Case: 20-30569 Document: 00515687565 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/29/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 29, 2020
No. 20-30569 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
In re Darryl Franklin, also known as Daryl Franklin,
Movant.
Motion for an order authorizing
the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana to consider
a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
and
No. 20-30619
United States of America,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
Darryl Franklin, also known as Daryl Franklin,
Defendant-Appellant.
Case: 20-30569 Document: 00515687565 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/29/2020
No. 20-30569
& No. 20-30619
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:16-CV-11689
USDC No. 2:02-CR-304-2
Before Willett, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
In No. 20-30569, Darryl Franklin, federal prisoner # 28126-034, seeks
authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his
2003 convictions and sentences for carjacking or attempted carjacking by
force with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm and carjacking
resulting in an intentional killing. After the district court entered judgment
dismissing Franklin’s first § 2255 motion, he filed a pro se motion requesting
relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The district court
recharacterized the purported Rule 60(b) motion as a successive § 2255
motion and transferred the case to this court for consideration of whether
Franklin should be granted authorization to file the successive motion. In No.
20-30619, Franklin seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the
district court’s transfer order. We exercise our authority to sua sponte
consolidate these related matters. See United States v. Fulton, 780 F.3d 683,
688 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Rodriguez, 564 F.3d 735, 737 (5th Cir.
2009); cf. Fed. R. App. P. 3(b)(2).
A district court’s transfer order is an appealable collateral order over
which we have jurisdiction. In re Bradford, 660 F.3d 226, 228-29 (5th Cir.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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Case: 20-30569 Document: 00515687565 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/29/2020
No. 20-30569
& No. 20-30619
2011). But because a transfer order is not a final order as described in 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), Franklin does not need a COA to appeal the transfer
order. See Fulton, 780 F.3d at 688.
Where a Rule 60(b) motion following the denial of collateral relief
seeks to add a new claim or attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of
a claim on the merits, the motion should be construed as a successive habeas
application. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532-33 (2005) (addressing
a Rule 60(b) motion in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding); United States v.
Hernandes, 708 F.3d 680, 681-82 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying Gonzalez to
analyze a Rule 60(b) motion filed in a § 2255 proceeding). We have
previously applied Gonzalez to motions under both Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). See Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d 291, 303 (5th Cir.
2010) (§ 2254 case). However, the Supreme Court recently held that Rule
59(e) motions do not constitute successive habeas applications and that the
rationale of Gonzalez does not apply to such motions. Banister v. Davis, 140
S. Ct. 1698, 1705-11 (2020).
Here, Franklin titled his post-judgment motion as seeking relief under
Rule 60(b), but the motion was filed within the 28-day period following the
entry of judgment during which a Rule 59(e) motion may be filed. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). As we have explained, “[a] motion asking the court
to reconsider a prior ruling is evaluated either as a motion to ‘alter or amend
a judgment’ under Rule 59(e) or as a motion for ‘relief from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding’ under Rule 60(b),” depending on “when the motion
was filed.” Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir.
2012). Such a motion is construed as one under Rule 59(e) if filed within 28
days of the judgment being challenged and as one under Rule 60(b) if filed
more than 28 days after the challenged judgment. Id. Therefore, the district
court erred in treating Franklin’s post-judgment motion as a Rule 60(b)
motion, recharacterizing it as a successive § 2255 motion, and transferring it
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Case: 20-30569 Document: 00515687565 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/29/2020
No. 20-30569
& No. 20-30619
to this court for authorization. See Banister, 140 S. Ct. at 1710-11; Demahy,
702 F.3d at 182 & n.2.
Accordingly, the district court’s transfer order is VACATED, and
the case is TRANSFERRED back to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Franklin’s motion for authorization
to file a successive § 2255 motion is DENIED as moot, and his motion for a
COA is DENIED as unnecessary.
4