20-1021-cr
United States v. Joseph Williams
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
____________________
August Term, 2020
(Submitted: March 16, 2021 Decided: May 26, 2021)
Docket No. 20-1021-cr
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Before: POOLER, SULLIVAN and PARK, Circuit Judges.
Joseph Williams appeals from that part of the March 17, 2020 judgment of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J.
McAvoy, J.) sentencing him to a 20-year term of supervised release. Williams
principally argues that the district court committed procedural error when it did
not separately explain its rationale for imposing a 20-year term of supervised
release. We disagree. The district court reviewed the Section 3553(a) factors in
imposing a term of imprisonment, and nothing in the statute or our case law
requires the district court to repeat the process in imposing a term of supervised
release.
Affirmed.
____________________
MELISSA A. TUOHEY, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, for Lisa A. Peebles, Office of the Federal
Public Defender, Syracuse, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellant
Joseph Williams.
JOSHUA R. ROSENTHAL, Assistant United States
Attorney (Geoffrey J.L. Brown, Assistant United States
Attorney, on the brief), for Antoinette T. Bacon, Acting
United States Attorney for the Northern District of New
York, Albany, N.Y., for Appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Williams appeals from that part of the March 17, 2020 judgment of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J.
McAvoy, J.) sentencing him to a 20-year term of supervised release. Williams
principally argues that the district court committed procedural error when it did
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not separately explain its rationale for imposing a 20-year term of supervised
release. We disagree. The district court reviewed the Section 3553(a) factors in
imposing a term of imprisonment, and nothing in the statute or our case law
requires the district court to repeat the process in imposing a term of supervised
release.
BACKGROUND
Williams pleaded guilty, without the benefit of a plea agreement, to a
three-count information charging him with (1) distributing child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2)(A), (b)(1), and 2256(8)(A); (2) receiving child
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1), and 2256(8)(A);
and (3) possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B),
(b)(2), and 2256(8)(A). The district court noted during sentencing that Williams
possessed a “massive collection of child pornography with over 3,000 videos and
close to 5,000 images,” along with “an instructional manual on how to identify,
gain access to, groom and sexually abuse children.” App’x at 68. Williams “used
a social-media application specifically geared toward young people as a means to
locate, make contact with, groom and exploit children for [his] own sexual
gratification,” and “then bragged about [his] success using the application and
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even attempted to . . . teach another pedophile how to use the application for the
same purpose.” App’x at 69. Williams belonged to chat groups “dedicated to
trading child pornography” and “actively chatted with other pedophiles while
expressing [his] desire to rape and kidnap children.” App’x at 68-69. The district
court adopted the presentence report without change and calculated the
Guidelines range for the term of imprisonment at 210 to 262 months. The district
court then imposed a sentence of 160 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be
served concurrently, followed by a 20-year term of supervised release. The
district court did not separately explain the factors imposing the term of
supervised release. This appeal—which challenges only Williams’s term of
supervised release—followed.
DISCUSSION
Williams argues that the district court committed (1) procedural error by
failing to adequately explain its reasons for imposing a 20-year term of
supervised release; and (2) substantive error in imposing a prolonged term of
supervised release following a 160-month term of imprisonment. We disagree.
Because Williams did not object when the sentence was imposed, plain
error review applies. See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir.
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2007). “To establish plain error, the defendant must establish (1) error (2) that is
plain and (3) affects substantial rights.” Id. at 209. “In reviewing the procedural
reasonableness of a sentence, this Court considers whether the district court
committed a significant procedural error, such as failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence.” United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted).
The district court is required to “state in open court the reasons for its
imposition of the particular sentence . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Congress sought
to accomplish several goals in imposing this requirement, including “inform[ing]
the defendant of the reasons for his sentences[;]” allowing for “meaningful
appellate review[;]” “enabl[ing] the public to learn why [the] defendant received
a particular sentence;” and “guid[ing] probation officers and prison officials in
developing a program to meet [the] defendant’s needs.” United States v. Molina,
356 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Reviewing the district court’s
weighing of the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors, “we consider whether the
factor[s], as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned [them]
under the totality of circumstances in the case.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d
180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
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We find no procedural error in the district court’s failure to separately
explain the basis for the term of supervised release after discussing the Section
3553(a) factors in imposing a term of imprisonment. Nothing in Section 3553(c)
or our caselaw requires a district court to undertake a separate recitation of the
basis for each part of the sentence imposed. Where, as here, the district court
explains the basis for imposing a term of imprisonment, it need not repeat the
process in imposing a term of supervised release. In United States v. Alvarado, we
upheld the district court’s imposition of a three-year term of supervised release
even though the district court “did not specifically state that supervised release (as
opposed to [defendant’s] sentence generally) was designed to provide an
additional measure of deterrence.” 720 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2013). Noting that
the district court “properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the range as
appropriately advisory, considered the Section 3553(a) factors, selected a
sentence based on facts that were not clearly erroneous, and adequately
explained its chosen sentence, which was in the Guidelines range,” we held that
“[n]othing more was required.” Id. (citation omitted).
We have recognized a narrow exception to the ordinary rule that district
courts do not have to separately explain the basis for the term of supervised
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release. Supervised release is meant “to assist individuals in their transition to
community life” and thus “fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served
by incarceration.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). There are
multiple reasons courts may consider in imposing a term of supervised release,
and attaching conditions thereto, “‘the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ ‘the need . . . to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; . . . to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; . . . and to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.”
Id. at 53, 59–60 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)). But not every reason that supports
imposing a term of imprisonment supports imposing a term of supervised
release. See, e.g., Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011) (holding that “a
court may not take account of retribution (the first purpose listed in § 3553(a)(2))
when imposing a term of supervised release” (emphasis omitted)). In United
States v. Burden, 860 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2017), we said that it was “understandabl[e]”
that district courts often provide only one explanation for the entirety of a
sentence—including the term of supervised release. Id. at 57. Nevertheless,
because retribution is a proper justification for a term of imprisonment but not
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for supervised release, we said that where “a district court bases a term of
incarceration substantially upon the seriousness of the offense, it would be
advisable for the district court to separately state its reasons for the term of
supervised release imposed.” Id. Put simply, once a district court has explained
the basis for its sentence, the district court need not provide a separate basis for a
term of supervised release unless retribution is the principal articulated basis for
the sentence.
This exception does not apply to this case. Williams’s sentence, including
his term of supervised release, was clearly justified by the need to protect
children—a risk the district court noted on the record, see App’x at 74 (“It’s clear
from your conduct . . . that you’re sexually attracted to children. The Court
believes that allowing you unfettered access to minors would jeopardize the
safety of the community . . . . “).
Williams also challenges his term of supervised release as substantively
unreasonable. A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “cannot be located
within the range of permissible decisions,” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal
quotation marks omitted), if it “shock[s] the conscience,” United States v. Rigas,
583 F.3d 108, 124 (2d Cir. 2009), or if it constitutes a “manifest injustice,” id.
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Based on his plea, the Guidelines recommend a lifetime term of supervised
release. The district court here imposed a term of 20 years, which Williams
argues is substantively unreasonable following a 160-month prison sentence
because nothing in the record supports the need for a lengthy term of supervised
release. Williams relies on United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2017), for
the proposition that a 20-year term of supervised release is too long. But unlike
Jenkins, where the defendant had not contacted or attempted to contact a minor,
id. at 194, the record here shows that Williams had a massive collection of child
pornography; was a member of chat groups dedicated to trading child
pornography; actively chatted with others about his desire to rape and kidnap
children; secretly photographed children in public and later distributed those
photos to others while talking about his desire to abduct and rape those children;
owned an instructional manual explaining how to identify, gain access to,
groom, and sexually abuse children; used a social media application specifically
geared toward young people as a means to locate, make contact with, groom,
and exploit children; and then bragged about his success using the application
and attempted to teach others how to use the application for the same purpose.
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Because of the obvious ongoing risk Williams poses to children, the district court
did not err in imposing a 20-year term of supervised release.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given above, the district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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