NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAKIN RAM, No. 18-72432
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-539-612
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 12, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN, IKUTA, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Sakin Ram seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)
dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing due
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
process challenges de novo and the agency’s factual findings for substantial
evidence, Rizo v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir. 2016), we deny the petition.
We need not decide whether the translation was deficient because Ram has
not established prejudice to prevail on his due process challenge. See Aden v.
Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that a noncitizen raising
a due process claim for erroneous translation “must show that defects in translation
prejudiced the outcome of the hearing”). When the interpreter had difficulty
understanding words from a Hindi dialect, Haryanvi, the interpreter and the IJ
sought clarification or repetition to ensure that the translation was correct. See
Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 782 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]n IJ may ameliorate
the damage caused by an incompetent translation by asking for ‘[c]larification or
repetition.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Kotasz v. I.N.S., 31 F.3d 847,
850 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994))). Also, there is no basis to conclude that the use of a
Hindi interpreter affected the adverse credibility finding, as Ram’s evasiveness and
non-responsiveness continued during the portion of the merits hearing that used a
Haryanvi interpreter.
To show that the IJ failed to act as a neutral arbiter and violated Ram’s due
process rights, Ram must show that the proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair
that [he] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Rizo, 810 F.3d at
693 (quoting Platero-Cortez v. I.N.S., 804 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1986)). To
2
the extent that the IJ expressed impatience or annoyance with Ram, the IJ did not
violate Ram’s due process rights. Id. (“[A] mere showing that the IJ was
unfriendly, confrontational, or acted in an adversarial manner is not enough to
meet [the noncitizen’s] burden.”). Ram was permitted to testify and offer
evidence, and his own counsel sought the IJ’s help when Ram’s evasiveness
persisted.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. Ram was evasive throughout his testimony. The IJ permissibly
concluded that Ram’s inconsistent testimony further undermined his credibility.
Among other inconsistencies, Ram was inconsistent in his testimony about how he
obtained a passport.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that, in the absence of
credible testimony, Ram did not establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of
removal, or CAT relief. Ram’s argument that “the IJ failed to read the United
States Department of State reports on human right practices for India, and failed to
conduct an analysis under the unwilling and unable standard” lacks merit. The IJ
noted that “[a]ll admitted evidence has been considered regardless of whether [it
is] specifically mentioned in the text of this decision.” And the country condition
evidence in the record does not compel a conclusion that it is more likely than not
Ram will be subject to torture in India. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a)(1).
3
PETITION DENIED.
4