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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ELIJAH JIHAD EASTERLING :
:
Appellant : No. 399 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 25, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0000829-2019
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2021
Elijah Jihad Easterling (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of obstructing administration
of law and disorderly conduct.1 Upon review, we affirm.
On February 16, 2019, Altoona Police Department officers responded to
a 911 call made by Appellant’s girlfriend, Debra Miller, reporting a physical
domestic incident between her and Appellant at 1615 17th Avenue in Altoona.
Affidavit of Probable Cause, 3/21/19. When the officers knocked on the door,
it momentarily opened and then slammed shut. Id. Ms. Miller then came to
the door and opened it. N.T., 2/3/20, at 39. Because Appellant could be
heard yelling inside the residence, the officers entered. Affidavit of Probable
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5101 and 5503(a)(1).
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Cause, 3/21/19. Once inside, the officers observed Appellant holding a baby
carrier with a small child inside. Id.
Other than providing his name, Appellant refused to speak to the officers
about the situation. Id. Appellant walked from the front door through the
living room, where Ms. Miller was, and into the kitchen, while carrying the
child. Id. Appellant “refused multiple times to put the child down and speak
with officers.” Id. Appellant attempted to leave the residence with the child
through the back door, but was met and turned back by additional officers.
Id. Appellant “took an aggressive stance and clenched his fists multiple times
towards [the] officers as [they] attempted to speak with him.” Id. He “was
irate and yelling the entire time officers were attempting to speak with him
and would provide no information[.]” Id.
Appellant then walked upstairs to the second story of the residence with
the child, and returned to the first floor where he finally set the child down in
the kitchen. Id. Appellant proceeded to the living room where he began
yelling at Ms. Miller, and after refusing to communicate and cooperate with
the officers, was ultimately detained. Id. On March 21, 2019, the
Commonwealth charged Appellant with obstructing administration of law,
disorderly conduct, harassment, and five counts of resisting arrest.2
Appellant appeared for a jury trial on February 3, 2020. The jury
convicted Appellant of obstructing administration of law and disorderly
____________________________________________
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2709(a)(1) and 5104.
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conduct, and acquitted him of resisting arrest. The trial court found Appellant
guilty of summary harassment. On February 25, 2020, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to 1½ years of probation. Appellant did not file any post-
sentence motions. On March 10, 2020, Appellant filed this appeal. The trial
court and Appellant have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b).
On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for review:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for
obstruction of justice where [Appellant] screamed, yelled, and
walked around his home but did not interfere with police
questioning his girlfriend about a domestic violence incident?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.3
Although Appellant uses the word “justice” above, he challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for obstructing
administration of law. Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. We begin our analysis with
our standard of review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that
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3 Appellant raised an additional evidentiary claim in his concise
statement. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 3/24/20. However, because
Appellant abandoned this claim in his brief, we do not address it. See
Appellant’s Brief at 5; see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 310
n.19 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 267 (2011) (refusing to address
claim appellant raised with trial court but subsequently abandoned in brief).
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of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Leaner, 202 A.3d 749, 768 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). To reiterate, the jury, as the trier of fact — while passing on the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence — is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1,
39 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). In conducting review, the appellate
court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact-
finder. Id. at 39-40.
A person commits a second-degree misdemeanor of obstructing
administration of law,
. . . if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the
administration of law or other governmental function by force,
violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty,
or any other unlawful act, except that this section does not apply
to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to
arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty,
or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without
affirmative interference with governmental functions.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.
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We have explained:
Evidence that one has physically impeded a law enforcement
officer from administering the law has been held sufficient to
sustain a conviction under § 5101. See Commonwealth v.
Conception, [] 657 A.2d 1298 ([Pa. Super.] 1995) (appellant
blocked door of her apartment to prevent the police from entering
to apprehend fugitive who was hiding in the shower stall);
Commonwealth v. Reed, 851 A.2d 958, 963-64 (Pa. Super.
2004) (defendant attempted to obstruct the pathway of a
uniformed police officer in the common area of an apartment
house after the officer exclaimed to the defendant: “Just let me
get by and do my job”); Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d
1276, 1284-[85] (Pa. Super. 2006) (defendant, in an attempt to
interfere with the law enforcement officer who was escorting his
wife from the courtroom, placed his arm across the court officer’s
chest and attempted to push him).
The interference need not involve physical contact with the
government official as he performs his duties. Commonwealth
v. Scarpone, [] 634 A.2d 1109, 1113 ([Pa. Super.] 1993). See
also Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, [] 414 A.2d 54 ([Pa.
Super.] 1980)[] (upholding a § 5101 conviction based on the
defendant’s verbal abuse of a parking enforcement officer upon
receiving a parking ticket, which then deterred the officer from
subsequently performing the job).
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 100 A.3d 207, 215 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Appellant claims he “did not deter the police from their investigation and
there is no evidence his screaming and yelling was intended to interfere with
the investigation.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. He states:
[Appellant] lost his temper and paced around his apartment
screaming and yelling. He did not physically interfere with police
officers who were there investigating an alleged domestic incident
between [Appellant] and his girlfriend. There is no evidence that
[Appellant] intended to interfere with the investigation. The
officers were able to conduct their investigation. Therefore, there
was not sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for obstruction
of the administration of law.
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Id. at 7.
In response, the Commonwealth,
. . . submits that there was sufficient evidence presented during
the course of the jury trial to support a conviction for Obstructing
Administration of Law or Other Government Function. The
Appellant was impeding several officers from conducting an
investigation into the underlying facts of the physical disturbance
by refusing to follow commands and causing a safety risk to all of
the involved parties. The Appellant was sweating profusely and
walking aggressively throughout the residence from one floor to
another while the officers were trying to ascertain more
information regarding the reason for their appearance at the
residence. At one point, the Appellant took a posturing stance as
though he was going to become physical with the officers. During
the entire encounter, the Appellant was screaming and was at
times incoherent.
The officers were attempting to conduct an investigation
concerning a physical disturbance that the victim, who was also
the 911 caller, had summoned assistance to the residence for.
The Appellant would not allow officers to have a conversation with
the victim so that they could ascertain the details necessary to
make an informed decision as to how to proceed in their
investigation. The Appellant, by screaming obscenities, refusing
to listen and obey officer commands and taking a posturing
stance, was actively interfering with the officers’ ability to engage
in the proper steps necessary for their investigation. The
[Commonwealth] understands that the Appellant may have been
upset at the victim. However, his lack of compliance during the
entire seven [] minutes that occurred prior to the officers finally
having to use physical force to apprehend the Appellant and place
him in handcuffs constitutes obstruction of the lawful duty and
authority the officers had to acquire information during the course
of their investigation.
Commonwealth Brief at 17-18.
Upon review, we agree with the Commonwealth. However, we first note
that to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant’s
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Rule 1925(b) statement must specify the element or elements of a crime
alleged to be insufficiently proven. Commonwealth v. Brown, 186 A.3d
985, 990 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274,
281 (Pa. Super. 2009)). Here, Appellant failed to specify in his Rule 1925(b)
statement which element(s) of his obstructing administration of law conviction
he is challenging. See Appellant’s Concise Statement, 3/24/20. Also,
Appellant’s sufficiency argument is underdeveloped, insofar as Appellant
reargues the evidence presented at trial to assert that he “did not deter the
police from their investigation.” See Appellant’s Brief at 9. Consistent with
the foregoing, we could find waiver. However, we decline to do so, and upon
review of the record, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s guilty verdict.
Four witnesses, all called by the Commonwealth, testified at trial.
Appellant did not present any witnesses.
Blair County 911 Dispatcher Cynthia Emlet testified she received a 911
call at approximately 5:18 a.m. on February 16, 2019 from Appellant’s
girlfriend, Debra Miller, “because she was having a domestic with her
boyfriend or significant other and supposedly he assaulted her and she also
told me she assaulted him back and he was trying to leave with their baby.”
N.T., 2/3/20, at 26-27. Although Ms. Miller was a hostile witness, she
confirmed that she made the 911 call. Id. at 31.
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Altoona Police Patrolman Garrett Trent testified to being dispatched to
1615 17th Street in response to Ms. Miller’s 911 call reporting a “physical
domestic.” N.T., 2/3/20, at 37. Patrolman Trent knocked on the door, which
briefly opened an inch or two, then slammed shut. Id. at 39. A short time
later, Ms. Miller answered the door and allowed him and other officers to enter.
Id. at 39-40.
Once inside, Patrolman Trent encountered Appellant, who came
“storming out from the back of the residence and he’s carrying an infant baby
seat and there’s a small child in it and he is screaming and yelling, doesn’t
have a shirt on.” Id. at 41. Patrolman Trent testified: “I’ve been to thousands
of domestic calls, this is something that we routinely answer and in the five
years now that I’ve been working, I’ve never -- still to this date have not dealt
with anyone as irate or out-of-control as [Appellant].” Id. at 41-42. He
continued:
So, right away, I mean, our protocol whenever we get to domestic
calls is we separate the two parties, whoever they are, and we
interview them separately because obviously one person can
influence another person’s story. In this instance, he’s just
screaming, yelling, we can’t talk to him. We can’t talk to the
female. We can’t talk to anyone. We’re getting little bits and
pieces as to what happened. . . .
[W]e wanted him to put the child down. . . . [S]o, the thought
was we need to get him to put this child down so that we could
separate him from the child so that we could talk to him because
obviously the thought is the way he’s swinging the baby carriage
around with this infant, the child is going to get hurt in some way,
shape, or form especially if the need arises where he goes after
the female that we’re there to speak with him about and our
primary concern is to make sure that that child is safe. . . .
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I know at one point he actually tries to leave the house with the
child in his hand. There were other officers fortunately at the
backdoor that were able to get him to stay in the house, because,
again, it’s freezing outside and the child wasn’t dressed for the
weather, it was in a bucket seat. [Appellant] wasn’t wearing
appropriate clothing either. At this time, we’re suspecting that
he’s under the influence of something. So, all in all, it wasn’t a
safe situation. . . .
I would say we gave him -- the leeway that we gave him was
probably more than I’ve ever done with anyone else, specifically,
because of his proximity to this child, his proximity to [Ms. Miller],
his size, his irate state. Again, as police we don’t want to go
hands-on with someone. We only do it as a last resort and our
primary objective is always just to talk to someone and we talked
to him and we talked to him and we talked to him and we gave
him order after order after order to put the child down, stop
walking around the house, stop doing this and he just refused to
listen the entire time. . . .
[H]e actually even went up to a second story of the residence
which officers -- again, on typical domestic calls, if we’re going to
be inside a residence for a while, we conduct what’s called a
proximity sweep. We just make sure that there’s no one else in
the house or nothing else in the house, like, there’s not a bomb
sitting upstairs or someone up there with a gun sitting in a room
that’s going to ambush us while we’re standing there. Typically,
that’s what we would do. Due to his behavior, we weren’t able to
conduct our investigation.
Id. at 42-45.
Patrolman Trent further testified that Appellant was ultimately detained
“because of his threatening nature to the entire household and our inability to
conduct an investigation into the domestic incident that we were originally
called there for.” N.T., 2/3/20, at 56. He stated, “We were unable to interview
witnesses, interview the female half of it because of his actions, the way he
was storming around the house because it wasn’t safe to let him walk around.”
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Id. When questioned by defense counsel as to how Appellant “physically
interfere[d] with officers talking to [Ms. Miller],” he stated that Appellant
“physically moving around the residence and not listening to commands [was]
the obstruction” to their investigation. Id. at 56-57.
Altoona Police Corporal Derek Swope also testified to responding to the
incident. He stated that when responding to a domestic call, “the first
objective is to control the scene and make sure the scene is safe.” N.T.,
2/3/20, at 62. “So, that include[s] controlling people’s movements, whether
you’re the 911 caller or the alleged suspect of the incident. Controlling their
movements, possibly patting them down for weapons and being able to safely
conduct a thorough investigation which includes interviews and things of that
nature.” Id. Corporal Swope explained:
I’m not saying that failure to comply with commands is unlawful
force but refusing to stop, moving back and forth, moving freely
through a residence when officers are telling you to stop is
impeding the investigation. . . .
. . . [Appellant] was given numerous commands to stop, put the
child down, moving freely throughout the house, based on my
training -- domestic violence situations are some of the most
dangerous situations we can respond to. I’m not saying
[Appellant] had weapons but in hindsight, we didn’t know if he
had weapons or not. We didn’t know if he -- we don’t know if he
has weapons stashed somewhere that he may have access to. He
was walking around the kitchen, he could’ve easily grabbed a
kitchen knife and turned or escalated the situation drastically. So,
that’s why we have to control people’s movements when we’re
there to investigate. And, again, it’s not just for our safety, it’s
for [the] safety of everybody involved, you know, I would’ve been
quite content if I could’ve just had a cordial conversation with
[Appellant] and sent him to his mother’s house that night but
that’s not the way he decided to handle this matter. So, we had
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to react to what he was doing, and, again, yes, he did physically
impede our ability to conduct that safe investigation. . . .
I’ve handled thousands upon thousands upon thousands of
domestic violence situations and it didn’t have to end that way
and it didn’t have to go the way it did but, again, he chose to not
listen to what officers were asking of him and that physically
prevented us from conducting our investigation.
Id. at 73-76.
The above testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient for the jury to find that
Appellant intentionally interfered with and impeded the officers’ investigation
of the 911 call. Leaner, 202 A.3d at 768; Melvin, 103 A.3d at 39. Thus, we
discern no error in Appellant’s conviction of obstructing administration of law.
Johnson, 100 A.3d at 215 (evidence of interference with a law enforcement
officer’s administration of the law, which need not involve physical contact
with the officer, is sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
5101).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/24/2021
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