FILED
5/4/2021
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Court for the District of Columbia
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KAUTANTOWIT'S MECAUTEA, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-00783 (UNA)
)
JEFF FRIEZE, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiffs’ pro se complaint, motion
for restraining order and permanent injunction, and applications for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”). Plaintiffs, Kautantowit’s Mecautea (a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization),
Michael C. Minter, Joy Graves, and Timothy Timm, have jointly filed suit against several
individual defendants who are apparently affiliated with the Douglas County Oregon Sherriff’s
Department and a local Oregon Church. The court will grant only Timm’s IFP application and
deny the remainder of the requests to proceed IFP. Furthermore, the court will deny the motion
for restraining order and permanent injunction, and shall dismiss the complaint, for reasons
explained herein.
Preliminarily, as to Kautantowit’s Mecautea, an entity may generally only appear as a party
in the federal courts “through licensed counsel.” See Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc.
v. Potter, 586 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194
(1993)); see also Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“[A] corporation, which is an artificial entity that can only act through agents, cannot proceed pro
se.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Diamond Ventures, LLC v. Barreto, 452
F.3d 892, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (same); Franklin v. Vilsack, No. 11–0206 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2011)
(denying IFP status to plaintiff in his capacity as an officer of a non-profit development corporation
which, as an artificial entity, cannot proceed IFP).
The only complete application is filed by Timm and the remaining two are muddled, at
best. Minter’s undated IFP application is devoid of certain required information, including, for
example, an estimation of various debt/expenses and disclosure of any sources of income. It
appears that Minter purports to have neither debts or expenses, nor sources of income, and if that
is, in fact, the case, additional information is necessary to explain these unusual financial
circumstances. Graves’s application is devoid of the same information, and further indicates that
she may receive disability or worker’s compensation benefits, but then no details relating thereto
are provided. Without properly detailed IFP applications, individually executed and filed by each
plaintiff, the court lacks the information by which it may assess their respective financial status at
this juncture. See generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
Even if Timm were proceeding solely for himself, the complaint falls short. The complaint
goes on for pages alleging a vague and attenuated “conspiracy to murder.” Rule 8(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that
defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive
answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown
v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a “complaint [] contains an untidy
assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished
from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the
requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom.
Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). The instant complaint
falls within this category. Additionally, the ability of this court to exercise personal jurisdiction
any of the defendants is entirely unclear. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); International Shoe Co. v
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Finally, the motion for restraining order and permanent injunction advances the same
incongruous allegations, which do not warrant injunctive relief. “The standard for issuance of the
extraordinary and drastic remedy” of a restraining order or an injunction “is very high . . . and by
now very well established.” RCM Techs., Inc. v. Beacon Hill Staffing Grp., LLC, 502 F. Supp. 2d
70, 72–3 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs have abjectly
failed to meet this standard, and the motion is therefore also denied.
For all of these reasons, all of the IFP applications are denied, other than the application
filed by Timm. The motion for restraining order and permanent injunction is denied, and the
complaint and this matter are dismissed. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
__________/s/_____________
Date: May 4, 2021 TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge