USCA11 Case: 20-12419 Date Filed: 02/16/2021 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-12419
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cv-61733-AHS
WILLIAM BURKE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CUSTOM MARINE GROUP,
CUSTOM MARINE GROUP, LLC,
ICONIC MARINE,
ICONIC MARINE GROUP,
ICONIC MARINE GROUP, LLC,
Defendants,
FOUNTAIN, et al.,
Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 16, 2021)
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Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal concerns William Burke’s purchase of a defective high-speed
sports fishing vessel. According to Burke, the district court erred in dismissing
Burke’s second amended complaint (1) as a shotgun pleading, (2) without leave to
amend, and (3) in its entirety. After careful review, we affirm the district court’s
ruling.
The facts are known to the parties; we do not repeat them here except as
necessary to resolution of the issues presented.
I
Burke purchased a high-speed sports fishing vessel. Burke eventually
discovered defects with the vessel and filed a complaint against more than 30
defendants. Burke filed a motion for enlargement of time to serve process; in
granting the motion, the district court stated: “Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to be a
shotgun pleading. Plaintiff fails to articulate with the requisite specificity how
each of the many Defendants are liable for the alleged claims. Plaintiff is advised
to address these pleading deficiencies in any amended complaint.” Burke then
filed his first amended complaint. Several defendants moved to dismiss the first
amended complaint, arguing, in relevant part, that it was a “shotgun pleading.”
The district court held a hearing and eventually granted the motion to dismiss,
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stating that “[a]s stated on the record, Plaintiff is advised to address the pleading
deficiencies in the amended complaint.”
Burke filed a second amended complaint. Some of the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The district court granted the
motion and dismissed the second amended complaint in its entirety with prejudice.
In particular, the district court stated:
In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [] each count incorporates
the allegations of all the preceding paragraphs and counts, even though
many of the allegations have no bearing on the claims. In opposition
to the instant motion, Plaintiff insists nothing set forth in the Second
Amended Complaint [] should prevent the parties or this Court from
understanding the heart of the complaint. And, he further asserts if
there are any ambiguities, ‘the parties will be able to ferret out
additional detail [sic] concerning Plaintiff’s legal theories in a timely
and efficient manner via the discovery process.’ [] Here, Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint [] spans 80 pages, an addition of two more
counts and two additional defendants. There are no discernible causes
of action, nor are the facts stated in the numbered paragraphs limited to
a single set of circumstances.
When Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint [], he had fair and
adequate notice of the defects and a meaningful chance to fix them. See
Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018) . .
. In the Second Amended Complaint [], Plaintiff still failed to correct
defects of which he had notice. To permit this action to go forward
would result in a waste of judicial resources.
Burke now appeals the district court’s order dismissing his second amended
complaint.1
1
We review a district court’s dismissal on shotgun-pleading grounds for an abuse of discretion.
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
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II
Before us, Burke argues that the district court erred in dismissing Burke’s
second amended complaint (1) as a shotgun pleading, (2) without leave to amend,
and (3) in its entirety. We address each of these arguments in turn.
A
Rule 8(a)(2) states that a “pleading that states a claim for relief must contain
. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Rule 10(b) similarly provides that:
A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each
limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A later
pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If
doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence—and each defense other than a denial—must
be stated in a separate count or defense.
This Court has referred to complaints that fail to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule
10(b), or both, as “shotgun pleadings.” See, e.g., Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.
Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). In Weiland, we identified
four categories of shotgun pleadings: (1) “a complaint containing multiple counts
where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each
successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint”; (2) “a complaint . . . replete with conclusory,
vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action”; (3) a complaint “that commits the sin of not separating into a different
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count each cause of action or claim for relief”; and (4) a complaint that “assert[s]
multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the
defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants
the claim is brought against.” 792 F.3d at 1321–23. “The unifying characteristic
of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another, and in
one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against
them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
Here, the district court concluded that Burke’s second amended complaint
fell into the first Weiland category—those which contain multiple counts where
each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts. Although each of the
counts realleged the generalized allegations, they did not reallege the preceding
counts. This Court does not categorize complaints as shotgun pleadings where
“[t]he allegations of each count are not rolled into every successive count on down
the line.” Weiland, 792 at 1324. The district court’s conclusion with respect to the
first Weiland category was therefore incorrect.
The district court identified other problems, however, with Burke’s second
amended complaint. Specifically, the court concluded that Burke’s complaint
“spans 80 pages, an addition of two more counts and two additional defendants”
and that “[t]here are no discernible causes of action, nor are the facts stated in the
numbered paragraphs limited to a single set of circumstances.”
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The district court correctly identified Burke’s complaint as implicating the
third Weiland category 2— failure to separate “into a different count each cause of
action or claim for relief.” 792 F.3d at 1322. In Count V, Burke alleged
“Negligent Manufacturing, Design, Failure to Warn, Etc.” against the Fountain and
Iconic defendants. These are distinct theories of liability that involve different
facts and should be asserted independently. See, e.g., Tang v. NCL (Bahamas)
Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 1229 (S.D. Fla. 2020). Further, before the district
court, Burke argued that “[r]eview of the Count [V] . . . reveals that this is a
negligence count supported by a list of negligent acts A-K which is perfectly
acceptable.” But the explanation that Count V is “a negligence count” only
compounds the difficulty of comprehending Burke’s second amended complaint;
in Count VI, Burke also alleges “Negligence” against the Fountain and Iconic
defendants, as well as defendant Hardison. The result of this—including Burke’s
use of “Etc.” in the title of Count V— is that the defendants lack “adequate notice
of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claims rest.”
Weiland, 792 at 1323. We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed
Burke’s second amended complaint as a shotgun pleading.
B
2
Although the district court incorrectly concluded that Burke’s second amended complaint fell
into Weiland’s first category, we may affirm the district court’s judgment based on any ground
supported by the record. See Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir.
2012).
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Burke also argues that the district court erred in dismissing the second
amended complaint without leave to amend because Burke lacked fair and
adequate notice of his pleadings’ defects. Under our precedent—
In dismissing a shotgun complaint for noncompliance with Rule 8(a), a
district court must give the plaintiff one chance to remedy such
deficiencies . . . . What matters is function, not form: the key is whether
the plaintiff had fair notice of the defects and a meaningful chance to
fix them. If that chance is afforded and the plaintiff fails to remedy the
defects, the district court does not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
case with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds.
Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation
marks omitted).
The district court afforded Burke with ample opportunity to fix the defects in
his pleadings. Recall that, in ruling on the motion for enlargement of time, the
district court stated: “Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to be a shotgun pleading.
Plaintiff fails to articulate with the requisite specificity how each of the many
Defendants are liable for the alleged claims. Plaintiff is advised to address these
pleading deficiencies in any amended complaint.” At the motion hearing that
resulted in the dismissal of Burke’s amended complaint, the district court identified
specific problems with Burke’s pleadings and permitted Burke to file his third
complaint. In light of Burke’s failure to cure his pleadings’ deficiencies after
multiple opportunities, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
his second amended complaint without leave to amend.
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C
Finally, Burke argues that the court erred in dismissing the second amended
complaint “in its entirety.” Specifically, Burke argues that the order dismissing the
amended complaint failed to give him fair notice of the defects as to the pleading
of the two additional counts and two additional defendants. Burke contends that he
advised the court that he intended to add another count, that the district court
signaled assent, but that the district court later dismissed the second amended
complaint by noting that Burke had added two more counts and two more
defendants. But it is clear that the district court did not dismiss the second
amended complaint because of the two additional counts and defendants. The
district court simply emphasized these additional defendants and counts to observe
that Burke’s changes to the amended complaint did not make his pleadings
intelligible. The district court rested its decision to dismiss on entirely independent
grounds, including that “[t]here are no discernible causes of action, nor are the
facts stated in the numbered paragraphs limited to a single set of circumstances.”
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Burke’s
second amended complaint in its entirety.3
3
We need not address the Appellees’ argument in the alternative that Burke failed to state a
plausible claim for relief.
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III
To sum up: the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Burke’s second amended complaint (1) as a shotgun pleading, (2) without leave to
amend, and (3) in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.
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