NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 25 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTEMIO MERAZ-HERNANDEZ, AKA No. 19-72996
Artemio Hernandez Meraz,
Agency No. A090-848-665
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 18, 2021**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.
Artemio Meraz-Hernandez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying his motion to terminate and his
application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1252. We review de novo questions of law, including whether an offense is a
crime involving moral turpitude. Orellana v. Barr, 967 F.3d 927, 932 (9th Cir.
2020). We review for abuse of discretion the agency’s denial of a motion to
terminate. Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020). We review de
novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings. Jiang v.
Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny in part and dismiss in part the
petition for review.
The agency did not err in finding Meraz-Hernandez removable as an “alien
who at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,” see 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), where Meraz-Hernandez’s convictions under California
Penal Code (“CPC”) section 646.9(a) and (c)(2) are categorically crimes involving
moral turpitude, see Orellana, 967 F.3d at 938 (concluding a conviction under
CPC § 646.9(a) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude); id. at 933 n.5
(“[CPC § 646.9] contains other provisions that enhance the penalty for a violation
of § 646.9(a) depending on the presence of other factors. Cal. Pen. Code
§ 646.9(b)–(c). A § 646.9(a) violation is a predicate for these enhancements.”).
Thus, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Meraz-Hernandez’s
motion to terminate.
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We lack jurisdiction to consider Meraz-Hernandez’s contentions as to the
merits of the agency’s discretionary denial of his application for cancellation of
removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1198
(9th Cir. 2012) (court lacks jurisdiction to review “the merits of a discretionary
decision to deny cancellation of removal” but retains jurisdiction to review legal
and constitutional questions). Meraz-Hernandez’s contentions that the agency
erred in its analysis of his cancellation of removal claim, misstated facts, or
otherwise denied him due process fail. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th
Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim); see also Torres-
Valdivias v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In the context of the
BIA’s discretionary decisions, we have noted that ‘it is proper [for the BIA] to look
to probative evidence outside the record of conviction in inquiring as to the
circumstances surrounding the commission of [a] crime in order to determine
whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted.’” (internal citation
omitted)).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate. The motion for a stay of removal is otherwise denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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