State v. Leevan Roundtree

2021 WI 1

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2018AP594-CR

COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Leevan Roundtree,
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 387 Wis. 2d 685,928 N.W.2d 806
(2019 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED: January 7, 2021
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: September 11, 2020

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Milwaukee
JUDGE: William S. Pocan & David A. Hansher

JUSTICES:
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and KAROFSKY,
JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. HAGEDORN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Kaitlin A. Lamb assistant state public defender. There
was an oral argument by Kaitlin A. Lamb.

For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Sarah L. Burgundy¸ assistant attorney general; with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by Sarah L. Burgundy.
 2021 WI 1

NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2018AP594-CR
(L.C. No. 2015CF4729)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
FILED
v.
JAN 7, 2021
Leevan Roundtree,
Sheila T. Reiff
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. Clerk of Supreme Court

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the
Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, DALLET, and KAROFSKY,
JJ., joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
ANN WALSH BRADLEY and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL
BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion. HAGEDORN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.

¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The petitioner, Leevan

Roundtree, seeks review of an unpublished per curiam decision of

the court of appeals affirming his judgment of conviction and
 No. 2018AP594-CR

the denial of his motion for postconviction relief.1 He asserts

that the felon-in-possession statute under which he was

convicted is unconstitutional as applied to him.

¶2 Specifically, Roundtree contends that Wisconsin's

lifetime firearm ban for all felons is unconstitutional as

applied to him because his conviction over ten years ago for

failure to pay child support does not justify such a ban. He

maintains that the conviction was for a nonviolent felony and

that no public safety objective is served by preventing him from

owning a firearm.

¶3 The parties disagree as to the level of scrutiny that

we should employ to resolve this constitutional challenge.

Roundtree advances that we should subject the statute to the

requirements of a strict scrutiny review. The State counters

that the application of intermediate scrutiny is consistent with

precedent.

¶4 We determine that Roundtree's challenge to the felon-

in-possession statute (Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) (2013-14)2)
requires the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny.

State v. Roundtree, No. 2018AP594-CR, unpublished slip op.
1

(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2019) (per curiam) (affirming the
judgment and order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County,
William S. Pocan and David A. Hansher, Judges).

All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
2

the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.

Although Roundtree was convicted pursuant to Wis. Stat.
§ 941.29(2), that subsection has since been repealed, with the
substance of the former § 941.29(2) now residing in Wis. Stat.
§ 941.29(1m) (2017-18). See 2015 Wis. Act 109, §§ 6, 8.

2
 No. 2018AP594-CR

Under such an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we conclude that

his challenge fails. The statute is constitutional as applied

to Roundtree because it is substantially related to important

governmental objectives, namely public safety and the prevention

of gun violence.

¶5 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals.

I

¶6 In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony

counts of failure to support a child for more than 120 days. 3 As

a consequence of these felony convictions, Roundtree was, and

continues to be, permanently prohibited from possessing a

firearm.

¶7 Milwaukee police executed a search warrant at

Roundtree's home on October 30, 2015. Under his mattress,

officers located a revolver and ammunition. A record check of

the recovered gun revealed that it had been stolen in Texas.

Roundtree claimed that "he purchased the firearm from a kid on
the street about a year ago, but that he did not know it was

stolen."

¶8 The State charged Roundtree with a single count of

possession of a firearm by a felon contrary to Wis. Stat.

§ 941.29(2). He pleaded guilty and was subsequently sentenced

to 18 months of initial confinement and 18 months of extended

supervision.

3 See Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2) (2003-04).

3
 No. 2018AP594-CR

¶9 Roundtree moved for postconviction relief, arguing

that Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2), the felon-in-possession statute,

was unconstitutional as applied to him. The circuit court held

the motion in abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court's

decision in Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 803 (2018),

which determined that a federal criminal defendant does not

waive a constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction on

direct appeal by entering a guilty plea.4

¶10 After the issuance of the Class opinion, the circuit

court ultimately determined that Roundtree waived his

constitutional challenge by entering a guilty plea.

Consequently, the circuit court denied Roundtree's motion for

postconviction relief.5

¶11 Roundtree appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed,

albeit on different grounds. State v. Roundtree, No. 2018AP594-

CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2019) (per

curiam). Instead of resting on the guilty plea waiver rule, the

court of appeals determined that "regardless of whether
Roundtree forfeited the constitutional argument by entering a

guilty plea, . . . the argument fails on its merits." Id., ¶5.

4The "guilty plea waiver rule" refers to the general rule
that a guilty, no contest, or Alford plea waives all
nonjurisdictional defects, including constitutional claims.
State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶18, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716
N.W.2d 886; see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
5The order denying the postconviction motion was entered by
the Honorable David A. Hansher. The Honorable William S. Pocan
accepted Roundtree's plea and entered the judgment of
conviction.

4
 No. 2018AP594-CR

By way of explanation on the merits, the court of appeals

expounded, "Roundtree's notion that his particular nonviolent

felony matters is incorrect. Rather, it is settled law that the

firearm ban applies regardless of the defendant's particular

felony." Id., ¶7. Like the court of appeals, we, too,

determine that Roundtree's argument fails on its merits, and

therefore we need not address whether he waived his

constitutional challenge.6

II

¶12 Roundtree asks us to review whether Wis. Stat.

§ 941.29(2) is unconstitutional as applied to him. Examining

the constitutional application of a statute presents a question

of law that this court reviews independently of the

determinations rendered by the circuit court or court of

appeals. State v. McGuire, 2010 WI 91, ¶25, 328 Wis. 2d 289,

786 N.W.2d 227.

¶13 In our review, we must also determine the appropriate

level of scrutiny to guide our analysis. This issue likewise
presents a question of law that we determine independently. See

6Roundtree contends that Wisconsin's use of the guilty plea
waiver rule was altered by the Court's recent decision in Class
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018). The Class Court
determined that a guilty plea by itself does not bar a federal
criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute of conviction on direct appeal. Id. at 803. Roundtree
asserts that, like the defendant in Class, he should be allowed
to challenge the government's power to criminalize his conduct
in spite of his guilty plea. The State disagrees, arguing that
Class applies in federal court only and that it does not extend
to as-applied challenges.

5
 No. 2018AP594-CR

Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 536-37, 540-41, 544

N.W.2d 894 (1996).

III

¶14 We begin by setting forth Roundtree's argument and

some necessary background regarding the individual right to bear

arms. Subsequently, we determine the level of scrutiny under

which we examine the felon-in-possession statute. Finally, we

apply the appropriate level of scrutiny.

A

¶15 Roundtree was convicted of possession of a firearm by

a felon contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)(a), which provides

that a person convicted of a felony in this state "is guilty of

a Class G felony if he or she possesses a firearm under any of

the following circumstances . . . ." The circumstance

applicable here is that "[t]he person possesses a firearm

subsequent to the conviction for the felony or other crime, as

specified in sub. (1)(a) or (b)." § 941.29(2)(a).

¶16 This statute, as Roundtree correctly observes, bars a
person convicted of any felony from firearm possession after

that conviction without exception, with no time limitation, and

with no mechanism for restoration of the right to possess a

firearm. The statute does not draw any distinctions among

felonies. Those convicted of less serious felonies are banned

from possessing firearms just as are those convicted of the most

serious felonies.

¶17 In Roundtree's estimation, this statutory scheme is
unconstitutional as applied to him. There are two major types
6
 No. 2018AP594-CR

of constitutional challenges: facial and as-applied. Michels

v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶11, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486. A

party challenging a law as unconstitutional on its face must

show that the law cannot be constitutionally enforced under any

circumstances. Id. (citation omitted).

¶18 In contrast, in an as-applied challenge, the court

assesses the merits of the challenge by considering the facts of

the particular case before it. State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13,

323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63. For an as-applied challenge to

succeed, the challenger must demonstrate that the challenger's

constitutional rights were actually violated. Id. If such a

violation occurred, the operation of the law is void as to the

facts presented for the party asserting the claim. Id. We

presume that the statute is constitutional, and the party

raising a constitutional challenge must prove that the

challenged statute has been applied in an unconstitutional

manner beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., ¶15.

¶19 Roundtree's as-applied challenge is based on the
contention that his conviction for failure to pay child support

is a nonviolent felony and thus is insufficient to curtail his

constitutional right to bear arms. He argues that "[d]isarming

[him] does not in any way advance public safety, but deprives

him of his right to keep and bear arms for self-defense." As

this is an as-applied challenge, he must demonstrate that his

constitutional rights specifically were violated, not that the

statute is unconstitutional in all applications.

7
 No. 2018AP594-CR

B

¶20 We begin our assessment of Roundtree's claim with some

background on the right to bear arms. Both the United States

and Wisconsin Constitutions provide for this right. U.S. Const.

amend. II; Wis. Const. art. I, § 25.7

¶21 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that

"[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment

is not unlimited." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 626 (2008). The same is true of the right provided by our

State Constitution. Moran v. DOJ, 2019 WI App 38, ¶48, 388

Wis. 2d 193, 932 N.W.2d 430. Indeed, the Second Amendment

secures "the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use

arms in defense of hearth and home." Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.

¶22 In Heller, the Court struck down a regulation barring

residential handgun possession as contrary to the Second

Amendment. Id. In doing so, the Court observed "that the

Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear

arms." Id. at 595. It was careful, however, to delineate the
reach of its analysis:

[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive

7 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed." Its Wisconsin counterpart,
art. I, § 25, sets forth: "The people have the right to keep
and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any
other lawful purpose."

8
 No. 2018AP594-CR

places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.
Id. at 626-27.

¶23 The Court identified such regulations as

"presumptively lawful," id. at 627 n.26, and reiterated the same

assessment two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561

U.S. 742, 786 (2010) ("We made it clear in Heller that our

holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory

measures as 'prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill,' 'laws forbidding the carrying of

firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government

buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the

commercial sale of arms.' We repeat those assurances here.")

(internal citations omitted).

¶24 It is the juxtaposition of the United States Supreme

Court's stated limitations on the Second Amendment individual

right to bear arms, as well as the felon-in-possession statute's

presumed lawfulness, that guides our analysis.

IV
A

¶25 With this necessary background in hand, we next

identify the appropriate level of scrutiny that frames our

analysis.

¶26 The parties here disagree as to the level of means-end

scrutiny that should be applied. Roundtree contends that we

should subject Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) to strict scrutiny. He
bases this argument on language in the Seventh Circuit's

9
 No. 2018AP594-CR

decision in Ezell v. City of Chicago which indicates that "the

rigor of . . . judicial review will depend on how close the law

comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity

of the law's burden on the right." Ezell v. City of Chicago,

651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011). Under this framework,

Roundtree argues that § 941.29(2) severely burdens the core of

the Second Amendment right because it completely restricts the

right to bear arms, thus necessitating strict scrutiny review.

¶27 In order to survive strict scrutiny, a statute must

be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.

Monroe Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ¶17,

271 Wis. 2d 51, 678 N.W.2d 831. Strict scrutiny is an exacting

standard, and it is the rare case in which a law survives it.

State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶48, 318 Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34.

¶28 The State disagrees and advocates for the application

of intermediate scrutiny. In the State's view, such an

application would be consistent with the language of Heller and

its interpretation by both the court of appeals of this state
and the Seventh Circuit. See State v. Pocian, 2012 WI App 58,

¶11, 341 Wis. 2d 380, 814 N.W.2d 894 (citing United States v.

Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639, 641-42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("In

a case decided after Heller and McDonald, the Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals utilized an 'intermediate scrutiny' analysis

and applied it to a constitutional challenge to a federal law

prohibiting an individual convicted of misdemeanor domestic

violence from carrying a firearm in or affecting interstate
commerce."). Pursuant to an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we
10
 No. 2018AP594-CR

ask whether a law is substantially related to an important

governmental objective. Id.

¶29 We agree with the State that intermediate scrutiny is

the appropriate inquiry to guide our analysis. First, Heller

clearly requires more than mere rational basis review of laws

that are alleged to burden Second Amendment rights. Heller, 554

U.S. at 628 n.27. "If all that was required to overcome the

right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second

Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional

prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect." Id.

¶30 Second, the intermediate scrutiny approach lends

vitality to the Heller court's statement that felon

dispossession statutes are "presumptively lawful." Kanter v.

Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 2019). To subject a

"presumptively lawful" statute to strict scrutiny would in

effect remove the operation of such a presumption. As stated,

strict scrutiny is a steep hill to climb.

¶31 Our conclusion is consistent with that of other courts
that have considered the question. Indeed, federal courts

around the country have interpreted the above-cited language

from Heller as indicative of requiring an intermediate scrutiny

analysis when examining Second Amendment challenges. See, e.g.,

Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641-42; Kanter, 919 F.3d at 448; United

States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010).

¶32 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has taken the same

approach. In both Pocian, 341 Wis. 2d 380, ¶¶11-12, and State
v. Culver, 2018 WI App 55, ¶37, 384 Wis. 2d 222, 918 N.W.2d 103,
11
 No. 2018AP594-CR

the court of appeals applied intermediate scrutiny to as-applied

challenges to the felon-in-possession statute. Support for the

use of intermediate scrutiny is thus plentiful in the case law

and accepting Roundtree's position would necessitate overruling

both Pocian and Culver, which we decline to do.

¶33 In contrast, Roundtree points us to no case in which

an appellate court has applied strict scrutiny to a Second

Amendment challenge to a felon-in-possession statute.8 Absent

any such application of strict scrutiny in Wisconsin or

elsewhere in this type of case, we decline to break new ground.9

We acknowledge that strict scrutiny has been applied to
8

related federal statutes, but none of those cases finds purchase
here. In United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-
32 (D. Utah 2009), the District Court applied strict scrutiny to
the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by a person
convicted of a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." See 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Similarly, in Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff's Dep't, 775 F.3d 308, 328-29 (6th Cir. 2014), reh'g en
banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 21, 2015), the Sixth Circuit
applied strict scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)'s dispossession
of a person "who has been committed to a mental institution."

Tyler largely based its application of strict scrutiny on
citation to separate writings in other cases, and in any event
the opinion has been vacated. Id. at 328-29. Likewise,
Engstrum is of little value here because the restriction it
addressed was based on a misdemeanor, not a felony.

Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's dissent would apply
9

strict scrutiny, citing this court's decision in Mayo v.
Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018
WI 78, ¶28, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678. Justice Rebecca
Grassl Bradley's dissent, ¶¶73-74. However, Mayo is
inapplicable here.

12
 No. 2018AP594-CR

¶34 We are likewise unpersuaded by the argument Roundtree

makes pursuant to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ezell, 651

In Mayo, an equal protection case regarding the
constitutionality of medical malpractice damage caps, the
majority of the court overruled the "rational basis with teeth"
standard from Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients
Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440.
Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32. The "rational basis with teeth"
standard from Ferdon, although similar, is different from
intermediate scrutiny. (continued)

The Ferdon court set forth that "rational basis with teeth"
"focuses on the legislative means used to achieve the ends.
This standard simply requires the court to conduct an inquiry to
determine whether the legislation has more than a speculative
tendency as the means for furthering a valid legislative
purpose." Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶78. Intermediate scrutiny,
on the other hand, asks whether a law is "substantially related
to an important governmental objective." State v. Pocian, 2012
WI App 58, ¶11, 341 Wis. 2d 380, 814 N.W.2d 894 (citation
omitted).

Importantly, the Ferdon court explicitly disclaimed that it
was applying intermediate scrutiny. It stated that rational
basis was the "appropriate level of scrutiny in the present
case," clearly evidencing a distinction between intermediate
scrutiny and "rational basis with teeth." See Ferdon, 284
Wis. 2d 573, ¶¶63-65.

Further, the Mayo court specifically stated that it was
addressing levels of scrutiny for equal protection challenges.
Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28. Roundtree's challenge is not based on
the equal protection clause, but on a purported abridgement of
his Second Amendment rights.

The intermediate scrutiny standard thus is well established
and retains vitality. In 1996, a unanimous court first adopted
and applied the intermediate scrutiny analysis in a challenge to
a cruising ordinance as violative of the constitutional right to
travel. See Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 540-41,
544 N.W.2d 894 (1996). More recently, in State v. Culver, 2018
WI App 55, ¶37, 384 Wis. 2d 222, 918 N.W.2d 103, the court of
appeals, post-Mayo, addressed the same question at issue here
and applied intermediate scrutiny.

13
 No. 2018AP594-CR

F.3d 684. He bases this argument on the Ezell court's statement

that "the rigor of . . . judicial review will depend on how

close the law comes to the core of the Second Amendment right

and the severity of the law's burden on the right." Id. at 703.

In Roundtree's view, the felon-in-possession statute implicates

the core Second Amendment right and severely burdens such a

right, necessitating the most rigorous level of scrutiny.

¶35 However, this argument rests on a faulty premise. As

the Seventh Circuit explained in Kanter, less than strict

scrutiny review is appropriate here because "the weight of the

historical evidence . . . suggests that felon dispossession laws

do not restrict the 'core right of armed defense,' but rather

burden 'activity lying closer to the margins of the right.'"

Kanter, 919 F.3d at 448 n.10. Instead, the core right

identified in Heller is "the right of a law-abiding, responsible

citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense . . . ."

United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis removed).
¶36 Like the Seventh Circuit in Kanter, we need not

conclusively determine the scope of the historical protections

of the Second Amendment. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 447; see infra,

¶41. But also like the Seventh Circuit in Kanter, we are not

persuaded that the core Second Amendment right is implicated so

as to require strict scrutiny review.

14
 No. 2018AP594-CR

¶37 Accordingly, we determine that Roundtree's challenge

to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) requires the application of an

intermediate level of scrutiny.10

B

¶38 We next apply intermediate scrutiny to the felon-in-

possession statute considering the facts of this case.

¶39 Generally, Second Amendment challenges require this

court to undertake a two-step approach. State v. Herrmann, 2015

WI App 97, ¶9, 366 Wis. 2d 312, 873 N.W.2d 257. We ask first

"whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling

within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee." Id.

(quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89). If the answer is no,

then the inquiry ends. Id.

¶40 If the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative,

then the court proceeds to inquire into "the strength of the

government's justification for restricting or regulating the

exercise of Second Amendment rights." Id. (quoting Ezell, 651

F.3d at 703).

10We observe that defendants around the country who raise
as-applied challenges to felon-in-possession statutes will face
an uphill climb. See Pocian, 341 Wis. 2d 380, ¶12 (explaining
that as of the writing of that opinion, "[n]o state law banning
felons from possessing guns has ever been struck down").
(continued)

Of those federal circuits that have not foreclosed such
challenges entirely, only one has ever upheld an as-applied
Second Amendment challenge to the federal statute banning
firearm possession by certain individuals convicted of crimes.
See Binderup v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016); 18
U.S.C. § 922(g); see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 442-44
(7th Cir. 2019).

15
 No. 2018AP594-CR

¶41 The Seventh Circuit has described the historical

evidence as to whether felons were categorically excluded from

the Second Amendment's scope as "inconclusive." Kanter, 919

F.3d at 445. Accordingly, when faced with an as-applied

challenge to the federal felon-in-possession statute, the court

declined to resolve the first step of the inquiry and instead

relied on the dispositive second step——the application of a

means-end scrutiny analysis. Id. at 447. We take a similar

approach here.

¶42 Like the court in Kanter, we assume that the felon-in-

possession statute burdens conduct falling within the scope of

the Second Amendment's guarantee in order to reach the

dispositive issue. Our inquiry, then, focuses on whether the

statute at issue is substantially related to an important

governmental objective.

¶43 As other courts in this state and elsewhere have done,

we recognize public safety generally, and preventing gun

violence specifically, as important governmental objectives.
See Pocian, 341 Wis. 2d 380, ¶15; Kanter, 919 F.3d at 448.

Indeed, "[p]ublic safety and the protection of human life is a

state interest of the highest order." State v. Miller, 196

Wis. 2d 238, 249, 538 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1995).

¶44 Roundtree protests that he should not be prohibited

from firearm possession because his felony conviction did not

involve violence. He claims that the nature of his conviction

and the fact that it is remote in time weigh in favor of a

16
 No. 2018AP594-CR

determination that Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) is unconstitutional as

applied to him.

¶45 We are not persuaded that the specific facts of

Roundtree's case compel such a conclusion. Roundtree was

convicted of failure to support a child for over 120 days. In

his view, this is different in kind from the crime at issue in

Pocian, where the defendant was convicted of uttering a forgery

as the underlying felony. Put frankly, he suggests that failing

to pay child support is not as bad as "physically taking a

victim's property."

¶46 But failure to pay child support is every bit as

serious as uttering a forgery if not more so. Those who fail to

make support payments deprive the very people they should be

protecting most, their own children, from receiving basic

necessities. Roundtree chose to keep money for himself that

rightly belonged to his children. And, to further add to the

egregiousness of his offense, he committed this crime repeatedly

by failing to support for at least 120 days. By all accounts
this is a serious offense.

¶47 Simply because his crime was not physically violent in

nature, it does not follow that the felon-in-possession statute

cannot be constitutionally applied to Roundtree. The Seventh

Circuit determined as much in Kanter when it concluded that "the

government has shown that prohibiting even nonviolent felons

like Kanter from possessing firearms is substantially related to

its interest in preventing gun violence." Kanter, 919 F.3d at

17
 No. 2018AP594-CR

448. The legislature did not in Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2) create a

hierarchy of felonies, and neither will this court.

¶48 Even in the case of those convicted of nonviolent

felonies, "someone with a felony conviction on his record is

more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and violent gun

use." United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir.

2010). Thus, even if a felon has not exhibited signs of

physical violence, it is reasonable for the State to want to

keep firearms out of the hands of those who have shown a

willingness to not only break the law, but to commit a crime

serious enough that the legislature has denominated it a felony,

as Roundtree has here.

¶49 The State has cited an abundance of research to

support this conclusion. "Other courts addressing this issue

have observed that nonviolent offenders not only have a higher

recidivism rate than the general population, but certain groups—

—such as property offenders——have an even higher recidivism rate

than violent offenders, and a large percentage of the crimes
nonviolent recidivists later commit are violent." Kaemmerling

v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Ewing v.

California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003)).

¶50 As the Kanter court noted, several studies "have found

a connection between nonviolent offenders . . . and a risk of

future violent crime." Kanter, 919 F.3d at 449.

For example, one study of 210,886 nonviolent offenders
found that about one in five were rearrested for a
violent crime within three years of his or her
release. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice

18
 No. 2018AP594-CR

Statistics Profile of Nonviolent Offenders Exiting
State Prisons 2, 4 (2004). A separate study found
that 28.5 percent of nonviolent property offenders——a
category that includes fraud convictions——were
rearrested for a violent offense within five years of
their release. See Matthew R. Durose, et al., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Recidivism of Prisoner Released in 30 States in 2005:
Patterns from 2005 to 2010, at 9 (2014). Yet another
study found that "even handgun purchasers with only 1
prior misdemeanor conviction and no convictions for
offenses involving firearms or violence were nearly 5
times as likely as those with no prior criminal
history to be charged with new offenses involving
firearms or violence." Garen J. Wintemute, et al.,
Prior Misdemeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for
Later Violent and Firearm-Related Criminal Activity
Among Authorized Purchasers of Handguns, 280 J. Am.
Med. Ass'n 2083, 2083 (1998) (emphasis added).
Id.

¶51 Such assertions are echoed by data from the Wisconsin

Department of Corrections (DOC). For example, DOC data indicate

that among recidivists who committed public order offenses, such

as failure to pay child support, and were released from prison

in 2011, 21.4 percent recidivated with a violent offense.

Joseph R. Tatar II & Megan Jones, Recidivism after Release from
Prison, Wis. Dep't of Corrections, at 14 (August 2016),

https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/InteractiveDashboards/Recidivism

AfterReleaseFromPrison_2.pdf. As the State strikingly observes

in its brief, "the 21.4 percent rate of public order offenders

recidivating with a violent crime was higher than that of

property offenders (16 percent) and drug offenders (17.9

percent). And it was just seven percentage points lower than

the rate of violent offenders (28.3 percent)." This data is
surely sufficient to support a substantial relation between

19
 No. 2018AP594-CR

keeping firearms out of the hands of those convicted of

nonviolent felonies and the public safety objective of

preventing gun violence.

¶52 Further, the fact that Roundtree's conviction occurred

over ten years ago does not affect the result. Roundtree

asserts that he poses no danger to public safety and should be

able to possess a firearm as a result. However, the record

indicates that the gun Roundtree possessed was stolen and

purchased off the street. Supporting street level gun commerce

is hardly the benign action Roundtree would have us believe it

is.

¶53 In sum, we determine that Roundtree's challenge to the

felon-in-possession statute (Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2)) requires

the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny. Under

such an intermediate scrutiny analysis, we conclude that the

felon-in-possession statute is constitutional as applied to

Roundtree because the statute in question is substantially

related to important governmental objectives, namely public
safety and the prevention of gun violence.

¶54 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is

affirmed.

20
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rfd

¶55 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J. (concurring). I write

separately to address the unanswered question of whether by

pleading guilty Roundtree waived his as-applied challenge to the

constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.29(2). I conclude that,

following Class v. United States, 583 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 798

(2018), he did not.

¶56 Generally, a defendant who pleads guilty with the

assistance of reasonably competent counsel waives his right to

later raise an independent claim related to a deprivation of his

constitutional rights that occurred prior to his pleading

guilty. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

The rationale behind this "guilty-plea-waiver rule" is that a

counseled guilty plea admits "all of the factual and legal

elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt

and a lawful sentence." United States v. Broce, 488

U.S. 563, 569 (1989).1

¶57 In order to balance efficient judicial administration

with the rights protected by the United States Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court has developed exceptions to the

guilty-plea-waiver rule for claims that implicate the State's

very power to prosecute the defendant, provided that a court can

resolve those claims without venturing beyond the record. See

id. at 574-76; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.2 (1975)

We have interpreted this rule, like other waiver rules, to
1

be one of judicial administration that does not deprive an
appellate court of jurisdiction. See State v. Riekoff, 112
Wis. 2d 119, 123-24, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983).

1
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rfd

(per curiam) (guilty plea did not waive a constitutional

challenge under the Double Jeopardy Clause when the claim could

be resolved on the existing record); see also Blackledge v.

Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (guilty plea did not foreclose

a defendant's habeas petition alleging "unconstitutional

vindictive prosecution" because the Due Process Clause precluded

the State from even prosecuting the defendant).

¶58 Although the guilty-plea-waiver rule arose in the

federal context, this court has steadfastly adopted that

precedent. See, e.g., State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶42, 294

Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886; Hawkins v. State, 26

Wis. 2d 443, 448, 132 N.W.2d 545 (1965). Wisconsin courts have

broadened the federal exceptions, recognizing that a guilty plea

does not waive facial challenges to the constitutionality of the

statute of conviction. See, e.g., State v. Molitor, 210

Wis. 2d 415, 419 n.2, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1997). This

court, however, has not yet extended that exception to as-

applied constitutional challenges. See State v. Cole, 2003

WI 112, ¶46, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328; State v.
Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶34 n.15, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644

N.W.2d 891. But following Class, the application of the guilty-

plea-waiver rule should no longer depend upon whether an appeal

challenging the constitutionality of a statute is classified as

facial or as-applied.

¶59 In Class, the United States Supreme Court applied an

exception to the guilty-plea-waiver rule to allow a defendant to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on

2
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rfd

appeal. 138 S. Ct. at 803-05. Class pleaded guilty to

unlawfully carrying a firearm on U.S. Capitol grounds, contrary

to 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1), after the police had found three guns

in his car in a Capitol parking lot. On appeal, Class argued

that the statute violated his due-process rights since he did

not have fair notice that a parking lot was part of the Capitol

"grounds." Id. at 802. Class also claimed that the statute

violated his Second Amendment rights because "Capitol Grounds"

included so broad an area that it was practically impossible to

lawfully carry a firearm anywhere within the District of

Columbia. Id. In allowing both claims to proceed, the Court

rested its decision on its 150-year-old understanding of the

nature of a guilty plea:

The plea of guilty is, of course, a confession of all
the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the
evil intent imputed to the defendant. It is a waiver
also of all merely technical and formal objections of
which the defendant could have availed himself by any
other plea or motion. But if the facts alleged and
admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of
the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled to be
discharged.
Id. at 804 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210

(1869)). The Court held that Class's guilty plea did not waive

his claims challenging the constitutionality of the statute of

conviction because those claims involved the State's ability to

constitutionally prosecute Class and did not contradict the

terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement. Id.

at 805.
¶60 Given the Court's analysis in Class, there is no

justification for continuing to treat as-applied challenges to
3
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rfd

the constitutionality of the statute of conviction any

differently than facial challenges. After all, Class did not

hinge on the type of constitutional challenge being raised. See

United States v. Alarcon Sanchez, 972 F.3d 156, 166 n.3 (2d

Cir. 2020) ("Pursuant to the holding in Class, defendants have a

right to raise on appeal both as-applied and facial

constitutional challenges to the [statute of conviction].").

Indeed, when addressing the merits of Class's challenges on

remand, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals treated both of his

claims as as-applied challenges. See United States v.

Class, 930 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But see State v.

Jackson, 2020 WI App 4, ¶¶8-9, 390 Wis. 2d 402, 938 N.W.2d 639

(noting that it was "not clear . . . whether Class'[s] challenge

was an as-applied or facial challenge"). Second, and more

importantly, the Court's reasoning in Class must apply equally

to facial and as-applied challenges because both types of

challenges "call into question the Government's power to

'constitutionally prosecute'" the defendant. Class, 138 S. Ct.

at 805 (quoting Broce, 488 U.S. at 575) (adding that whether a
constitutional challenge can be classified as "jurisdictional"

is also not dispositive).

¶61 This court should therefore adopt the holding in

Class, not only to remain consistent with United States Supreme

Court precedent but also to continue to strike the proper

balance between efficient judicial administration and the

protection of a defendant's constitutional rights. See
Kelty, 294 Wis. 2d 62, ¶27. It should be the law in Wisconsin

4
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rfd

that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant's right to

challenge the statute of conviction's constitutionality,

facially or as applied, provided the challenge can be resolved

without contradicting the record. We should withdraw language

from Cole and Trochinski and clarify the court of appeals'

holding in Jackson to the extent that those decisions hold that

a defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to later raise an

as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute of

conviction.2
¶62 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

¶63 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH

BRADLEY and JILL J. KAROFSKY joins this concurrence.

See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶46, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665
2

N.W.2d 328; State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶34 n.15, 253
Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891; State v. Jackson, 2020 WI App 4,
¶¶8-9, 390 Wis. 2d 402, 938 N.W.2d 639.

5
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

¶64 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). The Second

Amendment provides:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
U.S. Const. amend. II. St. George Tucker, a pre-eminent

constitutional law scholar during the founding era, described

the Second Amendment as "the true palladium of liberty . . . .

The right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most

governments it has been the study of rulers to confine this

right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing

armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear

arms is, under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited,

liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of

destruction." St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries 1:

App. 300 (1803). In plainer words, the Second Amendment is the

people's ultimate protection against tyranny.

¶65 Applying the original public meaning of this bulwark

of liberty, the United States Supreme Court more than a decade

ago finally dispelled the prevalent, but historically ignorant

notion that the Second Amendment protects merely a collective,

militia member's right. The Supreme Court declared the right to

keep and bear arms is "exercised individually and belongs to all

Americans"; accordingly, "the District [of Columbia]'s ban on

handgun possession in the home violates the Second

Amendment . . . ." District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 581, 635 (2008) (emphasis added). See also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in The Papers

1
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

of Thomas Jefferson, XII, 438-40 (Julian Boyd ed., 1950) ("Let

me add that a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to

against every government on earth, general or particular, [and]

what no just government should refuse or rest on inference.")

(emphasis added). Any encroachment upon this fundamental right

must withstand strict judicial scrutiny. Wisconsin Carry, Inc.

v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 19, ¶9, 373 Wis. 2d 543, 892 N.W.2d

233 (declaring the right to keep and bear arms to be "a species

of right we denominate as 'fundamental'"); Mayo v. Wisconsin

Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶28, 383

Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678 ("Strict scrutiny is applied to

statutes that restrict a fundamental right.").

¶66 Ignoring conclusive historical evidence to the

contrary, the majority upholds the constitutionality of

Wisconsin's categorical ban on the possession of firearms by any

person convicted of a felony offense,1 regardless of whether that

individual is dangerous. Under the majority's vision of what is

good for society, "even if a felon has not exhibited signs of
physical violence, it is reasonable for the State to want to

keep firearms out of the hands of those who have shown a

willingness to . . . break the law." Majority op., ¶48

(emphasis added). It may be "reasonable" to the majority but it

surely isn't constitutional. "The very enumeration of the right

takes out of the hands of government——even the Third Branch of

Government——the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether

the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional

1 See Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m).

2
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its

usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all." Heller, 554

U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original). Centuries of history warned

the Founders that governments certainly wanted to keep arms out

of the hands of the citizenry in order to ease the establishment

of tyranny——and they often succeeded. It is for this very

reason that the Framers insisted on preserving the individual

right to keep and bear arms for all Americans.

¶67 Under Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m), the State deprives

Leevan Roundtree of his fundamental constitutional right to keep

and bear arms, based solely on his failure to pay child support

more than ten years ago, with no showing that he poses a danger

to society. Applying the wrong standard of review, the majority

sidelines the United States Constitution, demotes the Second

Amendment to second-class status,2 and endorses a blanket ban on

one of our most fundamental constitutional liberties. In doing

so, the majority contravenes the original public meaning of the

Second Amendment. I dissent.
I

¶68 The Constitution takes precedence over any statute,

and any statute in conflict with the Constitution cannot stand.

"The [C]onstitution is either a superior, paramount law,

unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with

See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010)
2

("[R]espondents, in effect, ask us to treat the right recognized
in Heller as a second-class right, subject to an entirely
different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees
that we have held to be incorporated into the Due Process
Clause.").

3
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable

when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former

part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary

to the [C]onstitution is not law; if the latter part be true,

then written [C]onstitutions are absurd attempts on the part of

the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable."

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). Bearing in mind

that the Second Amendment protects the "first law of nature"——

the right to defend oneself——any infringement of the right must

be concordant with the Constitution and may replicate only those

restrictions society accepted at the founding. Permitting

restraints on the right to keep and bear arms that were never

contemplated by the Framers lends an illimitable quality to the

legislative power to regulate a fundamental right, thereby

deflating the primacy of the Constitution and imperiling the

liberty of the people.

¶69 Wisconsin Stat. § 941.29(1m) bans all felons from

possessing a firearm in this state: "[a] person who possesses a
firearm is guilty of a Class G felony if any of the following

applies: (a) [t]he person has been convicted of a felony in

this state, [or] (b) [t]he person has been convicted of a crime

elsewhere that would be a felony if committed in this state."

This felon dispossession statute draws no distinction between an

individual convicted of first-degree homicide and someone

convicted of "failing to comply with any record-keeping

requirement for fish" (a felony in this state). Wis. Stat.
§ 29.971(1)(c). Rather than the historically recognized

4
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

revocation of Second Amendment rights predicated on an

individual's dangerousness to society, the Wisconsin Legislature

instead rescinds those rights based merely on a felony

conviction, irrationally preserving the right to keep and bear

arms for both violent and dangerous citizens.

¶70 In 2003, Roundtree failed to pay child support for

more than 120 consecutive days, resulting in his conviction for

a felony under Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2). Roundtree was sentenced

to four years of probation and later paid his past due child

support. Nearly 13 years later, while executing a search

warrant on Roundtree's property, the police found a handgun

tucked beneath his mattress. The State charged Roundtree with

violating Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m).3 The majority concludes that

Roundtree's felony conviction for failure to timely pay child

support more than a decade earlier permanently forecloses his

individual Second Amendment rights. Although the United States

Supreme Court has never opined on the constitutionality of felon

dispossession laws, the majority reflexively follows federal
jurisdictions in upholding these laws, neglecting (as other

courts have) to conduct the historical analysis necessary to

ascertain the original public meaning of the Second Amendment in

this regard.

¶71 Troublingly, the majority applies intermediate

scrutiny to a statute that demands strict scrutiny review, while

3 Roundtree was actually convicted under Wis. Stat.
§ 941.29(2), but sub. (2) was subsequently repealed and replaced
with Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m). For consistency and to avoid
confusion, I use sub. (1m) throughout.

5
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

declining to discern whether the people who ratified the Bill of

Rights consented to the removal of the Second Amendment right

from non-violent felons. While legislatures have always had the

power to prohibit people who are dangerous from possessing

firearms, the Second Amendment does not countenance collectively

depriving all felons of their individual Second Amendment

rights. Such laws sweep too broadly, disarming those who pose

no danger to society. And if the professed purpose of felon

dispossession laws is "public safety and the prevention of gun

violence" as the majority describes,4 then Wisconsin's lawmakers

need to adjust their aim; Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) leaves violent

misdemeanants free to keep and bear arms.

¶72 Since the founding of our nation, Americans have

understood their right to keep and bear arms as fundamental to

the people's self-preservation and defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at

593-94 ("By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had

become fundamental for English subjects," citing Blackstone's

description of "the right of having and using arms for self-
preservation and defence"). In Wisconsin Carry, this court

expressly recognized the right to keep and bear arms to be "a

species of right we denominate as 'fundamental,' reflecting our

understanding that it finds its protection, but not its source,

in our constitutions." 373 Wis. 2d 543, ¶9 (citations omitted).

During the ratifying conventions, "there was broad consensus

between Federalists and their opponents on the existence and

nature of the 'natural right' to keep and bear arms for

4 Majority op., ¶4.

6
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

defensive purposes." Binderup v. Atty. Gen. U.S. of America,

836 F.3d 336, 367 (3d Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J., concurring).

Although we expound only the Second Amendment in this case, this

court has also deemed the people's right to keep and bear arms

protected under the Wisconsin Constitution5 to be a fundamental

right. State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665

N.W.2d 328 ("We find that the state constitutional right to bear

arms is fundamental."). Because Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)

restricts a fundamental right that predates and is "independent

of" the Constitution entirely, Wisconsin Carry, 373 Wis. 2d 543,

¶9, strict scrutiny must apply.

¶73 Inexplicably, but quite conveniently, the majority

opinion never mentions Wisconsin Carry, nor does it even utter

the word "fundamental." When a challenged statute impairs a

fundamental right, this court must apply a heightened level of

scrutiny. Very recently, this court articulated that "[s]trict

scrutiny is applied to statutes that restrict a fundamental

right." Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28. Not only does the majority
disregard the nature of the right to keep and bear arms, it also

fails to apply Mayo, which hardly imposed a novel approach to

examining laws restricting fundamental rights. Strict scrutiny

has never been limited to equal protection challenges. We

recently reiterated that "[a] statute which directly and

substantially infringes upon a fundamental liberty interest must

withstand strict scrutiny: it must be narrowly tailored to

See Article 1, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution:
5

"The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security,
defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose."

7
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

serve a compelling state interest." Matter of Visitation of

A.A.L., 2019 WI 57, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486. See

also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); Reno v.

Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). Strict scrutiny applies

"when a statute impinges on a 'fundamental right' or creates a

classification that 'operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a

suspect class.'" Metropolitan Associates v. City of Milwaukee,

2011 WI 20, ¶60 n.20, 332 Wis. 2d 857, 96 N.W.2d 717 (emphasis

added). In Larson v. Burmaster, 2006 WI App 142, ¶42, 295

Wis. 2d 333, 720 N.W.2d 134, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held

that "strict scrutiny is applied" when a "fundamental

constitutional right is violated."

¶74 Without explanation, the majority altogether ignores

its holding in Wisconsin Carry and refuses to apply Mayo, two

cases we recently decided. The majority threatens every

Wisconsin citizen's right to keep and bear arms by failing to

acknowledge the right as fundamental and accordingly using the

wrong level of review. In electing to apply an intermediate
level of scrutiny, the majority misconstrues the nature of the

infringement of Roundtree's Second Amendment right. Its error

stems from mischaracterizing the person who seeks to exercise

his Second Amendment right as an "activity lying closer to the

margins of the right." Majority op., ¶35 (emphasis added)

(citing Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 448 n.10 (7th Cir. 2019)).

Of course, a person is not an "activity" and in this case,

Roundtree wishes to exercise what Heller pronounced to be the
"core lawful purpose of armed defense," which the State of

8
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

Wisconsin totally denies him. 554 U.S. at 630. "[A] lifetime

ban on any felon possessing any firearm" undoubtedly "does

impair the 'core conduct' of self-defense in the home——at least

for a felon who has completed his sentence, or someone who

shares his household." C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha

Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695, 697 (2009).

Such "broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second

Amendment right . . . are categorically unconstitutional."

Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011).

Roundtree's core right to possess a firearm in his own home is

not merely restricted, it is extinguished. This alone warrants

strict scrutiny.

¶75 Ultimately, the level of scrutiny applied is not

dispositive; Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) fails under either level of

review. More importantly, the statute is inconsistent with the

historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment

right and who possesses it. For this reason, Heller declined to

adopt a particular level of scrutiny.6 The Supreme Court
expressed only that "'rational basis' . . . could not be used to

evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581, 628
6

(2008). See also State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, ¶34 (Wash.
2010) ("We follow Heller in declining to analyze [Washington's
statute restricting the rights of children to keep and bear
arms] under any level of scrutiny. Instead we look to the
Second Amendment's original meaning, the traditional
understanding of the right, and the burden imposed on children
by upholding the statute. See generally Eugene Volokh,
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev.
1443, 1449 (2009).").

9
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

specific, enumerated right" such as "the right to keep and bear

arms." Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 ("If all that was required

to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational

basis, the Second Amendment would . . . have no effect."). If

anything, Heller signals that courts should approach challenges

to statutes infringing the Second Amendment right with a

rigorous review of history, rather than the inherently

subjective consideration of whether the government's interest in

curtailing the right outweighs the individual's interest in

exercising it. "As to the ban on handguns[,] . . . the Supreme

Court in Heller never asked whether the law was narrowly

tailored to serve a compelling government interest (strict

scrutiny) or substantially related to an important government

interest (intermediate scrutiny). If the Supreme Court had

meant to adopt one of those tests, it could have said so in

Heller and measured D.C.'s handgun ban against the relevant

standard. But the Court did not do so; it instead determined

that handguns had not traditionally been banned and were in
common use——and thus that D.C.'s handgun ban was

unconstitutional." Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d

1244, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). The

majority in this case should have conducted the historical

analysis necessary to determine whether felons were

traditionally dispossessed of their weapons. They weren't,

unless they were dangerous to society. Accordingly, Wisconsin's

categorical dispossession of all felons irrespective of whether
they pose a danger to the public is unconstitutional.

10
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

¶76 Although the United States Supreme Court has declined

to pronounce the appropriate level of review for statutes

burdening the fundamental right to keep and bear arms in favor

of discerning the traditional understanding of the Second

Amendment, this court (as it must) has recognized the right to

keep and bear arms to be fundamental, and this court has

declared strict scrutiny to be the appropriate level of scrutiny

"applied to statutes that restrict a fundamental right." Mayo,

383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28. At the very least, the majority should

explain why it now subordinates the fundamental, constitutional

right to keep and bear arms.

II

¶77 Statutes subject to strict scrutiny rarely survive.

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) ("[I]t is the rare

case in which we have held that a law survives strict

scrutiny."). In order to survive, "a statute must serve a

compelling state interest[,] . . . be necessary to serving that

interest[,] and . . . be narrowly tailored toward furthering
that compelling state interest." Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶28.

Historically, laws that dispossessed the violent served the

compelling state interest in public safety. Wisconsin's felon

dispossession law, however, ensnares the non-violent, thereby

detaching itself from the statute's ostensible purpose.

¶78 Even assuming Wisconsin's felon dispossession statute

serves the unquestionably compelling state interest in public

11
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

safety,7 the statute is not "narrowly tailored" toward advancing

that interest because it applies to any individual convicted of

a felony offense, even if that person poses no danger to

society. For example: "One man beats his wife, harming her

physically and emotionally and traumatizing their children who

witness the assault. He may, however, only have committed

battery, a misdemeanor." State v. Thomas, 2004 WI App 115,

¶47, 274 Wis. 2d 513, 683 N.W.2d 497 (Schudson, J., concurring)

(emphasis in original). The legislature allows this

undisputedly violent man to possess a firearm. "Another man

enters a garage to steal a shovel; he has committed a

burglary," which is a felony offense. Id. The legislature

forever prohibits him from possessing a firearm. "One woman

drives while intoxicated, threatening the lives of countless

citizens. Under Wisconsin's drunk driving laws——the weakest in

the nation——she has committed a non-criminal offense if it is

her first, or only a misdemeanor unless it is her fifth (or

subsequent) offense." Id., ¶48. Wisconsin's legislature deems
this woman fit to possess a firearm. "Another woman, however,

forges a check; she has committed a felony." Id. As a result,

Wisconsin's legislature forever prohibits her from possessing a

firearm. Despite the utterly ineffectual distinctions drawn by

the legislature, the majority allows the legislature to

permanently dispossess non-dangerous individuals of their Second

Amendment rights while allowing violent citizens to retain them.

7State v. Pocian, 2012 WI App 58, ¶12, 341 Wis. 2d 380, 814
N.W.2d 894 (quoted source omitted) (holding that felon
dispossession statutes are a "matter of public safety").

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Even intermediate scrutiny cannot save a statute that purports

to serve an important government interest——protecting society

from violent criminals——but fails so miserably to achieve it.

¶79 In considering an as-applied challenge to a law "that

entirely bars the challenger from exercising the core Second

Amendment right, any resort to means-end scrutiny is

inappropriate" when the challenger falls outside of "the

historical justifications supporting the regulation." Binderup,

836 F.3d at 363 (Hardiman, J., concurring). Instead, "such laws

are categorically invalid as applied to persons entitled to

Second Amendment protection." Id. In Binderup, a federal

statute dispossessing all individuals convicted of state

misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in prison went

"even further than the 'severe restriction' struck down in

Heller: it completely eviscerate[d] the Second Amendment right"

as to an entire group of individuals who were historically

proven to retain it. Id. at 364. So too with Wisconsin's

categorical ban on the possession of firearms by non-dangerous
felons. The original meaning of the Second Amendment,

encompassing a traditional understanding of the scope of the

rights it protects as well as the range of historically

recognized restrictions, establishes this statute's

unconstitutionality, independent of the application of any

standard of scrutiny.

III

¶80 At its inception, the right to keep and bear arms
protected under the Second Amendment was never understood to

13
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countenance the categorical exclusion of felons that Wis. Stat.

§ 941.29(1m) endorses. Historically, legislatures prohibited

only dangerous people from possessing a firearm, not an

individual like Roundtree who, although convicted of a felony

offense, poses no demonstrable risk to the public. This more

narrowly drawn restriction reflects the nature of the right as

an individual, rather than a merely collective or civil one.

¶81 In drafting the Second Amendment, "both Federalists

and Anti-Federalists accepted an individual right to arms; the

only debate was over how best to guarantee it." Don B. Kates,

Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second

Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 223 (1983). The Founders

settled on the following language: "A well regulated Militia,

being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of

the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.

Const. amend. II. When judges interpret constitutional text, we

give words their original public meaning. Judges who instead

inject a modern gloss over constitutional provisions
impermissibly change their meaning, a right reserved to the

people through the process of constitutional amendment. In

interpreting the Second Amendment, we accordingly apply the

particular meaning of the words "militia" and "right of the

people" as they were understood at the time of ratification.

¶82 At the time of the founding, "militia" meant "the body

of the people"——an adult citizenry "who were not simply allowed

to keep their own arms, but affirmatively required to do so."
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican 123 (W.

14
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Bennett ed. 1978) (ascribed to Richard Henry Lee) ("A militia,

when properly formed, are in fact the people

themselves . . . ."); Kates, supra, at 214 (discussing how, in

the pre-colonial tradition, male citizens were required to keep

arms for purposes of law enforcement). It was the citizenry's

collection of personally-owned firearms that made possible law

enforcement and military service during the founding era. After

all, the Founders preserved this right primarily in response to

the tyranny witnessed in England and its corresponding colonies.

As George Mason warned, it was the goal of the English monarch

"to disarm the people," as that was the "best and most effectual

way to enslave them." 3 J. Elliot, Debates in the Several State

Conventions 380 (2d ed. 1836).

¶83 As a principal means of resisting such tyranny, the

Founders enshrined the "right of the people" to keep and bear

arms as an individual right. As Richard Henry Lee understood,

"to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the

people always possess arms and be taught alike, especially when
young, how to use them." Kates, supra, at 221-22 (citing

Letters from the Federal Farmer, supra, at 124). For Lee, the

right to keep and bear arms formed a bedrock of an independent

nation and free society. The Second Amendment "right of the

people" perfectly mirrors the language found in the First and

Fourth Amendments. In each of these provisions, "the people"

unequivocally retain far-reaching and fundamental individual

rights under the Constitution. As Heller acknowledged, "the
people" "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national

15
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community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection

with this country to be considered part of that community."

Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (citing United States v. Verdugo-

Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). It is within the context

of this broad protection of individual liberty that the Second

Amendment must be understood. While the Constitution permits

certain restrictions, regulations, and forfeitures of the right

to keep and bear arms, any curtailing of such a fundamental

liberty interest requires close judicial inspection.

¶84 In a case also concerning a constitutional challenge

to Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m), Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Judge Amy Barrett undertook the "exhaustive historical analysis"

of the Second Amendment as applied to felons, an issue left

unexamined in Heller, which did not consider the

constitutionality of felon dispossession laws. In that seminal

opinion, then-Judge Barrett concluded that "[h]istory is

consistent with common sense: it demonstrates that legislatures

have the power to prohibit dangerous people from possessing
guns[,] [b]ut that power extends only to people who are

dangerous." Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019)

(Barrett, J., dissenting). Founding-era state ratifying

conventions and contemporaneously-enacted legislation reveal

that the Second Amendment never empowered legislatures to disarm

non-dangerous felons.

¶85 Language protecting the right to bear arms proposed

during the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania
ratifying conventions is frequently cited as evidence of the

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constitutionality of felon disarmament. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 455

(Barrett, J., dissenting). All three proposals, however, would

have excluded from the Second Amendment's protections only

people who were dangerous. Id. at 456. The New Hampshire state

convention proposed that "Congress shall never disarm any

Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion." 2

Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 761

(1971) (emphasis added). At the time, "[t]his limitation

targeted a narrow group because 'rebellion' was a very specific

crime" denoting treason. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 455 (Barrett, J.,

dissenting) (citing Rebellion, 2 New Universal Etymological

English Dictionary (4th ed. 1756)). Nothing in the historical

record suggests New Hampshire would have extended disarmament to

common criminals, much less individuals who posed no risk to

public safety.

¶86 The same can be said for the proposal from the

Massachusetts convention. Samuel Adams suggested limiting the

right to bear arms to "peaceable citizens." Id. (citing
Schwartz, supra, at 681). In the founding era, "'peaceable'

meant '[f]ree from war; free from tumult'; '[q]uiet;

undisturbed'; '[n]ot violent; not bloody'; '[n]ot quarrelsome;

not turbulent.'" Kanter, 919 F.3d at 455 (Barrett, J.,

dissenting) (citing 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the

English Language (5th ed. 1773)). Each of the antonyms of

"peaceable" connote some form of danger to the public at large.

In other words, the Massachusetts convention couched its
proposed Second Amendment limitation within the context of one's

17
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propensity for violence; nothing in the language purports to

exclude criminals as a class.

¶87 Lastly, although the Pennsylvania convention offered

ostensibly the strongest restriction on Second Amendment rights,

a more careful reading of this proposal suggests otherwise. The

Pennsylvania Minority proposed: "That the people have a right

to bear arms . . . and no law shall be passed for disarming the

people or any of them unless for crimes committed, or real

danger of public injury from individuals." Schwartz, supra, at

665 (emphasis added). There are two potential interpretations

of this language: one that would exclude both criminals as well

as the otherwise dangerous, and another that would exclude those

who pose a danger to society, irrespective of whether they have

committed crimes. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 456 (Barrett, J.,

dissenting). Given the absence of any historical indications

that the founding generation contemplated the dispossession of

all criminals, the latter interpretation is the more reasonable

one, under which "the catchall phrase limiting the rights of
individuals who pose a 'real danger of public injury' would be

an effort to capture non-criminals whose possession of guns

would pose the same kind of danger as possession by those who

have committed crimes" namely, "a subset of crimes" involving

"real danger of public injury." Id. (emphasis in original).

¶88 Of course, none of the limiting language proposed by

any of these states' conventions appears in the Second

Amendment. Id. This omission provides further textual proof
that Second Amendment rights extend to every citizen, unless

18
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restricted or removed for constitutionally-permissible reasons,

which were uniformly rooted in concerns over dangerousness

rather than general criminality. An examination of legislation

in the American colonies predating the Second Amendment confirms

this understanding. Concerned at the time with impending

threats of English tyranny, the founding generation dispossessed

individuals "who refused to pledge their loyalty to the

Revolution, state, or nation." Binderup, 836 F.3d at 368

(Hardiman, J., concurring). Early Americans grounded their

disarmament laws in quelling the "potential danger" posed by

those who were disloyal, although they had committed no crime.

Id. (citing Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir.

2012)). At its core, the founding generation enacted these

types of laws in order to "deal with the potential threat coming

from armed citizens who remained loyal to another sovereign."

Kanter, 919 F.3d at 457 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoted source

omitted). These laws were not concerned with categorical
distinctions based upon classes of criminals nor an individual's

prior legal transgressions. Instead, they were designed to

disarm individuals who posed a danger to society or,

particularly in the founding era, a danger to the Revolution.

¶89 The same can be said about other laws enacted close in

time to the founding. In particular, colonial legislatures

passed statutes disarming Native Americans and slaves,

purportedly out of fear of their armed "revolt" or other threats
to "public safety." Id. at 458 (citing Joyce Lee Malcolm, To

19
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Keep and Bear Arms 140-41 (1994)). Similarly, a distrust of

Catholics prompted their disarmament "on the basis of

allegiance" rather than faith. Id. at 457 (citing Robert H.

Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to

Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second

Amendment, 25 Law & Hist. Rev. 139, 157 (2007)). Although these

laws would not survive a contemporary constitutional challenge,

they nevertheless reveal the limits the founding generation

contemplated for the right to keep and bear arms. The earliest

Americans enacted them out of a fundamental fear of rebellion

and public unrest, rather than as a forfeiture for criminal

conduct. Constitutionally permissible disarmament is

circumscribed by founding-era conceptions of a person's danger

to society. In other words, "Heller instructs that the public

understanding of the scope of the right to keep and bear arms at

the time of the Second Amendment dictates the scope of the right

today." Binderup, 836 F.3d at 367 (Hardiman, J., concurring).

¶90 In contrast to its meaning under Wis. Stat.
§ 941.29(1m), the word "felon" signified something quite

different in the founding era. "At early common law, the term

'felon' applied only to a few very serious, very dangerous

offenses such as murder, rape, arson, and robbery." Don B.

Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and

Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 1362

(2009). Over time, English Parliament began classifying more

and more crimes as "capital offenses, some involving trivial
thefts." Id. In colonial America, capital punishment was rare.

20
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Kanter, 919 F.3d at 459 (Barrett, J., dissenting). Although a

definitive understanding of what "felony" meant at that time

remains elusive, a felony conviction unaccompanied by a life

sentence typically resulted in a suspension of rights, rather

than a permanent loss. Id.

¶91 Contrary to this overarching distinction between

dangerous and non-dangerous individuals, some courts——and the

State in this case——claim that the original meaning of the

Second Amendment is rooted in a "virtuous citizenry" test. See,

e.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir.

2010) (citing with approval cases concluding that the right to

bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry);

United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979-80 (4th Cir.

2012) ("[F]elons were excluded from the right to arms because

they were deemed unvirtuous."). According to this theory, the

"right to arms was inextricably and multifariously linked to

that of civic virtue . . . ." Kates & Cramer, supra, at 1359.

Because criminals have engaged in unvirtuous conduct, purveyors
of this notion posit that the Framers intended to limit their

Second Amendment liberties outright, irrespective of

dangerousness. See id. at 1360.

¶92 The majority alludes to this concept in a selective

but incomplete citation to Heller, proclaiming that "the Second

Amendment secures 'the right of law-abiding, responsible

citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.'" Majority

op., ¶21 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). Of course, far from
restricting the right to keep and bear arms to a select segment

21
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of society, to be exercised only for self-defense in the home,

Heller instead declared that the Second Amendment right "belongs

to all Americans" and broadly protects all "defensive purposes"

regardless of whether the right is exercised within or beyond

the home. 554 U.S. at 581, 602. This is the core right

protected by the Second Amendment. The full context of the

phrase from Heller cited by the majority shows that the Second

Amendment is neither limited to "law-abiding" citizens nor

confined to the "defense of hearth and home." Instead, the

Heller Court reserved other applications of the Second Amendment

for "future evaluation" while declaring that the Constitution

"surely elevates above all other interests" the practice

prohibited by the District of Columbia's handgun ban: "the

right of law-abiding citizens to use arms in defense of hearth

and home." Id. at 635. While this may constitute a

particularly sacrosanct exercise of the Second Amendment right,

at its core, the Second Amendment protects far more, and nothing

in an original understanding of its text remotely suggests a
non-violent criminal forfeits his Second Amendment right

altogether.

¶93 In suggesting that the Second Amendment right belongs

only to the law-abiding, the virtuous citizen standard is deeply

intertwined with the collective rights interpretation of the

Second Amendment, a reading Heller debunked as contrary to the

22
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original meaning of the Second Amendment.8 While "history does

show that felons could be disqualified from exercising certain

rights——like the rights to vote and serve on juries——because

these rights belonged only to virtuous citizens[,]" such "virtue

exclusions are associated with civic rights——individual rights

that 'require[] citizens to act in a collective manner for

distinctly public purposes.'" Kanter, 919 F.3d at 462 (Barrett,

J., dissenting) (citation omitted). In contrast, the Second

Amendment "unambiguously" protects "individual rights," not

collective rights. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. Given the Supreme

Court's rightful rejection of the collective rights theory as

applied to the right to keep and bear arms, the virtuous

citizenry standard is entirely misplaced in construing the

Second Amendment, particularly considering that its exercise is

"intimately connected with the natural right of self-defense,

and not limited to civic participation." Kanter, 919 F.3d at

464 (Barrett, J., dissenting).

¶94 The virtuous citizenry standard lacks any foundation
in the historical backdrop to the Second Amendment. For one,

The "virtuous-citizens-only conception of the right to
8

keep and bear arms is closely associated with pre-Heller
interpretations of the Second Amendment by proponents of the
'sophisticated collective rights model' who rejected the view
that the Amendment confers an individual right and instead
characterized the right as a 'civic right . . . exercised by
citizens, not individuals . . . who act together in a collective
manner, for a distinctly public purpose: participation in a
well regulated militia.'" Binderup v. Atty. Gen. U.S. of
America, 836 F.3d 336, 371 (3rd Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J.,
concurring) (citing Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well
Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73
Fordham L. Rev. 487, 491-92 (2004)).

23
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

"this supposed limitation on the Second Amendment stems from a

misreading of an academic debate about 'ideological

interpretation.'" Binderup, 836 F.3d at 371 (Hardiman, J.,

concurring) (citation omitted). In advancing this theory,

certain scholars divorced themselves from more authoritative

historical sources and wrongly focused upon whether or not

particular Founders were civic republicans or libertarians.

Id.; see also Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated

Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L.

Rev. 487, 492 (2004). This debate over ideology may inform the

Framers' motivations for constitutionally preserving the right

to keep and bear arms, but it has nothing to say about the scope

of the right or any constitutionally permissible restrictions on

its exercise.

¶95 If the virtuous citizenry test was historically valid,

we would expect to discover 18th and 19th century laws depriving

felons of their Second Amendment rights——a class of people that

would certainly be categorized as "unvirtuous." But that is
simply not the case. In the decades following ratification,

"nine states enacted their own right-to-arms provisions in their

constitutions," and none of them placed restrictions on

criminals. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 463 (Barrett, J., dissenting)

(citing Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and

Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 191, 208-09 (2006)). The

historic record affords the virtuous citizenry test no

credibility; in fact, there is "no historical evidence on the
public meaning of the right to keep and bear arms indicating

24
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that 'virtuousness' was a limitation on one's qualification for

the right." Binderup, 836 F.3d at 373 (Hardiman, J.,

concurring). Instead, as outlined above, the original meaning

of the Second Amendment contemplates curtailing the rights of

only those individuals who pose a danger to the public.

¶96 The majority's rationale for sanctioning the blanket

revocation of felons' Second Amendment right is even weaker than

the "virtuous citizen" justification. Wisconsin's citizens

should be alarmed by the breathtaking scope of the majority's

conclusion that "it is reasonable for the State to want to keep

firearms out of the hands of those who have shown a willingness

to . . . break the law"9 considering the "cancerous growth since

the 1920s of 'regulatory' crimes punishable by more than a year

in prison, as distinct from traditional common-law crimes. The

effect of this growth has been to expand the number and types of

crimes that trigger 'felon' disabilities to rope in persons

whose convictions do not establish any threat that they will

physically harm anyone, much less with a gun." Marshall, supra,
at 697. As but one example of how the ever-expanding regulatory

state may eventually make felons of us all, recall that whomever

fails "to comply with any record-keeping requirement for fish"

is guilty of a Class I felony under Wis. Stat. § 29.971(1)(c)

(provided the fish are worth more than $1,000).

¶97 Only months ago, a slim majority of this court

invalidated Executive Order 28, which had been issued by a

single, unelected bureaucrat who in the name of the COVID-19

9 Majority op., ¶48.

25
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

pandemic "claimed the authoritarian power to authorize the

arrest and imprisonment of the people of Wisconsin for engaging

in lawful activities proscribed by the DHS secretary-designee in

her sole discretion." Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI

42, ¶81, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Rebecca Grassl

Bradley, J., concurring). Had the court ruled otherwise, would

a majority of this court deem it "reasonable" to keep firearms

out of the hands of those who disobeyed a cabinet secretary's

decree to "all people within Wisconsin to remain in their homes,

not to travel and to close all businesses that she declares are

not 'essential'"? Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶1. If so, the

court's decision in this case would give the State license to

disarm a substantial portion of the citizens of Wisconsin based

on their "willingness to break the law" as unilaterally decreed

by an unelected bureaucrat, for the unspeakable crimes of

opening their "non-essential" businesses or washing their hands

for less than 20 seconds. Palm, 391 Wis. 2d 497, ¶87 (Kelly,

J., concurring). As a general proposition, the judiciary should
defer to the policy choices of the legislative branch, but when

those policy choices unconstitutionally infringe the people's

fundamental rights, it is the duty of the judicial branch to say

so. "[T]o make an individual's entitlement to the Second

Amendment right itself turn on the predilections of the

legislature . . . is deference the Constitution won't bear."

Binderup, 836 F.3d at 374 (Hardiman, J., concurring).

¶98 Underlying the founding generation's reverence for the
fundamental right to keep and bear arms was the understanding

26
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that "[o]ne of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish

their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people,

and making it an offence to keep arms." Heller, 554 U.S. at

608-09 (citing Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of the

Constitution of the United States § 450 (reprinted 1986)).

Embodying "the first law of nature" and representing "the true

palladium of liberty," the people's Second Amendment right

deserves far more respect than the legislature or the majority

give it.

IV

¶99 Whether applying strict scrutiny or some lesser

standard, Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) is unconstitutional as applied

to Roundtree, under the original meaning of the Second

Amendment. Even if a compelling state interest underlies the

statute, it lacks any narrow tailoring tied to the protection of

the public and therefore the statute unconstitutionally limits

Roundtree's right to keep and bear arms. Nor does § 941.29(1m)

bear a substantial relation to an important governmental
objective. Section 941.29(1m) bans every felon from possessing

a firearm in this state, regardless of whether he poses a danger

to the public. If the compelling/important state interest is

protecting the public from dangerous felons, then the statute

must actually do so. Instead, § 941.29(1m) disarms every

citizen convicted of a felony offense, regardless of the nature

of the crime involved, and irrespective of whether the offender

is dangerous. To survive either strict or intermediate
scrutiny, § 941.29(1m) would need to reach only dangerous

27
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felons, as determined by the crime committed or the offender's

personal characteristics. Under the intermediate level of

scrutiny applied by the majority, in order to assess "the

strength of the government's justification for restricting"10

Roundtree's Second Amendment rights——public safety——the court

must ask whether the public is safer now that Roundtree is

completely and permanently disarmed.11

¶100 Roundtree committed a non-violent felony when he

failed to pay child support nearly 13 years ago. The sentencing

court did not send Roundtree to prison, indicating he was not

deemed dangerous to the public. The record shows he made full

restitution by paying what he owed and he did not reoffend.

Roundtree has never been convicted of a violent crime and the

State did not introduce any evidence otherwise suggesting that

Roundtree poses a danger to society. Abandoning any pretense of

conducting an individualized inquiry into the application of

Wisconsin's felon disarmament statute to Roundtree specifically,

the majority instead resorts to nearly decade-old data from the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections indicating that 21.4 percent

of those who committed "public order offenses" and spent time in

prison later committed a violent crime. Majority op., ¶51. Of

course, Roundtree was never incarcerated for his offense, so the

only foundation for the majority's declaration of a "substantial

10 Majority op., ¶40 (citation omitted).

C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?,
11

32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695, 696 (2009) ("Is the public safer
now that Martha Stewart is completely and permanently
disarmed?").

28
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

relation" between disarming nonviolent felons and "preventing

gun violence" collapses when applied to Roundtree and others

like him who never spent time in prison.

¶101 Even if Roundtree had spent time in prison, the

premise that the State may permanently disarm all felons in

order to protect the public, based on data showing that 21.4

percent of felons incarcerated for "public order offenses" later

commit violent ones, presents a specious justification for

infringing a fundamental constitutional right. Unlike Roundtree

who was sentenced to probation, Martha Stewart spent five months

in jail. Marshall, supra, at 695. "Is the public safer now

that Martha Stewart is completely and permanently disarmed?"

Id. at 696. Of course not, and "it is at least curious how

Martha Stewart could merit anyone's concern." Id. at 735. The

same could be said for Roundtree, since the State produced no

evidence indicating that Roundtree presents a danger to society

warranting removal of his Second Amendment right.

¶102 The Founders never understood legislatures to have the
power to strip non-dangerous criminals of their Second Amendment

rights, which the Constitution protects for all Americans.

Absent statutory language narrowly tailoring the disarming of

felons based upon their perceived dangerousness, or even bearing

a substantial relationship to the ostensible governmental

objective of protecting society, Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) cannot

survive any level of constitutional scrutiny as applied to

Roundtree, much less the hapless possessor of fish who runs
afoul of the record-keeping requirements of Chapter 29 of the

29
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

Wisconsin Statutes. Without the predictive powers of the mutant

precogs from "The Minority Report,"12 permanently revoking the

Second Amendment rights of those who fail to meet their familial

financial obligations or carelessly keep their fish records,

bears no relationship to "public safety" or "the prevention of

gun violence," majority op., ¶53, much less a substantial one.

¶103 Of particular constitutional concern, Wis. Stat.

§ 941.29(1m) permanently disarms Roundtree and other non-

dangerous felons, who have no avenue for having their Second

Amendment rights restored. In contrast, a convicted felon only

temporarily loses his right to vote during his incarceration and

extended supervision. Wis. Stat. § 6.03(1)(b). Once he

completes the term of his sentence, the State restores his

voting rights. Wis. Stat. § 304.078(3). Similarly, convicted

felons regain their right to serve as jurors after their civil

rights have been restored. Wis. Stat. § 756.02. Reviving these

collective rights for felons while permanently dispossessing

them of their individual and fundamental Second Amendment rights
turns the constitutional order on its head.

12 "The Minority Report is a 1956 science fiction novella by
American writer Philip K. Dick, first published in Fantastic
Universe. In a future society, three mutants foresee all crime
before it occurs. Plugged into a great machine, these 'precogs'
allow a division of the police called Precrime to arrest
suspects before they can commit any actual crimes." The
philosophical premise underlying the novella "question[s] the
relationship between authoritarianism and individual autonomy."
The story was adapted into the 2002 film "Minority Report,"
directed by Steven Spielberg.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Minority_Report.

30
 No. 2018AP594-CR.rgb

* * * * *

¶104 To the extent Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m) permanently

deprives Roundtree of his fundamental, individual right to keep

and bear arms, with no showing of his dangerousness to society,

this statute is unconstitutional as applied to Roundtree. While

the wisdom of the legislature's policy choices may be fiercely

debated, "the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily

takes certain policy choices off the table." Heller, 554 U.S.

at 636. Permanent dispossession of felons' Second Amendment

rights is one of them. "[A]n act of the Legislature repugnant

to the Constitution is void." Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. As

applied to felons who pose no danger to society, Wisconsin's

felon dispossession statute is repugnant to the Constitution,

and therefore void. Because the majority allows statutory law

to override the fundamental constitutional right to keep and

bear arms, I dissent.

31
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

¶105 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. (dissenting). The Second

Amendment prohibits the government from infringing upon the

individual and fundamental right to keep and bear arms.

Wisconsin, however, makes possession of firearms a crime for any

person convicted of a felony. Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) (2017-

18).1 This complete ban on possessing firearms never expires; it

lasts for a lifetime. It matters not whether the felony was for

making unlawful political contributions (Wis. Stat.

§ 11.1401(1)(a)), legislative logrolling (Wis. Stat. § 13.05),

armed robbery (Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2)), or here, delinquent

child support (Wis. Stat. § 948.22(2)).

¶106 In 2003, Leevan Roundtree was convicted of a felony

for failure to pay child support for more than 120 days. In

2015, a search warrant found him in possession of a firearm

under his mattress at his home, leading to the charge currently

before us on appeal. Roundtree asks this court to decide

whether the Second Amendment permits the State to criminalize

his possession of a firearm. The majority answers yes,
reasoning that the State may disarm all those who have committed

a felony of whatever kind. I disagree. I conclude that the

original public meaning of the Second Amendment supports

applying at least intermediate scrutiny to this type of

restriction. This places the burden on the State to demonstrate

that the law is constitutional as applied to Roundtree by

proving a substantial relationship, a close fit, between

All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
1

the 2017-18 version.

1
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

criminalizing gun possession for those convicted of any felony

or of the felony of failure to pay child support and the State's

interest in preventing gun-related violence. The State has come

nowhere close to meeting its burden. I respectfully dissent.

I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT

¶107 We begin by laying down the guiding principles of

constitutional interpretation, and then apply those principles

to the Second Amendment.2

A. Principles of Constitutional Interpretation

¶108 In America, the people are sovereign. This is the

bedrock principle of American government. Wis. Leg. v. Palm,

2020 WI 42, ¶172, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900 (Hagedorn, J.,

dissenting) ("Government has a morally legitimate claim to order

and command not because it has the biggest guns or because it's

always been that way, but because the people have given it that

power."). When the people established our federal government,
they granted it only a limited set of enumerated powers. United

States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). States,

meanwhile, retained broad and far-reaching police powers,

covering the state's inherent power "to promote the general

welfare," which "covers all matters having a reasonable relation

2 Roundtree also challenges Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) under
Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution. However,
he fails to develop this argument in any meaningful way, and we
will not do so for him. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos,
2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35. Accordingly,
this analysis focuses on the Second Amendment alone.

2
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

to the protection of the public health, safety or welfare."

State v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., 65 Wis. 2d 482, 490, 222

N.W.2d 912 (1974).

¶109 Neither state nor federal power is without limitation,

however. The people declared certain areas off limits. Many of

these limits are listed in the federal Constitution's Bill of

Rights, including the Second Amendment's protection of the right

"to keep and bear Arms." U.S. Const. amend. II.

¶110 Initially, the Bill of Rights only applied against the

federal government. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687

(2019). Following the Civil War, however, the people decided

that some of the limits on federal power should also constrain

the exercise of state power. Id. To that end, the people

adopted the Fourteenth Amendment which, among other things,

provides that states may not "abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States" or "deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Over time, the United
States Supreme Court has construed the Fourteenth Amendment as

incorporating most of the protections in the Bill of Rights

against the States——the Second Amendment among them. McDonald

v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). Once

incorporated, the amendment's "protection applies 'identically

to both the Federal Government and the States.'" Timbs, 139

U.S. at 689 (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766 n.14).

Therefore, no arm of Wisconsin government may infringe upon "the

3
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

right of the people to keep and bear Arms." U.S. Const. amend.

II.

¶111 The Supreme Court's Second Amendment jurisprudence is

sparse, establishing for our purposes only two controlling

propositions: (1) the Second Amendment is incorporated against

the States via the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the right the

Second Amendment protects is an individual right, not a

collective right. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749-50; District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). While we are

bound by these holdings, neither offers much assistance in this

case. Several federal courts of appeals have opined on the

intersection of the Second Amendment and felon-dispossession

laws, but those decisions are merely persuasive, not binding.

¶112 In other words, this court is both free and duty-bound

to do the job of a court——not just to compare and contrast other

courts' opinions, but to explore the meaning of the Second

Amendment and apply it afresh. Admittedly, this is a difficult

task. But we are not without the tools to do the job. When the
people enacted the Constitution, they used words with certain

meanings, and those words were understood——and meant to be

understood——by the public. Our job when reading and applying

the Constitution is to learn how its words were understood by

the public when they were written, what many call the "original

public meaning."

¶113 The first task in this inquiry is, not surprisingly,

to read the constitutional text taking into account its context
and structure. The people who adopted it, after all, can be

4
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

presumed to have meant what their words conveyed when they wrote

and adopted them. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188

(1824) ("[T]he people who adopted [the Constitution], must be

understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to

have intended what they have said."); see also Joseph L. Story,

1 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 451

(1833) ("In the first place, then, every word employed in the

constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and

common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to

control, qualify, or enlarge it.").

¶114 However, sometimes the meaning of the text is

difficult to determine. This can be especially true with the

passage of time. When that is the case, we look to the

historical record for clues as to what the public understood the

provision to mean when it was adopted. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union,

Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶28 n.10, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946

N.W.2d 35 ("[W]here necessary, helpful extrinsic aids may

include the practices at the time the constitution was adopted,
debates over adoption of a given provision, and early

legislative interpretation as evidenced by the first laws passed

following the adoption."). The meaning of the text as

enlightened by the historical record is no less binding because

the historical inquiry is still directed toward discovering what

the words were understood to convey when written. See McPherson

v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892); Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. In

other words, the original public meaning controls, even when we
have to work a little to find it.

5
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

¶115 Judicial application of the original public meaning is

sometimes quite easy. A President, for example, must be at

least 35 years old. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Putting

that into practice isn't difficult and requires nothing more

than analyzing and applying the text. But other provisions,

especially the more vaguely worded protections in the Bill of

Rights, often demand some legal framework or test that enables a

court to apply the law to the facts of a case. See, e.g., Ezell

v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700-04 (7th Cir. 2011); see

also Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶¶256-59, 393 Wis. 2d 172,

945 N.W.2d 685 (Hagedorn, J., concurring). Our law is replete

with these implementing doctrines that give effect to various

constitutional provisions.3

¶116 A proper legal test must implement and effectuate the

original public meaning of the law. Bartlett, 393 Wis. 2d 172,

¶259 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (explaining that an appropriate

implementing doctrine is one "that gets us to the heart of the

constitution's meaning"). This is not a license for the
judiciary to engage in policy-driven constitutional line

drawing. Rather, an implementing doctrine must be a faithful

3 For example, the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. This text is put into
practice with the default warrant requirement and analytical
categories such as reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and
exigent circumstances. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). Most
challenges under the equal protection clause are analyzed under
a rational basis test. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
470 (1991). But government discrimination on the basis of race
is subject to strict scrutiny. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11 (1967). And the list could go on.

6
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

extension of the lines ascertainable in the provision's text and

history. Id., ¶¶257-59.

¶117 With these principles in mind, we turn to the text and

history of the Second Amendment, followed by a discussion of its

proper application.

B. The Text

¶118 The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the

right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

infringed." U.S. Const., amend. II.

¶119 As more extensively discussed in Heller, the Second

Amendment contains both a prefatory and operative clause, the

latter of which protects the right to keep arms and to bear

them. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-78. Historical evidence makes

clear that "'[k]eep arms' was simply a common way of referring

to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone else." Id. at

583. Similarly, to "bear" arms meant to carry, as it is
understood today. Id. at 584.

¶120 The text's reference to "the right of the people"

reflects an understanding that this right——like the Founders'

understanding of many protections in the Bill of Rights——did not

create a new right unknown to the people. Id. at 592. Rather,

the Second Amendment presumes this right already existed and was

held by the people. Id. The Second Amendment therefore called

upon a right that had an ascertainable scope and substance, and
gave it protection in our fundamental law.

7
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

¶121 By adopting the Second Amendment, then, the people

prohibited the federal government from infringing their right to

keep and bear arms to the same extent the right existed when the

Second Amendment was ratified in 1791. As Heller explained,

"Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were

understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not

future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope

too broad." Id. at 634-35.

¶122 The text, however, leaves many questions unanswered.

It does not readily reveal the nature of the right as it was

originally understood, and therefore the power of the state to

regulate matters touching its protections. Accordingly, we look

to the historical record for further assistance.

C. The History

¶123 In 1689 King William and Queen Mary assured Englishmen

that they would never be disarmed. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.

Codified in the English Bill of Rights, the protection provided:
"That the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for

their Defence suitable to their Conditions, and as allowed by

Law." Id. (quoting 1 W. & M., ch. 2, § 7, in 3 Eng. Stat. at

Large 441 (1689)). The English right to arms "has long been

understood to be the predecessor to our Second Amendment." Id.

This forerunner, and its understanding leading up to the

adoption of the Second Amendment in 1791, is our starting point.

¶124 But our study of the historical record does not end
there. As noted above, the Second Amendment does not operate

8
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

against the states directly; it does so by incorporation via the

Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified in 1868. Although this

issue engenders some debate, the prevailing view is that "when

state- or local-government action is challenged, the focus of

the original-meaning inquiry is carried forward in time; the

Second Amendment's scope as a limitation on the States depends

on how the right was understood when the Fourteenth Amendment

was ratified." Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702 (citing McDonald, 561

U.S. at 770-77). Thus, our study of the historical record does

not conclude with the close of the Founding Era, but rather

continues through the Reconstruction Era. Id. at 702-03.

1. A Positive Right

¶125 At its core, the historical record demonstrates that

the Second Amendment protects the longstanding, natural right to

self-defense.

¶126 From the outset, the English Bill of Rights made this

point explicit by guaranteeing the right to "have Arms
for . . . Defence." Heller, 554 U.S. at 593. Blackstone,

reflecting on the English right, noted that it protected the

"natural right of resistance and self-preservation" and "the

right of having and using arms for self-preservation and

defence." Id. at 594 (quoting 1 William Blackstone,

Commentaries on the Laws of England 139-40 (1765)).

¶127 Across the Atlantic, after King George III tried to

disarm American colonists, Americans "invoke[ed] their rights as
Englishmen to keep arms." Id. It was in that context that a

9
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

New York newspaper said in April 1769 that "[i]t is a natural

right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by

the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence." Id.

(quoted source omitted). On the American conception of the

right to keep and bear arms, Blackstone observed it was "without

any qualification as to their condition or degree, as [was] the

case in the British government." 1 William Blackstone,

Commentaries on the Laws of England 143 n.40 (St. George Tucker

ed. 1803).

¶128 In short, the central component of the Second

Amendment is the longstanding, natural right to self-defense.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. And, as Heller noted, this right

extends "to the home, where the need for defense of self,

family, and property is most acute." Id. at 628.

2. With Limitations

¶129 This core right, however, was not impervious to

certain types of government regulation. Laws restricting the
right to keep and bear arms were rare, but they were not

unknown. Those that existed were largely aimed at persons or

classes of people who might violently take up arms against the

government in rebellion, or at persons who posed a more

immediate danger to the public.

¶130 An early instance of this was in 1689, the same year

the English Bill of Rights codified Protestants' right to

possess arms. At that time, Catholics were deemed a threat to
rebel against the Protestant crown and "were not permitted to

10
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

'keep arms in their houses.'" Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (quoting

4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 55

(1769)). A 1695 Irish law disarmed Catholics on the same basis.

7 Will. III ch. 5, § 3 (1695); see also Joseph G.S. Greenlee,

The Historical Justifications for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons

from Possessing Arms, 20 Wyo. L. Rev. 249, 260 (2020). These

class-based dispossessions of those feared to be disloyal to the

crown, and therefore likely to take up arms against the crown,

were renewed multiple times and persisted well into the 18th

century. Greenlee, supra at 260-61.

¶131 The American colonies adopted similar laws disarming

those they feared would use them to violent ends. In 1736,

Virginia permitted constables to "take away Arms from such who

ride, or go, offensively armed, in Terror of the People."

Id. at 262 (quoting George Webb, The Office of Authority of a

Justice of Peace 92-93 (1736)). And in 1756, during the French

and Indian War, Virginia authorized the seizure of arms from

Catholics out of fear they were sympathetic to the French cause
and would take up arms against the colonies. Id. at 263. But

even that law provided an exception "for the defense of his

house or person." Id. (quoting 7 William Waller Hening, The

Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of

Virginia 37 (1820)). Maryland and Pennsylvania also enacted

similar laws during the French and Indian War. Id.

¶132 The revolutionary years gave rise to related laws

targeting those perceived as disloyal to the American cause and
therefore at risk to take up arms in violence against it. In

11
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

1775, Connecticut prohibited anyone who defamed acts of Congress

from keeping arms "until such time as he could prove his

friendliness to the liberal cause." Id. at 268 (quoting G.A.

Gilbert, The Connecticut Loyalists in 4 Am. Historical Rev. 273,

282 (1899)). One year later, the Continental Congress passed

the Tory Act, which called for disarming those with "erroneous

opinions, respecting the American cause."4 Also that year,

Congress recommended that the colonies disarm those "who are

notoriously disaffected to the cause of America." 4 Journals of

the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 205 (1906). And, at a

minimum, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North

Carolina, and Virginia all heeded the call, disarming those

disaffected with or unwilling to take an oath of allegiance to

the American cause. Greenlee, supra at 264-65.

¶133 Massachusetts' responded likewise to Shays' Rebellion

a decade later. Beginning in August 1786, armed bands of

western Bay Staters revolted against the federal government,

attacking government properties and, on February 2, 1787,
engaging a Massachusetts militia in a military confrontation.

Id. at 268-69. In response to the violent rebellion,

Massachusetts placed a variety of restrictions on those

involved, including dispossession of their firearms for three

years. 1 Private and Special Statutes of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts from 1780-1805 145-47 (1805). Notably, the law

provided that arms given up be kept safe "in order that they may

4 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1775-1789 18-22
4

(1906); https://www.loc.gov/resource/bdsdcc.00801/?st=text.

12
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

be returned to the person or persons who delivered the same, at

the expiration of the said term of three years." Id. at 147.

The response to Shays' Rebellion epitomized the type of

dispossession laws that existed during the Founding Era. They

were aimed at those considered dangerous to the government

during a time of war, and to a more limited extent, those

considered dangerous to society.

¶134 Moving forward in time, the Reconstruction Era

unsurprisingly reflects the prejudices of the age; most arms

regulations targeted slaves and freedmen. At a minimum,

Mississippi, Indiana, Maryland, Kentucky, North Carolina, and

Delaware adopted such discriminatory laws. Greenlee, supra at

269 n.133. Before passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress

condemned these laws as a violation of the right to keep and

bear arms in the Freedmen's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act,

both of 1866. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 773-75. Ratification of

the Fourteenth Amendment, which was widely viewed as

constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, affirmed that
states could not enact such discriminatory laws depriving

persons of their constitutional rights. Id. at 775.

¶135 A Kansas law adopted in 1868, the same year the

Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, is quite instructive. See

Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶64 ("Early enactments following adoption

of the constitution are appropriately given special weight.

This is because these enactments are likely to reflect the

original public meaning of the constitutional text." (citation
omitted)). It provides:

13
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

Any person who is not engaged in any legitimate
business, any person under the influence of
intoxicating drink, and any person who has ever borne
arms against the government of the United States, who
shall be found within the limits of this state
carrying on his person a pistol, bowie-knife, dirk, or
other deadly weapon, shall be subject to arrest upon
charge of misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be
fined a sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, or by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding three
months, or both, at the discretion of the court.
2 General Statutes of the State of Kansas 353 (1897). This law

prohibits carrying arms: (1) while "not engaged in legitimate

business"; (2) while intoxicated; or (3) for any individual "who
has ever borne arms against" the United States. The first two

restrictions are temporarily imposed in circumstances where

individuals pose a danger of engaging in arms-related violence.

The third restriction focuses on those who could be considered a

threat to rebel against the government because they had done so

in the past.

¶136 Notably the Kansas law prohibited only the "carrying,"

or "bearing," of arms, and not their possession. See supra ¶15.

Therefore, it did not prohibit keeping arms in defense of one's

home. The law also did not prohibit long guns, so it was not a

complete prohibition on carrying weapons. Greenlee, supra at

271 (citing Parman v. Lemmon, 244 P. 232, 233 (Kan. 1926)

(holding shotguns were not included in a similarly constructed

statute)).

¶137 Although more historical clarity would be welcome, the

record sufficiently establishes three key propositions regarding

the original meaning of the Second Amendment. First, possession
of firearms for self-defense and protection of one's home as an

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 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

individual right was widely accepted as the core of the Second

Amendment's protections. And the relative paucity of laws

prohibiting the possession or carrying of arms shows that this

fundamental right was subject to only narrow bands of

restrictions. Second, in at least some circumstances, states

could permissibly restrict the right to keep and bear arms among

those posing a danger to take up arms against the government and

those posing a danger of engaging in arms-related violence.5

Third, states had some authority to protect against dangerous

individuals by way of class-based arms restrictions, even when

not everyone in the class posed a clear danger of putting their

arms to violent use.

¶138 Instead of this relevant historical evidence, the

majority relies in large part on Heller's declaration that its

opinion was not meant to cast doubt about "longstanding

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons," which

were presumed lawful. 554 U.S. at 626-27. This statement

reflects that Heller was limited in its reach, and at least
suggests not all such laws would be unconstitutional. But it

also does not mean all such laws are constitutional (that

question is reserved), nor does it establish that these laws are

In addition to the examples provided, see United States v.
5

Sheldon, in 5 Transactions of the Supreme Court of the Territory
of Michigan 337, 346 (W. Blume ed. 1940) ("The constitution of
the United States also grants to the citizen the right to keep
and bear arms. But the grant of this privilege cannot be
construed into the right in him who keeps a gun to destroy his
neighbor.").

15
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

embedded into the original public meaning of the Second

Amendment.

¶139 To be sure, felon-dispossession laws laws have been on

the books for some time. But these laws are of 20th century

vintage; they do not date back to the 18th or 19th centuries——

the relevant time periods when the Second Amendment was

ensconced as an individual constitutional right. See generally

C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32

Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695 (2009) (examining the genesis of

felon-dispossession laws). In fact, no historical evidence from

the time the Second Amendment was adopted or incorporated

against the states demonstrates broadscale dispossession of

those who have committed certain crimes. Kanter v. Barr, 919

F.3d 437, 454 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) ("[A]t

least thus far, scholars have not been able to identify any such

laws.").

¶140 The first felon-dispossession laws appeared in 1923,

when New Hampshire, North Dakota, and California enacted laws
forbidding felons from possessing pistols or revolvers.

Greenlee, supra at 273 & n.160. In 1927, Rhode Island went a

step further, barring those convicted of "a crime of violence"

from possessing "any firearm." Id. at 274 (quoting 1927 R.I.

Pub. Laws 257). The federal felon-dispossession law, meanwhile,

was not enacted until the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, and even

then it only applied to those who had committed certain violent

crimes. Id. (citing Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, §§ 1(6),
2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250-51 (1938)). It was not until a 1961

16
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

amendment to the Federal Firearms Act that federal law first

prohibited all felons nationwide from possessing firearms

regardless of their underlying felony. Marshall, supra at 698

(citing An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L.

No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (1961)). Wisconsin's felon-

dispossession law, meanwhile, dates back only to 1981. Ch. 141,

Laws of 1981.

¶141 Thus, the proliferation of these laws in the last

century——far removed from the time the Second Amendment was

enshrined in the Constitution and incorporated against the

states——does not support the notion that these laws were

understood to be permissible under the historic preexisting

right to keep and bear arms. Such laws may be common today, but

they do not enlighten the original public meaning of the Second

Amendment.

¶142 Moreover, even if such a law had existed when the

Second and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified, it is unclear

how much help that would be. This is because the definition of
a "felon" has greatly expanded since the Founding Era. See

Kanter, 919 F.3d at 458-62 (Barrett, J., dissenting). In 1791,

felonies were a narrow subset of crimes generally involving

violence, many of which warranted the death penalty. Id. at

459. In contrast, today a person can become a felon for

possessing certain fish illegally, falsifying a boat title, tax

fraud, trafficking SNAP benefits, second offense dialing 911 for

a nonexistent emergency, adultery, and perjury, just to name a

17
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

few.6 This reality seems to undercut any useful comparisons

between the treatment of felons in 1791 and today. But again,

the historical record reveals no evidence from the Founding or

Reconstruction Eras of the kind of broad felon-dispossession law

like the one here.

¶143 Some have justified these laws by applying a so-called

"unvirtuous citizenry" theory to the Second Amendment. See

Greenlee, supra at 275-85. But this lacks any sound basis in

historical fact, at least insofar as it would apply to today's

felon-dispossession laws.

¶144 This theory is based on the accurate premise that

founding-era felons could be disqualified from exercising

certain civic rights because those rights belonged only to

virtuous citizens. See Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the

Constitutional Limitations 29 (1st ed. 1868) (noting that

certain groups including "the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon,

on obvious grounds," were "almost universally excluded" from

exercising certain civic rights). The problem with extending
this theory to the Second Amendment, however, is that the right

to keep and bear arms is not a "civic right" as that term was

understood at the founding. "Civic rights" were understood to

be just that——rights related to the civic space, i.e., the

community. They included "individual rights that 'require[]

citizens to act in a collective manner for distinctly public

purposes.'" Kanter, 919 F.3d at 462 (Barrett, J., dissenting)

Wis. Stat. § 29.971(1)(c); § 30.80(3m); § 71.83(2)(b)(1);
6

§ 946.92(3)(a); § 256.35(10)(a); § 944.16; § 946.31(1).

18
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

(quoting Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment,

22 Law & Hist. Rev. 161, 165 (2004) (alteration in original)).

Put differently, civic rights were those rights that empowered

individuals to participate in the enterprise of self-governance—

—for example, the right to vote and to serve on juries. Id.

Although these civic rights are "held by individuals," they are

exercised "as part of the collective enterprise[s]" of self-

governance or administration of justice. Id.

¶145 "Heller, however, expressly rejects the argument that

the Second Amendment protects a purely civic right"; it protects

a personal, individual right. Id. at 463 (citing Heller, 554

U.S. at 595 ("[T]he Second Amendment confer[s] an individual

right to keep and bear arms.")). Because the right to keep and

bear arms is not a civic right, it was not one of the rights

that could historically be withdrawn from unvirtuous citizens.

Indeed, there is "no historical evidence on the public meaning

of the right to keep and bear arms indicating that

'virtuousness' was a limitation on one's qualification for the
right——contemporary insistence to the contrary falls somewhere

between guesswork and ipse dixit." Binderup v. Att'y Gen. U.S.,

836 F.3d 336, 372 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Hardiman, J.,

concurring). In short, nothing in the text or history of the

Second Amendment suggests the right to keep and bear arms could

be removed by the government because the government deemed

certain kinds of people unvirtuous.

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 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

¶146 Putting all this together, the historical record

reveals the following regarding the original public meaning of

the Second Amendment:

 The Second Amendment protects an individual right to

keep and bear arms, especially in the defense of one's

home;

 The government nevertheless was understood to have

some ability to dispossess those who posed a danger of

engaging in arms-related violence, often due to the

risk of rebellion against the government;

 The government had some flexibility to disarm classes

of people that posed a high risk of engaging in arms-

related violence, even if individuals within that

group might themselves not pose that danger; and

 No evidence supports the notion that felon-

dispossession laws of the type at issue here are

"longstanding" in the sense that they were

contemplated when the right to keep and bear arms was
safeguarded in the Constitution.

¶147 With this history in mind, we turn to the task of

determining what legal framework or test best effectuates the

Second Amendment's original public meaning.

D. An Implementing Doctrine

¶148 The application of these principles to the case before

us requires some additional work. We need some judicially
enforceable legal framework, or implementing doctrine, to

20
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

effectuate the constitutional provision's original public

meaning. See supra ¶¶11-12.

¶149 For better or for worse, both federal courts and this

court have created and adopted a tiers of scrutiny approach for

evaluating some types of constitutional claims, especially those

dealing with fundamental rights. Courts typically employ three

tiers of judicial scrutiny: rational basis, intermediate

scrutiny, and strict scrutiny——although these tiers sometimes

work more like a sliding scale. Some have criticized this

approach, not without merit.7 But it has the virtue of putting

the State to its proof when government attempts to regulate in

areas the Constitution generally places outside the permissible

bounds of regulation. While a better analytical tool may be

devised, I accept this general construct in this case as a

reasonable approach to the tricky problem of applying the text

of the Constitution to various kinds of regulations touching the

Second Amendment.

¶150 The United States Supreme Court has described the
right to keep and bear arms as "among those fundamental rights

necessary to our system of ordered liberty." McDonald, 561 U.S.

at 778. This is consistent with its inclusion in the

Constitution alongside other basic, pre-existing rights,

including the freedoms of speech and religion. Generally, when

the government restricts the exercise of rights deemed

E.g., R. George Wright, What if All the Levels of
7

Constitutional Scrutiny Were Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. Mem.
L. Rev. 165 (2014) (advocating for abolition of the tiers of
scrutiny).

21
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

fundamental, courts apply strict scrutiny. See, e.g., State v.

Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995). To survive a

challenge, the "statute must further a compelling state interest

and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Id. This

burden rests on the state, not the challenger, and will rarely

succeed.

¶151 An honest evaluation of the historical record

regarding the Second Amendment, however, suggests strict

scrutiny may not be appropriate for all regulations affecting

the right it protects. We must match the doctrine to the scope

of the right, and do so fairly. Prohibiting the possession of

firearms altogether (especially in the home, as with Roundtree),

cuts on its face right to the core of the Second Amendment

right. That said, as best as I can discern from the historical

evidence now available and summarized above, the state was

nevertheless understood to have some authority to dispossess

those who posed a danger of engaging in arms-related violence,

and to do so in ways that were at least somewhat over- or under-
inclusive.

¶152 As explained above, in the early English tradition of

protecting the right to keep and bear arms, the government

dispossessed an entire class of citizens based on the fear they

would take up arms in violent rebellion against the Protestant

crown. Surely, not every member of that class was predisposed

to violence against the government, yet the class as a whole was

restricted. Similarly, during the Founding Era, states broadly
dispossessed those unwilling to take an oath to support the

22
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

cause of independence or otherwise sympathetic to British rule.

Surely not everyone dispossessed under those laws presented a

danger to public safety. Even the 1868 Kansas law that

dispossessed anyone "who has ever borne arms against the

government of the United States" cannot be said to be narrowly

tailored in the context of the Civil War's aftermath. Former

confederate soldiers presumably comprised a not insignificant

class of people in Kansas, many of whom no longer would have

posed a significant risk of violence simply by virtue of their

past war efforts on behalf of the Confederacy.

¶153 As a starting point, then, the individual right to

keep and bear arms, especially for the protection of one's home,

is a fundamental and individual right that should be treated as

such. But where there is a significant risk of arms-related

violence, government retains some authority to restrict this

right in ways that are not narrowly drawn; it may be over- or

under-inclusive. Even though restrictions on the individual and

fundamental right to keep and bear arms should ordinarily be
subject to the highest judicial scrutiny, where the risk of gun-

related violence is at stake, a slightly more deferential

standard is appropriate and in keeping with the historical

record.

¶154 Overly-generous deference to the government, however,

would not be appropriate, especially since the text generally

carves this right out as an impermissible area of government

interference. The State must bear the burden in this context to
show it is acting within constitutional limits, not the other

23
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

way around. When it comes to individuals who pose a danger of

using a firearm to commit violence, however, strict scrutiny

would seem to demand too much of the government in ways that do

not capture the historical understanding of the right. A more

appropriate analysis in this context is therefore a heightened

scrutiny that still puts the government to its proof. Among the

tools available, intermediate scrutiny best fits the bill.8

¶155 This approach has parallels in other areas of

constitutional law. The Supreme Court applies intermediate

scrutiny in some other circumstances where fundamental rights

are implicated. In the First Amendment context, for example,

the Court analyzes content-based restrictions on speech under

strict scrutiny, but it applies a form of intermediate scrutiny

to time, place, or manner regulations. Compare Texas v.

Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (applying "the most exacting

scrutiny" to a flag-burning statute) with United States v.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying intermediate

scrutiny to uphold a defendant's conviction for burning a draft

8I endorse the majority of Justice Rebecca Bradley's
dissent. However, I believe something less than strict scrutiny
is more in keeping with the historical record——and therefore the
original public meaning——for the type of restriction here. I
also agree with the majority that our decision in Mayo v.
Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund, 2018
WI 78, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678, is inapplicable. Whatever
analytical framework this court applies to equal protection
cases under the Wisconsin Constitution is not, in my view,
relevant to the framework we should employ to a claim under the
Second Amendment to the federal Constitution. The original
public meaning inquiry should dictate the appropriate legal
test, regardless of the tests this court has employed in
analyzing cases under different constitutional provisions.

24
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

card); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014) (applying

intermediate scrutiny to strike down a statute establishing

"buffer zones" around facilities where abortions are performed).

¶156 Intermediate scrutiny places the burden on the State

to show that the law at issue advances an important governmental

interest and is substantially related to that interest.

Gerhardt v. Estate of Moore, 150 Wis. 2d 563, 570-71, 441

N.W.2d 734 (1989). Even when the governmental interest is

important, a law survives intermediate scrutiny only if it "does

not burden substantially more [protected activity] than

necessary to further those interests." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.

v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997). As now-Justice Barrett

explained in her dissent in a case challenging this same

Wisconsin law, the fit between the means and the ends must be a

close one. Kanter 919 F.3d at 465 (Barrett, J., dissenting)

("'[A] very strong public-interest justification and a close

means-ends fit' is required before [the defendant] may be

constitutionally subject to the United States and Wisconsin
dispossession statutes.").

¶157 It's worth emphasizing again that the burden when

applying intermediate scrutiny is on the State to prove that the

restriction advances an important interest and is substantially

related to that interest. State v. Baron, 2009 WI 58, ¶14, 318

Wis. 2d 60, 769 N.W.2d 34. Every federal circuit to consider

this matter agrees. See, e.g., Binderup, 836 F.3d at 353; Tyler

v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sherriff's Dept., 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir.
2016); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1258 (D.C.

25
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

Cir. 2011). As one court put it, "Strict and intermediate

scrutiny (which we collectively refer to as 'heightened

scrutiny' to distinguish them from the far less demanding

rational-basis review) in effect set up a presumption of

invalidity that the defendant must rebut." Hassan v. City of

New York, 804 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2015).

¶158 To summarize, where the government purports to act in

ways the people have made clear in their constitution are

outside the power granted, it is not the citizen who must show

the government has acted unconstitutionally; it is the

government that must demonstrate it has authority to do what it

wishes. The Constitution reflects a presumption that government

action in that zone is unlawful unless proven otherwise. The

historic right to keep and bear arms is an individual and

fundamental right. But the government has broader authority to

restrict the right of those who would use arms for gun-related

violence. Intermediate scrutiny——requiring a substantial

connection to the important governmental interest——appears to
best capture and secure the right in accordance with its

original public meaning where government acts to protect against

those who pose a danger of engaging in gun-related violence.

26
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

II. APPLICATION

¶159 Roundtree challenges the constitutionality of

Wisconsin's felon-dispossession law as applied to him.9

Wisconsin Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) provides: "Any person who

possesses a firearm is guilty of a Class G felony if any of the

following applies: (a) The person has been convicted of a

felony in this state." "In this context, 'possess' . . . simply

'means that the defendant knowingly had actual physical control

of a firearm.'" State v. Black, 2001 WI 31, ¶19, 242

Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363. Thus, for anyone convicted of a

felony, § 941.29(1m)(a) operates as a lifetime ban on possessing

firearms for self-defense, hunting, or any other ordinarily

lawful purpose.

¶160 Roundtree brings two types of as-applied challenges.

First, he argues that the State may not constitutionally

dispossess him because the State has not shown that he

personally poses a danger of engaging in gun-related violence.

To support this challenge, Roundtree notes that his underlying
felony, besides being nonviolent, occurred more than ten years

ago, and that nothing he has done since suggests he poses any

heightened risk of using a gun violently. But as we have

discussed, the historical record suggests states may, consistent

9 As we have explained before, "Challenges to the
constitutionality of a statute are generally defined in two
manners: as-applied and facial." Vos, 393 Wis. 2d 38, ¶37.
Where "[a]s-applied challenges address a specific application of
the statute against the challenging party," a facial challenge
argues a statute "operates unconstitutionally in all
applications." Id., ¶¶37-38.

27
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

with the right secured by the Second Amendment, dispossess some

people on a somewhat overbroad class-wide basis. This is so

even if some individual members of the class demonstrate their

personal characteristics are inconsistent with a propensity for

violence. Moreover, the challenged law criminalizes firearm

possession for committing a felony, not for any of Roundtree's

personal characteristics or other actions. In other words, the

State has charged Roundtree with the crime of illegally

possessing a firearm on one basis only——his prior felony

conviction. Therefore, a challenge focused on Roundtree's

personal risk of danger is off the mark.

¶161 Roundtree also argues the State may not dispossess him

simply for belonging to either the class of people that

committed any felony or the class of people that committed the

same felony as him.

¶162 It is indisputable that public safety is a compelling

governmental interest. See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶23, 264

Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328. This interest is also well-
illustrated in the history of the Second Amendment. Wisconsin

Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) therefore advances an important government

objective.

¶163 Thus, we turn to the second prong of the intermediate

scrutiny analysis: whether a law that dispossesses all felons

is substantially related to the government's interest in

preventing gun-related violence. And again, it's worth

repeating that the State bears the burden to show a close and

28
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

substantial connection exists. The State tries to meet its

burden by pointing us to two studies.10

¶164 The study most heavily relied on by the State is a

2016 study on recidivism prepared by the Wisconsin Department of

Corrections. See Joseph R. Tatar II & Megan Jones, Recidivism

After Release from Prison, Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections

(August 2016) (hereinafter "DOC Study"). In its analysis, that

study grouped all offenses into four categories: violent

offenses, property offenses, drug offenses, and public order

offenses. Id. at 14. Relevant here, the public order offense

category included failure to pay child support (120 days+) in

addition to crimes like operating while intoxicated, bail

jumping, and operating a vehicle to elude an officer. Id. The

State primarily relies on the study's conclusion that for those

who committed a prior public order offense, 21.4 percent of

recidivists in that category went on to commit a violent offense

within three years. The remaining 78.6 percent of crimes

committed within three years by recidivists whose original
incarceration was for a public order offense committed non-

violent offenses (either a drug offense, property offense, or

another public order offense). Id.

10The majority, in a block quote to the majority opinion in
Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 449 (7th Cir. 2019), notes two
additional studies that are not discussed by the State in its
briefing. Majority op., ¶50. Because it is the State's burden
to satisfy the substantial relationship prong of intermediate
scrutiny, its failure to discuss these studies should preclude
the majority's consideration of them. This court should not
attempt to prove the State's case for it.

29
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

¶165 The State erroneously cites this study for a

proposition it most certainly does not support. It

characterizes the DOC Study as concluding that 21.4 percent of

all those released after committing a public order offense went

on to commit a violent offense. That's simply not what the

study says, and it is an egregious error in light of its almost

singular prominence in the State's effort to prove the requisite

connection. This 21.4 percent is not the percentage of all

public order offenders who, after release, committed violent

crimes. Rather, it considers only those who committed another

crime after committing a public order offense, and conveys the

percentage of those public order offense recidivists who

committed a violent crime. In other words, this 21.4 percent

figure has nothing to do with, and makes no reference to, those

who never recidivate after committing a public order offense.

It should be obvious, then, that this statistic offers no

assistance in establishing the relationship between past crime

and a person's risk to commit gun-related violent crime in the
future, which is the core inquiry of the intermediate scrutiny

analysis.

¶166 The second study offered by the State surveys "5,923

authorized purchasers of handguns in California in 1977," 3,128

of whom had at least one prior misdemeanor conviction at the

time of purchase. Garen J. Wintemute et al., Prior Misdemeanor

Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-

Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of
Handguns, 280 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2083, 2083 (1998) (hereinafter

30
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

"Wintemute Study"). Specifically, the State points to that

study's conclusion that "even handgun purchasers with only 1

prior misdemeanor conviction and no convictions or offenses

involving firearms or violence were nearly 5 times as likely as

those with no prior criminal history to be charged with new

offenses involving firearms or violence." Id. Consider me

unsurprised that people with criminal records who purchase

handguns are more likely to commit future crime than those

without a criminal record. But this correlation hardly

demonstrates the close and substantial relationship required to

justify this law. While those with a prior criminal record are

surely more likely to commit future crime, the vast majority of

people in the study who had prior criminal records did not

commit a new violent offense. And the State must demonstrate

that dispossessing the entire class that it chose will

substantially further the State's efforts to remediate the risk

of gun-related violence.11 This study falls far short of

demonstrating why those convicted of illegal possession of
certain fish, tax fraud, or failure to pay child support should

be dispossessed in the interest of preventing gun-related

violent crime.

¶167 The State's correlation-centric reasoning——that Wis.

Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a) substantially furthers the fight against

gun-related violence simply by virtue of a correlation between

past crime of any sort and future violent crime——does not meet

Importantly, the Wintemute Study does not actually
11

analyze felons as a class because generally, felons will not be
authorized handgun purchasers.

31
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

the mark. Playing this logic out further, suppose those who

previously declared bankruptcy are modestly more likely to

commit violent crime in the future?12 Or those who do not have a

bachelor's degree by the time they are 25?13 How about those who

were born out of wedlock,14 or who fall below the poverty line?15

Taking the State's argument on its face, dispossession laws

barring these classes of persons (which impact not a small

amount of the population) would survive as long as the State

could prove that these features are correlated with an increased

risk of committing violent crime with a firearm. Modest

correlation, however, is simply not enough. And at best, that

is all the State has here.

Gercoline van Beek, Vivienne de Vogel & Dike van de
12

Mheen, The Relationship Between Debt and Crime: A Systematic
and Scoping Review, European J. of Probation, Oct. 2020, at 1
(showing "a strong association between debt and crime whereby
debt is a risk factor for crime").

Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, The Effect of Education
13

on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-
Reports, 94 The Am. Econ. Rev. 155, 156-57 (2004) ("Instrumental
variable estimates reveal a significant relationship between
education and incarceration . . . .").

Todd D. Kendall & Robert Tamura, Unmarried Fertility,
14

Crime, and Social Stigma, 53 J.L. & Econ. 185, 213 (2010) ("[A]n
increase of 10 nonmarital births per 1,000 live births is
associated with an increase in future murder and property crime
rates between 2.4 and 4 percent.").

U.S. Dep't of Justice, NCJ 248384, Household Poverty and
15

Nonfatal Violent Victimization, 2008-2012, 1 (2014) ("Persons in
poor households had a higher rate of violence involving a
firearm (3.5 per 1,000) compared to persons above the FPL (0.8-
2.5 per 1,000).").

32
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

¶168 Including all felonies in Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)(a)'s

reach, no matter how violent and no matter how serious, is

"wildly overinclusive." Kanter, 919 F.3d at 466 (Barrett, J.,

dissenting). It is an extraordinarily broad class that lacks a

substantial relationship to the harm it seeks to remedy. Id.

The fit between means and ends must be close——not perfect, but

close. The State's evidence is far from showing that

dispossessing all felons forever bears a close or substantial

relationship to remediating the danger of gun-related violence.

¶169 If the class of all felons is too broad, perhaps the

State could nonetheless show that criminalizing possession of

firearms based on the particular underlying felony survives

constitutional scrutiny. But the State does not even purport to

argue that those who have failed to pay child support or

committed other analogous crimes pose any risk of committing

gun-related violence as a consequence of their underlying

felony, nor do its studies support that conclusion. The State

therefore fails to meet its burden of proof here as well.
¶170 The important goal of protecting against gun-related

violence does not seem to be furthered by dispossessing those

who have not committed a violent act with a gun, and indeed have

not committed a violent act at all. The State does not meet

this challenge head on; it has not met its burden to prove a

close and substantial relationship between the means and ends of

the prohibition. Accordingly, Roundtree's conviction for

possession of a firearm, a criminal prohibition triggered

33
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

because he was convicted of failure to pay child support for 120

days, violates the Second Amendment and is unconstitutional.

III. CONCLUSION

¶171 We are bound to interpret and apply the Constitution

as written. A careful study of the history surrounding the

right to keep and bear arms as protected by the Second Amendment

demonstrates that while the right to keep arms in the home for

self-defense is within the core of the right, some class-based

restrictions on firearm possession are permissible to protect

against the danger of gun-related violence. Felon-dispossession

laws may be permissible under this historical protection, but

only where the State shows the restriction substantially

advances the State's interest in protecting against gun-related

violence. Here, however, the State did not carry its burden to

show that Wisconsin's dispossession law satisfies this standard

as applied to Roundtree. Therefore, his conviction violates the

Second Amendment. I respectfully dissent.

34
 No. 2018AP594-CR.bh

1