 and 510 were distinct

provisions and section 510(c) did not reference the amended guidelines. Harms, 2018 IL App (5th)

160472, ¶ 30. Laura argues that neither Kuper nor Harms analyzed section 504(b-8) when finding

the new guidelines were inapplicable to maintenance orders entered prior to the statutory change

and on review after its effective date. According to her interpretation, section 504(b-8) applies and

warrants a higher maintenance award.

¶ 18 Section 504(b-8) states: “Upon review of any previously ordered maintenance award, the

court may extend maintenance for further review, extend maintenance for a fixed non-modifiable

term, extend maintenance for an indefinite term, or permanently terminate maintenance in

accordance with subdivision (b-1)(1)(A) of this section.” 750 ILCS 5/504(b-8) (West 2018).

Section (b-1)(1)(A) includes the amount and duration guidelines. 750 ILCS 5/504(b-1)(1)(A)

(West 2018).

¶ 19 The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that the court must determine and give effect

to the legislature’s intent. In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 13. The language of the

statute should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. In re Marriage of Kane, 2018 IL App (2d)

180195, ¶ 15. A court should interpret a statute in such a way that avoids absurd results. In re

Marriage of Kasprzyk, 2019 IL App (4th) 170838, ¶ 27 (citing In re Jian L., 2018 IL App (4th)

170387, ¶ 22). We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Marriage of Best, 228

Ill. 2d 107, 116 (2008).

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¶ 20 In both Kuper and Harms, the petitions for review and modification that the trial courts

considered were filed prior to the addition of section 504(b-8), which became effective January 1,

2017. See Pub. Act 99-763 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending 750 ILCS 5/504). Here too, Laura’s

petition to modify and extend maintenance was filed in August 2015, which was before the statute

was amended to include section (b-8). Although Mark did not file his petition to terminate

maintenance until July 2018, when section (b-8) was in effect, his filing does not extend the effect

of the statutory amendment to include Laura’s petition. In Kuper, the parties were granted a

judgment of dissolution in December 2013, and the wife was awarded maintenance reviewable on

or after July 2016. Kuper, 2019 IL App (3d) 180094, ¶ 3. In August 2016, the husband petitioned

to terminate or abate his maintenance obligation based on a substantial change of circumstances.

Id. ¶ 4. The hearing on his petition was held on August 30, 2017, during which the wife filed her

petition to modify or extend maintenance. Id. We did not consider the wife’s submission of her

petition midtrial to require the court to employ the January 1, 2017, statutory amendments. The

parties and the trial court had proceeded on the husband’s petition to terminate filed before section

504 was amended to add section (b-8), and the amended provision was inapplicable to the Kuper

proceedings. In Harms, the petitions were heard in June 2016, before section 504(b-8) became

effective. Harms, 2018 IL App (5th) 160472, ¶ 9.

¶ 21 The trial court relied on Kuper and Harms in denying Laura’s motion to reconsider, finding

section (b-8) was not applicable. Although we reject the reasoning the court used to reach its

conclusion, we may affirm on any basis in the record. See In re Marriage of Petrik, 2012 IL App

(2d) 110495, ¶ 33 (citing Mutual Management Services, Inc. v. Swalve, 2011 IL App (2d) 100778,

¶ 11 (court may affirm on any basis in the record, regardless of whether the trial court’s decision

was based on proper grounds)). Here, the record includes the dates of the filings and establishes

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 that section 504(b)(8) did not become effective until after the parties’ petitions were filed. As in

the instant case, as in Kuper and Harm, Laura filed her petition for review or to extend in August

2015, before the effective date of the section 504(b-8) amendment. Although Mark sought to

terminate maintenance with a petition filed in July 2018 and the trial on both petitions did not take

place until December 2018, we determine that the applicable statute was the version in effect at

the time Laura moved for review. That version of section 504 did not include section (b-8), and

section 510(c) directed the court only to section 504(a). Neither section 504(a) nor 510(c)

referenced section 504(b-1)(1), which are the amount and duration formulas introduced in the

amendments. We conclude that, when Laura sought review, the guideline formulas did not apply,

and we affirm the trial court’s refusal to use them.

¶ 22 We must now determine whether the trial court erred in reducing Mark’s monthly

maintenance obligation to Laura. Prior to and during the pendency of this proceeding, Mark paid

$1000 per month in maintenance; the trial court reduced his obligation to $675. The court based

the reduction on its finding that Mark established a substantial change of circumstances in that the

business in which he earned his livelihood was suffering an industry-wide downturn. The court

found Mark’s business income experienced a significant decline in 2017 and estimated Mark’s

2018 income at $33,666 based on an approximate 50% decrease in gross income since the original

maintenance order was entered. It found Mark took reasonable measures to weather the economic

downturn to “his” business, such as cutting employee hours and overhead, and that Mark also

reduced his personal expenses. Mark sold the marital home, receiving $70,000 from its sale, of

which “$21,000 [sic]” remained. Mark was 61 years old and could opt for early Social Security.

According to the court, if Mark retired and received Social Security, his income would not greatly

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 change from the figure it extrapolated. The court further found Mark’s medical issues marginally

affected his ability to work.

¶ 23 The court found Laura to be 59 years old, with a gross annual income from unemployment

insurance of $11,580, plus $12,000 annually in maintenance, for a combined gross income of

$23,580. Laura had numerous health problems and received Social Security disability insurance

of $405 a month, from which she paid $134 for health insurance. Laura was without any viable

employment income. She had a pending workers’ compensation claim but had not worked in any

regular capacity since the initial maintenance award was entered. The court further found in five

years Laura had not sought any part-time regular employment. Her tax returns indicated a “hobby

loss,” which the court found could not be sustained as a business. Laura minimized her living costs,

incurred reasonable expenses, and relied primarily on maintenance for support. The court noted

that Laura had been a housewife and worked part time during the marriage. Like Mark, her skills

did not translate well in the current technological world.

¶ 24 Relying on those facts, the court considered the statutory factors. It found Mark’s

downward trajectory in his employment income was adequately explained and not due to any fault

of Mark. The court felt its estimate of Mark’s 2018 income was more accurate than averaging his

income over a period of years. The court found Laura sat on her petition for more than three years

and would have been better served having the matter heard when Mark enjoyed a greater income.

The court considered that Laura could have increased her income despite her health issues and that

“she made no real effort to help herself.” The court noted Laura lacked any property and Mark had

only approximately $21,000 [sic] left from the sale of the marital house. The court determined

Laura had a diminished earning capacity due to devoting her time to raising the children and taking

care of the family and could not fully support herself. It further determined that Mark’s future

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 earning impairment was adequately considered by the court in fashioning Mark’s 2018 income. It

found neither party would be able to enjoy the standard of living maintained during the marriage.

Based on the section 504(a) factors, the court found an award of maintenance to be appropriate.

¶ 25 The trial court then considered the section 510(a-5) factors. It again noted the downturn in

Mark’s business and Laura’s reduction in income. The court found concerning what it described

as Laura’s lack of efforts to increase her income after “five years and living near the poverty line.”

Describing the money situation as untenable as to both Mark and Laura, the court suggested that

Laura should obtain part-time employment within her capabilities. The court defined the

maintenance as reviewable and not rehabilitative due to the uncertainty of Mark’s business. It

acknowledged Mark and Laura each had impairments to future earnings but stated they both had

to rise above their circumstances and look for every source of income, including public assistance.

¶ 26 The court concluded that termination of maintenance was not appropriate, that Laura

needed maintenance, and that Mark demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances

warranting a modification of his maintenance obligation. The trial court reduced maintenance to

$675 per month, automatically reviewable after Mark turned 62 or before that occurrence if there

was a substantial change of circumstances, if Laura received a workers’ compensation award, or

upon petition by the parties. The trial court rejected a retroactive application of the reduced

maintenance amount, finding it would be “catastrophic” to Laura. It noted both parties “sat on the

review for three plus years.”

¶ 27 Although we do not agree with all the trial court’s findings regarding the statutory factors,

we do agree that Laura was entitled to an award of maintenance and that a reduction in the monthly

amount was warranted. As expressed by the trial court, there was not enough money to support

both Laura and Mark. During the marriage, they relied primarily on Mark’s income. Laura’s

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 employment afforded flexibility for home and childcare responsibilities and supplied insurance for

the family. The trial court found Mark experienced a legitimate decline in his income, which

essentially halved the amount of available funds. Laura argues the downturn in Mark’s industry

and income was already factored into the initial maintenance award. We find no support in the

record for Laura’s claim. In the court’s trial order initially awarding maintenance, it found

reviewable maintenance was appropriate based on the statutory factors, reasonable expenses of a

single person, and “considering Husband’s employment may be negatively affected by the lack of

business at his company.” In the judgment of dissolution, the court awarded $1000 in monthly

maintenance to be reviewable after 24 months. The judgment does not contain any details

regarding its calculation of the amount. Laura did not present any evidence the maintenance

amount was initially reduced other than the trial court’s order indicating it was considering the

income decline. Laura did not offer any calculations or demonstrative proof that the initial

maintenance award should have been an amount greater than the $1000 a month she was awarded.

On this record, we cannot determine whether the court awarded a lower amount of maintenance

because of the anticipated decline in income or as a basis to make the award reviewable in two

years. Without evidentiary support, we cannot accept Laura’s premise that the downturn in Mark’s

business prospects was factored into the initial maintenance calculation.

¶ 28 In reviewing the maintenance award, the trial court found that Mark’s business suffered a

downturn after entry of the judgment of dissolution in 2013, which became significant in 2017. It

found the trial court had initially set the award at 24 months because it found that “change was

coming” in terms of Mark’s income. The court found Mark to be credible and the downturn in

business to be legitimate and not due to any actions on Mark’s part. The court relied on Mark’s

business decline in estimating an annual income for him that was 50% lower than his salary the

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 prior year, using Mark’s figures to calculate a gross income of $33,666 for 2018. It is unclear as

to what evidence the trial court used to extrapolate this number. The court stated it used Mark’s

“figures” to calculate gross income of $33,666 for 2018. A payroll detail report indicated his

monthly salary of $2000 from March 2018 through August 2018, except for two months where he

earned an additional $2625, for a partial year-to-date total income of $16,250 for the six-month

period from March to August 10, 2018. Mark’s financial affidavit dated September 2018 stated a

monthly gross income of $2170 and a net income of $170 after $2000 in deductions. Presumably,

the court relied on the payroll numbers and Mark’s affidavit to extrapolate and estimate Mark’s

2018 salary. We consider the court’s calculations to be a reasonable estimation of Mark’s salary,

post-business-decline.

¶ 29 Laura contests the trial court’s treatment of the proceeds from the sale of the marital house.

The house was awarded to Mark in the dissolution based on his request. At that time, the house

was valued at $223,000 with equity of $24,729. Laura received a lump sum maintenance payment

of $9000 as her share of the marital house. Mark sold the house within several years of the

dissolution and netted in excess of $70,000. We find the postdissolution increase in equity suspect

and disagree with the trial court’s treatment of the sale proceeds. The court stated that Mark did

not need to diminish his “sole remaining asset to pay maintenance.” In addition, the court

expressed concern that the money from the house sale was all Mark had left from the property

settlement and it was not equitable to require him to use it to pay maintenance. On his September

2018 financial affidavit, Mark listed more than $27,000 in his savings account, which he explained

was the remaining proceeds he received from the sale of the marital home. In contrast, Laura

received $9000 in lump sum maintenance as her share of the marital home, which amount she long

ago depleted. The court should have considered the proceeds as a factor relevant to the

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 maintenance review under section 510(a-5)(6) and section 504(a)(1). Its failure to do so was error.

Nevertheless, we do not conclude that this error would have altered the maintenance amount

calculation. The trial court predicated the amount on the income Mark had available to pay

maintenance. While Mark had money in his savings account from the sale of the marital house,

the funds were limited, and he, too, had to adjust to a reduced income. The court calculated that

Mark’s income decreased 50%, and the reduction in Laura’s monthly maintenance award

amounted to a decrease of 32.5%. We thus affirm the trial court’s reduction in the maintenance

amount due Laura.

¶ 30 Next, Laura complains that the court failed to determine what amount of maintenance she

was owed during the pendency of her petition for review. She maintains she was entitled to a

higher monthly award during that time period because Mark’s income did not, in fact, decrease as

he had told the trial court it would when a maintenance amount was originally set. According to

Laura, Mark’s income did not decrease in 2015, 2016, or 2017, yet he still paid a reduced amount

of maintenance. She submits that she was entitled to a judgment in her favor for amounts she

claimed she should have been paid based on Mark’s actual income.

¶ 31 A party to a dissolution action may petition the trial court for temporary maintenance. 750

ILCS 5/501(a)(1) (West 2018). Any temporary orders entered under section 501 do not prejudice

any rights of the parties that are to be subsequently adjudicated. Id. § 501(d)(1). In determining an

award of temporary maintenance, the trial court must consider the entire financial situation of both

parties. Bellow v. Bellow, 72 Ill. App. 3d 608, 610 (1979). An award must be based on a showing

of the parties’ incomes and assets and what is required to support the party seeking maintenance.

Rabin v. Rabin, 57 Ill. App. 2d 193, 198 (1965). We review a trial court’s award of temporary

maintenance for an abuse of discretion. Moore v. Moore, 53 Ill. App. 3d 228, 230 (1977).

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¶ 32 As discussed above, Laura did not present any evidence the trial court factored Mark’s

business decline into its initial maintenance award. The record lacks any information concerning

the trial court’s initial calculation. She did not offer any calculations of her own to indicate what

the award should have been. The court’s statement regarding the anticipated decline is not

definitive proof Laura was awarded a reduced amount. Without proof, we will not conclude the

initial award was decreased. See In re Marriage of Landfield, 209 Ill. App. 3d 678, 704 (1991)

(wife sustained her burden to show that husband’s income increased warranting an increase in

maintenance).

¶ 33 Laura relies on In re Marriage of Wojcik, 2018 IL App (1st) 170625, to support her

argument that she should have been awarded a retroactive increase in maintenance for the time

period her petition was pending. Wojcik is distinguished. In that case, the parties’ marital

settlement agreement provided that the husband would pay the wife unallocated family support for

60 months and the support award was reviewable at that time. Id. ¶ 7. On review, the court

considered the parties’ financial situations and concluded that, even imputing income to the wife,

she would not make enough money to live based on the standard of living established during the

marriage. Id. ¶ 13. The husband’s income had continued to increase since the initial support order

was entered. Id. ¶ 6. At the time of the hearing, he was earning $700,000 per year, and the wife

was earning $9 per hour with imputed income of $46,000. Id. ¶¶ 33, 37. In contrast here, Mark’s

income declined 50% since the original maintenance order was entered, and neither party was able

to enjoy the standard of living established during the marriage.

¶ 34 In Wojcik, the reviewing court emphasized that the order on appeal was initially determined

by the trial court based on current facts and not the husband’s conjecture that the wife’s imputed

income should have been higher. Id. ¶ 38. Here, Laura submitted inadequate proof to support her

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 claim that the initial maintenance was decreased based on a decline in Mark’s income and asks us

to accept her claim based on speculation and conjecture. We reject her request, find Laura was not

entitled to a higher maintenance award during the pendency of the review proceedings, and affirm

the trial court’s denial of her request to retroactively increase her maintenance award.

¶ 35 CONCLUSION

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

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 No. 3-19-0342

Cite as: In re Marriage of Burdess, 2020 IL App (3d) 190342

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 12-D-165;
the Hon. Kim L. Kelley, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Jeffrey Alan Ryva, of Quinn, Johnston, Henderson, Pretorius &
for Cerulo, of Peoria, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys No brief filed for appellee.
for
Appellee:

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