NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 20-1989
___________
ARIEL RAMIREZ-AGUILAR,
AKA Ariel Aguilar, AKA Ariel Ramirez-Vasquez,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
On Petition for Review of a Final Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA-1: A206-704-560)
Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 11, 2021
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 21, 2021)
OPINION *
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Ariel Ramirez-Aguilar, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United
States in 2002, leaving behind his pregnant wife. On his first entry, border patrol agents
spotted and removed him, but he re-entered the country without inspection less than 24
hours later. Since then, he has worked as a farm laborer supporting his new family in the
United States—an undocumented Mexican national partner, Aurelia, and their now-six-
year-old son, E.R.A., who has a history of health problems.
Following Ramirez-Aguilar’s arrest and conviction for a DUI offense in 2014, the
Government began removal proceedings against him. Ramirez-Aguilar conceded he was
removable but sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The
immigration judge (“IJ”) determined that although Ramirez-Aguilar was credible and
satisfied the other criteria for cancellation (i.e., continuous physical presence, good moral
character, and no disqualifying convictions), he failed to establish “that removal would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who
is a citizen of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The IJ denied the
application for cancellation of removal and the BIA affirmed. Ramirez-Aguilar timely
petitioned us for review.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Ramirez-Aguilar primarily argues
that the BIA erred in its hardship determination by failing to conclude that E.R.A.’s
serious health problems were exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, as well as
ignoring Aurelia’s inability to care for E.R.A. adequately. But the BIA considered all
these arguments in affirming the IJ’s hardship determination, A.R. 3–4, and we do not
have jurisdiction to review its discretionary judgment on this issue. See Mendez-
Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The decision whether an alien
meets the hardship requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b is . . . a discretionary judgment [,
and] we lack jurisdiction to review [it].”). Although Ramirez-Aguilar frames his
challenge as constitutional due process violations, what we have is a “disagreement about
weighing hardship factors [, which] is a discretionary judgment call, not a legal
question.” Hernandez-Morales v. Att’y Gen., 977 F.3d 247, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2020).
* * * * *
While we appreciate that Ramirez-Aguilar’s removal may have harsh and life-
changing consequences for his family, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
discretionary determination that his removal does not create exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship for his U.S. citizen son. We thus must dismiss his petition.
3