IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
No. 80404-9-I
v.
PUBLISHED OPINION
MICHAEL J. ROGERS,
Respondent.
DWYER, J. — The State appeals from a sentence imposed upon a juvenile,
Michael Rogers, following his conviction in superior court of murder in the first
degree. The State contends that the 106 month sentence imposed upon Rogers
was too lenient and was, therefore, unlawful. Rogers responds that when youth
is established as a mitigating factor and the sentencing court has imposed an
exceptional sentence below the standard range, the length of the sentence
cannot be questioned on appeal.
Because the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 14 of our state constitution require that superior court judges
possess broad discretion when sentencing juveniles who have been convicted in
adult court, we conclude that the exceptional sentence provisions of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, are no longer
applicable once a judge has determined that youth has been established as a
mitigating circumstance. However, recognizing that standardless and
No. 80404-9-I/2
unreviewable sentencing could both allow arbitrary and biased decision-making
and run afoul of our state constitution’s guarantee of a defendant’s right to an
appeal, such decisions must be capable of being entertained on appellate
review. Accordingly, we review the sentencing court’s decision as we would
review a sentence imposed prior to the effective date of the SRA. Applying such
a standard, we affirm.
I
On February 13, 2016, 14-year old Diante Pellum and 16-year-old Michael
Rogers planned to rob marijuana from 16-year-old Wesley Gennings when
Gennings met up with them to sell them marijuana. Several weeks earlier,
Rogers had attended a New Year’s Eve party at Gennings’ home and had seen a
realistic looking BB gun in Gennings’ bedroom. This left Rogers with the
impression that Gennings carried a gun. At some point on the evening of
February 13, Michael Stewart, Pellum’s cousin, and Stewart’s girlfriend,
Stephanie Blanc, dropped Rogers and Pellum off at Pellum’s house.
Later that evening, Janelle Massingill heard a gunshot coming from a
parked car in the parking lot of a Taco Bell. Massingill saw Rogers leave the
front seat of the car and Pellum leave the back seat. 1 Rogers opened the
driver’s door, looked inside the vehicle, and shut the door. To Massingill, Rogers
appeared “shocked” and “panicked.” Pellum appeared nonchalant. The two
teenagers walked away from the car.
1 Massingill testified to seeing two young African-American individuals leave the car, a
taller person from the front seat and a shorter person from the back seat. Rogers was, at the
time, five inches taller than Pellum. The State obtained a conviction on the theory that Rogers
was the taller person whereas Pellum was the shorter person.
2
No. 80404-9-I/3
Massingill called the police, who discovered Gennings’ body slumped over
in the front seat of the car. The cause of death was a gunshot wound to the back
right side of his head. Pellum’s fingerprint was found on the car seat headrest
post.
Shortly after Gennings was shot, Stewart received a telephone call. Blanc
and Stewart drove to pick up Pellum and Rogers from an apartment building near
the Taco Bell. As they passed the Taco Bell, Rogers expressed that he would
have liked to have removed Gennings’ car, but that he did not know how to drive
a stick-shift vehicle. Rogers instructed Blanc to drive to a body of water. Blanc
drove to Fisher’s Pond, and Rogers got out of the car and crossed the street
toward the pond. After he returned to the car, Blanc drove Rogers and Pellum to
Pellum’s home. Neither Gennings’ cell phone nor the murder weapon were ever
found.
Rogers and Pellum were each charged with murder in the first degree
predicated on robbery. 2 Pellum and Rogers were tried together. The State’s
theory of the case was that Pellum was the shooter. The jury convicted both
Pellum and Rogers.
At sentencing, Rogers requested that the court impose an exceptional
sentence below the standard range of 321-407 months. He urged a sentence of
84 months. In support of this request, Rogers argued that his youthfulness and
developmental immaturity mitigated his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct. He presented evidence that, in addition to being immature at the
Rogers was also charged with unlawful possession of a firearm. The charge was
2
dismissed following a successful suppression motion.
3
No. 80404-9-I/4
time of the crime because he was a juvenile, he was developmentally immature
for his age. A psychological evaluation concluded that severe, untreated
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), as well as adverse childhood
experiences, rendered Rogers significantly immature, even compared to his
peers. The psychologist expressed the opinion that Rogers was unable to
appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions and was easily influenced
by his peers.
Rogers also presented a mitigation report, which detailed challenging
aspects of Rogers’ upbringing, such as a lack of familial support, instability, and
his witnessing frequent incidents of domestic violence, and explained how those
experiences likely impacted him. In addition, Rogers argued that his limited role
in the murder justified a lower sentence because the justifications for the felony
murder rule are less compelling when applied to juveniles. Finally, Rogers
presented evidence of his rehabilitation during his incarceration, including his
earning a general equivalency diploma with a 4.0 grade point average during his
last two semesters.
The State opposed the grant of an exceptional sentence below the
standard range, arguing that Rogers had not established sufficient mitigating
circumstances. It requested the imposition of a low-end standard range
sentence.
The trial court entered written findings that Rogers was significantly
immature because of his age and ADHD, and that he had demonstrated the
capacity for rehabilitation. The trial court concluded that Rogers’ youthfulness
4
No. 80404-9-I/5
and developmental immaturity warranted the imposition of a sentence below the
standard range, and pronounced a sentence of 106 months of incarceration.
The State appeals.
II
The State contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court was too
lenient to be lawful, in that it was not consistent with the goals of the SRA. 3 In
advancing this assertion, the State acknowledges that youth can constitute a
statutory mitigating factor insomuch as it can affect a person’s capacity to
appreciate wrongfulness and ability to conform conduct to the law. The State
concedes that trial courts have discretion to impose exceptional sentences below
the standard range based on youth as a mitigating factor. However, the State
avers, trial courts may only impose an exceptional sentence within the confines
of the SRA’s “departures from the guidelines” provision, RCW 9.94A.535, with
the exception that a court cannot be required to impose on a child a life or de
facto life sentence.
Rogers counters that pursuant to State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1,
391 P.3d 409 (2017), sentencing courts have absolute discretion to sentence
juveniles below the standard range and, therefore, the decision as to the length
of a sentence cannot be reviewed on appeal.
3 The State has made clear that it is not now challenging the trial court’s conclusion that a
sentence below the standard range was warranted. Instead, it is challenging the process by
which the court arrived at its conclusion as to the length of the sentence it imposed, as well as
challenging the length of the sentence itself.
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No. 80404-9-I/6
Thus, as an initial matter, we must determine what obligations, if any, the
SRA imposes on superior courts when sentencing juveniles who were tried as
adults.
A
Our Supreme Court has announced that the SRA allows a sentencing
court to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range when a
defendant’s youthfulness significantly impairs that defendant’s capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, or to conform his or her
conduct to the requirements of the law. State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 698-99,
358 P.3d 359 (2015); RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e). But youth is not a per se mitigating
factor, even for juvenile defendants. State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 434, 387
P.3d 650 (2017). The SRA provision that governs departures from the guidelines
places the burden of proving that substantial and compelling reasons justify
imposing an exceptional sentence on the defendant. RCW 9.94A.535. Neither
the state constitution nor the Eighth Amendment prohibit assigning the burden in
this manner. State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 478, 474 P.3d 539 (2020); Ramos,
187 Wn.2d at 433; accord Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259, slip op. at 14 (Apr.
22, 2021), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/18-1259_8njq.pdf.
However, the SRA does not alone govern the ways in which sentencing
courts may exercise discretion in order to properly account for a defendant’s
youth. Our Supreme Court has explained that the Eighth Amendment requires
that
sentencing courts must have complete discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile
6
No. 80404-9-I/7
defendant, even in the adult criminal justice system, regardless of
whether the juvenile is there following a decline hearing or not. To
the extent our state statutes have been interpreted to bar such
discretion with regard to juveniles, they are overruled. Trial courts
must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must
have discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise
applicable SRA range and/or sentence enhancements.
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21 (footnote omitted). 4
Accordingly, a sentencing court could not be required to impose on 16-
and 17-year-old defendants firearm enhancement penalties that would otherwise
be mandatory under the SRA. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 25-26 (“The
mandatory nature of these enhancements violates the Eighth Amendment
protections discussed above.”). The Houston-Sconiers court also affirmed that
because youth can be a statutory mitigating factor under the SRA, an exceptional
sentence of zero months on the substantive offenses was not “technically illegal”
as the sentencing court had assumed. 188 Wn.2d at 24 (citing O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d
at 688-89).
However, unlike purely statutory mitigating factors, the mitigating
circumstances related to a defendant’s youth present considerations that a
sentencing court is required to consider:
4 Our Supreme Court has since explained in a plurality opinion that article I, section 14 of
our state constitution imposes the same requirement. In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke,
__Wn.2d__ , 482 P.3d 276, 279 (2021). At oral argument, counsel for the State observed that
only four justices joined the opinion opining that article I, section 14 imposes such a requirement.
However, neither the concurring nor the dissenting opinions express any disagreement with this
principle. Justice González’s concurrence indicated his ongoing belief that the O’Dell decision
represented a significant change in the law. Monschke, 482 P.3d at 288-89 (González, J.,
concurring). Justice Owens’ dissent expressed concern about expanding these protections to
young adults. Monschke, 482 P.3d at 289-91 (Owens, J., dissenting). Further, in the context of
sentencing a juvenile tried as an adult in superior court, the Supreme Court has determined that
article I, section 14 provides the defendant greater protection than does the Eighth Amendment.
State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 82, 428 P.3d 343 (2018). Accordingly, given that the Eighth
Amendment requires that superior courts have discretion to consider the mitigating circumstance
of youth when they sentence juveniles, article 1, section 14 logically must also so require.
7
No. 80404-9-I/8
Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d
407 (2012),] requires such discretion and provides the guidance on
how to use it. It holds that in exercising full discretion in juvenile
sentencing, the court must consider mitigating circumstances
related to the defendant’s youth—including age and its “hallmark
features,” such as the juvenile’s “immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” It must also
consider factors like the nature of the juvenile’s surrounding
environment and family circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s
participation in the crime, and “the way familial and peer pressures
may have affected him [or her].” And it must consider how youth
impacted any legal defense, along with any factors suggesting that
the child might be successfully rehabilitated.
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23 (citations omitted); see also In re Pers.
Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 236, 474 P.3d 507 (2020), cert. denied, 2021
WL 1163869, U.S. Wash. (Mar. 29, 2021) (“Reasonable jurists could disagree
whether the court had such discretion or whether they could consider youth;
however, because no prior precedent required courts to do so, Houston-Sconiers
announced a new rule.”).
Furthermore, unlike any other mitigating factor, when considering youth, a
sentencing court may depart from mandatory sentencing enhancements. Trial
courts have “full discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines and any
otherwise mandatory sentence enhancements, and to take the particular
circumstances surrounding a defendant’s youth into account.” Houston-
Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 34.
Our Supreme Court has explained that Houston-Sconiers represents a
significant change in the law. Ali, 196 Wn.2d at 233-34; In re Pers. Restraint of
Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 259, 474 P.3d 524 (2020), cert. denied, 2021
WL 1163870, U.S. Wash. (Mar. 29, 2021). This further emphasizes
8
No. 80404-9-I/9
that Houston-Sconiers identified the existence of a constitutionally required
possession of discretion by courts when engaged in sentencing juveniles
convicted as adults, as distinct from the preexisting conceptualization of youth as
a statutory mitigating circumstance. Cf. In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth, 191
Wn.2d 328, 336-37, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) (O’Dell, which affirmed that youth may
be a mitigating factor under the SRA, did not constitute a significant change in
the law).
The State acknowledges that we are bound by Houston-Sconiers, but
argues that its holding applies only to life sentences or de facto life sentences.
According to the State, interpreting enhancements as discretionary avoided “the
constitutional dilemma that occurs when a juvenile faces an effective life-without-
parole sentence.”
The State’s effort to restrict the scope of Houston-Sconiers is unavailing.
The two defendants in Houston-Sconiers did not themselves face life sentences.
Instead, the sentences at issue were 372 months (31 years) and 312 months (26
years), respectively. 188 Wn.2d at 12-13. Similarly, the defendant in Domingo-
Cornelio had been sentenced to 240 months (20 years), 196 Wn.2d at 260, and
the defendant in Ali had been sentenced to 312 months (26 years), 196 Wn.2d at
228. Furthermore, even if they had faced life sentences, the defendants
in Houston-Sconiers, Domingo-Cornelio, and Ali would have all had the
opportunity to seek parole. See Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 22; RCW
9.94A.730. Nevertheless, as our Supreme Court explained:
Statutes like RCW 9.94A.730 may provide a remedy on collateral
review, Montgomery[ v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S. Ct. 718,
9
No. 80404-9-I/10
[736], 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016)], but they do not provide sentencing
courts with the necessary discretion to comply with constitutional
requirements in the first instance.
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23.
It is thus apparent that the holding of Houston-Sconiers does not apply
only to situations in which an exercise of discretion is required to avoid the
imposition of a mandatory life without parole sentence. Rather, Houston-
Sconiers applies the animating principles of Miller, 567 U.S. at 480—that
“children are different” and that courts must be empowered to treat them
differently—to all instances in which juveniles are sentenced in adult
court. 5 Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 34. Despite the State’s professed belief
that Houston-Sconiers is overbroad, we are bound by its precedent. State v.
Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227 (1984); State v. Mandefero, 14 Wn.
App. 2d 825, 837, 473 P.3d 1239 (2020) (this court is bound by the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision in Houston-Sconiers).
With all this said, when sentencing a juvenile in adult court, the court
retains its discretion to impose a standard range sentence. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d at
486. A standard range sentence does not become an exceptional sentence
upward merely because it is imposed upon a juvenile. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d at 482-
83. And as we explained, the burden of proving youth as a mitigating factor lies
with the defendant. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d at 478; Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 436-
5 Division Two of this court recently held that “Houston-Sconiers does not apply to
juvenile defendants sentenced in juvenile court.” State v. S.D.H., No. 53841-5-II, slip op. at 2
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2021), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2053841-5-
II%20Published%20Opinion.pdf. We recognize that decision while noting that it resolved an
issue not present herein.
10
No. 80404-9-I/11
37; accord Jones, slip op. at 14. Accordingly, the provisions of the SRA apply
until a court has determined that youth has been established as a mitigating
factor.
However, once a sentencing court has considered youth and determined
that it is a mitigating factor, the exceptional sentencing requirements imposed by
the SRA are simply no longer applicable. To comply with the “dual mandates
of Houston-Sconiers, . . . sentencing courts must consider youth and must have
discretion to impose any exceptional sentence downward based on youth.” Ali,
196 Wn.2d at 236 (third emphasis added). That discretion is not cabined by the
SRA. Indeed, because our Supreme Court has determined that the Eighth
Amendment and article I, section 14 of our state constitution require that
sentencing courts have complete discretion to consider pertinent aspects of
youth in arriving at a just sentence, it necessarily follows that the legislature may
not impose limitations on the exercise of that discretion. 6
This conclusion follows logically from our Supreme Court’s recent decision
in In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, __Wn.2d__, 482 P.3d 276 (2021). Therein,
the court determined that article I, section 14 of our state constitution prohibits
mandatory life without parole sentences when imposed upon 18-, 19-, or 20-
year-old defendants. In separate prosecutions, Dwayne Bartholomew and Kurtis
Monschke had each been convicted of aggravated murder in the first degree and
sentenced to life without parole pursuant to RCW 10.95.030, which provides that
any person convicted of aggravated murder must be sentenced to either life
When, however, a sentencing court has determined that youth has not been established
6
to be a mitigating circumstance, it must comply with the sentencing requirements of the SRA.
11
No. 80404-9-I/12
without parole or death. 7 Monschke, 482 P.3d at 277. The court held that
mandatory sentences imposed on Bartholomew and Monschke were
unconstitutional. Monschke, 482 P.3d at 288. Each man was deemed to be
entitled to resentencing so that a court may consider his youth at the time of the
offense and exercise discretion in fashioning an appropriate
sentence. Monschke, 482 P.3d at 288.
No SRA provision applied to the mandatory sentence imposed on either
defendant. Nor will any provision in the SRA cabin the discretion the sentencing
court will now exercise in determining the appropriate sanction to impose on
either Bartholomew or Monschke on remand. This is clear, in that sentencing for
aggravated murder in the first degree is not provided for within the SRA, and
neither the provisions of the SRA nor the provisions of any other statute
authorize courts to exercise discretion when sentencing upon a conviction for
aggravated murder in the first degree. See RCW 10.95.030; chapter 9.94A
RCW. Moreover, Bartholomew committed his act of aggravated murder before
the effective date of the SRA. 8 Nevertheless, a trial court must consider the
mitigating qualities of youth and apply discretion in resentencing either
Bartholomew or Monschke. 9
7 After State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 5, 427 P.3d 621 (2018) (death penalty is
unconstitutionally cruel because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner), life
without parole is the only statutorily authorized sentence.
8 The SRA became effective on July 1, 1984. RCW 9.94A.905. Bartholomew shot a
laundromat attendant during the course of a robbery in 1981. Monschke, 482 P.3d at 277.
9 RCW 9.94A.535, which places the burden of proof upon a defendant to prove mitigating
circumstances, is plainly not applicable to Bartholomew (whose crime predated the SRA) or
Monschke (whose sentencing provisions are codified outside of the SRA). No statute assigns the
burden of proof of demonstrating that youth was a mitigating factor at sentencing for Bartholomew
or Monschke. See State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 123, 456 P.3d 806 (2020) (unlike SRA,
“Miller-fix” sentencing provision, RCW 10.95.030(3)(b), does not allocate a burden of proof).
12
No. 80404-9-I/13
Bartholomew and Monschke, young adults who committed the most
serious crime our law recognizes, are thus constitutionally entitled to a
sentencing court’s discretion unfettered by provisions of the SRA. There is no
logical reason why a true juvenile who, at 16 years of age, committed a less
serious crime is not entitled to the same benefit. Just as Bartholomew and
Monschke will be sentenced with their entreaties for leniency unfettered by any
restrictions or concerns emanating from the SRA, so must this same unfettered
status apply in our review of the sentencing court’s decision herein.
B
Rogers contends that when a trial court imposes an exceptional sentence
below the standard range based on youth as a mitigating factor, that sentence
cannot be reversed, or even reviewed, on appeal. We disagree. Because
completely unfettered discretion poses a risk of arbitrary decision-making, and a
total prohibition on meaningful appellate review would violate our state
constitution’s guarantee of “the right to appeal in all cases,” Rogers’ contention
fails.
When the reasoning underlying a sentencing court’s decision may not be
reviewed at all, due process concerns arise. See State v. Jacobson, 92 Wn.
App. 958, 968, 965 P.2d 1140 (1998) (“Moreover, the procedural safeguard
requiring sentencing courts to state their reasons for imposing exceptional
However, if it were the State’s burden to prove that youth was not a mitigating factor before a life
without parole sentence could be imposed, the Sixth Amendment would require that a jury make
such a finding. See Jones, slip op. at 10 n.3 (“If permanent incorrigibility were a factual
prerequisite to a life-without-parole sentence, this Court’s Sixth Amendment precedents might
require that a jury, not a judge, make such a finding.”); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304-
05, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).
13
No. 80404-9-I/14
sentences on the record—subject to appellate review—prevents arbitrary
sentencing decisions.”). Moreover, article I, section 22 of the Washington
Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants the right to appeal, and a
complete bar on direct appeals of sentences is not permissible. State v.
Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 126, 456 P.3d 806 (2020).
Accordingly, despite our Supreme Court’s use of the phrase “absolute
discretion,” some form of appellate review is necessary to ensure nonarbitrary
decisions and to satisfy defendants’ constitutional right to appeal.
Because, as we have determined, the SRA is not applicable once a
sentencing judge has found that youth is a mitigating factor, we will review such a
sentencing court’s determination pursuant to the standard of appellate review
that obtained prior to the SRA. 10
Prior to the enactment of the SRA, sentencing courts possessed broad
discretion. State v. Flowers, 30 Wn. App. 718, 724, 637 P.2d 1009 (1981); State
v. Wachsmith, 23 Wn. App. 283, 284, 595 P.2d 64 (1979). “The sentencing of
criminals is subject to the exercise of sound judicial discretion which will not be
set aside absent an abuse.” State v. Cunningham, 96 Wn.2d 31, 34, 633 P.2d
886 (1981); see State v. Blight, 89 Wn.2d 38, 42, 569 P.2d 1129 (1977) (“The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in pronouncing sentence.”). Such an abuse
of discretion existed only where it could be said no reasonable judge would have
taken the view adopted by the trial court. Blight, 89 Wn.2d at 41; Wachsmith, 23
10 We say this in anticipation of that being the standard of review on appeal of a sentence
imposed on Bartholomew or Monschke upon remand. Given that the same constitutional right is
at stake, it stands to reason that the applicable appellate standard of review would also be the
same.
14
No. 80404-9-I/15
Wn. App. at 284-85 (citing State v. Hurst, 5 Wn. App. 146, 148, 486 P.2d 1136
(1971)).
In order for an appellate court to determine whether a sentencing judge
has acted within these bounds, sentencing judges must explain their reasoning.
This is why, under the SRA, to impose an exceptional sentence, courts are
required to “set forth the reason for its decision in written findings of fact and
conclusions of law.” RCW 9.94A.535. Although, as we have explained, once a
judge has determined that a defendant has proved that the defendant’s youth is a
mitigating circumstance, the SRA is inapplicable, the need to review the
reasoning underlying discretionary sentencing determinations remains.
Accordingly, we hold that when sentencing judges determine that youth is
a mitigating factor and exercise their broad discretion to fashion an appropriate
sentence, such judges (1) must explain the reasons for their determination, and
(2) those reasons must be rationally related to evidence adduced at trial or
presented at sentencing. We note that such reasons are not limited to those
expressly authorized by the SRA, or to any goals or concerns expressed in the
SRA. For example, a judge is free to consider the specific role that the
defendant played in the commission of the offense for which the sentence is
being imposed.
When sentencing juveniles, a superior court must
consider mitigating circumstances related to the defendant’s
youth—including age and its “hallmark features,” such as the
juvenile’s “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 477. It must also consider
factors like the nature of the juvenile’s surrounding environment
and family circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s participation
15
No. 80404-9-I/16
in the crime, and “the way familial and peer pressures may have
affected him [or her].” Id. And it must consider how youth impacted
any legal defense, along with any factors suggesting that the child
might be successfully rehabilitated. Id.
Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23.
When a sentencing court has considered these factors and concluded that
youth is a mitigating circumstance, it must then exercise discretion in selecting
the appropriate length of incarceration to impose. Once done, it must explain the
reasons for its determination. We do not require that sentencing courts explain
the calculation leading to the precise length of the sentence imposed. Instead,
the court must provide sufficient reasoning to allow for meaningful appellate
review as to whether any reasonable judge could make the same decision based
on the evidence and information before the sentencing judge.
C
Here, the sentencing court entered sufficient written findings to explain its
decision. It found that, because Rogers suffered from severe ADHD and had
certain adverse childhood experiences, at the time of the crime, he was much
more impulsive and immature than a typical child of 16. Furthermore, it found
that Rogers’ behavior during his incarceration showed his capacity for
rehabilitation. Finally, it found that Rogers did not personally shoot the victim. 11
It concluded that Rogers had established by a preponderance of the evidence
11 The trial court did not base its decision on Rogers’ role in the crime. While it found
(somewhat imprecisely) that Rogers was not the shooter, it observed that under the definition of
first degree murder set forth in the SRA, all participants are equally culpable. See RCW
9A.32.030. Because the SRA does not apply in this instance, the sentencing court was free to
consider the specific role that Rogers played in the offense for which he was sentenced.
16
No. 80404-9-I/17
that his youthfulness and developmental immaturity were mitigating
circumstances, and that based on its individualized consideration of Rogers’
youth and life circumstances, a sentence of 106 months of confinement was
appropriate.
Under such circumstances, a reasonable judge could conclude that a 106
month sentence was appropriate for a 16-year-old defendant convicted of murder
in the first degree. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. No error is shown.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
17