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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-12421
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60330-WPD-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARLON EASON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 2, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Marlon Eason appeals his sentence of 175 months’ imprisonment for Hobbs
Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), which was reimposed at his resentencing.
Eason’s original 175-month sentence was vacated after he successfully challenged
his designation as a career offender. Eason argues that the district court abused its
discretion on remand by varying upward from his new guidelines range and
reimposing the same sentence. He asserts that the district court did not adequately
explain the sentence and improperly relied on his criminal history in imposing an
upward variance. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Marlon Eason pled guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. Eason had
several prior convictions, all in Florida, including convictions for strong arm
robbery, attempted strong arm robbery, and resisting an officer with violence.
Prior to his original sentencing, a probation officer classified Eason as a career
offender based in part on the conclusion that his Hobbs Act robbery was a crime of
violence. Eason objected; the district court overruled the objection and sentenced
him as a career offender. He received a sentence of 175 months’ imprisonment.
Eason appealed his sentence. We held that the district court erred in sentencing
him as a career offender because Hobbs Act robbery did not qualify as a crime of
violence. United States v. Eason, 953 F.3d 1184, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 2020). The
sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. Id.
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At Eason’s resentencing, the district court asked if either party wanted to
request an updated presentence investigation report. Both parties declined but
noted that Eason had been convicted of two non-violent crimes since his original
sentencing. The district court calculated Eason’s new offense level as 22 and his
criminal history category as VI, which resulted in a sentencing range of 84 to 105
months. The government requested an upward variance to 175 months because of
Eason’s criminal history, the nature of his offense, and his likelihood of recidivism,
and the need to promote respect for the rule of law. Eason asked for a sentence
within the guidelines range, noting that he was no longer a career offender and
arguing he was less culpable than his coconspirator, who had received 180 months’
imprisonment. Eason also maintained that his personal background, including that
his 10-year-old son was killed in a drive by shooting right before the crime,
mitigated the seriousness of his offense.
The district court then examined the record from Eason’s previous
sentencing hearing. It noted that most of the mitigating and aggravating factors
remained the same, save the fact that Eason now had two additional criminal
convictions. It went on to discuss Eason’s criminal history, stating that “there is
just a pattern of Mr. Eason taking things that aren’t his; and when he’s caught, not
cooperating.” Doc. 146 at 11.1 The district court acknowledged that Eason was no
1
“Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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longer a career offender but stated that it could “disagree with the sentencing
guidelines [about] . . . whether or not someone is a recidivist.” Id. at 12. It then
sentenced Eason to 175 months’ imprisonment—the same as his previous sentence.
In levying the sentence, the district court noted that it had “taken into account the
lower sentences that some of the codefendants got.” Id. at 13–14.
Eason objected, arguing that the sentence was unreasonable because the
district court “failed to consider all of the 3553(a) factors” and focused too heavily
on “the first factor regarding the nature and circumstance of the offense and history
and characteristics of the defendant.” 2 Id. at 15. The district court overruled the
objection, finding that “an upward variance [was] necessary to promote respect for
the law, act as a deterrent, and to stop Mr. Eason from stealing from people and
then fleeing from the police in a dangerous manner.” Id. at 15–16. The district
court followed the hearing with an order in which it further explained its reasoning
for the upward variance. In the order, the court stated that, among other things, the
2
Under § 3553(a), the district court is required to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the statute. These purposes include the
need to: reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal
conduct, and effectively provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of
the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need
to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
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nature and circumstances of this conviction and Eason’s other convictions, as well
as the need for deterrence, “warrant[ed] the extent of the variance.” Doc. 137 at 1.
This is Eason’s appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“To be upheld on appeal, a sentence must be both procedurally and
substantively reasonable.” United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th
Cir. 2010). We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse
of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). “A district
court abuses its discretion when it: (1) fails to afford consideration to
relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in
considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The party challenging the
sentence bears the burden of showing it is unreasonable. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d. 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Eason argues that the district court abused its discretion because
it did not sufficiently explain its reasoning for varying upward, and it failed to
adequately consider all of the § 3553(a) factors. We address these arguments in
turn.
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Eason’s argument that the district court did not provide sufficient
justification for its upward variance sounds in procedural reasonableness. A
district court commits a significant procedural error if it fails “to adequately
explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court must give an
explanation that is sufficient to allow for “meaningful appellate review.” Id. at 50.
Here, the district court adequately explained its reasons for varying upward.
It stated that it had considered Eason’s troubled past, as well as his son’s tragic
death, but believed that Eason’s criminal record, as well as the seriousness of this
offense, outweighed those mitigating circumstances. The court also noted that it
had taken into account the sentences given to Eason’s coconspirators and the need
to provide adequate deterrence, promote the respect for the rule of law, and protect
the public and police from future crimes. Because the district court’s explanation
is sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review, there was no procedural
error.
Eason’s argument that the district court did not properly consider the
§ 3553(a) factors sounds in substantive reasonableness. When reviewing a
sentence for substantive reasonableness, we examine the totality of the
circumstances, including “whether the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the
sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.
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2008). “We will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof), that [a district
court] accorded to a given factor under § 3553(a) as long as the sentence is
reasonable, in light of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes,
611 F.3d 855, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations
adopted). We may vacate a sentence only if we firmly believe that the district
court “committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by
arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by
the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We may not set aside a sentence “merely because we would have decided that
another one is more appropriate.” Id. at 1191.
Eason argues that, in weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the district court placed
too much weight on one factor—his history and characteristics—and failed to give
meaningful consideration to the others. 3 We agree with Eason that “a district
court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor” may be indicative of an
unreasonable sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration adopted). But “[d]istrict
courts have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior crimes the
3
As part of his argument that the district court improperly relied on his previous criminal
history, Eason maintains that the district court ignored our ruling that he was no longer a career
offender. This is inaccurate. The district court acknowledged that Eason was no longer a career
offender and recalculated his guidelines score accordingly. The court then based its sentence on
Eason’s criminal history and other § 3553(a) factors, rather than whether he was a career
offender as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines.
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defendant has committed.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1261
(11th Cir. 2015). Eason maintains that the district court’s reliance on his criminal
history was unreasonable because it “had already been appropriately accounted for
in the calculation of the advisory guidelines.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. However,
“[p]lacing substantial weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely consistent
with § 3553(a) because five of the factors it requires a court to consider are related
to criminal history.” Rosales-Bruno, at 1263; see also United States v. Early,
686 F.3d 1219, 1223 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that it was not an error of
judgment to give “great weight” to the defendant’s “substantial criminal history”).
We cannot say that the district court unjustifiably relied on one factor here.
True, in imposing an upward variance, the district court gave great weight to
Eason’s criminal history. Although Eason’s asserts that the district court’s focus
on his criminal history means that it gave weight to only one § 3553(a) factor—his
history and circumstances—his criminal history was relevant to other § 3553(a)
factors including the need to: promote respect for the law, provide adequate
deterrence, and protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C). Indeed, the
record shows that the district court expressly considered each of these § 3553(a)
factors when it imposed the upward variance. In addition, the court imposed a
sentence that was below the statutory maximum of 20 years, which is indicative of
reasonableness. United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Eason’s 175-month sentence was within the bounds of the district court’s
substantial sentencing discretion and thus reasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Eason’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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