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Appellate Court Date: 2021.02.01
14:29:06 -06'00'
People v. Stoffle, 2020 IL App (2d) 190431
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Caption v. JENNIFER M. STOFFLE, Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. Second District
No. 2-19-0431
Filed June 3, 2020
Rehearing denied July 14, 2020
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 18-CF-2939;
Review the Hon. Jeffrey S. MacKay, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Robert B. Berlin, State’s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lisa Anne Hoffman
Appeal and Mary A. Fleming, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the
People.
No brief filed for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices McLaren and Hudson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Jennifer M. Stoffle, petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension of
her driving privileges. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petition, based on the
State’s failure to disclose to defendant the names of certain relevant witnesses until the day of
the hearing, which, according to the court, resulted in the failure to provide defendant with a
timely hearing under section 2-118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/2-
118.1(b) (West 2018)). The State timely appealed. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On September 28, 2018, defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI). A law enforcement sworn report, signed and dated September 28, 2018, indicated that
defendant had been involved in a motor vehicle crash, had slurred speech, and smelled of
alcohol. The sworn report indicated that defendant submitted to testing at Edward Hospital and
that the testing revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.243. The sworn report also
provided: “Notice of Summary Suspension/Revocation Given On 2/28/2019.” Certain
discrepancies in the date fields of the sworn report 1 were reconciled, and the SOS confirmed
the statutory summary suspension with an effective date of April 29, 2019.
¶4 On February 21, 2019, defendant was indicted on four counts of aggravated DUI.
¶5 On February 25, 2019, defendant petitioned to rescind the summary suspension of her
driving privileges. 2 The petition alleged the following: she was not properly placed under
arrest; the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that she was driving or
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs; she
was not properly warned; she did not refuse to submit to or complete the required chemical
test or tests; she submitted to the requested test or tests but the test sample of her blood alcohol
concentration did not indicate a concentration of 0.08 or more; and she was not involved in a
motor vehicle crash that caused “Type A” personal injury or death. Defendant reserved the
right to challenge the validity of the suspension on any additional basis, upon the completion
of discovery by opposing counsel.
¶6 Section 2-118.1(b) of the Code (id.) provides that a defendant “shall” be given a hearing
on his petition to rescind within 30 days after the petition is received or on the first appearance
date. “ ‘The word “shall” conveys that the legislature intended to impose a mandatory
obligation.’ ” People v. Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766, ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Moreland,
2011 IL App (2d) 100699, ¶ 8). The failure to provide a defendant with a timely hearing in
1
In a letter dated March 7, 2019, the Office of the Secretary of State (SOS) advised the Woodridge
Police Department that it could not suspend defendant’s driver’s license, because the “Sworn Report
contains discrepancies in the dates that appear in the Report.” The letter advised that the date of the
notice to the motorist and the date of the officer’s signature should be the same but that the officer’s
signature can be at a later date. The SOS asked that an amended sworn report be submitted. An amended
sworn report, dated March 14, 2019, provided: “Notice of Summary Suspension/Revocation Given on
03/14/2019.” Subsequently, the SOS confirmed the statutory summary suspension with an effective
date of April 29, 2019.
2
Defendant filed her petition to rescind three days before receiving notice of summary suspension
as indicated by the initial sworn report.
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accordance with section 2-118.1(b) results in the rescission of the suspension, unless the delay
is “ ‘occasioned by the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Summary Suspension of Driver’s
License of Trainor, 156 Ill. App. 3d 918, 923 (1987)); see also Moreland, 2011 IL App (2d)
100699, ¶ 10 (“[A] defendant is not entitled to a rescission if the defendant caused the hearing
to be delayed.”).
¶7 Along with her petition to rescind the summary suspension, defendant filed and served on
the State two motions for discovery and two notices to produce pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 214 (eff. July 1, 2018) and Rule 237 (eff. July 1, 2005). One motion and notice
related to “Refusal”; one motion and notice related to “Blood or Urine Test.”
¶8 On March 18, 2019, 21 days after defendant filed her petition to rescind, the State moved
to strike defendant’s notices to produce, arguing that defendant was improperly using Rule 237
as a discovery tool. In addition, the State objected to defendant’s requests under Rule 214,
arguing that the requests were “unreasonable, overly burdensome, and unlikely to lead to the
discovery of relevant information related to the *** Petition to Rescind Summary Suspension.”
The State also argued that the “requests do not reflect the scope and procedure of a summary
suspension hearing.” Defendant acknowledged receipt of the State’s motions and asked that
they be heard on April 17, 2019. Defendant agreed, in the interim, to “toll Trainor,” an
acknowledgement that the delay from March 18, 2019, to April 17, 2019, would be attributed
to her.
¶9 The State advised that it had provided defendant with the “initial disclosure,” “the reports,”
“lab results,” and the “towing report” and that it was still waiting for “the squad video.”
¶ 10 On April 17, 2019, the parties agreed that the petition to rescind summary suspension had
been filed on February 25, 2019, and that on March 18, 2019, defendant agreed to “toll
Trainor.” The parties further agreed that, for purposes of the 30-day speedy-hearing
requirement, it was “day 21.” The State argued its motions to strike, and the court found that
defendant had not improperly invoked Rules 214 and 237 for discovery. Nevertheless, the court
struck defendant’s discovery requests related to a refusal of testing, because there was no
refusal in the case. The court denied the State’s motion to strike defendant’s discovery requests
related to the blood testing.
¶ 11 The trial court noted that the State had also filed objections and asked whether discovery
was complete. The State indicated that it had tendered the squad car video, the labs, and the
police report. The State further indicated that it had sent a subpoena and was awaiting receipt
of hospital records.
¶ 12 The court set the matter for a summary suspension hearing on April 26, 2019, which the
parties agreed was “day 30” of the speedy-hearing period. Defense counsel commented: “So I
cannot say that discovery is complete or complied with, but if we’ll put it to day 30 and rehash
it on that day.” The court stated: “And, in the meantime, if you guys could attempt to have a
201(k) [(see Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(k) (eff. July 1, 2014))] conference.”
¶ 13 On April 26, 2019, the State advised that it was “answering ready for SS hearing.”
Defendant responded that “all we can do is enter a recission [sic]” because the State has not
complied with discovery. The court asked defendant what discovery was missing. Defendant
responded that it was not defendant’s burden to tell the State what she did not have. The court
asked if the parties had conducted a Rule 201(k) conference. The State argued that defendant
did not participate in the conference in good faith and also that the State had “opened [sic] and
pending objections on 214 materials.” The State maintained that it had made reasonable efforts
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to comply with discovery. The State advised that it had not provided any documents pursuant
to defendant’s Rule 214 discovery requests because it had filed objections on March 18, 2019.
The State argued that defense counsel had not negotiated their discovery disputes in good faith:
“Since that date we did have a 201 K conference, and again I think this is another
indication that the defense has proceeded in bad faith because counsel says that they
participated in this conference. They did not participate. In fact the conference began
by [Assistant State’s Attorney] Barsanti going through the enumerated paragraphs in
their 214 requests. She would talk about their request and she made comments as to
whether certain items had been provided in the criminal case. Counsel and I believe
two of the other attorneys at his office were also on the phone. [Assistant State’s
Attorney] Miner from my office was also on the phone. None of them said anything
while Ms. Barsanti was going through those requests. And at one point Ms. Barsanti
had to even ask them are you going to participate in this conference because they were
silent. There was a comment made by counsel that he was thinking out loud and Mr.
Miner said well, you’re not even thinking out loud because you’re not saying anything
to us. They then relayed to the State that they only had to confirm what they were given
in discovery and to quote the Patel case that counsel himself just cited, and I would
argue this is nothing like the Patel case. It is a totally different set of facts. But, in the
Patel case Patel talked about the spirit of the 201 K conference and the fact that
reasonable attempts should be made to resolve the differences in discovery. So, at this
point the State has participated in this conference. I’m arguing that the defense if
anything has not been reasonable whatsoever and after the 201 K we are here answering
ready for hearing. It’s our position additionally that we don’t have to file a certificate
of compliance because we have not tendered anything. There’s nothing that’s been
resolved with regards to the discovery because we have opened [sic] and pending
objections on 214 materials. The Defendant has made no attempts whatsoever to
discuss or request any of the additional materials since they know we have had
objections on file since March 18th.”
¶ 14 The State commented further:
“And I just want to point out that this is nothing like the Patel case. Because in the Patel
case, first of all the State didn’t file any objections to the discovery. And, additionally,
the State in that case admitted that all the items they were requesting were relevant to
the hearing. We filed objections, and I’m not conceding any of that is relevant because
I don’t even know what they want a hearing on because they wouldn’t talk on the phone
to us. So, I think I know the courts are very mindful of the 30 day Trainor time period.
But, counsel can’t proceed by filing all these requests under the civil discovery rules
and demanding that this time period be followed, but then themselves not follow the
rest of the discovery rules. We have received no motion to compel. And as I’ve said we
have absolutely made reasonable efforts. I’m saying we have gone above and beyond
because we have the arresting officer here. We have the lab analyst here for their
benefit, and I also want to delineate the State has criminal discovery obligations. So,
yes, we have issued subpoenas for lab documents, for paramedics reports, for the video,
for 911 calls and CAD sheets and that is all part of our burden in the criminal case. If
we are going by the rules of civil procedure as counsel is going to argue and want to
proceed under, they have to follow those, too. They have not done that. The State has
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made all reasonable efforts and again would say we have gone out of our way. So, I
would ask that we are answering ready for hearing. You deny any motion from them
trying to rescind the suspension because the delay has been occasioned by them and
they have acted in bad faith.”
¶ 15 Defendant denied acting in bad faith. Defendant stated: “We previously gave them our
request. If we tell them what we have logically, whatever we don’t have we still want. We
don’t have to go through and say this, but not that.”
¶ 16 The trial court noted that the situation “doesn’t fit within the Patel case” because the State
had filed objections to defendant’s discovery requests. The court stated: “Once the objections
are filed. I think I have discretion as to what is and is not relevant to the Summary Suspension
hearing.” The court stated that “it doesn’t sound like there’s been any type of meaningful 201
K conference.” The court passed the case for the parties to confer. The court stated that, if
necessary, it would “have a sub hearing on the objections within the SS parodyne [sic].”
¶ 17 When the case was recalled, the State “renew[ed] [its] objection[s]” to defendant’s
discovery motions. Thereafter, the trial court addressed defendant’s Rule 214 motion
paragraph by paragraph. Paragraph 1 requested:
“The names and addresses of all persons who have knowledge of any of the facts
regarding this matter, including any written or recorded statements made by said
witnesses. This would include notices, tow and inventory records, warnings, police
reports, mugshots, fingerprints, booking record, bail bond records, and recordings
related thereto.”
The State argued that it had objected on the basis that the request was overbroad and not
relevant to the blood test results. The State indicated that there was no booking video but that
it had tendered, in the criminal case, police reports, the warnings to motorist, the towing
documents, and the suspension notices. Defendant conceded that her requests for mug shots
and fingerprints were not relevant. The court found that defendant’s request for “booking
records” was overbroad, stating, “It sounds like a fishing expedition to me.” The court also
found that defendant’s request for “recordings related thereto” was overbroad. It stated: “You
want specific things like 911 tapes or paramedics reports, dispatch items? You have to specify
those.”
¶ 18 The State indicated that it had “tender[ed] today pursuant to the criminal discovery the
paramedic report that we are in receipt of.” The State also advised that it had subpoenaed the
hospital records but had not yet received them. At that point, the trial court stated:
“All right. And I’m going to make the finding that I think you’ve complied with
tendering the names of all known witnesses through the discovery you’ve tendered
already. Additionally I think you’ve made reasonable attempts to try to get the hospital
records of the Defendant from Edward Hospital.”
Defendant responded, “Your Honor, I was just tendered I think within the last 20 minutes the
paramedic report, and it does give the identity of the paramedics that were on the crew. But as
a practical matter if I want to call them as a witness, I couldn’t very well do that today.”
Defendant argued further that the witnesses were relevant. The trial court agreed that the
witnesses were relevant and that the delay had deprived defendant of the opportunity to address
their potential testimony within the 30-day speedy hearing period:
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“THE COURT: All right. In through what defense has filed and how the State
responded to this, we are going through item by item and counsel provided me with
some discovery that the State provided to which is day 30 of the Summary Suspension
hearing. Regarding paramedics reports, it’s a chance to look at those. There is a mention
of alcohol in those paramedic reports. I think the paramedics would be relevant to
Defendant’s SS hearing. Defense is saying that they cannot answer ready today because
the paramedics are not here. Well, he has the reports[;] the paramedics are not here.
These are witnesses, relevant witnesses, in my opinion in exercising my discretion I
think they are relevant witnesses that he may call at a potential SS hearing. We are on
day 30.
[Defense counsel] is put in a position of having to either proceed on his SS petition
without the relevant witnesses that he thinks he needs or take a date beyond the 30 days,
and thus putting his client in potentially having the Summary Suspension go into effect.
And I don’t know if we are on day 46 or not. Are we beyond 46 days from the date she
received the notice?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe so.
THE COURT: And it’s not relevant. But I was just asking. So based upon that, one
of the sanctions I can exercise is a recission [sic] of the SS hearing. I’m not going to
exercise any further sanctions regarding presumptions of evidence or anything like that.
The only sanction I’m going to exercise right now is recission [sic] on the SS hearing
because a hearing has not been held within the terms of Trainer [sic] and pursuant to
statute.”
¶ 19 The trial court’s written order provided: “Based on the People’s failure to provide witnesses
that being the paramedics involved in the treatment of the Defendant until 4/26/19, the
Defendant’s petition to rescind is granted ***. A recission [sic] of the Defendant’s statutory
summary suspension is granted with the ruling being Trainor was violated.”
¶ 20 The State timely appealed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 The State appeals from the rescission of defendant’s summary suspension. We initially
note that defendant has not filed an appellee’s brief. In First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v.
Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976), our supreme court provided three
possible approaches to such a situation. First, if justice requires, we may serve as advocate for
the appellee and search the record for purposes of sustaining the trial court’s judgment. Id.
Second, we may decide the appeal’s merits if the record is simple and the claimed errors are
such that we can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee’s brief. Id. Third, if the
appellant’s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error, as supported by the record, we may
reverse the trial court’s judgment. Id. Here, the record is simple, as it consists of a relatively
short common-law record and fewer than 80 pages of transcripts. In addition, we can review
the claimed errors without the aid of an appellee’s brief. Accordingly, we decide the merits of
the appeal.
¶ 23 “Proceedings on a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of a defendant’s
driving privileges are civil.” Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766, ¶ 12. “[T]he legislature intended
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the summary suspension and rescission hearing process to be swift and of limited scope.”
People v. Teller, 207 Ill. App. 3d 346, 351 (1991).
“The only issues which a driver may raise at such hearings are: ‘(1) whether the person
was placed under arrest; (2) whether the arresting officer had probable cause to believe
that the person was driving while under the influence; (3) whether the person refused
to take a chemical test; and (4) whether the person failed a test to which that person
submitted.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Moore, 138 Ill. 2d 162, 167 (1990)).
The burden of proof is on the defendant. Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766, ¶ 12. If the defendant
establishes a prima facie case for rescission, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence
justifying the suspension. Id.
¶ 24 The State characterizes the rescission as a sanction for a discovery violation. From this
perspective, the State argues that it did not commit a discovery violation, given that it filed
timely objections and was “not ordered to produce the paramedics report in question before
April 26, 2019.” The State alternatively argues that, even if it had committed a discovery
violation, the court’s rescission of the summary suspension was an unreasonable sanction. In
addition, the State argues that “Trainor should have been tolled” while the State’s objections
were pending and that any delay should be attributed to defendant.
¶ 25 The State frames the issue as whether the rescission of defendant’s summary suspension
was an appropriate “sanction” for a discovery violation, which it claims that it did not commit.
To be sure, the trial court called the rescission a “sanction,” but the court expressly cited “the
statute,” effectively rescinding the summary suspension for a violation of the speedy-hearing
requirement of section 2-118.1(b) of the Code. Thus, our review of the rescission turns not on
whether the State committed a discovery violation and whether rescission was an appropriate
sanction but on whether defendant occasioned the delay in the proceedings.
¶ 26 Section 2-118.1(b) mandated that defendant receive a hearing on her petition within 30
days after the petition was received (see 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2018)) and that the
failure to provide a timely hearing must result in rescission. Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766,
¶ 13; Trainor, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 918. “[U]nless defendant occasioned the delay in the
proceedings, [s]he was entitled to a hearing that complied with the time constraints of section
2-118.1(b) of the [Code].” Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766, ¶ 19.
¶ 27 The State provided defendant with the names of necessary witnesses on the last day that a
timely hearing could have occurred, effectively preventing defendant from calling those
witnesses. A hearing after that day would have been timely only if the delay between April 17,
2019, and April 26, 2019, were attributed to defendant. The trial court, in granting defendant’s
petition to rescind her summary suspension, essentially attributed that delay to the State. We
review this decision for an abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 14.
¶ 28 The record refutes the State’s position that defendant occasioned the delay between April
17, 2019, and April 26, 2019. The State claims that it is not responsible for the delay, because
it “[was] not ordered to produce the paramedics report in question before April 26, 2019.”
However, the rescission was based not on the State’s delay in producing the report but on its
delay in disclosing the names of the paramedics. The court found that the paramedics were
relevant and discoverable witnesses, and the State does not dispute this point on appeal. See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (“Points not argued are forfeited ***.”).
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¶ 29 The State also argues that, while its objections were pending, “Trainor should have been
tolled” and that any delay should have been attributed to defendant. To be sure, the State filed
objections to defendant’s discovery motions, and on April 17, 2019, the trial court struck
defendant’s discovery requests related to a refusal of testing, because no refusal occurred. On
April 26, 2019, the court found that defendant’s requests for booking records and recordings
were overbroad. However, the State has not directed us to any authority holding that the filing
of an objection by the State automatically tolls the 30-day period set forth in section 2-118.1(b)
of the Code. The State cites People v. Tsiamas, 2015 IL App (2d) 140859, ¶ 18, where we
noted that the State may object to discovery requests during summary suspension proceedings,
but we did not hold that doing so would have automatically tolled the 30-day period, which
was not even at issue in that case. If we were to adopt the State’s position, the State could
manipulate the summary suspension proceedings by filing a series of discovery objections and
attributing the delay to defendant.
¶ 30 The State also cites Patel, where the defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary
suspension of his driving privileges, along with motions for discovery and notices to produce.
Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766, ¶ 3. Twenty-five days later, the trial court, over the
defendant’s objection, granted the State an additional 7 days to produce discovery and tolled
the 30-day period. Id. ¶ 7. The defendant filed a motion to rescind the summary suspension,
because the hearing took place 38 days after the petition was filed, but the trial court denied
the motion. Id. ¶ 8. We reversed, holding that the additional time should have been attributed
to the State, because the record did not support a conclusion that the defendant “occasioned
the delay.” Id. ¶ 15. We noted the State’s concession at trial and at oral argument that the
defendant was entitled to the discovery that he requested and that the State did not dispute that
it would have been feasible to produce the requested discovery. Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. We stated:
“In the absence of any excuse from the prosecutor as to why the State failed to timely
produce the requested materials—which were admittedly discoverable and even
integral to the defense—and in the absence of any justification by the trial court for
attributing the time to defendant, there is simply no basis to conclude that defendant
occasioned the delay of the hearing.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 19.
¶ 31 Unlike in Patel, the State objected to defendant’s discovery requests, but those objections
were unrelated to the paramedics. The State does not dispute that the paramedics were relevant
and discoverable witnesses or that it was feasible to timely disclose their names. Moreover, the
State did not argue below that the 30-day period should be tolled pending a ruling on its
discovery objections. Indeed, on March 18, 2019, when the State filed its objections, defendant
was the party who agreed to toll the 30-day period until April 17, 2019. On April 17, 2019, the
State did not seek a ruling on certain objections or object when the summary suspension
hearing was set for April 26, 2019. The State conceded that, for purposes of section 2-118.1(b),
the 30-day period would expire on April 26, 2019. The State offers no basis on which to
conclude that any delay in producing the names of the paramedics should be attributed to
defendant.
¶ 32 The trial court held: “[Defense counsel] is put in a position of having to either proceed on
his SS petition without the relevant witnesses that he thinks he needs or take a date beyond the
30 days, and thus putting his client in potentially having the Summary Suspension go into
effect.” We agree. See Patel, 2019 IL App (2d) 170766, ¶ 17. Given the court’s rationale, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s petition to
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rescind her summary suspension.
¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
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