NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 16 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALONDRA Y. CARRANZA MORENO, No. 19-71379
Petitioner, Agency No. A215-816-116
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted February 9, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: BERZON, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Alondra Y. Carranza Moreno, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
We apply de novo review to questions of law, and we review factual
findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051,
1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under the substantial evidence standard, the
agency’s findings are conclusive unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted).
1. To establish entitlement to asylum, an applicant must show either past
persecution or a fear of future persecution. Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 503
(9th Cir. 2013). An applicant who alleges past persecution must show “that
(1) [her] treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) the persecution was on
account of one or more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was committed
by the government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to
control.” Id. (citation omitted). The record does not compel the conclusion that
the BIA erred in determining that Carranza failed to show she suffered past
persecution based on a statutorily protected ground. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A).
Although Carranza did not clearly articulate a statutorily protected ground in
her asylum application, the IJ analyzed her asylum claim based on membership in
the particular social groups of family members of Carranza’s mother, or siblings of
her stepfather’s children. Carranza asserts that she suffered past persecution
because her stepfather hit her one time when she was sixteen years old, he
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allegedly killed her mother after previously threatening to do so, he contacted her
through social media and sent her photos in which he was holding a gun and
photos of her mother in a casket, and her stepfather’s daughter told Carranza that
her stepfather would take his children (Carranza’s half-siblings)—who were
staying with relatives of Carranza’s mother after her death—on “bad terms.”
Nothing in the record compels the conclusion that these incidents were connected
to Carranza’s status as a member of either her mother’s family or siblings of her
stepfather’s children. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that applicant seeking asylum “must establish that any persecution was
or will be on account of his membership” in a particular social group (citation
omitted)).
Carranza testified that her stepfather killed her mother, but she also testified
that he was motivated by jealousy and a desire to control Carranza’s mother and
that his later actions were motivated by his desire to gain custody of his children.
Thus, Carranza did not show that harm to a family member—her mother—was part
of a “pattern of persecution” that was “closely tied to” her. Wakkary v. Holder,
558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Additionally, members of
her mother’s family (including Carranza’s grandparents, aunts, uncles, and several
of her siblings) have remained in Mexico without incident—beyond unfulfilled
threats—which suggests that there is no nexus between any form of persecution
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that Carranza has faced and her status as a member of her mother’s family or
siblings of her stepfather’s children. See Santos-Ponce v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 886,
890–91 (9th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, the record does not compel the conclusion
that there was a nexus between the past harm Carranza alleged and a statutorily
protected ground. Thus, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that
Carranza did not establish past persecution.
When an applicant fails to establish past persecution, she must prove “both a
subjective fear of future persecution and an objectively ‘reasonable possibility’ that
[she] will be persecuted upon return to the country in question.” Recinos de Leon
v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)–(B)). To make these showings, an applicant must
demonstrate that she subjectively and reasonably “fear[s] persecution by [the]
government, or forces [the] government is unable or unwilling to control.”
Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2003).
The BIA concluded that Carranza failed to show “that any feared future
harm would be inflicted either by the Mexican government or by persons or an
organization that the government is unable or unwilling to control.” Following the
killing of Carranza’s mother, the Mexican police pursued Carranza’s stepfather
because he shot a gun outside Carranza’s home, and the police captured him after
engaging in a shootout that left him injured and his son dead. See Nahrvani v.
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Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that police action in
response to applicant’s “reports of mistreatment” supported determination that
government was not unable or unwilling to control persecutors). The Mexican
government then detained Carranza’s stepfather for a year until his release after a
trial related to charges that he killed Carranza’s mother. Substantial evidence
therefore supports the BIA’s conclusion that the Mexican government is not unable
or unwilling to control Carranza’s stepfather. Because the BIA held that the
government was not “unable or unwilling to control” any future private
persecution, we do not reach Carranza’s argument that the BIA also erred in
evaluating the Mexican government’s actions under another, more stringent
standard than the unable-or-unwilling standard.
2. To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an applicant must
show an unrebutted presumption of fear of future persecution, arising from proof
of past persecution or, in the absence of past persecution, a “clear probability of
future persecution.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). The “clear probability of persecution” standard for withholding
of removal is “more stringent” than the “well-founded fear of persecution”
standard for asylum. Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 672–73 (9th Cir. 2004);
see also Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 357–60 (9th Cir. 2017)
(describing applicable standard). Because the BIA concluded that Carranza did not
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establish eligibility for asylum, it necessarily found her ineligible for withholding
of removal. See Mansour, 390 F.3d at 672–73. Thus, substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s denial of Carranza’s application for withholding of removal.
3. We do not consider Carranza’s assertion that the BIA erred in failing
to evaluate whether Carranza faced past persecution or fears future persecution
based on “her membership in the [particular social group] of Mexican women, or
single Mexican women without the protection of a father.” Carranza did not
exhaust this claim before the agency. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070,
1084 (9th Cir. 2020) (observing that courts need not mechanistically analyze
proposed social groups, but neither may petitioners reframe their proposed social
groups on appeal).
4. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Carranza’s CAT
claim because the record—in particular, the government’s response to Carranza’s
stepfather’s actions—does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not
that Carranza will suffer torture inflicted or instigated by the Mexican government
or with its acquiescence, including future threats or harm to Carranza from her
stepfather. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1)–(2); Nahrvani, 399 F.3d
at 1154. Carranza also asserts, however, that she will be at risk from men other
than her stepfather as a “single female deportee” because “Mexican culture [is]
steeped in . . . a machismo that is exacerbated by and glorified by cartels.” But
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Carranza specifically testified that she is not “afraid” of anyone or anything in
Mexico other than her stepfather. Therefore, the record supports that Carranza
does not face a “particularized threat of torture” from the cartels. Dhital v.
Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
5. Finally, we reject Carranza’s contention that the BIA and IJ failed to
review all the evidence relevant to her CAT claim. The BIA’s “catchall phrase”
that it reviewed the record is sufficient because “[t]here is no indication that the IJ
or BIA did not consider all the evidence before them.” Gonzalez-Caraveo v.
Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The IJ cited
Carranza’s testimony and evidence in the record. The BIA independently analyzed
the issues and cited law that the IJ did not cite. Thus, there is no indication that the
IJ and BIA did not review all the evidence in the record, and the BIA’s general
statement that it reviewed the record is sufficient.
PETITION DENIED.
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