Case: 20-10420 Document: 00515740487 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/10/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
February 10, 2021
No. 20-10420
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Manuel Lang, III,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:15-CR-92-2
Before Davis, Southwick, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Manuel Lang, III, federal prisoner # 66137-380, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to reduce sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Lang requested a compassionate-release sentence reduction
based upon the COVID-19 pandemic and his underlying medical conditions.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-10420 Document: 00515740487 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/10/2021
No. 20-10420
Because Lang failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing his
motion, we AFFIRM. 1
In 2016, Lang pleaded guilty to a drug offense and was sentenced to
96 months in prison. On April 13, 2020, Lang submitted a motion requesting
a compassionate-release sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and home
confinement under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act. 2 Lang stated that he suffers from various health ailments,
making him high risk for contracting COVID-19 and developing a debilitating
illness from it. On April 18, 2020, the district court denied Lang’s motion
based on Lang’s failure to describe “the conditions of his present housing at
FMC-Fort Worth or how those conditions might justify any change to the
service of his sentence.” Lang timely filed a notice of appeal. 3
On appeal, Lang argues that the district court abused its discretion and
erred in denying his motion for a compassionate-release sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because it failed to consider his medical conditions
which put him at high risk of contracting, and becoming seriously ill from,
1
United States v. Chacon, 742 F.3d 219, 220 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that this Court
may affirm on any basis supported by the record).
2
Lang indicated that on April 13, 2020, he signed and submitted his motion to
prison authorities to be mailed to the district court. The motion was received and marked
as “filed” by the district court on April 16, 2020.
3
Lang subsequently filed in the district court a motion to expedite his appeal and
an amended motion to expedite his appeal. Construing those motions as additional motions
for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court denied those motions
on May 20, 2020, based on Lang’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as
required by § 3582(c)(1)(A). Lang, however, did not appeal the district court’s May 20,
2020, order. Thus, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of the district court’s
April 20, 2020, order. See Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 392 F.3d 802, 806–07 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review a ruling without an effective
notice of appeal of that ruling).
2
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No. 20-10420
COVID-19. 4 He asserts that his medical conditions combined with the
COVID-19 pandemic constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” as
contemplated by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), qualifying him for a compassionate-
release sentence reduction. 5 He contends that he exhausted his
administrative remedies because he sent an inmate request for
compassionate release to the appropriate prison authority on April 18, 2020,
and he did not receive a response within 30 days.
“‘[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of
imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment’ and may not be modified by a
district court except in limited circumstances.” 6 One such exception is
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the provision that Lang relies on here, which allows a
district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if, after considering any
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it finds that “extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 7 We review the denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for an
abuse of discretion. 8
4
Lang has informed this Court that he tested positive for COVID-19 on
September 21, 2020.
5
Although Lang contends he meets the criteria for release to home confinement
under the CARES Act, the plain language of the CARES Act does not grant a federal court
the authority to make home confinement determinations. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134, § 12003 Stat. 281, 516 (2020). Rather, it
authorizes prison authorities to lengthen the maximum amount of time to place a prisoner
in home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2), which applies to “prerelease custody”
and not to compassionate-release sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
6
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (quoting § 3582(b)).
7
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
8
United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020).
3
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No. 20-10420
A § 3582(c)(1)(A) compassionate-release motion may be filed either
by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or by a defendant after he has “fully
exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons
to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the
receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever
is earlier.” 9 This Court recently held in a case involving a motion for
compassionate release based on the COVID-19 pandemic that this pre-filing
administrative exhaustion requirement, although not jurisdictional, is
mandatory. 10
As stated above, with respect to exhaustion, Lang asserts that he
submitted a written inmate request to the appropriate prison authority on
April 18, 2020, and that he did not receive a response within 30 days. But the
record shows that on April 13, 2020, before Lang ever made his request to
prison officials, Lang submitted his motion for compassionate release for
mailing to the district court, which was marked as filed on April 16, 2020.
Thus, Lang had not begun the mandatory administrative exhaustion process
required by § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), let alone completed it, before he filed his
motion for compassionate release in federal court.
Based on the foregoing, because Lang failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing his motion for a compassionate-release
sentence reduction in federal court, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED. 11
9
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).
10
United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467–68 (5th Cir. 2020).
11
See id.
4