USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 1 of 13
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-13105
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A200-277-155
PATRICIA JANNET CUAUHTENANGO-ALVARADO,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(May 10, 2021)
Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 2 of 13
Patricia Cuauhtenango-Alvarado seeks review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s (“BIA”) order affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her
request for cancellation of removal. Cuauhtenango-Alvarado challenges the IJ’s
determination that she failed to prove her two U.S. citizen sons would suffer
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon her removal to Mexico. After
careful review, we grant her petition and remand to the BIA to reconsider her
application for cancellation of removal.
I.
Cuauhtenango-Alvarado, a native and citizen of Mexico, has resided in the
United States since 2001. In 2011, the government served Cuauhtenango-Alvarado
with a notice to appear charging her as removable for being in the United States
without authorization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Cuauhtenango-Alvarado
conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1), asserting that her removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to her two U.S. citizen children, who at the time were eleven and
eight years old.
Cuauhtenango-Alvarado explained that if she were removed, she would have
to take her U.S. citizen children with her because they had nowhere else to stay in
the United States. She is a single mother and her U.S. citizen children’s father is not
present in their lives. If removed to Mexico, she would not be able to stay with her
2
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 3 of 13
family, as she suffered sexual abuse as a minor at the hands of her step-father who
still lives with her mother. Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s children do not speak, read,
or write in Spanish. They have only ever lived in the United States and
Cuauhtenango-Alvarado herself has lived here her entire adult life here. Beyond
that, her youngest child suffers from severe communication problems; he cannot
communicate verbally and communicates only with his mother or siblings. He
receives speech therapy to help him with this disability. Cuauhtenango-Alvarado
also testified credibly that the region she is from in Mexico is very dangerous and
submitted a Human Rights Watch Report documenting disturbing violence in
Mexico including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and
mistreatment of people with disabilities.
The IJ first found that Cuauhtenango-Alvarado satisfied the continuous
presence requirement, was of good moral character, and had no disqualifying
convictions. But the IJ denied her application on the basis that she did not establish
that her U.S. citizen children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship if she were removed.
The IJ reasoned that Cuauhtenango-Alvarado was resilient and would be able
to adapt to and find work in Mexico. Responding to Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s
arguments about poorer economic conditions and diminished educational
opportunities in Mexico, the IJ, in reliance on In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec.
3
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 4 of 13
319 (BIA 2002), found that the circumstances she faced upon removal were not
substantially different than what would normally be expected upon removal to a less-
developed country. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision on appeal. This
petition for review followed.
II.
The government argues that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review
Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s petition for review. We review our subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir.
2006).
The government says that whether or not a noncitizen establishes the
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” factor to receive cancellation of
removal is a “discretionary determination” that we are barred from reviewing. But
in this regard the government misinterprets our holding in Patel v. U.S. Attorney
General, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). In that case, we rejected the
argument that the jurisdiction stripping language in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
applies to decisions that constitute the exercise of discretion. Id. at 1276–78 (noting
that the “discretionary and non-discretionary distinction flies in the face of the
statutory language.”) Instead, the Court said that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes
review (when read in conjunction with §1252(a)(2)(D)) only of “factual challenges
to denials of certain kinds of discretionary relief.” Id. at 1276 (emphasis added).
4
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 5 of 13
The Court specifically noted that we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional and
legal challenges, “including review of mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. at 1275–
76 (emphasis added).
Whether or not a given set of facts amounts to “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact which we are empowered to
review. It presents the exact same type of question as whether a given set of facts
amounts to “torture” under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), which this
Court has explicitly recognized is a mixed question of law and fact. See Jean-Pierre
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that whether a
course of conduct amounts to torture under CAT is a mixed question because it
“requires a court to apply a legal definition to a set of undisputed or adjudicated
historical facts.”). Therefore, while we may not review the IJ’s factual findings as
to Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s application for cancellation of removal, we can review
the IJ’s determination that those facts do not rise to the level of “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” for her qualifying relatives.
III.
As we have jurisdiction to review this petition, we now turn to the merits of
Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s claim. In order to establish exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to a qualifying relative, a noncitizen must show hardship that is
more than we would ordinarily expect to arise as a result of removal, but this does
5
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 6 of 13
not require a showing that the hardship would be “unconscionable.” In Re
Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I.&N. Dec. 56, 60 (BIA 2001). In deciding whether the
noncitizen has made that showing, the BIA looks to the “ages, health, and
circumstances” of any qualifying relatives, as well as whether a qualifying child
has “compelling special needs in school,” and, though insufficient by themselves,
“[a] lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of
return” are also relevant factors. Id. at 63–64. “[T]he hardship standard is not so
restrictive that only a handful of applicants, such as those who have a qualifying
relative with a serious medical condition, will qualify for relief.” In re Gonzalez
Recinas, 23 I.&N. Dec. 467, 470 (BIA 2002).
Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s situation is remarkably similar to that of the
noncitizen the BIA considered in In re Gonzalez Recinas. In that case, the BIA
affirmed a grant of cancellation of removal to a single mother from Mexico who was
the sole provider for her four U.S. citizen children. Id. at 469–470, 471. Gonzalez
Recinas had no family support in Mexico and the father of her children was not
actively involved in the children’s lives. Id. at 470. Her U.S. citizen children had
spent their whole lives in the United States and did not speak, write, or read Spanish.
Id. In contrast, in In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I.&N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002), the case the
IJ relied on in denying Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s application, the U.S. citizen
children’s father lived with the family and helped to provide for them. Id. at 324.
6
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 7 of 13
That is not the case for Cuauhtenango-Alvarado, whose children, similar to
Gonzalez Recinas’s children, would be “completely dependent on their mother’s
ability, not only to find adequate employment and housing, but also to provide for
their emotional needs.” In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I.&N. Dec. at 471. And
Cuauhtenango-Alvarado has never before worked in Mexico, making her even more
poorly situated to finding new work upon removal to a country she never lived in as
an adult. If anything, Cuauhtenango-Alvarado presents an even more compelling
case for “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” than Gonzalez Recinas as her
youngest son suffers from a communication disability, which would only worsen if
he were forced to move to a country where he does not speak the language. We
therefore find that Cuauhtenango-Alvarado has made a showing that her U.S. citizen
children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if she were
removed.
As there is no dispute that Cuauhtenango-Alvarado met the other criteria for
cancellation of removal, her petition is GRANTED and REMANDED.
7
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 8 of 13
BRANCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Patricia Cuauhtenango-Alvarado petitions this Court for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of the denial of her application for
cancellation of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), 1 after finding that she
failed to satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement for
cancellation of removal. She argues that the undisputed facts of her case are
similar to several other cases in which the BIA determined that individuals
established the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement, and
that the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) erred in determining otherwise. In response, the
government contends we lack jurisdiction to review her petition, pursuant to the
jurisdictional-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). The Majority
disagrees, concluding that her petition presents a mixed question of law and fact
that we retain jurisdiction over, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Because I
conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of her application for
1
The Attorney General may cancel removal of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from
the United States if the alien (1) has been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than 10 years; (2) has been a person of good moral character during such
period; (3) has not been convicted of an offense under section 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3); and (4) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a United States citizen
or lawfully admitted permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
8
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 9 of 13
cancellation of removal, I would dismiss the petition. Accordingly, I respectfully
dissent. 2
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) contains a jurisdiction-
stripping provision that imposes certain limits on the scope of our appellate review,
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). It provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except
as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the
judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no
court shall have jurisdiction to review—
(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section
1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other
than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Cancellation of removal under § 1229b is one of the
five enumerated categories set forth in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Section 1252(a)(2)(D),
however, restores our jurisdiction to review constitutional claims or questions of
law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any
other provision of this chapter (other than this section) which limits or eliminates
judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or
2
Neither party requested oral argument in this case.
9
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 10 of 13
questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
appeals in accordance with this section.”).
I agree with the Majority that this Court overruled its prior precedent that
interpreted the jurisdictional stripping language in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) as precluding
judicial review of discretionary determinations but retaining jurisdiction over
non-discretionary determinations because that “interpretation [was] based on the
predecessor version of § 1252(a)(2)(B) and [was] unmoored from the current
statutory language.” See Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir.
2020) (en banc). Thus, the discretionary versus non-discretionary distinction is no
longer controlling and, to the extent that the government relies on that distinction
for its jurisdictional argument, the Majority concludes correctly that the
government’s argument is misplaced. Nevertheless, I dissent because I agree with
the government that we lack jurisdiction over the petition based on our recent en
banc decision in Patel, which interpreted the scope of the jurisdictional-stripping
provision in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
We held in Patel that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precluded our review of “any
judgment regarding the granting of relief under [8 U.S.C. §§] 1182(h), 1182(i),
1229b, 1229c, or 1255 except to the extent that such review involves constitutional
claims or questions of law.” Id. at 1262 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
And we explained that the phrase “any judgment” in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was “a
10
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 11 of 13
broad[] term that encompasses both discretionary and non-discretionary
determinations. It provides a blanket prohibition on review of judgments relating
to [the] five [enumerated] categories” of relief. Id. at 1277–78. Thus, we
explained that “§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes us from reviewing ‘whatever kind’ of
judgment ‘relating to’ the granting of relief under the five enumerated sections,”
including eligibility requirements. Id. at 1274, 1283.
The “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” factor is an eligibility
requirement for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1129b(1)(D), and the
determination of whether an alien has met that requirement is a judgment related to
one on the enumerated five categories of relief set forth in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
Accordingly, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes us from reviewing eligibility
determinations for purposes of cancellation of removal. Patel, 971 F.3d at 1276,
1279, 1283. Indeed, in Patel, we used the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” requirement for cancellation of removal as an example of the eligibility
determinations that we lacked jurisdiction to review. Id. at 1278–80. Accordingly,
in keeping with Patel, we may review the BIA’s decision only if Cuauhtenango-
Alvarado raises a colorable constitutional claim or a question of law. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).
The Majority concludes that Cuauhtenango-Alvarado’s petition presents the
question of whether or not a given set of facts amount to “exceptional or unusual
11
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 12 of 13
hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact that falls within the purview of
§ 1252(a)(2)(D). It does not. Although the Majority couches her claim as a legal
question, Cuauhtenango-Alvarado alleges that her situation is similar to that of
several other cases in which the requisite level of hardship was found. In other
words, she merely challenges the BIA’s factual findings pertaining to her hardship
determination and the weighing of the evidence in her case. Her arguments are
precisely the type of eligibility determination challenge that we deemed precluded
by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) in Patel. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over her petition,
and it should be dismissed pursuant to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).3 Patel, 971 F.3d at
3
I am not alone in this conclusion. Both pre- and post-Patel, we have without fail concluded that
review of whether the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship requirement” is barred by
§ 1252(a)(2)(b)(i). See Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding pre-Patel that “§ 1252(a)(2)(D) does not restore the federal courts’ ability to review the
BIA’s § 1229b(b)(1)(D) ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ determinations”);
Salazar-Yanez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 803 F. App’x 383, 384–85 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding pre-
Patel that we lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s “arguments that the BIA failed to consider
the relevant facts ‘in the aggregate’ and apply its precedent in Matter of Recinas, 23 I & N Dec.
467 (B.I.A. 2002),”—one of the identical arguments Cuauhtenango-Alvarado asserts in this
case—because those arguments “merely challenge the BIA’s factual findings pertaining to its
hardship determination”); Guerrero-Cruz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 839 F. App’x 325, 327–28 (11th
Cir. 2020) (holding post-Patel that we lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claim that he
had “demonstrated sufficient hardship based on his children’s ages, limited Spanish proficiency,
their mother’s health concerns, and the decreased standard of living they would experience if
moved to Mexico” because although couched as a legal question, the petitioner “in effect
challenge[d] the weight given to the pertinent hardship factors and the adequacy of the IJ’s and
BIA’s explanations”); Lara v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 826 F. App’x 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding
that we lacked jurisdiction over alien’s petition challenging determination that she failed to show
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship because “[w]e held in Patel that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)
bars review of “all eligibility determinations for the five enumerated categories of discretionary
relief.” 971 F.3d at 1279. And “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is one of the
eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D); see Patel, 971
F.3d at 1278-80 (using that standard in its discussion of threshold eligibility determinations for
discretionary relief).”); Francisco-Pedro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 838 F. App’x 385, 387 (11th Cir.
12
USCA11 Case: 20-13105 Date Filed: 05/10/2021 Page: 13 of 13
1276, 1279, 1283; see also Alhuay v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 661 F.3d 534, 549–50 (11th
Cir. 2011) (holding that Ҥ 1252(a)(2)(D) does not restore our jurisdiction in cases
where the BIA affirms an IJ’s order due to the petitioner’s failure to demonstrate
the requisite hardship” because such challenges do not raise colorable
constitutional claims or questions of law). Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
2020) (“Section 1252(a)(2)(D) does not restore our jurisdiction where the Board affirms an
Immigration Judge’s order due to the petitioner’s failure to demonstrate the requisite hardship.”
(quotations omitted)); see also Andablo Guiterrez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 828 F. App’x 599, 601-02
(11th Cir. 2020) (holding that post-Patel, “even non-discretionary decisions, such as
determinations of the physical presence requirement, are shielded from judicial review”). While
the majority of these cases are not published and therefore non-binding, they provide significant
persuasive authority for the conclusion that we lack jurisdiction over the petition at hand.
13