Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed March 24, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D20-541
Lower Tribunal No. 18-6008
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Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company,
Appellant,
vs.
Carmen Celestrin, et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C.
Miller, Judge.
Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., Elizabeth K. Russo and Paulo R. Lima, for
appellant.
Alvarez, Feltman, Da Silva & Costa, PL, and Paul B. Feltman, for
appellees.
Before FERNANDEZ, HENDON, and GORDO, JJ.
FERNANDEZ, J.
Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (“Universal”)
appeals the trial court’s order granting attorneys’ fees in favor of
homeowners, Carmen Celestrin and Ernesto Parra. Upon review of the
record, we reverse and remand with instructions to reduce the number of
billable hours and to recalculate the Lodestar amount accordingly. We affirm
the court’s order in all other respects and write only to address the basis for
the reduction.
The underlying case is a first-party property insurance water loss claim
brought by homeowners, Carmen Celestrin and Ernesto Parra, against
Universal. Upon finding that homeowners’ attorneys were entitled to fees,
the trial court entered a sixteen (16) page order analyzing the factors set
forth in Rowe 1, Quanstrom 2, and Joyce 3 to determine the Lodestar amount
(number of hours reasonably incurred by plaintiff’s attorney multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate). Upon reviewing these factors, the trial court found
that the firm expended 222.8 hours representing plaintiffs for a cumulative
Lodestar amount of $120,570.00. The total fee awarded to plaintiffs is
1
Fla. Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
2
Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
3
Joyce v. Federated Nat'l Ins. Co., 228 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. 2017).
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$301,425.00. With costs and interests added, the total final judgment for fees
and costs is $337,611.98.
Competent substantial evidence provided by the testimony of experts
on both sides supports a necessary reduction in fees for hours homeowners’
trial counsel billed for preparing and fighting the attorneys’ fee dispute
(known as, “fees for fees”), after the trial court determined that plaintiffs were
entitled to attorneys’ fees. The trial court ignored the experts’
recommendations without explanation.
Homeowners’ expert, Mr. Mintz, testified that he estimates that the
billable hours should be further reduced from 222.8 to 209.6. This is a
reduction of 13.2 hours for hours billed to prepare for the attorneys’ fee
dispute, after the trial court determined plaintiffs were entitled to fees. After
Mr. Mintz testified to this reduction, the trial court acknowledged the numbers
but did not comment on whether he would implement this reduction. Experts
for both parties agree that the record supports a reduction of at least 13.2
hours billed, as the general rule is that counsel cannot be compensated for
work towards determining the amount of fees it seeks to recover.
In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Deshpande,
45 Fla. L. Weekly D2511 (Fla. 3d DCA Nov. 12, 2020), this Court reversed
the Lodestar amount for a number reasons that do not apply to our case.
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However, this Court did find that the trial court failed to make specific findings
as to disputed time entries. Id. at *2. In that case, the trial court applied a
10% blanket reduction to the hours expended without explanation. Id.
Therefore, this Court determined that the reduction was “arbitrary and
unsupported.” Id. Likewise, when experts for both sides agree to a reduction,
and the trial court ignores the recommendation without explanation, the lack
of reduction without explanation is equally arbitrary and unsupported.
For the reasons stated, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
with instructions to reduce the billable hours by 13.2 hours and to recalculate
the Lodestar amount accordingly.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
4