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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-12301
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20761-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAN ISAIAS MARADIAGA OSEGUERA,
a.k.a. William Isaisa Maradiag Oseguera,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 3, 2021)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Willian Isaias Maradiaga Oseguera appeals his 42-month, above-guideline
sentence after pleading guilty to one count of illegal reentry after removal from the
United States. First, he argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because
the district court failed to consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Second, he
contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court
primarily considered his prior criminal history, which had already been taken into
consideration in the Sentencing Guidelines advisory range, when it decided to vary
upward from that range by 12 months. After review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm.
I
Mr. Maradiaga pled guilty to one count of illegal reentry after removal from
the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1). Prior to sentencing, a
probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The probation
officer calculated a total offense level of 13, which included a four-level
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L.2(b)(1)(A) because Mr. Maradiaga committed the
offense after he previously had been convicted of a felony, and an additional four-
level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(3)(D) because after he was removed from the
United States for the first time, he engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in a
felony conviction.
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The PSI went through Mr. Maradiaga’s criminal history. Mr. Maradiaga was
given zero criminal history points for his 2004 conviction for illegal entry, an
attempted purchase of marijuana in 2007, and a petit theft in 2009. He was given
one criminal history point for a 2011 charge for criminal mischief, resisting an
officer without violence, and indecent exposure. He was also given one criminal
history point for a 2013 conviction for possession of cocaine and possession of
marijuana, two criminal history points for a 2013 illegal reentry conviction, and two
criminal history points for a 2017 illegal reentry conviction. The PSI added two
criminal history points to the criminal history score because Mr. Maradiaga
committed the instant offense while under a term of supervised release. So Mr.
Maradiaga had a total of eight criminal history points and a criminal history category
of IV. Based on a total offense level of 13 and criminal history category IV, the PSI
calculated an advisory range of 24 to 30 months’ imprisonment, with statutory
maximum being 10 years.
At the sentencing hearing, there were no objections to the PSI. Mr. Maradiaga
apologized for his conduct. He argued that his mother and children were in the
United States, which explained his numerous reentries. He requested that the district
court follow the parties’ joint 24-month recommendation. Though the government
noted that Mr. Maradiaga had been removed and illegally reentered several times, it
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stated that the Sentencing Guidelines considered those factors and agreed with a 24-
month sentence recommendation.
The district court stated that it was prepared to vary upward. The court said
that Mr. Maradiaga did “not seem to get the message” because this was the fifth time
that he had entered the United States after having been removed. See D.E. 30 at
5:13-17. The court noted that incarceration had not deterred him in the past and that
he did not have respect for the law. The court went through the facts from Mr.
Maradiaga’s 2011 case for criminal mischief, resisting an officer without violence,
and indecent exposure, and found that the offense also showed that he had no respect
for the law. The court additionally determined that, given his family circumstances,
it was not sure that 30 months’ imprisonment would be a sufficient deterrent because
he would just use the same excuse the next time.
Mr. Maradiaga argued that he would be serving a substantially longer jail
sentence than he previously had served and he would not be able to help his family
if he were in custody. He also argued he would be on supervised release in both this
case and another case that had been transferred to the current district; he knew if he
were to violate supervised release again, he would face a heavy penalty.
The district court stated that it had considered the parties’ statements, the PSI,
and the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court sentenced Mr. Maradiaga
to 42 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. Mr. Maradiaga
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objected to the reasonableness of the sentence in light of the advisory guidelines
range, and now appeals.
II
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard, using a two-step process. See United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d
933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016). “We determine first whether the district court committed
a ‘significant procedural error,’ and second whether the sentence was ‘substantively
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.’” United States v. Green, 981
F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627,
636 (11th Cir. 2013)). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
establishing its unreasonableness. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th
Cir. 2010).
III
A procedurally reasonable sentence is free from significant procedural errors,
including improperly calculating a defendant’s guidelines range, treating the
guidelines as mandatory, failing to explain a chosen sentence, or failing to consider
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a district court’s sentence must be sufficient, but
not greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of sentencing, which are: reflecting
the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, providing just
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punishment, deterring future criminal conduct, protecting the public, and providing
the defendant with any needed training or treatment. A district court must also
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and
characteristics, and the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. See id. The court is not
required to state that it has evaluated each § 3553(a) factor individually. See United
States v. Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). An acknowledgment
by the court that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors is usually sufficient. See
United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
Although some explanation of the sentence is required, the district court is
under no duty to explain the sentence in “great detail.” United States v. Irey, 612
F.3d 1160, 1195 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The court’s explanation of a sentence
may be brief and may derive substance from the context of the record, the
defendant’s history and characteristics, and the parties’ arguments. But where the
court varies from the Sentencing Guidelines, it must explain why it has done so. See
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-58 (2007). The court must explain the
sentence with enough detail to satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the
arguments of the parties and has a reasoned basis for its decision. See id. at 356. If
the court varies from the guidelines range, it must offer a “sufficiently compelling
[justification] to support the degree of the variance.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1186-87.
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These justifications must be “complete enough to allow meaningful appellate
review.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009).
Mr. Maradiaga argues the 12-month variance is procedurally unreasonable
because the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors. He contends the
court made a general statement that it had considered the statements of the parties,
the PSI, and the § 3553(a) factors, but it did not explain why a variance was
appropriate.
We disagree. The district court stated that it had considered the § 3553(a)
factors and discussed several factors, including the need for deterrence, to promote
respect for the law, and Mr. Maradiaga’s prior criminal history. The record reflects
that the court placed substantial weight on Mr. Maradiaga’s history of prior illegal
reentries and on the need to deter him from committing further criminal conduct.
The court explained that it believed a 30-month sentence would be insufficient to
deter Mr. Maradiaga from reoffending because of the presence of his family, his four
prior illegal reentries, and the fact that his previous terms of incarceration had not
effectively acted as a deterrent. The court provided enough explanation to establish
that it had considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for its decision
to impose a 12-month variance. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Accordingly, Mr.
Maradiaga has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
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IV
In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed outside the
advisory guidelines range, we generally take the degree of the variance into account
and consider the extent of a deviation from the guidelines. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 47.
A major variance from the advisory guidelines range requires a more significant
justification than a minor one, and the justification must be sufficiently compelling
to support the degree of the variance. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196.
We will not vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable unless we are left
with a definite and firm conviction that the district court clearly erred in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence outside the range of reasonable
sentences. See id. at 1190. The weight given to any of the § 3553(a) factors is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See United States v. Croteau,
819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016).
Mr. Maradiaga argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable
because the district court relied on his prior conduct to justify an upward variance
when the same conduct was the basis for the guidelines range. The district court,
however, was permitted to vary upward based on conduct that was already
considered in calculating the guideline range. See United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d
823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). The court was also allowed to consider any information
relevant to Mr. Maradiaga’s background, character, or conduct. See Tome, 611 F.3d
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at 1379. The court considered the need for the sentence to deter Mr. Maradiaga,
promote respect for the law, and reflect Mr. Maradiaga’s prior criminal history and
characteristics. Although the court focused on the need to deter Mr. Maradiaga from
further criminal conduct, it was within its discretion to give greater weight to this
specific § 3553(a) factor. See Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1309.
Mr. Maradiaga maintains his sentence was substantively unreasonable
because it was 30 months higher than any of his previous sentences, but we find this
argument to be unavailing. The district court specifically considered Mr.
Maradiaga’s prior sentences and found that even a 30-month sentence would be
insufficient to deter Maradiaga from returning in light of his family circumstances.
Additionally, Mr. Maradiaga’s 42-month sentence was still well below the statutory
maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319,
1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that a sentence imposed well below the statutory
maximum penalty is an indicator of reasonableness).
Because Mr. Maradiaga had an extensive history of illegal reentries and his
prior sentences had failed to deter further violations, his 42-month sentence does not
leave us with a definite and firm conviction that the district court clearly erred in
weighing the § 3553(a) factors and imposing a sentence outside the range of a
reasonable sentence. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. Accordingly, Mr. Maradiaga has
not met his burden of showing the sentence was substantively unreasonable.
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V
We affirm Mr. Maradiaga’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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