IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1312
Filed January 21, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF D.B. and J.J.,
Minor Children,
S.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Rose Anne
Mefford, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children.
AFFIRMED.
Lynnette M. Lindgren of Faulkner, Broerman & Lindgren, Oskaloosa, for
appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Rebecca L. Petig of Bierman & Petig, P.C., Grinnell, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., Tabor, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children, born
in 2015 and 2018.1 She contends the State failed to prove the grounds for
termination cited by the juvenile court, the department of human services failed to
make reasonable efforts toward reunification, and termination was not in the
children’s best interests. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family came to the attention of the department of human services in
March 2019,2 when three-year-old J.J. was found wandering unsupervised several
blocks from the mother’s home in nearly freezing temperatures and without
appropriate clothing. Police took the child to the department’s office, where the
child was non-verbal and “very withdrawn.” When the mother came to retrieve J.J.,
she had eight-month-old D.B. with her, who appeared to have medical issues
requiring further evaluation, including a flat head and visibly small stature. The
mother was “confused” and appeared to be under the influence of some
substance. She was arrested and charged with child endangerment.
The children were taken to the emergency room. J.J. was found to have
“no verbal interaction” and “unspecified lack of expected normal physiological
development.” D.B. was behind on immunizations, small for his age, and had skull
flattening due to prolonged supine positioning. Examination of the children’s prior
1 The parental rights of D.B.’s father and J.J.’s putative fathers were also
terminated, and they did not appeal.
2 The department had previously provided voluntary services to the family in 2017,
following an incident in which the mother threatened the maternal grandmother
with a knife in the presence of J.J.
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medical records revealed the mother had not followed through with recommended
services for these issues. The children were removed from the mother’s care,
adjudicated in need of assistance, and placed in foster care where they have
remained since.
An array of rehabilitative services were offered to the mother, including a
psychological evaluation with parental assessment, mental-health treatment,
supervised visitation, family team meetings, and drug testing. The mother
struggled to make or attend appointments, both for herself and for the children.
The court’s July 2019 dispositional order found continued removal of the children
from the mother’s home was necessary “due to the mother’s inability to safely
parent the children and due to neglect of the children.” Specifically, the court noted
“concerns regarding the mother’s health and her ability to stay awake” and the
mother’s “complete denial of concerns that people are witnessing regarding the
children ([J.J.] being non-verbal is one example).”
In September 2019, the mother was found guilty of child endangerment.
She was sentenced to two years of probation. She was subsequently arrested for
violating her probation by failing to report and maintain contact with her probation
officer. The mother’s lack of compliance with her probation requirements mirrored
her lack of compliance with the department’s case plan requirements. In January
2020, her probation was revoked and she was sentenced to a prison term not to
exceed two years. Thereafter, the mother had phone contact with the children, but
in-person visits were delayed due to the child-endangerment charges that
precipitated her incarceration. Shortly after the correctional facility approved in-
person visits, the visits began taking place via videoconference due to COVID-19.
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Meanwhile, the guardian ad litem reported that D.B. had “completely
changed” since being in the care of the foster parents, including his physical and
emotional development. The guardian ad litem also noted changes in J.J.’s
development and behavior, including that she was interactive, excitable, and
displayed a visible bond with the foster mother.
In April 2020, the State filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental
rights. The termination hearing was held over two days in August 2020. The
record before the juvenile court indicated the children had been removed from the
mother’s care since March 2019, the mother had been released from prison in July
2020, and visits with the children remained fully supervised. The department
caseworker opined the mother had made “no progress” in the areas of parenting
and her ability to provide for the children’s needs. The department caseworker
and guardian ad litem recommended termination of parental rights.
Following the termination hearing, the court entered its order terminating
the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2020)
(concerning J.J.) and (h) (concerning D.B.). The mother appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.
In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019). Our primary consideration is the
best interests of the children, In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006), the
defining elements of which are the children’s safety and need for a permanent
home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).
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III. Discussion
The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
grounds for termination cited by the juvenile court. Iowa Code sections
232.116(1)(f) and (h) require proof of several elements conceded by the mother
and proof the children could not be returned to her custody. The mother contends
the evidence did not establish the children could not be returned to her care at the
present time.
The mother was released from prison less than one month prior to the
termination hearing. She testified she was living with a friend, who was getting
ready to move “within the next couple of months.” She had just gotten a “better
job.” The mother testified, “I’ve been trying to attend to my mental health needs,
and I’ve been on medication.” She stated she would not miss appointments
because, “I realize that I have to show up early for things.” The mother testified,
“Last year is when everything hit me and I said, ‘Oh, my gosh. I’ve got things to
work on.’” But she stated, “I made the most out of prison,” including taking classes
and reading self-help books, and “I’m just hoping that everybody can see that I am
really trying to change” and “I just really want to be a part of their lives, whether
it’s, you know, increased visits or not, but I don’t think that termination of my
parental rights is the right thing for us.”
The department caseworker opined the mother was living in a house that
“was not appropriate for the children.” Indeed, the mother acknowledged her
housing would not “be stable in the long-term,” and she asked for additional time
to “find a place of [her] own.” The caseworker acknowledged that the mother “kind
of acted like, you know, she had things ready to go and got the ball moving, but
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we are unsure if that is ever going to happen.” The caseworker did not believe the
children could be returned to the mother’s care because the mother was unable to
give them the permanency and stability they needed: “They need someone who is
able to take care of themselves in order to take care of the children, and I believe
[the mother] does not have what it takes to do that.” Ultimately, the juvenile court
found:
The gains Mother made in prison will hopefully continue to aid her in
navigating her life better than she did before. Unfortunately Mother
was not able to take advantage of the services and the extension of
time offered to reunify with her children. She loves them. No one
doubts it. But the fallout from the neglect they suffered while still in
her care, will continue to require extensive time, energy and parental
investment. Mother was never able to move beyond supervised
visitations. Mother will need to invest her limited cognitive and
emotional resources into managing herself; she would not be able to
safely parent these children today, nor in the foreseeable future.
We concur in the court’s finding that the children could not be returned to the
mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. Iowa Code sections
232.116(1)(f) and (h) were satisfied.
The mother also challenges the services provided, claiming her requests
for a different family safety, risk, and permanency provider “were ignored” and the
background-check process regarding her relative-placement request (which was
ultimately denied) took too long. Although the mother challenged the sufficiency
of her visits with the children while she was in prison, she did not raise these
current claims before the juvenile court. See In re S.J., No. 14-0978, 2014 WL
4231161, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2014) (“A challenge to the sufficiency of
the State’s efforts to reunite parents with their children should be raised when the
services are offered.”). The mother also points to her therapist’s opinion that she
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“was a fit parent,” which she claims was “ignored by the department.” Contrary to
the opinion of the mother’s therapist, the record shows the mother was “not . . .
consistent in successfully completing parenting programs or maintaining her
mental health.” When the mother received an extension in September 2019, the
department provided her with a written list of what she “needed to do in order to
get her kids back” “so that she had a constant reminder of what needed to happen.”
The caseworker went through the list, and “even sat with her and [they] called to
set up appointments,” but
[s]he failed to do the things that I needed her to do in the case plan,
and she also wasn’t able to follow through with the expectations of
her probation. So you see that underlying problem is that she—she’s
not able to follow through with the—you know, the commitments that
she has with her criminal charges or her children.
In this regard, we find the caseworker’s characterization of the department’s efforts
as “above and beyond what [it] would normally do for . . . [a] parent” to be accurate.
Termination also must serve the children’s best interests. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2). At the time the children were removed, J.J. did not respond to her
name, grunted in response to questions, and exhibited self-harming behavior. At
the time of the termination hearing, J.J. was speaking in full sentences, doing
“normal” kid activities, was fully potty trained, and was “just a totally different child.”
And D.B. had progressed from the fourth percentile to the seventy-fifth percentile
in weight, was “talking and jump[ing] around,” and was “within a few months of his
developmental age.” The children had a “really strong” bond with their foster
parents and went to them “for all of their needs.” We conclude termination is in the
children’s best interests, and no permissive statutory exception should be applied
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to preclude termination. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court to terminate
the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.