Case: 20-10774 Document: 00515746275 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-10774 February 17, 2021
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Michael Pringle,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 3:12-CR-316-2
Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Michael Pringle, federal prisoner #45052-177, moves to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) in his appeal of the order denying his motion for
compassionate release under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,
132 Stat. 5194 (2018), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). By seeking leave to
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opin-
ion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-10774 Document: 00515746275 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2021
No. 20-10774
proceed IFP, Pringle challenges the district court’s certification that his
appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th
Cir. 1997).
Pringle contends, relying on United States v. Herrold (Herrold I),
883 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 2712 (2019),
that his convictions of Texas burglary of a habitation and attempted burglary
of a habitation no longer qualify as predicate offenses for purposes of the
career-offender enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Thus, Pringle posits that
he had shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate
release based on the decisional change in law made by Herrold I.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Even if a post-sentencing development in caselaw constituted an
extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), Pringle’s argument based on Herrold I is legally incorrect.
This court has since held in United States v. Herrold, 941 F.3d 173, 177, 182
(5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Herrold II), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 273 (2020), that
Texas’s burglary statute is indivisible and falls within the generic definition
of burglary. Thus, contrary to Pringle’s argument, his Texas convictions of
burglary of a habitation and attempted burglary of a habitation still qualify as
predicate offenses for purposes of the career-offender enhancement. Pringle
therefore has not shown any basis for relief under § 3582(c), much less one
that is “extraordinary and compelling.” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
Because Pringle has failed to demonstrate that he will raise a nonfriv-
olous issue, his IFP motion is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED as
frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
2