NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-2485
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TOMAS CANAS MEJIA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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On Petition for Review of an
Administrative Order of Removal
of the Department of Homeland Security
(A098-358-380)
Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 25, 2021
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Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: May 5, 2021)
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OPINION *
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Tomas Canas Mejia petitions for review of a decision of an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) concluding that he was not entitled to relief from reinstatement of a prior order of
removal. The IJ concurred with the asylum officer’s conclusion that Mejia had neither a
reasonable fear of persecution based on his race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group—as required for withholding of removal—nor a
reasonable fear of torture, as required for relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). Finding that substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision and that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to review the unexhausted particular social group before the IJ, we will
deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
I. Background
Mejia, a native and citizen of Guatemala, first entered the United States in
September 2004. He was ordered removed from the United States on April 15, 2005, and
pursuant to that order was removed to Guatemala on June 13, 2008. Mejia subsequently
reentered the United States in December 2008, and has lived in the United States
continuously since 2008. On February 3, 2020, the Department of Homeland Security
issued Mejia a “Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order.”
While in detention, Mejia expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala. As a result,
he was referred to an asylum officer for a reasonable fear interview. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.31(b).
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Mejia told the asylum officer that, upon his return to Guatemala in 2008, he
received an unsigned letter at his parents’ house asking for money. He also stated that he
received phone calls asking for money. These requests were accompanied with threats
against Mejia and his family. Mejia believed the letters and phone calls were being made
by the gang MS-18, who assumed that Mejia had money, given that he had returned from
the United States.
II. Discussion
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Romero v. Att’y Gen.,
972 F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020). We review an IJ’s factual findings in reasonable fear
proceedings for substantial evidence. Id. at 342. This is an “extraordinarily deferential
standard,” where we uphold the IJ’s findings if they are “supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. at 340
(quoting Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2011)). “When we review for
substantial evidence, ‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562
F.3d 246, 251 (3d Cir. 2009)). We review the IJ’s legal conclusions, such as whether a
proffered particular social group is cognizable, de novo. See S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d
535, 542 (3d Cir. 2018).
Before us, Mejia argues that the IJ erred in affirming the asylum officer’s
determination that Mejia did not have a reasonable fear of returning to his country,
despite finding him credible, because (1) the IJ improperly found that the petitioner does
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not belong to a cognizable social group and (2) the IJ abused her discretion and
improperly found that the petitioner’s fear did not rise to the level of persecution. These
arguments have no merit.
In a reasonable fear interview, an asylum officer determines whether the alien has
demonstrated a “reasonable possibility that he or she would be persecuted on account of
his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be tortured in the country of
removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c). If the asylum officer finds that the alien has not
established a reasonable possibility of persecution or torture, an alien may appeal the
asylum officer’s determination to an IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(f)–(g).
Before the IJ, Mejia proposed only one particular social group. Mejia’s counsel
presented the particular social group as “individuals that are coming back from the
United States, which the Mara Salvatrucha gang has imputed they have financial means
to be extorted.” A.R. 38. The IJ confirmed her understanding that only one particular
social group was under consideration.
Now Mejia argues before us that he presented two particular social groups before
the IJ. This second proposed social group, individuals who defied the MS-18 gang and
escaped their grasp was not presented to the IJ, nor did Mejia correct the IJ’s purported
omission when she gave her decision.
Our jurisdiction is constrained by the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. A “court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has
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exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). Thus, a petitioner must “raise and exhaust his . . . remedies as to each
claim or ground for relief if he . . . is to preserve the right of judicial review of that
claim.” Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594–95 (3d Cir. 2003). Because Mejia
did not present this second particular social group—individuals who defied the MS-18
gang and escaped their grasp—before the IJ, we lack jurisdiction to review it.
Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to review only the IJ’s determination with
respect to the proposed particular social group Mejia presented before the IJ—
“individuals that are coming back from the United States, which the Mara Salvatrucha
gang has imputed they have financial means to be extorted.” A.R. 38. The IJ did not err
in rejecting this social group. The particular social group composed of individuals who
returned from the United States who are perceived to be wealthy is not cognizable. See,
e.g., Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 498 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting as “too amorphous”
a proposed social group of “secularized and westernized Pakistanis perceived to be
affiliated with the United States”); Beltrand-Alas v. Holder, 689 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.
2012) (neither wealth alone nor perceived wealth upon returning from the United States
can form the basis for a cognizable social group).
Additionally, Mejia contends he is entitled to CAT relief. To be eligible for
protection under CAT, an applicant is required to establish that the claimed torture would
occur “by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public
official . . . or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
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“Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity
constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); Guzman
Orellana v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2020). Where the government may
not have “actual knowledge” of the torture, an applicant “may meet this standard by
showing that the government is willfully blind to it.” Id.
The IJ determined that there was no evidence that Guatemala would acquiesce to
any anticipated torture. Before the IJ, Mejia stated that he had received numerous
telephone calls and a threatening letter from individuals whom he believed were gang
members or affiliated with a gang. Mejia contends that it is clear both by his own
testimony as well as the actual conditions with respect to gangs in Guatemala, and
especially the MS-18 gang, that the government has acquiesced to the activities of MS-
18. Moreover, Mejia claims, the government is likely to do so again, that is, be willfully
blind to the plight of individuals such as he. However, Mejia does not present any
evidence to support this assertion. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
determination that Mejia failed to show a reasonable possibility that he could establish
eligibility for protection under CAT.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny in part and dismiss in part the
petition for review.
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